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This thesis is an interrogation of the impact of the Partido de Unión Republicana 
Autonomista (The Autonomist Republican Union Party or PURA) on the politics of 
the Spanish province of Valencia, and in turn on national politics, during the politically 
turbulent years of 1930-1936, the period which immediately preceded the outbreak 
of the Spanish Civil War.  It was the most important Valencian political force and 
acted as de facto provincial affiliate of the Radical Party, a conservative republican 
party which was to play a crucial role in national politics.  
 
This study uses a wide range of documentary sources, including contemporary 
newspapers, official papers, and parliamentary records, supplemented by a number 
of interviews with participants in the events and in-depth case study reviews of two 
important settlements in the province together with detailed studies of electoral and 
land ownership data in a further three settlements.  
 
It is the first study which places the PURA within a broader provincial context, 
including the impact of the economic depression of the 1930s, the socio-economic 
structure of Valencian society, and land ownership patterns. Particular attention is 
paid to the PURA’s relationship with its major political rivals, the Radical Socialists 
(and subsequently Izquierda Republicana, the Republican Left party) to its left and 
the Derecha Regional Valenciana (The Valencian Regional Right or DRV) to its right.   
 
Nationally the main focus is on its relationship with the Radical Party. The PURA, 
with poor quality and corrupt leadership, failed to have any meaningful impact on the 
political trajectory of the Radical Party nationally and was unable to utilise the 
PURA’s undoubted popular support to stabilise and strengthen the Radical Party.  In 
the province the PURA acted as the single most destabilising political force, creating 
a violent and meretricious political culture which shut down democratic discourse. In 
so doing it inadvertently helped undermine the more centrist forces within its political 




providing a strong provincial basis for the subsequent creation of the Republican Left.  
To its right, by cheating the DRV of an important electoral victory, the PURA 
strengthened the anti-democratic forces within the DRV, which went on to become a 
key part of the conspiracy against the republican regime in the spring of 1936. The 
thesis discusses why the PURA, a purportedly centrist party, acted in a way so 
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(i) Overview  
 
This thesis is primarily a study of a political party, the Partido de Unión Republicana 
Autonomista (the Autonomist Republican Union Party or PURA) in the period 
January 1930 to August 1936, that is from the fall of the dictatorship of General Primo 
de Rivera to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, during a period of growing political 
instability and polarisation. The PURA was a party exclusive to the Spanish province 
of Valencia but operated as the de facto provincial affiliate of a national republican 
party, the Partido Republicano Radical (the Radical Republican Party, normally 
referred to as simply the Partido Radical and in this thesis, as the Radicals). 
 
(ii) Province of Valencia: Geography and Economy 
 
Valencia is a province in eastern Spain, situated on the Mediterranean littoral as 
shown at Illustration 1 overleaf. It has a mountainous interior marked by deep and 
steep valleys carved by the principal rivers which flow rapidly in deep gorges and are 
not suitable for transportation.1 In the east of the province is the plain of Valencia, by 
far and away the most agriculturally productive area and where most of the population 
lived; see Illustration 2 on page 19.2 The population increased from 606,608 people in 
1857 to 1,042,154 by 1930, slightly ahead of national population growth, two thirds of 
whom lived in the coastal strip which had the highest population density in the whole 
of Western Europe.3   
                                            
1 Naval Intelligence Division Geographical Handbook Series: Spain and Portugal, 4 Vols, HMSO, 
Oxford, 1941, (Naval Intelligence, Spain), Vol. 1, p. 14. 
2 Naval Intelligence, Spain,Vol. 1, p. 42. See also Antonio López Gómez, ‘Les Condicions Físiques’ 
in Ernest Lluch (ed.), L'estructura económica del Pais Valencia, Vol. 1, L'Estel, Valencia, 1970, pp. 
39-64; 
3 Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Estimaciones de población, censos y cifras oficiales de población, 
at its website: http://www.ine.es/. Accessed 15 December April 2017. The province had a relatively 
small number of large settlements. In 1922, there were only 29 settlements which had more than 
5,000 inhabitants (excluding the city). Of these 29, only one, Alzira, with 20,963 people had more than 
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By the advent of the Republic agricultural production was focussed on high value 
crops, especially the orange, exported through the ports of Valencia and Gandia to 
wealthier European countries. During the latter half of the 19th century Valencian 
agriculture experienced a powerful process of change, driven largely by smallholding 
peasant farmers working family farms. Between 1860 and 1922 the amount of 
cultivated land increased by almost 40%.4 By the 1930s Valencian agriculture had 
become one of the most important sources of foreign currency for Spain. This 
transformation occurred despite the poverty of the vast majority of owners and 
tenants.5 Around Gandia, for example, 85 per cent of landowners owned less than a 
hectare of land, insufficient for a family to live.6 For a variety of reasons, discussed 
briefly later, tenant farmers were able to purchase their small plots so that, by the time 
of the arrival of the Republic, many small-scale farmers were outright owners.  
 
Industry too was developing quickly and was strongly centred in the city of Valencia 
although there were important industrial activities elsewhere.7 Between 1840 and  
                                            
4 Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millán y García-Varela and María Cruz Romeo Mateo, ‘Leaseholders in 
Capitalist Arcadia: Bourgeois Hegemony and Peasant Opportunities in the Valencian Countryside 
during the Nineteenth Century’, Rural History, Vol. 17, No 2, 2006, pp. 149—166 at p. 151. There has 
been much academic debate, primarily among anthropologists, as to how to define a ‘peasant’ and 
on the usefulness of the term. By way of example, see  George M. Foster, ‘What is a peasant’ in Jack 
M. Potter, May N. Diaz and George M. Foster (eds.), Peasant Society: a Reader, Little, Brown, Boston 
(Massachusetts), 1967, pp. 2-14, and Teodor Shanin, ‘Peasantry as a concept’, in Teodor Shanin 
(ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies: Selected Readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, 
pp. 1-11. Much of this broader debate is not relevant for the purposes of this thesis, but I do follow the 
majority view that landless day-labourers should be excluded from the term, even though the 
difference in the economic security and the day-to-day pattern of work between many peasants with 
tiny holdings who of necessity worked for others for most of the year and a landless day-labourer was 
often very fine.  
5 In a province with both irrigated land (regadio) and unirrigated land (secano) one has to take into 
account the productivity of the land in considering the adequacy of land-holdings. Malefakis, in his 
study of landholdings and agrarian reform during the Republic, defined a small-holding as anything 
less than 10 hectares, but so productive was Valencian regadio that a family could just about survive 
farming one hectare, while 5 hectares or above of regadio would imply relative affluence; 10 hectares 
would count as a large holding. On his definition of a smallholding, see Edward Malefakis, Agrarian 
Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970, p. 15.   
6 Samuel Garrido Herrero and Salvador Calatayud Giner, ‘La compra silenciosa. Arrendamientos, 
estabilidad y mejoras el la agricultura valencianan de regadío (1850-1930)’, Investigaciones de 
Historia Económica, No. 8, 2007, (Garrido and Calatayud, ‘La compra silenciosa’) pp. 77-108 at pp. 
86-87. 


















1930, the city’s population tripled while its area increased five-fold.8 Illustrations 3 to 5 
on pages 21 to 23 show its spatial development in the period 1812 to 1925. By 1900 
Valencia was the second largest province in Spain in terms of industrial production, 
although it lagged a long way behind Barcelona.9  
 
In December 1930 Valencia was the third largest city in Spain, with a population of 
320,195.10 This was a divided city spatially, strongly segregated by class and income. 
The wealthy still lived, mainly, in the Old City, to the immediate west and south-west 
of the cathedral, and in Sant Francesc-Barcas, the neighbourhood to the south and 
south-west of the Calle de la Pau whilst the working-class was concentrated in the 
districts of Carme and Velluters. The prosperous middle class were the main 
occupants of ‘L’Eixample’. Illustration 6 opposite shows the city neighbourhoods.  
 
(iii) Province of Valencia: Political Background  
 
Politically Valencia had some unusual characteristics. Valencia had been a bastion 
of liberalism and republicanism throughout much of the nineteenth century and was 
one of the urban centres where the ‘Turnante’ system, whereby the two Restoration 
parties alternated in power, was effectively inoperative.11 It was therefore fertile 
ground for the powerful political machine created by Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, the 
charismatic leader of the cross-class republican movement known as blasquismo 
which dominated local politics from 1896 onwards. The rise of Blasco in many ways 
parallels the rise of his friend and comrade Lerroux in Barcelona. Both were 
charismatic figures who challenged the dynastic system and sought to capitalise 
                                            
8Joaquín Azagra Ros: ‘Urban Growth and 'Ensanches': Neighbours and Householders in 1930s 
Valencia’, Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, Vol. 75, No. 5, 1998, pp. 133-155 at pp. 133-134. 
9 Archivo General y Fotográfico de la Diputación Provincial de Valencia (AGFDPV)/ Sección 
A/Central/ Secretaría General/Expedientes generales/ Caja 33/Carpetas 20 & 23; Teresa Carnero i 
Arbat and Jordi Palafox, Creixement, polititzacio I canvi social, 1790-1980, Alfons el Magnànim, 
Valencia, 1990, p. 51. 
10 Barcelona had a population of 1,005,565 and Madrid 952,832, while the fourth largest, Seville, had 
a population of only 228,729. Naval Intelligence: Spain Vol. 1, pp. 111-123. 
11 Ismael Saz Campos, Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, Vol.  75, No. 5, December 1998. Introduction to 












on the emerging popular culture. Both leaders, initially at least, displayed a deep 
understanding of how to build an efficient cross-class electoral machine, capture the 
streets and create and communicate effective political propaganda. In one respect, 
the use of violence to ensure mastery of the streets, Blasco was if anything more 
ruthless than Lerroux.12 This tradition of violent street politics bedevilled blasquismo  
throughout its existence. It was one of the few places too, and arguably the most 
important, where Catholic political forces, largely dominated by Carlism, successfully 
adapted to mass politics and developed mass organisations.13  
 
In January 1930 the PURA began to reorganise after a period of semi-hibernation 
under the dictatorship of Primo. In the summer of 1936 after the civil war had 
commenced it was proscribed in the republican zone. The period January 1930 to 
July 1936 also covers the existence of what became the PURA’s main political rival, 
the Derecha Regional Valenciana (Valencian Regional Right, or DRV), founded in 
January 1930 and proscribed in July 1936. It came to represent the most serious 
challenge to the PURA’s dominance, and the relationship between these two 
organisations was central to the dynamics of local politics.  
 
(iv) Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the historiography of the Second Republic at national level and 
then the literature specific to Valencia to contextualise the contribution which this 
thesis makes to this area of study. This study of the PURA is intended to be a 
contribution towards such a piecing together of the national trajectory of the Radicals. 
                                            
12 On Lerroux, see José Alvarez Junco, El emperador del paralelo: Lerroux y la demagogia populista, 
Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1990. On the particularly vicious street battles with supporters of Blasco’s 
former colleague Rodrigo Soriano during the early years of the 20th century, see Ramiro Reig, 
Blasquistas y clericales, Alfons El Magnànim, Valencia, 1986 (Reig, Blasquistas y clericales), pp. 307-
314. 
13 Valencia has been subject to greater study than many Spanish provinces, and one has to be alive 
to the possibility that some of the apparent distinctiveness might be an artifice derived from the greater 
level of knowledge of what transpired here. Even so, its rapid rise and transformation as an economic 





It is broadly, a conventional political history dealing primarily with one political party, 
the PURA, in one province during the Republic. The narrative, analysis, and 
conclusions of this thesis are compared to some of the more sweeping assertions, 
generalisations and assumptions common to the historiography for this period. 
Methodologically, this study embraces the insights which can be obtained by looking 
beyond the pure political history of leaders and parties to broader matters whether 
economic, social, or cultural. It suggests some fruitful lines of enquiry for pursuit in 
other localities and at the national level, such as the manner in which political 
mobilisation occurred and the crucial role of the mobilisation of the poor small-holding 
peasantry.   
 
The vast majority of historians who have written on the Republic have a political 
orientation from liberal to left and their sympathy for the republican project is clear 
from their analysis. Most of these sympathisers place primary responsibility for the 
Republic’s problems and ultimately the Civil War on the political right.14  They are 
sympathetic to the reform programme of the first bienio and see the response of the 
Catholic Church and the Catholic political right (including the main national political 
party the CEDA) as intransigent.  
 
Whilst acknowledging the radicalisation of the Socialists as a contributing factor in 
the growing political polarisation, they stress its fear of the authoritarian tendencies 
of the newly ascendant CEDA, particularly in the light of growing far right politics and 
the evident fragility of democracies throughout much of Europe. They also cite grass-
roots pressure as rank and file members experienced a counter revolution during the 
                                            
14 There is a vast body of literature which could be cited in support of this short summary of views, but 
in respect of the traditional left of centre approach, see the early works of the Anglo- American school 
by Hugh Thomas and Gabriel Jackson. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, Pelican, London, 1977 
but first edition 1961; Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1965. The foremost current proponent remains Paul Preston; see The 
Spanish Holocaust, Harper Press, London, 2012. In the same line, see also the works of the Spanish 
historian Julián, Casanova Ruiz especially his Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain 1931-
1939, Routledge and Taylor and Francis, Abingdon UK and New York, 2005, and The Spanish 




second bienio.15 Despite high levels of industrial and agricultural unrest, and 
escalating levels of violence, this school of thought maintains that the state was still 
capable of keeping these difficulties under control, and asserts that Spain was not 
spiralling into anarchy or facing a pre-revolutionary situation. 
 
On the other hand, there is now a significant body of work by historians, commonly 
referred to as revisionists, who ascribe the failure of the Republic largely to the left 
republicans and Socialists who they characterise as intransigent: rigid, intolerant of 
divergence of view, and therefore undemocratic.16 Both the current generation of 
revisionists and their predecessors tend to write political history of a traditional ‘top 
down’ type. In general they focus on the short period of the Republic in isolation, 
invest huge importance in the behaviour of leading figures, who are perceived as 
motivated primarily by ideology, and paint a picture in which grass-root members, 
supporters and voters barely figure. They take as a given that this is the correct way 
to write history, asserting that their work is ‘scientific’ and that other approaches are, 
by implication, not. Indeed Álvarez and del Rey, without giving any reasons 
whatsoever, simply reject ‘structural interpretations - economic, sociological, cultural 
- that have been so in vogue amongst historians during the last decades’.17  Within 
                                            
15 ‘Bienio’ literally ‘two years’ and habitually used for the period April 1931 to November 1933 when 
references are made to ‘the first bienio’. Also used for the period December 1933 to January/ February 
1936 which I refer to as the ‘second bienio’. For the view that something approaching a grass-roots 
counter-revolution was underway, see by way of example Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish 
Civil War. Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic, Second Edition. New York, 
Routledge, 1994, (Preston, Reform, Reaction and Revolution) pp.  120-160. For a contrary view, see 
Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 1931–
1936. Sussex Academic Press, Portland, 2000, (Townson, Crisis), pp. 202-205.   
16 See for example Fernando del Rey Reguillo, Paisanos en lucha. Exclusión política y violencia en 
la Segunda República española, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 2008 (del Rey, Paisanos en lucha). See 
also Manuel Alvarez Tardío and Roberto Villa García, El precio de la exclusión. La política durante la 
Segunda República, Encuentro, Madrid, 2010, and Manuel Alvarez Tardío and  Fernando del Rey 
Reguillo (eds.), The Spanish second republic revisited: from democratic hopes to Civil War (1931-
1936),  Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2013 (Alvarez Tardío and  del Rey, 
The Spanish second republic revisited). In a similar vein, see the essays in Fernando del Rey Reguillo 
(ed.),   Palabras como puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República Española, Tecnos, 
Madrid, 2011. The roots of their analysis can be found in the work of an earlier generation of 
conservative historians, especially Richard Robinson and Stanley Payne. See Richard Robinson, The 
Origins of Franco’s Spain, The Right, the Republic, and Revolution, 1931–1936, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1970 and Stanley Payne, Spain’s First Democracy, The Second 
Republic, 1931–1936, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1993. Payne continues to publish and 
has become closely associated with the revisionists; see his The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 
1933–1936, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006.   




their self-imposed methodological limitations (which results in much evidence being 
discounted), some history of a high technical calibre has however been produced.18  
 
In this alternative view of the period, Spain in April 1931 was devoid of a past, the 
church was an innocent victim of sectarian behaviour, and the CEDA a fundamentally 
moderate force pushed beyond the limits of tolerance. Any broader context which 
might explain events and behaviour, such as extreme social and economic 
deprivation is ignored, denied, or its importance minimalised.  Where they address 
violence they focus on violent incidents between political actors or trade unions. 
Dealing with violence from this rather limited perspective they marshal evidence 
which shows that the perpetrators came primarily from the left and victims primarily 
from the right.19  This is an accurate and important insight so far as it goes, but the 
large numbers of deaths of workers and poor peasants are ignored, because these 
were predominantly carried out by the security force of the state.     When they direct 
their attention to the alleged grass-roots counter-revolution which was supposed to 
have occurred following the November 1933 elections they present evidence which 
suggests that it had limited effect or applied only to some geographical areas.  
 
It will be evident from the analysis above that, almost ninety years after the creation 
of the Second Republic, the causes of its fall, and the causes of the Spanish Civil 
War, continue to be live and highly charged topics, regularly revisited in the light of 
current politics and events.  The intensity of contemporary Spanish politics has led 
to historical evidence being interpreted in a ‘binary’ manner. The literature continues 
                                            
18 The best examples are Townson, Crisis, although this work does not sit fully within the revisionist 
camp, and del Rey, Paisanos en lucha, a deeply researched work of microhistory. 
19 Manuel Álvarez Tardío, ‘The Impact of Political Violence During the Spanish General Election of 
1936’, Journal of Contemporary History, July 2013, Vol. 48, No. 3,  pp. 463-485 and his ‘Politics, 
Violence and Electoral Democracy in Spain: the case of the CEDA, 1933-1934’, Bulletin for Spanish 
and Portuguese Historical Studies, Vol. 35, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 123-146; Stanley Payne’s ‘Political 
Violence in Spain’s Second Republic’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 25, Nos. 2 and 3, May-
June 1990, pp. 269–88; Roberto Villa García’s, ‘Political Violence in the Spanish Elections of 
November 1933’ Journal of Contemporary History, July 2013, No, 48, pp. 446-462,  and his ‘Violencia 
en democracia. Las Elecciones Republicanas en Perspectiva Comparada’, Historia y política, No 29, 
2013, pp. 247-267 at pp. 253-254. Much of Villa García’s book on the 1933 elections, La República 
en las urnas. El despertar de la democracia en España, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2011, deals with 




to focus on attributing responsibility (ascribing blame) for those events, which has 
tended to result in a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ between proponents of one or other view. 
The ‘responsibilities’ debate permeates and, arguably, distorts the analysis even 
where historians make a deliberate effort not to become fully enmeshed within it, 
although there are some important new approaches emerging which seek to go 
beyond it. 
 
Of those historians who have tried to avoid being enmeshed within the 
responsibilities debate, there are a wide range of viewpoints and of methodological 
approaches.  One cannot really describe them as a ‘school’ in any meaningful sense.  
As a broad generalisation the majority remain of a centre-left viewpoint and reject 
the revisionist position. Many enthusiastically embrace methodological approaches 
involving insights from sociology, social anthropology, feminism and cultural history, 
and this approach has produced some rich and complex lines of enquiry.20  Many 
are primarily concerned with the processes by which Spanish society opened up to 
large-scale political mobilisation.21 Others focus on the study of violence and have 
tried to develop a sophisticated taxonomy of political violence whereas the 
revisionists tend to focus on the much narrower issue of violence between political 
parties and trade unions.22  
  
                                            
20 The essays in the volume edited by Chris Ealham and Michael Richards demonstrate fruitful ways 
in which to approach the study of this period without being trapped within the ‘responsibilities’ debate; 
see The Splintering of Spain, New Historical Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
21 See for example Chris Ealham, Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona 1898–1937, Routledge: 
Oxford and New York, 2004 and Pamela Beth Radcliff, From Mobilisation to Civil War. The politics of 
polarisation in the Spanish city of Gijón, 1900-1937, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 
(Radcliff, Mobilisation). 
22 There is a large and developing body of literature on political violence, but see especially Eduardo 
González Calleja, El máuser y el sufragio. Orden público, subversión y violencia política en la crisis 
de la Restauración (1917-1931), CSIC, Madrid, 1999, his La violencia en la política. Perspectivas 
teóricas sobre el empleo deliberado de la fuerza en los conflictos de poder, CSIC, Madrid, 2002, his 
Contrarrevolucionarios. Radicalización violenta de las derechas durante la Segunda República, 1931-
1936, Alianza, Madrid, 2011, his En nombre de la autoridad. La defensa del orden público durante la 
Segunda República Española (1931-1936), Comares, Madrid, 2014, and Cifras cruentas. Las 
víctimas mortales de la violencia sociopolítica en la Segunda República española (1931-




Although primarily a study of the local affiliate of the Radicals in Valencia, this thesis 
considers broader questions about the nature and role of political parties during the 
Republic, the extent to which there existed the potential political support for the 
Radicals attempt to ‘centre the Republic’ and whether if the Radicals had behaved 
differently a more inclusive coalition could have been created.23 This thesis, inter alia, 
investigates the nature of the relationship between the Radicals at national and the 
PURA at local level and how this impacted the attempts by the central government 
to implement its policies. It therefore sheds light on the relationship between the 
Radicals and its local affiliates throughout Spain more generally, and the Radicals’ 
claim to be a consolidating centrist force. 
 
The thesis highlights the significance of the local political culture in Valencia and 
demonstrates the need to construct the national picture from the highly localised and 
fragmented political situation throughout Spain, as opposed to relying, as is 
traditional, on a Madrid-centric parliamentary approach. As one Anglo-American 
historian who has studied the Spanish city of Gijón has argued, there is a strong case 
for the view that good quality local studies are the best way to understand polarisation 
and the origins of civil war in the Republic, because the weak national political culture 
meant that the political centre of gravity remained at the local level, with the result 
that the overall picture needs to be pieced together from local experience.24  It is 
commonplace to note that the state machine which the Republic inherited from the 
monarchy was weak, and it is increasingly accepted that the localised and diverse 
nature of politics made it extremely difficult to build a national consensus and 
maintain a coherent coalition behind the new regime’s policy proposals. What has 
been less recognised in most of the literature is that even within a province or region  
differences in attitude could be dramatic and this could produce a dynamic which 
                                            
23 ‘…in order to consolidate itself, a new regime must do two things: implement policies that will satisfy 
a large number of potential supporters and link them to the regime, with negative effects on the 
smallest possible number of opponents; and follow policies that will satisfy the leadership of the 
coalition which installed the new regime, avoiding policies that would provoke dissent and splits in the 
coalition.’, Juan J.Linz, ‘From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain’, in 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins, Baltimore, 1994, pp. 142-215 at p. 151. 
24 Radcliff, Mobilization, p. 2. My view is that this conclusion is broadly correct, but that the extreme 





itself increased polarisation. This was especially true in respect of the response to 
the laicising legislation of the first bienio.   
 
Despite their political importance, the Radicals had been little studied until the 
publication of a book by the English historian Nigel Townson. Townson’s book, and 
a number of articles authored by him, represent a necessary corrective to the too 
dismissive approach taken by many historians who sympathise with the left 
republicans and Socialists and who portray the Radicals as little more than a corrupt 
enabler for the right.25  Townson’s book is one of the few national studies to make a 
serious attempt to consider the provincial dimension, but it is hampered by the lack 
of good quality secondary works based on serious research at the provincial level. 
More recently in a further set of articles Townson has become increasingly 
associated with the revisionist canon, accepting and developing most of their 
arguments, including those on the sectarianism of the republican left and the 
Socialists and the relative moderation of the CEDA.26  
 
The Radicals defined themselves as a party of the ‘centre’, and I will discuss in some 
detail later in this thesis what this term meant in the context of the Second Republic, 
and from the Valencian perspective what this meant in respect of the ideology, 
behaviour and social base of support for the PURA. What is clear is that the intensely 
localised political culture in Valencia put significant strains on the relation between 
the Radicals and the PURA. Whether or not, as Townson has suggested, the 
                                            
25 In Townson, Crisis, and six articles published by 2005. Most of these articles are not from the 
perspective of this introduction particularly important but see ‘Una República para todos los 
españoles’: el Partido Radical en el poder, 1933-1935’ in  (ed.) Nigel Towson,  El republicanismo en 
España (1830-1977), Alianza,  Madrid, 1994, pp. 193-222 and ‘The Second Republic, 1931–1936, 
Sectarianism, Schisms, and Strife’, in Adrian Shubert and Jose Alvarez Junco, (eds.), Spanish History 
since 1808, Hodder Arnold, London, 2000, pp.  222-235. 
26 In four articles: Nigel Townson, ‘"Centrar la República": ¿una posibilidad o un espejismo?’, Hispania 
Nova, No.11, 2013; ‘¿Rectificación o reacción? La alianza de centro-derecha,1933-1935’,  in Manuel 
Ballarín Aured, Diego Cucalón Vela and José Luis  Ledesma Vera, (eds.), La II República en la 
encrucijada: el segundo bienio, Cortes de Aragón, Zaragoza, 2009 pp 25-52 (‘¿Rectificación o 
reacción?’); ‘A Third Way? Centrist Politics under the Republic’ in Alvarez Tardío and del Rey, The 
Spanish second republic revisited,  2013,  pp 97-113; Nigel Townson ‘¿Vendidos al clericalismo? La 
política religiosa de los radicales en el Segundo bienio 1933-1935’, in Julio de la Cueva Merino and 
Feliciano Montero García (eds.), Laicismo y catolicismo. El conflicto político-religioso en la segunda 
república, La Universidad de Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares, 2009, pp. 73-90. ‘¿Rectificación o reacción?’ 




Radicals for all their failings represented a positive contribution to the attempts to 
consolidate the Republic, this thesis suggests that no such case can be made for the 
PURA.  In reality, the PURA had free rein to dictate the political agenda in Valencia 
as it wished, but did nothing to promote political reconciliation. Instead, it used 
violence to stifle dissent. There is no sign that the national leadership of the Radicals 
sought to discourage this. The Radicals therefore cannot fully escape responsibility 
for what transpired, which was hardly consistent with their claim to be a force for 
consolidation.  
 
The description in this thesis of the specifically local nature of left republicanism and 
Valencian socialism also contributes to the overarching debate on a ‘politics of 
exclusion’, the term used by the revisionists to describe intolerant and sometimes 
violent behaviour by Socialists and left republicans. The evidence from Valencia runs 
completely counter to the ‘politics of exclusion’ debate, at least as normally 
formulated. There is no evidence that left republicanism, the Socialists or their 
affiliated unions practised political intolerance or instigated any violence at any time 
up to the commencement of the military rising. Their only involvement in incidents of 
violence was as victims of PURA instigated incidents .27  
 
This commitment to tolerance and pluralism is rooted primarily in the relative 
moderation of their political views, which will be discussed later in the thesis. But 
even had they not been so moderate, they were denied the opportunity to practice 
the ‘politics of exclusion’. It was the PURA which dominated local government and 
left republicans controlled very few councils, the Socialists only one of any 
significance, Alzira. In Valencia the sole practitioner of a ‘politics of exclusion’ was 
the party of the supposed centre, the PURA, not the left republicans or the Socialists. 
The question then arises as to whether Radical affiliates elsewhere behaved in a 
similar manner. If they did, at least in some other locations, then the ‘politics of 
                                            
27 Severe censorship on the press imposed by the civil governor after the Popular Front victory in 
Valencia leaves open the possibility that Socialist affiliated unions may have played a part in some of 
the industrial and agrarian unrest from February 1936 onwards. Given the very low levels of violence 




exclusion’ ceases to be a useful analytical tool for the revisionists and becomes 
instead a broader cultural issue related to republican politics in general.   
 
The impact of the intensely local nature of politics in Valencia and elsewhere can 
also be seen in the relationship between the DRV and the CEDA nationally, and in 
the relationship between the DRV and the PURA. The CEDA represented the DRV 
as its most acceptable ‘human face’, as a modern, moderate and democratic 
organisation with an ‘advanced’ social programme.28  My work confirms the prior 
conclusions of Rafael Valls that in reality the DRV’s acceptance of the regime was 
always conditional.29 It goes beyond Valls in analysing in greater detail the rural base 
of support for the DRV. This was strongest in those intensely Catholic settlements 
which had also formed the social base for Valencian Carlism. This always limited the 
extent to which the DRV could be openly republican. The thesis too pays greater 
attention to the November 1933 general elections and their importance in radicalising 
the DRV.  
 
The relationship between the PURA and the DRV seems not to have followed the 
same trajectory as that of the Radicals and the CEDA during the first bienio. The 
thesis is the first work which describes why the PURA and the DRV in fact worked 
closely together in a political campaign supposedly concerned with the crisis of the 
orange crop against the central government during 1932 and 1933, and the tensions 
within this co-operation as the DRV and the PURA competed for peasant support.  
 
It is frequently taken as a given by historians of the Republic that the small-holding 
peasantry throughout most of Spain were inherently conservative and ready to be 
mobilised by the CEDA once it was clear that there existed a credible political party 
                                            
28 This claim has been accepted at face value by some historians. See in particular Robinson, Origins, 
pp. 75, 81-82 and 116; see also Vicent Comes Iglesia, En el filo de la navaja, biografía política de 
Luis Lucía Lucía (1888–1943), Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 2002 (Comes, en el filo), especially pp. 208-
214. 
29 Rafael Valls, La Derecha Regional Valenciana, 1930/1936. El catolicismo político valenciano, 




which could articulate their concerns. What is missing from this view of the peasantry 
is an understanding of politics as a process, which is a central focus of my thesis. 
The support from a section of the peasantry did not flow automatically to the CEDA 
or the DRV and the reality is that the leaders of the CEDA and DRV had to create an 
attractive political narrative and communicate it. Often this involved emotive and 
highly demagogic campaigns alleging that the central government, through 
incompetence at best or malice at worst, was engaged in actions designed to harm 
the peasantry. This tactic had been used in Castille during the autumn and winter of 
1931, and used again in Valencia during the orange harvest campaign of 
1932/1933.30 
 
It has also been suggested that in parts of Spain peasants moved to the right 
because they suffered economically (as employers) from the improved working 
conditions of landless agricultural workers.31 Applying some of the insights from a 
range of cross-disciplinary studies of peasant societies, (especially the work of 
James Scott) to the Spanish context, this thesis takes issue with this overly 
mechanistic view of the relationship of the poor peasantry to the labour market and 
argues that it ignores the complex and multidirectional relationship with the labour 
market. My work shows that the vast majority of smallholders and their family 
members (tenants and owners) still had to work for others for much of the year. Each 
member of the family unit was, at different times and to varying degrees, a direct 
exploiter of their own agricultural holding, an employer, and an employee.32 
 
Valencia remains under-researched, and this is particularly true of the contemporary 
period, although much progress has been made since the 1980s. The political history 
of Valencia from the end of the nineteenth century until 1911 is reasonably well 
                                            
30 On Castille see Preston, Reform, Reaction, and Revolution, pp. 58-60. 
31 Francisco Cobo Romero, ‘El voto campesino contra la II República. La derechización de los 
pequeños propietarios y arrendatarios agrícolas jiennenses, 1931-1936’, Historia Social, No. 37, 
2000, pp. 117-142.  
32 James Scott, Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Resistance in South-East Asia,  Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1984; ‘Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance’, Journal of Peasant 
Studies, Vol.13, No.2, pp. 5-31 and Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, 




documented, but for the period 1911 until 1930 little serious research has been 
carried out, except for one publication on the history of the blasquista daily El 
Pueblo.33 As elsewhere in Spain, studies on the collapse of the Restoration system 
in Valencia following the fall of Primo’s dictatorship in 1930 and on the Second 
Republic itself are more plentiful. Most of these represent a fairly traditional ‘top 
down’ narrative-driven approach to both political and social history, with a heavy 
emphasis on the leadership of political parties and of workers’ organisations, and 
limited attention given to deep social and economic structural issues. Typically, there 
is little emphasis on the attitudes of ordinary members of parties and unions, or to 
voters, and minimal to no attention is paid to political and social mobilisation as an 
active process. Insights from cultural studies, feminism, and social anthropology are 
only slowly finding their way into Valencian historiography.  
 
Profound social changes took place in the Valencian countryside in the second half 
of the 19th and the first third of the 20th century. Much work has been done in this 
area beginning with Ramón Garrabou Segura in the 1980s, followed by Salvador 
Calatayud Giner and Samuel Garrido Herrero.34 Their work has demonstrated the 
extent to which former tenant farmers had come to own their land,  the significance 
of local agricultural innovation, and the tension for these family farmers between the 
security offered by land ownership and the financial risks associated with selling their 
products in volatile foreign markets.  On top of this orange-growing farmers faced 
problems caused by the crisis in quality of the crop. This latter area has been well 
explored by the economic historian Jordi Palofox Gamir, and the agrarian historian 
                                            
33 The period up to 1911 has been studied primarily by Ramiro Reig in Blasquistas y clericales and 
Obrers i ciutadans. Blasquisme i moviment obrer: Vàlencia 1898-1906, Alfons El Magnànim, Valencia, 
1982. The study of El Pueblo is: Antonio Laguna Platero, El Pueblo: historia de un diario republicano, 
1894-1939 Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1999.   
34 The key study is Ramón Garrabou Segura, Un fals dilemma: modernitat o endarreriment de  
l‘ágricultura valenciana (1850-1900), Institució Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1985. Salvador 
Calatayud Giner and Samuel Garrido Herrero have produced a range of well-researched and rigorous 
studies, but see especially Salvador Calatayud Giner, Capitalismo agrario y propiedad campesina: la 
Ribera del Xúquer, 1869-1930, Alfons el Magnánim, València, 1989 and two articles jointly written by 
them: ‘La compra silenciosa’, pp. 77-108, and ‘The Price of Improvements. Agrarian Contracts and 
Agrarian Development in Nineteenth Century Eastern Spain’, Economic History Review, Vol. 64, No. 




Vicente Abad García.35 These changes and difficulties gave a particular intensity to 
the political campaigns waged in Valencia in the 1930s and are an important 
backdrop to the arguments of this thesis. 
 
Turning to the literature relating to political parties or movements in Valencia, Sergio 
Valero Gómez has recently aided our understanding of Valencian socialism and the 
socialist led union federation the UGT, but his particular focus is on the internal 
working of the socialist party and its local perspective.  Thus his book on the conflict 
between the Valencian socialists and the PURA does not adequately address the 
national dimension, or the PURA’s attempt to maintain local working-class support.36 
 
Valencia was a major centre of anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist radicalism during 
the 1920s and the 1930s, but it has been studied less than the movement in 
Andalusia, Aragon and Catalonia. Eulàlia Vega and more recently Richard Purkiss 
have produced significant work on the province and region and have chronicled the 
increased domination of the dissident Sindicatos de Oposición and the broader 
impact this had on Valencian working-class politics. Purkiss also has some important 
things to say about the relationship between the PURA and the CNT, especially in 
respect of the pre-republican period.37 More work is needed to increase our 
                                            
35 See especially Jordi Palafox Gamir, Atraso económico y democracia. La Segunda República y la 
economía española, 1892-1936, Crítica, Barcelona, 1991, his ‘Agricultura d’especulació i crisi 
econòmica. El País Valencià durant els anys trenta (1930-1936)’, Estudis d'historia agraria, No.3, 
1979, pp. 139-162, and ‘Estructura de la exportación y distribución de beneficios. La naranja en el 
País Valenciano (1920-1930),’ Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American 
Economic History, No 2, 1982, pp. 339-351.  Vicente Abad García’s key work is Historia de la 
naranja (1781–1939), Comite de Gestión de la Exportacion de Frutos Citricos, Valencia, 1984. 
36 Sergio Valero Gómez’ general study of Valencian socialism is Republicanos con la monarquía, 
socialistas con la República: La Federación Socialista Valenciana (1931-1939), Universitat de 
València, Valencia, 2015. His work on the relationship of local socialists with blasquismo is Ni contigo 
ni sin ti: Socialismo y republicanismo histórico en la Valencia de los años treinta, Alfons el Magnànim, 
Valencia, 2016.  
37 Eulàlia Vega, Anarquistas y sindicalistas durante la Segunda República: la.  CNT y los sindicatos 
de oposición en el País Valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1987.  Richard Purkiss, Trade 
Unions and Political Violence in Spain: The Valencian Anarchist Movement 1918-1936, Sussex 
Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2011. Francisco Javier Navarro Navarro has written 
extensively on the ideology and the internal cultural life of Valencian anarchism. Valuable as these 
works are, they do not add greatly to the understanding of the pressures faced by the CNT during the 
Republic. See his Ateneos y grupos ácratas, Generalitat Valenciana, Valencia, 2003, and A la 
revolución por la cultura. Prácticas culturales y sociabilidad libertarias en el País Valenciano, 1931-




understanding in particular of the rivalry between the UGT and both of the CNT 
federations (the ‘official’ CNT and the Oposición unions) in the city and elsewhere.38  
 
The political party which has been best served by serious scholarship for this period 
is the DRV, which has been studied in depth by two historians, Rafael Valls and 
Vicent Comes Iglesia.39 Thanks to their efforts the rise of the DRV, its ideology, and 
its position within the CEDA nationally is reasonably well understood. Neither study 
is completely successful however in situating the DRV in the broader local political 
and socio-economic context.40   
 
Although two books on the PURA for the republican period exist, neither have much 
merit.41 Both contain a great deal of factual information, but they are thinly 
researched (relying heavily on the blasquista daily newspaper El Pueblo as the key 
source) and provide little serious analysis. Neither work makes the slightest attempt 
to take into account the economic situation, or to place the PURA adequately in the 
broader local or national political context. There is nothing for example on the 
mobilisation of a section of the peasantry during 1932 and 1933, virtually nothing on 
the disenchantment of the urban working-class with the PURA, and nothing on the 
threat to the PURA posed by the rise of the DRV or subsequently by the rise of the 
Izquierda Republicana. The relatively early appearance of these manifestly 
inadequate books probably inhibited  the production of worthwhile monographs on 
                                            
38 A number of articles by Aurora Bosch Sánchez have shed light on the rivalry in the rural sphere. 
See in particular her ‘Nuevas perspectivas sobre la conflictividad rural en la II República’, Historia 
contemporánea,  No. 9, 1993, pp. 141-166,  ‘La Segunda República y la Guerra Civil, conflicto rural 
y colectivización’, in Paul Preston and Ismael Saz Campos, (eds.), De la revolución liberal a la 
democracia parlamentaria, Valencia, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 2001, pp. 237-254, ‘Sindicalismo, 
conflictividad y política en al campo valenciano durante la segunda República’, in Aurora Bosch, 
Rafael Valls and Vicent Comes Iglesia, (eds.), La derecha católica en los años 30: en el 
cincuentenario de la muerte de Luis Lucía, Ajuntament de València, Valencia, 1996, pp. 217-297. 
39 The books are: Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana, and Comes, En el filo. 
40 There is little on the Valencian far right. There are no studies on the Falange or on Renovación 
Española and only one very poor study on Carlism, written by a Carlist militant who is not a 
professional historian. This is: Luis Pérez Domingo, Martires carlistas del Reino de Valencia 1936-
1939, Actas, Madrid, 2004. 
41 These are: Vicent Franch i Ferrer, El Blasquisme. Reorganització i conflictes polítics 1929-1936, 
Xàtiva (Valencia), 1984 and Vicente Alós Ferrando, Reorganizacion, supremacia y crisis final del 




blasquismo. There are still no serious published studies on other aspects of 
Valencian republicanism during this period. There remains a need for a study at the 
provincial level of left republicanism, especially of the Radical Socialists during the 
first bienio and the rise of Izquierda Republicana in the second.42  
 
A number of local studies demonstrate just how varied the local political situation was 
even within one province.  It is at the municipal level that much of the extant evidence 
relating to the economic circumstances and living conditions of the working class can 
be found, incomplete though it is. Antonio Calzado Aldaria, writing on the 
administrative area the Vall d'Albaida, in the extreme south of the province, has 
worked productively with these sources. For a map of the administrative areas, see 
Illustration 7 at page 73. His work with Lluis Sevilla Parra on the town of Gandia has 
shed light on the behaviour of the PURA away from the capital city.43  Pilar Rovira 
Granero writes on Alzira, the centre of power for Valencian socialism and important 
for the PURA, but although she has utilised all extant material, her work suffers from 
the loss of much of the local archive and the destruction of virtually all local 
newspapers.44   
 
Other local studies help to clarify the role of the Radical Socialists. Francesc Andreu 
Martinez Gallego writes on L’Alcudia, the Radical Socialists stronghold, while 
Josep Daniel Simeón Riera’s study of Llíria is particularly strong on local PURA and 
Radical Socialist rivalry.45 Much useful information on Xàtiva, another important 
                                            
42 There are no provincial studies on any of the national political parties in Valencia which are regarded 
as forming the left republican movement during the Republic. Some attention has been given by Alfons 
Cucó Giner to the very small regionalist republican organisations which never had any support outside 
of Valencia city, and even there they gained little traction. By far the most important work is Cucó, El 
valencianisme politic (1874-1936), Col·leció Garbí 2, Valencia, 1971. Cucó, who had pan-Catalanist 
sympathies, wished to understand why Valencian regionalism (and nationalism) was so unsuccessful.  
43 Antonio Calzado Aldaria, Segunda república y guerra civil: la Vall d'Albaida, 1931-1939, Associació 
de Veïns el Llombo, Ontinyent (Valencia), 2012; Antonio Calzado Aldaria and Luis Sevilla Parra, La 
IIª República a Gandía, Centre d'Estudis Alfons el Vell, Gandía (Valencia), 2000.  
44 Pilar Rovira Granero,Mobilització social, canvi polític i revolució. Associanisme, Segona República  
i Guerra Civil. Alzira, 1900-1939, Germania, Alzira, 1996. 
45 Francesc Andreu Martinez Gallego, Agricultores Solidarios: el Cooperativismo en l'Alcúdia, 1908-
1999, Caixa Rural de l'Alcúdia, l'Alcúdia (Valencia), 2000 and Construint la Ciutadania: una Història 




settlement with a strong Radical Socialist organisation, is to be found in the three 
volume work by Germà Ramírez Aledón; Isabel Martínez Salas; Sebastià Garrido 
Rico; and Josep-Lluís Cebrian Molina.46 A map of the major provincial settlements 
can be found at Illustration 8 at page 74. Local studies too have appeared in 
collections of conference papers, in particular the bi-annual conference Jornades 
d’Estudis de Cullera.47  Some useful articles can be found in a number of Catalan 
and Valencian specialist journals and in a number of semi-scholarly magazines, 
typically sponsored by local municipalities.48 Some of this work is based on local 
municipal archives as far as they survive.49 
 
The destruction of much of the documentation of the republican period, and the 
necessity to rely heavily on newspapers as the primary source of information, leads 
to an understandable emphasis on political history of a traditional ‘top down’ type. It 
requires a labour–intensive and rigorous interrogation of the information available at 
the provincial level to move beyond this and even then the shortage of information 
available within provincial-level archives limits what is possible. Some of the works 
of ‘micro history’ cited above, and in particular the work of Anthony Calzado Aldaria, 
                                            
L´Alcúdia (Valencia), 2002. Josep Daniel Simeón Riera, Entre la rebel·lia i la tradició: Llíria 
durant la república i la guerra civil, 1931-1939, Diputació de València, Valencia, 1993. 
46 República i Guerra Civil a Xàtiva (1931-1939) 3 Vols, Col·leccio Gramalla, 1991, Ajuntament de 
Xàtiva, Xàtiva, 1991. Other settlements such as Agullent, Alboraia, Alcàsser, Carcaixent, Quatretonda 
and Simat de Valldigna have been subject to monographs which contain useful information. See 
Antonio Calzado Aldaria, Agullent. Desenvolupament Econòmic i Canvi Social,  Ajuntament Agullent, 
Agullent (Valencia), 1997; Maria Jose  Sigalat Vaya,  La II República en Alboraia, 1931-
1936,   Ajuntament d'Alboraia, Valencia, 1995; Antoni  Simó Rosaleny, Alcàsser. Biografia d'un poble 
en guerra (1931-1941) Universitat de Valencia, Valencia, 2010; Maria Jose Sigalat Vaya,  Canvi 
social i mobilització política a Carcaixent durant la República i la Guerra Civil (1931-1939), L’Entorn, 
Valencia, 2011; Antonio Calzado Aldaria, República i Guerra a Quatretonda, 1931-1939, Ajuntament 
de Quatretonda, Quatretonda (Valencia), 2005; Antonio Calzado Aldaria, La Valldigna un món en 
conflicte (1931-1939), La Xara, Simat de la Valldigna, (València), 2015.    
47 The first one was held in 1993. 
48 Of the scholarly journals, particularly noteworthy are the Catalan publications Recerques and Afers, 
Saitabi, the house magazine of the Faculty of Geography and History of the University of Valencia, 
and the (now defunct) Valencian journals Arguments, and Estudis d'historia contemporània del Pais 
Valencia. The municipality focussed magazines include Alba and Almaig, which cover the Vall 
d’Albaida, Lauro which is a magazine of Llíria, Al-Gezira for Alzira, Quaderns de Sueca for Sueca and 
Ullal, for Gandia. There are many others, often short-lived. 
49 There are too many articles to mention, but by way of example see Ángeles Adrià Montagut, 
‘Una industria vista por sus trabajadores: la fábrica de hilados de yute y esparto de Ríos y Cía de 
Lliria (1929-1974)’, Lauro, No. 4, 1989, pp. 129-140, Joan Vicent Climent i Espí, and Rosa Bona i 
Juan, ‘La questió agrària a Tavernes’, Ullal, No. 3, Spring 1983, pp. 38-47, and Maria Jesús Fuertes 
Llopis, ‘Algunas aspectos sobre el cultivo del naranjo y la comercializacion de la naranja en La Ribera. 




who has managed to piece together information relating to local wages and industrial 
disputes from municipal records,  demonstrates what can sometimes be done.  
 
To supplement my use of sources such as newspapers and to counter the emphasis 
that such sources give to political leaders, I too have had to find the evidence to 
develop a more ‘bottom up’ approach to both political history and labour history. This 
has required a painstaking review in a wide range of archives both provincial and 
municipal, utilising information on such matters as levels of extreme poverty, land 
ownership patterns, agricultural developments and demographic data. I have 
compared this with local election results, including at individual polling station level 
where the data exists, to try to build a picture not only of changing voting patterns 
but to make deeper inferences about the social base of political allegiances and voter 
mobilisation. My study is the first work on the province of Valencia to do this. 
 
There is not yet any sign that a distinct trend in interpretative thought is emerging. 
The majority of Valencian historians are politically leftist and sympathetic to the 
republican project. There is no sign yet of an emerging revisionist school in the 
specifically Valencian context. The one serious historian of a more centrist or 
conservative persuasion (Comes) is more concerned to defend the reputation of Luis 
Lucía and to a lesser extent the DRV than to assign responsibility for the Civil War 
to the left republicans and working-class organisations.50 Localised studies are in any 
case rather less useful in supporting the moral and political judgements which sit 
behind a ‘responsibilities’ debate since they do not fit easily into a ‘grand narrative’ 
approach to historiography. No one work has radically changed the perceptions of 
republican Valencia, although Valls’ well-researched and rigorously argued  book on 
the DRV demonstrated that its claim to be the socially concerned vanguard of the 
CEDA was rather hollow.  
 
                                            




The PURA was the hegemonic political force in Valencia. An understanding of how 
it achieved and maintained that dominance and why it collapsed so spectacularly in 
terms of popular support during 1934 is a crucial contribution towards understanding 
the broader political history of Valencia during the Republic. My study, I believe, 
makes that contribution and is as deeply researched as the extant evidence permits.  
In terms of secondary studies, every serious piece of local history from a wide range 
of publications has been accessed in researching this thesis. 
 
This study is a contribution to our understanding of the complex interplay between 
local and national politics and sheds light on the importance of the local political 
culture in Valencia. It suggests that the highly fragmented Spanish political culture 
and the significant variations not only province by province but settlement by 
settlement created a potentially polarising dynamic which fatally weakened the 
attempt to build a coherent and stable democratic politics. In terms of its primary 
focus, the Valencian affiliate of the Radicals, it demonstrates that the PURA was a 
very different beast to the Radicals nationally and how this created tensions which 
contributed to the instability of national politics.   
 
In terms of the national political scene, the Valencian case is an illustration of how 
difficult it is to create a coherent national picture which accurately reflects events at 
the grass–roots.  Whilst the Radicals were preaching the need to centre the Republic, 
the PURA continued to deploy anti-clerical rhetoric and to use violence against its 
political opponents. At a time when the Radicals were still formally part of the 
governing coalition, the PURA had formally declared hostility to the government. 
While the revisionist historians argue that a ‘politics of exclusion’ was practised by 
left republicans and socialists, and implicitly by no-one else, the PURA (and only the 
PURA) practised an extreme version of it in Valencia. 
 
Tested against the revisionist canon, Valencia suggests that revisionism 




opposite pole of the responsibilities debate. Most importantly, it provides little 
evidence for the consistent grass-roots counter-revolution against workers’ rights 
which was supposedly one of the key causes of the radicalisation of the Socialists. It 
also supports the view that localised anti-clericalism was a potent force which had a 
key role in building support for the right, although in Valencia it was the PURA not 
the local left political forces which drove this. In terms of this review of the 
historiography, one has to acknowledge the epistemological limitations of a provincial 
study. Valencia may simply have been an exception, or even the sole exception, to 
one or other grand narrative. This however seems unlikely given what is known about 
the lack of a strong national political culture and regional and provincial studies 
elsewhere. Indeed one might question just how meaningful is the homogenisation of 
information in order to produce a supposed national norm. 
 
(v) The PURA in the Republic: a brief summary 
 
With the advent of the Republic in April 1931, there were many factors which might 
have suggested that Valencia would be a stabilising force. It boasted a strong, 
purportedly centrist mass republican party in the PURA; the local Socialists were 
largely reformist in outlook; the strong anarcho-syndicalist influenced working-class 
movement proved to be far from revolutionary in practice; and there existed an 
embryonic Catholic party regarded as one of the most moderate within Spain. This 
was the DRV, whose leadership took what appeared to be a genuinely ‘accidentalist’ 
line towards the new regime, that is, it was not hostile to the Republic as a form of 
government and declared that it was prepared to work within it.  
 
Valencia was, too, a relatively prosperous province. Although Spain remained still a 
mainly agricultural society, Valencia had fewer landless day-labourers than many 
parts of Spain.  In the countryside, agricultural production was largely driven by small 
family farms, owned or leased, while compared to much of Spain, land ownership 
was more equitably distributed. In industry, Valencia was a ‘middling’ province in 
terms of wages. Despite all this, Valencia did not become a stabilising force; indeed 




underlying socio-economic forces or with the political forces to the left or to the right 
of the PURA, but in the peculiar nature of the PURA itself.  
 
The economic crisis of the 1930s weighed heavily on Valencia, because its export-
driven economy suffered particularly badly, but it was the manner in which the PURA 
channelled the grievances which this economic crisis inevitably produced into an 
orchestrated campaign against central government which exacerbated political  
instability. I explore why an avowedly republican party behaved  in this way and, 
while acknowledging that this campaign was part of the national campaign of the 
Radicals against the republican-socialist regime, I argue that its peculiar viciousness 
and intensity here cannot be understood unless one understands the history of local 
republican politics.  
 
The PURA’s behaviour, particularly in the years 1931-1933, was extremely 
damaging to the republican cause and also fatal to the PURA’s continued existence 
as a mass party. It regarded Valencia as its personal republican fiefdom, routinely 
using violence as a political tool to establish complete control of the streets in order 
to silence those who it perceived to be a danger to its hegemony.  It concentrated all 
of its propaganda against the political parties which formed the governing alliance, 
and in so doing largely ignored the political challenge from its right.  By missing the 
threat from the DRV, it fatally allowed the DRV breathing space to thrive.  
 
Indeed, far from understanding just how serious the threat was, the PURA co-
operated with the DRV to oppose the national government, during 1932 and much of 
1933, further alienating the PURA’s traditional supporters. As a result, when general 
elections were held in November 1933, the only way that the PURA could beat the 
DRV was through massive corruption and violence, which resulted in fatalities, 
producing one of the most corrupt electoral results in the history of the Republic. The 
PURA’s electoral victory produced great bitterness within the DRV and hastened the 
radicalisation of the DRV towards extra-parliamentary activity.  Although DRV 




the experience of local politics was hardly conducive to bolstering democratic 
sentiment.    
 
The DRV had roots in the pre-modern extreme rightist political movement known as  
Carlism. The DRV inherited Carlist  organisational skills, honed locally during their 
fight against the PURA in the early years of the twentieth century.  It also inherited a 
relatively coherent set of ideological beliefs, which left it better placed than many on 
the Spanish Catholic right to adapt to the reality of the Republic.  Ostensibly 
regionalist and committed to mild social reform as advocated in Catholic teaching, it 
was regarded as being the faction of the CEDA  which was most genuinely 
‘accidentalist’ and therefore the least hostile to the Republic.  
 
Much of the struggle between the PURA and the DRV for hegemony centred on the 
issue of the laicising legislation of the Republic, and on the manner in which at local 
level these issues played out, typically by the actions of local town councils which 
often degenerated into open anti-clericalism.  This is also important in terms of the 
relationship which the PURA had with the Radical Party, since the PURA continued 
to deploy anti-clericalism while the Radical Party, in its attempt to reach out to 
religious voters, attempted to downplay it. Catholicism was crucial to the rise and 
evolution of the DRV, an openly confessional party. Although poverty and class were 
important factors in the growing political polarisation, I argue that the ‘master 
cleavage’, within Valencia at least, was the religious rather than the class divide.51 
  
The national results of the 1933 general elections resulted in a significant loss of 
seats by Socialists and left republicans.  The right did well, and the CEDA became 
the largest single minority while the Radicals, including the PURA, formed the second 
largest minority. With the parliamentary support of the CEDA, the Radicals took 
power. Government policy now shifted decisively towards the right, but for the PURA, 
                                            
51 Valencia, a province with less extreme economic inequality than most, recorded some of the highest 




the greatest difficulty was caused by the effective suspension of the legislation 
passed to limit the power of the Catholic Church. Given the critical importance of anti-
clericalism for the PURA, this, together with unease at the central government’s 
policy towards the Catalan regional government during 1934, led to the PURA 
splitting, with the defection of a number of its most able parliamentary deputies and 
the resignation of many local activists in the summer of 1934. Even the appointment 
as Prime Minister of a leading member of the party, Ricardo Samper, in April 1934, 
seems to have done nothing to staunch the loss of support. Indeed by the autumn of 
1934 it is probably the case that the party was in terminal decline.    
 
The PURA’s behaviour cannot be understood if there is an exclusive focus on the 
challenge from the DRV. The PURA had forged a strong relationship with local 
workers during the early years of the twentieth century and they remained an 
important part of its electoral support. It now faced a significant challenge from the 
left, as unions affiliated to the Socialist-led federation the Unión General de 
Trabajadores (General Workers’ Union, or UGT) began to grow in importance in the 
province, especially in the countryside, while workers in unions affiliated to the 
anarcho-syndicalist led confederation the Confederación Nacional del 
Trabajo (National Confederation of Labour, or CNT) began to radicalise towards 
explicitly anti-republican views. This started the unravelling of the inter-class coalition 
which the PURA had constructed. It also faced pressure from a bourgeois national 
republican party to its left, with the rise of the provincial affiliate of the new Izquierda 
Republicana (the Republican Left) at the end of 1934 and during 1935. As the 
PURA’s working-class voters transferred their allegiances elsewhere, the PURA’s 
only response was to try to whip up hostility to its political opponents, as it had done 
in the past, but with decreasing effectiveness. 
 
In October 1934, following increasing parliamentary pressure, the CEDA entered 
government. This event triggered a left-wing rising, and with its suppression, politics 
took a decisively reactionary turn. Valencia was spared the worst excesses of the 
repression, and local working-class organisations seem in general to have managed 




cases dramatically. The PURA was appalled by the right-wing turn in national politics, 
but its leaders were not prepared to countenance withdrawing political support from 
the Radicals. Devoid of its mass base, but granted mastery of local government, a 
move into opposition would have led to the party losing control of local patronage 
which would almost certainly have seen the party collapse. Throughout 1935 it had 
nothing to contribute to national politics except blind acquiesence to the Radicals, 
but  provincially the PURA leadership enjoyed the continued opportunities for 
personal enrichment.    
 
With the collapse of the Radicals in the autumn of 1935 under the weight of 
allegations of corruption, the PURA, which was itself tainted by similar allegations, 
needed new allies. Fortunately for its leaders, they found one in the Galician notable, 
Portela Valladares, who  was appointed by the President to attempt to rebuild a 
centre party which would attempt to partially ‘make’ the next general elections in the 
traditional Restoration manner with the aim of denying the left or the right an outright 
majority. The PURA became in effect the Valencian affiliate of the new party, and 
was rewarded with continuing control of local government under the benevolent eye 
of the new Portelista Civil Governor. With the electoral victory of the Popular Front in 
February 1936, Portela’s project failed nationally, and it did no better in Valencia 
where the PURA saw a calamitous drop in its vote as the Popular Front won in both 
the city and the province. The PURA attempted to rebuild, but this process was 
interrupted by the military rising of July 1936, and it ceased to exist when it was 
proscribed shortly thereafter. 
 
(vi) Thesis chapter outline 
 
Chapter 1 explains the ideology and political culture of the PURA, and discusses 
how meaningful it is to consider the party an organisation of the ‘centre’ in the light 
of its origins as a party with a strong populist streak and its relationship with the 
Radicals nationally during the Republic. This in turn requires a discussion of what 
the term ‘centre’ meant at the national level and the degree of potential popular 





Chapter 2 covers the period from the fall of the dictatorship of General Primo de 
Rivera in January 1930 to the declaration of the Republic in April 1931. It describes 
the reorganisation of republican forces and the successful attempts of the PURA to 
become, for the first time, a party with an important presence throughout the 
province. Particular attention is paid to how little blasquismo, at its heart still a highly 
parochial municipal organisation, with poor quality leadership, had adapted its views 
to the new political terrain. It deals also with the arrival of a new force on the 
Valencian right, the DRV, which sought to galvanise the pro-monarchist forces 
against republicanism. Lastly, I discuss the overwhelming republican victory in the 
April 1931 elections.  
 
The Republic represented, for all its failings, the first serious attempt to establish a 
democracy in Spain. The significance of the ‘new democracy’ dynamic in the creation 
and growth of political parties  in this highly fluid political landscape is discussed in 
Chapter 3 specifically in the Valencian context. I discuss how the influx of new 
members particularly in settlements where the PURA had previously not existed, 
changed the nature of the party’s social support, and the extent to which these 
changes may have altered the political trajectory of the party.   
 
Chapter 4   concentrates on the  creation of the provincial Radical Socialist party 
and the early success of the local Derecha Liberal Republicana (Republican Liberal 
Right, or DLR), the conservative, mainly Catholic, republican party and the PURA’s 
hostile  response to both, placing this in the long PURA tradition of intolerance 
towards opponents, particularly republican opponents. In the short term this attack 
on potential rivals proved successful given the the overwhelming victory in the Cortes 
elections for the PURA-led alliance.   
 
A central feature of Spanish republican ideology was a critical, and often openly 
hostile, attitude to the Catholic church, which was viewed as a bulwark of political 




clerical line and  how the combined effect of the Republic’s national legislation and 
the PURA’s localised anti-clericalism boosted support for the DRV so that, by the 
summer of 1932, the DRV could be said to be a truly mass organisation.  The other 
main theme of this chapter is the increasing hostility of the PURA towards the 
Socialist party both nationally and locally.  
 
Chapter 6  covers the period October 1932 to October 1933 when the PURA and 
the DRV worked closely and effectively together to oppose the central government. 
I explain what motivated both parties to do this and why they were able to co-operate 
across the ‘sectarian divide’.  
 
The general elections of November 1933 are widely regarded as the most honest 
elections held during the Republic. If correct, then Valencia was an exception to this 
since it is clear that the elections here represented one of the most corrupt and violent 
campaigns to have occurred anywhere during the Republic.  There is no doubt that 
victory was stolen from the DRV in Valencia province and possibly in the city too, 
and that the violence and corruption was orchestrated by the PURA in order to 
ensure victory. In Chapter 7 I explain  the consequences for Valencian politics.    
 
Chapter 8 deals with the PURA’s response to the national electoral results and the 
Radical-led governments during the period December 1933 to September 1934. The 
rightwards direction of politics, partly from the CEDA but driven also by an 
increasingly hardline attitude to social unrest from within the Radicals, led to the 
PURA splitting in July 1934. I examine the reasons for the split and its results. I also 
explain the circumstances under which a member of the PURA, Ricardo Samper, 
became Prime Minister, and reassess the performance of Samper’s government.52  
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The consequences on Valencian politics of the granting of Cabinet posts to the CEDA 
in October 1934 and the left-wing rising which followed are examined in Chapter 9, 
which covers the period October 1934 to July 1935. Particular attention is given to 
the effective supplanting of the PURA by Izquierda Republicana and how in the 
summer of 1935 its rise destroyed what remained of the PURA’s popular support. As 
the country polarised, the parochialism of local politics were increasingly submerged 
in the national struggle, symbolised in Valencia when three huge political meetings, 
by Izquierda Republicana, the CEDA/ DRV and the Radicals/PURA were held at the 
Mestalla football stadium.  
 
In Chapter 10 I discuss  the collapse of the Radicals in the autumn of 1935 as 
evidence emerged of corruption in the so-called ‘Straperlo’ affair in which two 
important members of the PURA, Ricardo Samper and the party’s leader, Sigfrido 
Blasco, were implicated.   I place the PURA’s  involvement in the broader context of 
the PURA’s notorious reputation for corruption which had dogged the party from its 
creation and had worsened significantly with the arrival of the Republic.  I explain 
why the PURA, unlike the Radicals, did not completely collapse at this point. Indeed 
it was viewed as a credible ally of Portela Valladares as he attempted to build a new 
party of the political centre. I describe the PURA’s involvement in Portela’s strategy 
in the February 1936 elections and the reasons for its failure locally.  
 
Following the victory of the Popular Front, the PURA was a bystander to the growing 
tensions of the spring and summer of 1936, which were largely focussed on growing 
anti-clerical behaviour culminating in a significant number of arson attacks on Church 
property. In Chapter 11 I discuss the impact of these incidents on the DRV and the 
reasons why the party committed itself to conspiratorial activity against the regime. 
The reasons why the military rising in Valencia failed are explained. With the failure, 
the PURA and the DRV ceased to exist. The early incidents of revolutionary 
repression against the forces of the right, particularly former members of the DRV, 





In considering the actions of the PURA during the Republic both as a provincial force 
and nationally as the de facto provincial affiliate of the Radicals, this thesis attempts 
to interrogate what it meant to be a force supposedly of the political ‘centre’ in a 
society where social disorder and political polarisation were pulling civil society apart. 
Trapped by its past, its populist discourse and its blind loyalty to Lerroux, the PURA 
was Janus faced, centrist at the national level and trying and failing to maintain a 
superficial radicalism locally. Attempting to hold to this impossible position, it proved 
to be the major force for political instability in Valencia.    
 
 



















1  THE PURA: CENTRISM, POPULISM, REPUBLICANISM AND PARTY 
ORGANISATION  
 
….the Nation must be the harmonic integration of all the forces and 
ideologies and not the patrimony of a single, class, doctrine or 
organisation…. 





This thesis is primarily about the PURA and its title implies that it is an accurate 
description of the PURA to describe it as the fulcrum of centrist politics in Valencia. 
The description is however problematic. In this chapter I explain why, in spite of the 
peculiarities of the PURA as an organisation, it is, for want of a better term, the right 
one to use. There were aspects of the PURA’s ideology and discourse, and in 
particular a residual left populism, which caused difficulties with the PURA’s 
relationship with the Radicals. As the PURA retained much of its populist discourse 
I also discuss what this meant in the context of the Republic and the nature of the 
PURA’s republicanism in ideological terms. Given the tension between provincial and 
national politics, embodied partly in the differences between the PURA and the 
Radicals, I discuss too the question as to what it meant to be a party of the political 
centre in a society such as the Republic, with its turbulent and radicalising politics. I 
will also discuss the organisational structure of the PURA and how this impacted its 
ability to impose a clear party discipline on its members.  
 
1.2 Centrism  
 
The long-established application of the terms ‘left’ and right’ in the political context 
represent points on a linear and two-dimensional axis, a spatial metaphor which 
                                            




implies intermediate points of reference, with the middle point being the ‘centre’. 
Surprisingly little scholarly work in the area of political science has taken place on what 
the term ‘centre’ means in ideological terms, and its precise meaning will in any case 
depend on the specific politics of the country concerned and will also evolve over time, 
but there is broad agreement that self-definition, by parties and voters, is one of the 
most important elements.2 It is generally recognised that while the existence of a 
sizeable middle-class (absent in Spain at this time) is a necessary pre-condition for 
the establishment and maintenance of a stable parliamentary democracy, it is by no 
means a sufficient condition. Moreover, the existence of such a middle-class does not 
necessarily mean that ‘centrist’ political ideas will prevail or that a specific centrist 
political party will have electoral appeal.3   In the vast majority of cases, one cannot 
establish a straightforward class basis of support for a party in terms of its position on 
the left/right axis. Workers and poor peasants do not always support the left, and the 
middle-class do not always support parties (or values) which regard themselves as 
being in the political centre or on the moderate political right. Indeed, under conditions 
of economic and political crisis, the middle classes may support authoritarian solutions 
of the extreme right.4  
 
Politics can polarise away from a centrist position even where class differences are 
not especially severe where there are other key ‘cleavages’ such as religion.5 In the 
                                            
2 See Hans Daalder, ‘In Search of the Center of European Party Systems’, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, March 1984, pp. 92-109; John D. Huber, ‘Values and partisanship in 
left-right orientations: measuring ideology’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 17, 1989, pp. 
599-621; Oddbjørn Knutsen, ‘Europeans Move Towards the Center: A Comparative Longitudinal 
Study of Left-Right Placement in Western Europe’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 
Volume 10, Issue 4, 1 December 1998, pp. 292–316; and Toni Rodon, ‘Do All Roads Lead to the 
Center? The Unresolved Dilemma of Centrist Self-Placement’, International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 1 June 2015, pp.177–196. 
3 This point has been made many times, but see Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, March 1959, pp. 69-105. 
4 Another frequently made point, but for a particularly wide-ranging survey over European politics, see 
Mark Mazover, Dark Continent: Europe's 20th Century, Knopf, New York, 1998. 
5 The term ‘cleavage’ denotes a specific type of conflict in democratic politics that is rooted in the 
social structural transformations that have been triggered by large-scale processes and are therefore 
fundamental divisions, such as religious, class, or ethnic splits which affect political allegiances and 
policies. See the classic introductory essay by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ‘Cleavage 




Spanish case an additional key ‘cleavage’ was the attitude towards the regime as an 
entity (monarchy or republic). These two additional cleavages map quite closely to a 
linear analysis with other issues such as attitudes to hierarchy, workers’ rights and the 
separation of church and state, so they are not in themselves distortive, but they do 
represent additional reasons as to why a centrist project was unlikely to become a 
stabilising point of the new regime.6  
 
Even where there might be a large body of voters who self-identify as ‘centrist’ in their 
political views, the nature of the party political system needs to be taken into account. 
In the Spanish case this was not a problem since the fragmented and polarised nature 
of the party political system, although conducive to political instability, left voters with 
the option of supporting a party or parties which openly proclaimed themselves to be 
‘centrist’. In contrast in two party democracies, where broad coalitions span a 
significant portion of the political spectrum, ‘centrist’ parties have rarely thrived though 
the majority of voters in modern parliamentary democracies typically self-define as 
either ‘centrist’ or ‘moderate’.  
 
For the PURA, this process of self-definition as a centrist entity was itself a complex 
process. Its broad statement of principles made in 1930 and repeated late in 1931, 
although vague, can be read as centrist given its attempt to appeal to all social classes 
and its assertion that social reform could be implemented without threatening any 
social class, although this type of rhetoric was common within Spanish republicanism 
and was used by some who would not necessarily self-identify as ‘centrist’. The 
PURA’s statements in 1930 and 1931 will be discussed in more detail later in this 
thesis.7  At the same time, the party tried to present itself as a radical and strongly pro-
                                            
Rokkan, (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspective, Free Press, New 
York, 1967.      
6 These other key cleavages were an important factor in the slow and limited development of 
republican sentiment within the emerging middle class. Luis Iñigo Fernández, ‘La Derecha Liberal 
Republicana. Un modelo de organización de un partido republicano conservador durante la Segunda 
República española’, Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie V, Historia contemporánea, No. 12, 1999, pp. 
133-178 , ‘La ideología de la derecha liberal en la España de la Segunda República (1931–1936)’, 
Spagna contemporanea, No. 17, 2000, pp. 59–74, and ‘El republicanismo conservador en la España 
de los años treinta’, Revista de estudios políticos, No. 110, 2000, pp. 281-296. 
7 See Partido Union Repúblicana Autonomista, Proyecto de programa y bases del Partido Union 




workers’ party, continuing to cultivate the support of workers who were members of 
the CNT, and it usually attacked the policies of the PSOE with rhetoric which largely 
echoed the attacks made on the PSOE and its socialist union the UGT by the CNT.  
 
The credibility of the PURA as a strongly pro-workers organisation was not helped by 
the social composition of its provincial leadership. Although some local PURA 
organisations had a few workers within the leadership, they were conspicuously 
absent from the provincial leadership. Not one of its leaders could be described as a 
worker, although the party made much of the working-class origins of the elderly self-
made businessman Joaquín Garcia Ribes who had started his working life as a 
carpenter.8 In terms of the social composition of the party’s leadership, it was very 
similar to that of other national and local republican organisations, with a 
predominance of businessmen, journalists, and members of the liberal professions, 
especially lawyers. The only really distinctive feature of the composition of its 
leadership team, compared to other local political organisations, is that it had not a 
single prominent academic, or indeed any academic, amongst its leaders.      
 
Generally, the PURA in its local propaganda avoided describing itself as a centrist 
political force. In terms of national politics however, its complete loyalty to the leader 
of the Radical Party, Alejandro Lerroux, and hence to the political strategy and 
trajectory of the Radicals, meant that it identified itself as the regional affiliate of a 
national party which was openly proclaiming itself as a party of the centre. As Townson 
has noted, from the earliest days of the Republic Lerroux stressed that for its survival 
the Republic needed to attract support from the broad mass of Spaniards and to do 
so it needed to be a regime of consensus, adopting the slogan of the former 
monarchist Santiago Alba that ‘The Republic is for all Spaniards’.9  During the 1933 
general election campaign, Lerroux described himself as the ‘…centre solution of 
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9 Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 




Spanish politics’.10 Whenever Lerroux made an important political speech El Pueblo 
usually gave it front page coverage, typically reporting it word for word, and the paper’s 
leader column declaring total support.11   
 
Although it is clear that in terms of national politics the PURA leadership saw itself as 
part of a national political organisation which self-defined as centrist, the relationship 
between the party’s self-identification on the political spectrum, its grass-root members 
and its voters is much more complex. By 1930 it had become the most important 
political organisation throughout the province but we know very little of the social 
composition of the expanded party. New members were unlikely to feel strong loyalty; 
in the fluid and highly contested political landscape of the Republic one cannot identify 
any group of voters in Valencia with a strong partisan identification with any of the 
political parties (except for supporters of the Socialists), let alone establish that in 
ideological terms these voters held political views which were similar to those of the 
PURA leadership. But we do know that throughout the province it must have attracted 
very many poor peasant landowners and tenants to vote for it because the social 
composition of Valencia province meant that that had to be the case for any successful 
political party.  
 
Despite a sometimes fraught relationship with the local workers’ organisations, 
blasquismo maintained a high level of support within the urban working-class.12  The 
origin of the party as a municipal force of the city helped it maintain close relations 
with local workers and it continued to present itself as a leftist party, while the 
Radicals had between 1918 and 1923 accentuated their conservative image.13 No 
doubt like many ordinary voters elsewhere, many of the urban working class were 
not very politically literate and/or did not hold a coherent set of ideological views, but 
it seems unlikely that many could be labelled ‘centrist’. As rank-and-file members of 
                                            
10 Townson, Crisis, p. 184. 
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the CNT and/or the Oposición unions, which were organisations led by anarcho-
syndicalists, and who accepted union discipline during a number of strikes during 
this period, the probability is that these voters would not have supported an openly 
centrist political party.  
 
1.3 The PURA as a ‘Particularist’ Party  
 
The analysis so far of the PURA as a ‘centrist’ political party has been constructed as 
if the PURA were a modern ideologically driven political party, under which its leaders 
held clear ideological principles which translated themselves into a consistent political 
programme. Such a party, when in government, is expected to implement its policies 
in a transparent and unbiased way in accordance with the rule of law.14 The term used 
by political scientists – and which I will use in this thesis - for this type of party is a 
‘programmatic’ party, in reality an idealised type of organisation. This is contrasted 
with a ‘particularist’ party which is one with little or no ideological motivation, no serious 
political programme other than the desire to gain and to maintain itself in power, and 
which uses the machinery of the state to build party loyalty amongst its members, to 
buy votes, and to target resources towards individual voters to buy long-term loyalty. 
 
‘Particularist’ is the term I have adopted from the schema developed by Petr Kopecký, 
Gerardo Scherlis and Maria Spirova under which the broadest category of non-
programmatic behaviour is referred to as ‘particularist’, whilst terms such as 
‘patronage’, ‘pork barrel’ and ‘clientelist’ politics are given subsidiary meanings.15  The 
use of such a schema allows for a more focussed and rigorous analysis of the nature 
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15  Petr Kopecký, Gerardo Scherlis and Maria Spirova, Party Patronage in New Democracies: 
Concepts, Measures and the Design of Empirical Inquiry, Paper delivered at the 2007 Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Chicago,  August 30th-September 2nd, 2007, available 
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of the PURA. In reality, both ‘programmatic’ and ‘particularist’ parties represent 
theoretical models and all political parties fall somewhere between the two. The PURA 
did have political principles and a confused and inconsistent ideology, but much of its 
behaviour and the nature of its support can only be understood if the particularist 
aspects of the party are understood. 
 
Within this schema, ‘patronage’ is defined (narrowly) as the appointment of people to 
positions in public and semi-public life. Patronage in this sense is used by party leaders 
to build and maintain active and disciplined networks of party activists and functions 
as a ‘social cement’ to hold together the organisation and to co-opt new supporters. It 
is part and parcel of all politics, not just strongly particularist forms, but particularist 
parties typically use it intensively.16 Throughout the existence of the PURA the use of 
patronage had been a constant feature, but it took on a qualitatively different 
dimension within the Republic because before then the PURA only controlled the 
municipality of Valencia city and thus had limited power to offer jobs in the context of 
a national state machine which was hostile to republicanism and hence to the PURA. 
There were regular complaints from political opponents of the PURA during the 
Republic that senior and middle-ranking posts within City Hall and within the 
Diputación were filled with PURA members and prominent supporters. 
 
One characteristic of particularist parties which was of little significance to the PURA 
for most of its history was that known by the American term of ‘pork-barrelling’, that is  
the appropriation of government spending for localized projects which benefit all local 
voters, but where the costs are born by the electorate as a whole. As an oppositional 
group under the Restoration system, and as the Valencian representative of the 
Radical Party during the first years of the Republic, the PURA had little opportunity to 
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achieve any material ‘pork-barrelling’ benefit for Valencia. During the second bienio 
however, and especially under the premiership of Ricardo Samper, this became one 
of the predominant tactics used to shore up its crumbling political support.  
 
Clientelism as a term is used here in a restricted sense to describe the activities 
whereby a party builds a sophisticated vote-garnering machine in order to engage in 
a range of activities to induce voters to vote for it. These activities include vote-buying 
and directing resources to individual voters and /or particular groups of voters both at 
election times and other times too in order to promote voter loyalty. It may also offer 
financial and other inducements in return for votes.  
 
The capture of municipal politics during the first third of the twentieth century enabled 
the PURA to fund a clientelist system in the city which benefited local workers in return 
for their political support and often membership. If a worker wished to be employed by 
City Hall, membership of the PURA was essential. The creation of jobs, schools, 
consumer co-operatives, financial support and provision of accommodation for local 
unions, the provision of free clothes, soup kitchens, and access to medical care to 
both supporters and to broader categories of voters to create a limited kind of welfare 
state for the poor were powerful incentives to support the PURA. Even under the 
dictatorship of Primo when access to state resources was denied to the PURA it was 
able to maintain some of these activities especially educational ones, as the continued 
existence of the Casa de la Democracia in Valencia city shows.17  
 
No evidence exists about the precise structural mechanisms used by the PURA to 
sustain their clientelist machinery and how this related to the formal party organisation. 
It was presumably sophisticated because it enabled the PURA to maintain strong 
loyalty amongst the urban working-class at a time when the leadership of local unions 
was becoming highly radicalised by anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist ideology. It is 
probable that the key element of the clientelist structure was the blasquista casinos 
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(social clubs), which were often the only visible permanent presence of the party in 
working-class neighbourhoods even though in formal terms they were only loosely 
aligned with the party. Blasquista casinos were well equipped with libraries, and were 
centres of political propaganda and education and represented the part of the PURA 
organisation which was most embedded in the local neighbourhoods.18  
 
Some possible clues as to how the PURA managed its clients may be found in the 
extensive scholarly work which has been carried out in respect of Mexico, Ecuador, 
Brazil and Argentina on the ‘bottom up’ aspects of how a political party can use a 
successful clientelist machine for mass support within societies which hold democratic 
elections. Although one has to be wary in drawing conclusions from very different 
societies, these suggest that to operate a successful vote-garnering machine, parties 
need to deploy large numbers of militants who in the main are residents of the local 
communities in which they operate. Political scientists use the term ‘brokers’ to 
describe such people, since they have a crucial intermediate role in distributing 
resources to individual voters and in providing key information to party leaders. They 
are usually paid to carry out this role, funded sometimes directly by the party or (more 
often) from corruptly mis-directed state funds.  
 
The term ‘brokers’ however is perhaps an unfortunate word because it implies a simple 
transactional role within a competitive market, whereas such individuals are often well-
regarded local militants who act as much as community organisers and/or social 
workers.19  Although we cannot be sure that the PURA had ‘brokers’ in this sense, we 
                                            
18 For the crucial importance of the casinos in the rise of the PURA, see Ramiro Reig, Blasquistas y 
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do know that there were regular complaints from the party’s political opponents that 
the payrolls at City Hall and the Diputación for junior posts were stuffed with ‘phantom’ 
employees who were never seen at work. A possible explanation is that many of these 
municipal ‘employees’ were in reality acting in a similar way to brokers on behalf of the 
PURA in their communities.  
 
Elsewhere in the province, there is no extant evidence. Given that the PURA had not 
managed to penetrate most of the province until the arrival of the Republic, it is 
doubtful that any clientelist machine which it did manage to construct could match the 
efficiency of the city operation. To the extent that any machine existed, the PURA’s 
capture of the Diputación would have been critical because this opened up the 
possibility of using (misdirected) state funds to employ brokers but also allowed the 
offer of employment, especially within the road maintenance and building team, to 
loyal supporters. Where the PURA also controlled the local municipality the overlap 
between the opportunities generated from the Diputación and those from the 
municipality may have allowed an effective machine to have been established, but it 
is also probable that in parts of the province it had no effective clientelist mechanism. 
 
Placing a political party with strong particularist elements on a conventional left/right 
axis is not straightforward. A purely particularist party could hardly be mapped at all 
since the political values usually associated with ‘left’, ‘right’ or ‘centre’ would not apply. 
Thus because the PURA, at least in terms of Valencian politics, had strong particularist 
features, it could be argued that the term ‘centrist’ is hardly applicable. This would 
however be too extreme a position. By reason of its history, as the centre of republican 
opposition to the Restoration system in Valencia, its long-term advocacy of a lay 
                                            
Hilgers (ed.), Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012; 
Mariela Szwarcberg, Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in 
Argentina,  Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge, 2015; Carlos G. Vélez-Ibañez, 
Rituals of Marginality: Politics, Process, and Culture Change in Urban Central Mexico, 1969-1974, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1983; Rodrigo Zarazaga,  ‘Brokers Beyond 
Clientelism: A New Perspective Through the Argentine Case’, Latin American Politics and Society, 





Republic, and its championing of workers’ rights, it should be placed on the left at least 
until the Republic became a reality.  
 
During the period of the Republic the position became much more complex. Nationally, 
in its support for the Radicals and Lerroux, it is clearly correct to place it close to the 
political centre, although one has to acknowledge that the increasingly conservative 
political trajectory of the Radicals demonstrates that the ‘centre’ was a shifting and 
often elusive concept. Within Valencia its opposition to the main political players on 
the left and right of the political spectrum and its strong continued commitment to a lay 
Republic places it, tentatively, in the political centre as the Radicals’ ‘left wing’. But it 
must be acknowledged that its intolerance towards its political opponents and the 
demagoguery of its political campaigns against the centre-left administrations of the 
first bienio make it a strange centrist beast indeed.    
 
1.4 PURA Populism  
 
A central feature of PURA ideology throughout the Restoration period was its claim 
to personify the Valencian people against the dynastic political elite, both local and 
national. The glorification of Blasco Ibáñez, the manner in which the PURA portrayed 
the Republic as an almost magical solution to all conflicts, the aggressive and highly 
sentimentalised tone and content of blasquista propaganda, and the denial of 
political legitimacy to its political opponents, has led Ramiro Reig to categorise 
blasquismo as ‘populist’.20  There is a strong element of truth in this, but it needs to 
be qualified. 
 
Much scholarly work in the field of political science has been undertaken on the 
meaning of the term ’populism’ in recent years, and whether it can best be 
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understood as an ideology, a discourse, or merely a type of rhetoric. There is still 
much disagreement, but there is an emerging consensus that in isolation it is an 
inadequate term to define any political movement, and has to be understood in a 
broader context. For this reason it has been described as a ‘thin-centred’ ideology.21 
For the purposes of this thesis is not necessary to attempt a definitive answer to 
these theoretical distinctions since even if ‘populism’ is little more than a rhetorical 
style, it clearly had an important role within blasquismo.22   
   
Whilst populism’s exaltation of ‘the people’ is central to its message, this in itself is 
insufficient to explain the term, and Laclau has argued that the delegitimisation and 
creation of a strong antagonism towards the elite are also essential components.23 
Many scholars point out that Laclau’s analysis, although correct as far as it goes, is 
too general to carry much analytical power.24 In the context of Spanish republicanism 
under the Restoration system it would, without further qualification, result in all 
republicans being described as ‘populist’ since in their pursuit of a republic they 
championed ‘the people’ and attacked the elite of the Restoration system. Opponents 
of the system, which had the trappings but not the reality of parliamentary 
democracy, needed an alternative source of political legitimacy which they could only 
find in the concept of ‘popular sovereignty’ or simply ‘the people’. This alternative 
source of legitimacy was shared with but was not exclusive to populism, but most 
other republicans, once the ancien régime had fallen, did not claim a monopoly of 
political truth.   
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The stress which populism puts on the concept of ‘the people’ as undifferentiated, 
brings it close to a position hostile to plurality in which populist leaders claim to 
identify the true people whose views, it transpires, chime with their own. All 
opponents, whether formally part of the elite or not, from this point of view lack 
legitimacy.25 Blasquismo shared this claim that it was (within Valencia) a uniquely 
virtuous organisation and this was clear when it set out by the use of street violence 
to destroy the rival republican movement of Blasco’s former colleague and then rival  
Rodrigo Soriano. By demonstrating that it was more threated by those who claimed 
a rival republican legitimacy than it was by the Restoration elite, its implicit 
authoritarianism was laid bare. It also demonstrated the populist need to create 
enemies to mobilise its masses. This explains why during the Republic its campaign 
against the PSOE and against the central government headed by Manuel Azaña took 
on such an extraordinarily aggressive tone.   
 
Since it was a provincial organisation in a region which was not nationalist nor even 
strongly regionalist in sentiment, there was little to no concept of valencians as being 
a distinct people and this imposed limits on the PURA’s claim to speak for the 
‘people’. As the people in this case meant the Spanish people, the PURA could only 
claim to speak for that component of the Spanish people within Valencia. Any claim 
to be the sole repository of republican truth were never, therefore, sustainable, 
because its ideology looked towards the rest of Spain and it also needed republican 
allies from elsewhere. All this meant that there was always an acceptance of a 
measure of pluralism at the national level and an acceptance that blasquismo was 
not necessarily entirely synonymous with Spanish republicanism.  It could (and did) 
claim superiority for its version of republicanism, but a claim of superiority fell far 
short of a delegitimisation of other strands.26   We might, perhaps, best describe the 
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PURA not as a populist party but as a ‘Janus-faced’ entity, strongly populist in 
Valencia but much less so in terms of national politics.    
 
1.5 ‘Belt out la Marseillaise and vote blasquista’: PURA Republicanism 
 
It is only relatively recently that the ideology of Spanish republicanism has been 
seriously studied and it is now clear that it lacked a coherent theoretical framework.27 
Álvarez Junco has argued that republican ideology functioned as a kind of ‘alternative 
Catholicism’, that is a broad ethical and quasi-religious worldview for those opposed 
to the monarchy which, although providing a powerful emotional and intellectual 
framework to oppose the regime, was not particularly conducive to the development 
of detailed political ideas. In my view, this argument has a great deal of merit.28  At a 
practical level, this broad vision was useful in helping to bring together people with a 
very wide spectrum of political views. All that was necessary to be accepted within 
the republican family was opposition to the monarchy and belief in a laic state. But 
as well as a benefit there were potential costs in the ability to postpone the 
development of a serious political programme virtually indefinitely.   
 
Consistent with republicans elsewhere, the PURA had carried out no work on how to 
adapt republican ideology to the needs of the twentieth century and little work on 
what it might mean in terms of producing a concrete political programme which was 
relevant to Valencia. Cucó has summarised its ideology as ‘to belt out la Marseillaise, 
and vote blasquista. Here beginneth and endeth the “Revolution”’.29 Cucó was a 
harsh critic of blasquismo, and with reason, but he is wrong to imply that the PURA 
                                            
it in his article ‘populismo’). See also his book Catalunya populista. Imatge, cultura i politica en 
l’etapa republicana (1931-1939), Barcelona, La Magrana, 1982. 
27 The most important study remains the collection of essays in Nigel Townson (ed.), El 
republicanismo en España (1830-1977), Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1994, (Townson, republicanismo). 
28 See his ‘Los amantes de la libertad: la cultura republicana española a principios del siglo XX’, in 
Townson, republicanismo, pp. 265-292. 
29 Prologue by Alfons Cucó to the 1975 reprint of Vicente Marco Miranda, Las conspiraciones contra 




had no ideology: its ideology was simply that of many other Spanish republicans and 
had few distinctive features other than a stronger populist component.  
 
The party might fairly be described as being somewhat anti-intellectual.  Throughout 
the entire history of the party it did not produce a single profound political thinker, 
theoretician or ideologue. Blasco Ibáñez was a good journalist and an excellent 
novelist, but his political writings were entirely derivative.30 Félix Azzati left no corpus 
of political writing and did not claim to be an intellectual. Of the leading figures in the 
PURA in the period from 1930, only Fernando Valera could claim to be a serious 
thinker, but he was a member of the party for too short a time to influence its 
ideological direction. 
 
If anything distinguished the republican strand within blasquista ideology, it was the 
fact that its ideas were taken almost entirely from the thinkers of the First Republic; 
from El Pueblo, one would gain the impression that republican political thought had 
stopped with the federalist ideas of Francisco Pi y Margall.31 Given that the party had 
been content simply to defend its municipal redoubt of Valencia city, its insularism 
and lack of interest in intellectual development is perhaps not surprising. This left it 




                                            
30 On the political writings of Blasco Ibáñez, see Antonio Laguna Platero, El Pueblo: historia de un 
diario republicano, 1894-1939, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1999 pp. 1-115; José Luis Leon Roca, 
Blasco Ibáñez. Política i periodismo, Edicions 62, Valencia, 1970; and Paul Smith, V. Blasco Ibáñez. 
Contra la Restauración. Periodismo político 1895–1904, Nuestra Cultura, Madrid, 1978.   
31 On Pi y Margall, see Antoni Jutglar, Pi y Margall y el Federalismo español. 2 vols, Taurus, Madrid, 
1974.    
32 Ramiro Reig goes too far in arguing that once blasquismo extended itself beyond the city, it ‘carried 
the seeds of its own destruction’. There was nothing pre-ordained in the events which followed. The 
PURA leadership had the organisation’s fate in its hands, and the subsequent collapse was far from 
inevitable. Ramiro Reig Armero, ‘Entre la realidad y la ilusión: el fenómeno blasquista en Valencia, 




1.6 Formal Structure of the PURA 
 
A distinction has to be made between the organisation of the PURA as intended under 
its constitution and the reality.33 Under the constitution day to day management and 
control of the party was to be placed in the hands of a new body, the Federal Council. 
The Council would be directly elected by the committees of local PURA branches, but 
each branch decided how it would consult with its members. Council members were 
supposed to be subject to elections in every other year, with one half of them then 
required to stand for election. Subject to oversight by the annual assembly of the whole 
party, the Council would decide on party strategy. 
 
With the exception of Valencia city, each settlement in the province which had a PURA 
office constituted one branch. The draft constitution was silent on how individual 
branches should operate in terms of party discipline and policy, and how local 
committees should be organised; no ‘model rules’ on individual branches were 
imposed and there seems to have been little central oversight or control over individual 
branches.34 The city organisation was divided into eleven districts, each district 
constituting a branch for these purposes.  The organisational structure of the party 
was very flat, with each individual branch in theory reporting to and in turn supervised 
by the Council. With the exception of the city organisation, there were no formal links 
between the separate PURA branches and the only connecting link was through the 
Council. The city organisation did have its own city assembly, in addition to its right to 
participate in the provincial assembly, but the city assembly had no power and was a 
purely advisory body.    
 
                                            
33 The information on the constitution is taken from the Information on the preparation for the assembly 
and the report of the assembly as set out in in El Pueblo, 3, 4, 6, 10 and 11 June 1930. 
34 In common with many political parties of the republican period, there seems to have been no full-
time party bureaucracy. Certainly there was no central headquarters building and whatever central 
role was carried out seems to have been undertaken from the offices of El Pueblo, presumably on a 
part-time basis by employees of the newspaper. In contrast, the DRV had both a party bureaucracy 




Although each local branch was subordinate to the Council, the Council did not in 
theory have untrammelled power. Apart from its members being subject to election, 
the supreme sovereign body of the party was the annual assembly, composed of 
delegates nominated by each branch, which had the power to evaluate the 
performance of the Council over the previous year and to set down broad policy 
guidelines which the Council was obliged to follow over the coming year. The annual 
assembly also elected the President of the Council, but could only do so from the 
Council’s current members. Thus the PURA had a very flat formal structure, with all 
day to day power lying with the Council but with there being in theory at least 
considerable democratic checks and balances.  
 
The gap between reality and theory was wide. In part, this occurred because of the 
sheer pace at which the PURA grew during the first months of 1930. On 24 January 
senior members of the party met to set in train its reorganisation. They established a 
provisional leadership team, known as the Central Reorganizing Committee, which set 
about writing a draft constitution and a provisional statement of political principles. 
From the complete lack of information in El Pueblo, it seems that no formal elections 
were held for the Council.35  Given the rapid pace at which PURA branches were still 
being created, holding elections would have been very difficult, but it seems that some 
sort of informal consultation with local branches must have occurred given the lack of 
resistance to the list of members presented at the assembly. This process gave the 
Central Reorganising Committee effective control over the membership of the Council. 
The Council became a law unto itself. In defiance of the constitution, no elections were 
held for it throughout the period of the Republic, and no further provincial assemblies 
were held under this constitution.36  
 
                                            
35 El Pueblo had a dual function.  Under the party’s constitution it was designated as the official party 
organ and it was mandated that all formal party communications had to be printed in it, but it was also 
a daily newspaper open to purchase by the general public. 
36 On 24 May 1936 the PURA did hold an assembly, the only one actually held during the Republic, 
but this was a constituent assembly as part of the attempted reorganisation of the party after its defeat 




The combination of the flat organisational structure and the lack of democratic 
oversight of the Council worked in the short term at least to the advantage of the party’s 
leadership. There was no effective formal channel under which local branches could 
share views concerning the political direction of travel of the party, endorse or put 
pressure on the leadership to change direction. Each branch was atomised, with no 
formal links with other branches and had no way to impose collective pressure. But in 
the longer term the structure represented a serious weakness to the coherence of the 
party because, once disquiet against the political direction of travel reached an 
intolerable level, the flat structure   made it easy for a dissenting branch simply to leave 
the PURA and keep its local organisation intact either as an autonomous entity or by 




With the fall of Primo, and as the Restoration system entered its dying days, Spanish 
politics faced an uncertain period. The PURA’s role in the events which were to follow 
would be important but in terms of its ideology, its voter base and its newly growing 
organisation it did not appear well-equipped to carry out a clear leadership role. 
Ideologically it faced two ways, presenting itself as an ally of the Radicals at national 
level (and therefore clearly self-identifying as a centrist organisation) whilst 
continuing to present itself within Valencia as a populist party committed to anti-
clericalism and the champion of the working–class. Valencia needed a republicanism 
which could tone down the demagogic rhetoric whilst recognising the needs of the 
urban working-class and the growing power of the poor peasantry. But this was not 
the PURA way. 
 
The PURA was faced with the need to break out of its isolation as a party of the city 
and build a new coalition including workers, the urban lower middle-class and 
sections of the poor peasantry. In a period of rapid political change, the possession 
of a clear ideology and a principled political culture would at least have provided a 
route map to help it construct its new coalition. Instead, it found it difficult to break 




support and to build its organisation at speed but without any clear understanding of 
the alliances it needed to build to ensure long-term local political stability as well as 
ensure its local hegemony. The behaviour of blasquismo from its creation had helped 
create a political culture in the city which simply accepted low-level violence and 
extreme confrontational rhetoric as the norm, whether that was between the PURA 
and the followers of Soriano, or between the PURA and local Carlists. The PURA 
knew how to propagandise, mobilise support, build an electoral machine and to take 
the battle, at the ballot box and in the street, to its political enemy. But it did not know 




















2 ‘HOURS OF TRANSITION’: THE COMING OF THE REPUBLIC IN VALENCIA.  
 JANUARY 1930 TO APRIL 1931 
 
In the entire province grows the fruitful and intense flowering of our ideas with 
new legions which join our party. Unusual is the week in which a republican 
entity does not open its doors…even in the farthest corners of the rural 
districts of Valencia. 




In this chapter I will describe the role which Valencia played in the national political 
events which followed the fall of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, as the political 
forces opposed to the monarchy sought to unite and to mobilise in order to defeat 
the demoralised and fractured dynastic forces. Valencia was one province among 
many, but it was an important one. As one of the few places where at the city level 
at least the Restoration ‘turno’ had been decisively shattered by republicans it was a 
key strategic location for the anti-dynastic forces.  
 
The dominant anti-dynastic force, the republican PURA, was to play a superb 
strategic hand in gaining effective political hegemony throughout most of the 
province, the sole occasion on which the leadership showed such skill during the 
entire republican period. This was probably down to the abilities of Fernando Valera 
and his supporters. This organisational drive was all the more impressive because it 
had never before managed to penetrate beyond the boundaries of Valencia city 
except in one or two other important urban settlements. I will explain how the PURA 
managed to achieve this.  I will also describe its relationship with the anarcho-
syndicalist union federation the CNT, and the struggle between relative newcomers 





On the anti-republican side, one new organisation, the DRV stood apart. Far from 
demonstrating the demoralisation of most anti-republican dynastic parties, it showed 
drive, strategic and tactical acumen. I will explain why it was different and the reasons 
for the outstanding quality of its leadership. Although anti-republican, it was only 
barely monarchist, arguing that the form of government was unimportant, but that at 
this stage, a republic could open the way to revolution and therefore had to be 
opposed.  The quality of its leaders, its energy and ideological cohesion allowed it to 
completely dominate the other anti-republican forces in the city. As a new and small 
organisation, not yet organised outside the city, it had limited impact and was unable 
on its own to resist the republican forces, but it was an example of how the Spanish 
right might be able to regroup. I will explain what was unusual about the nature of 
Valencian rightist politics which allowed the DRV to appear and, in time, to prosper.     
 
2.2  ‘To Achieve the Triumph of Our Ideals’: the PURA Reorganises 
 
The period from the fall of the Dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera on 28th 
January 1930 to the arrival of the Second Republic on 14 April 1931 was a time of 
great uncertainty as the monarch sought to restore normality at a time when the 
country began to turn decisively against him. The king entrusted the difficult task of 
restoring constitutional normality to General Berenguer, but there was a widespread 
feeling within the country that a return to the ‘old’ politics of the ‘turno’ must be 
avoided. Yet the first actions of the Berenguer government suggested that this was 
indeed what was envisaged.1  
 
There was an upsurge in republican support and anti-monarchical sentiment 
throughout the country, including Valencia, an acknowledged republican stronghold. 
It was significant that it was in Valencia, in April 1930, that the former Liberal Party 
Minister Alcala-Zamora chose to declare his republicanism.2 In Valencia city, 
                                            
1 Such as the designation of the pre-1923 councillors to town and city halls. The best analysis of the 
period following the fall of Primo remains Schlomo Ben-Ami, The Origins of the Second Republic in 
Spain, Oxford, 1978 (Ben-Ami, Origins).  




republicans had a clear focal point, the PURA, which had controlled City Hall for 
much of the first twenty three years of the twentieth century, continuing to publish its 
daily newspaper, El Pueblo, throughout the years of the dictatorship. PURA members 
had also been key players in conspiratorial activity against the dictatorship, which 
had helped to cement close links with the local CNT.  
 
The PURA now moved decisively to rebuild its machine and to establish, for the first 
time, a significant presence throughout the province. Even nearby villages outside 
the electoral catchment area of the city had previously been of little concern, although 
in one town of importance, Buñol, it had succeeded in making headway in the early 
years of the twentieth century.3 This time, the potential political prize was provincial 
hegemony and the PURA invested much time, effort and financial resources into the 
task; the results were impressive.4 The republican but non-partisan daily newspaper 
El Mercantil Valenciano, in summarising  the key events of 1930,  singled out the 
reorganisation of the PURA as the  political event of the year.5 
 
By March 1930 the PURA had 56 committees in the province and by May 1930 it 
reported 105 local organisations.6 By mid-August it claimed, probably accurately, 180 
organisations.7 This meant that the PURA could boast a presence in virtually every 
significant population centre.8 By the end of June 1930 Assembly it could boast, with 
                                            
3 For the long republican history of Buñol, see https://bunyul.com/2013/05/04/la-memoria-republicana-
de-bunol. Accessed 5 January 2018. For villages outside the city, see for example Manises, Mislata, 
Meliana and Zafranar, all pueblos in the horta, which seem never to have had a PURA organisation 
before; El Pueblo, 2 April 1931 (Manises); El Pueblo, 8 April 1930 (Mislata); El Pueblo, 22 April 1930 
(Meliana); El Pueblo, 13 August 1930 (Zafranar). 
4 The origin of the funding for this organisational drive is unclear, but some of the PURA leaders were 
wealthy, including the three children of Blasco Ibáñez who had inherited significant wealth from their 
father.    
5 El Mercantil Valenciano, 1 January 1931.  
6 El Pueblo, January to May 1930 passim. In the absence of a coherent political programme and 
agreed internal rules, during these first few months it was a moot point as to what the self-definition 
of an organisation as part of the PURA actually meant.  This was equally true, of course, for all of the 
Spanish republican organisations being created or resuscitated at this time: this was a fluid political 
landscape. 
7 El Pueblo, 13 August 1930. 
8 The 1930 census listed 198 settlements with populations of 1,000 or more people in the province; 
see the Ministry of the Interior papers at the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN/FCM_Interior) at Legajo 




good reason, that ‘…Unusual is the week in which a republican entity does not open 
its doors…even in the farthest corners of the rural districts of Valencia.’9 By 
‘…republican entity’, it meant a PURA affiliate.  
 
During this reorganisation drive, the PURA was able to deploy the prestige it had 
acquired through its long domination of the city’s municipal politics. There were no 
other local republican groups of importance, and it was thus free to consolidate its 
position. Such was its predominance in this period that in the local press it was 
frequently referred to simply as ‘the republican party’. Its distancing from Lerroux and 
the Radicals under Azzati meant that it was not seen simply as the Radicals affiliate, 
and it was able to stress its uniquely Valencian, ‘socially advanced’ and anti-clerical 
character to attract working class support. There were clear signs that the PURA was 
edging towards an understanding with the Radicals, specifically that Lerroux was 
content that it take a leading role on behalf of Valencia in Alianza Repúblicana, but it 
was still not certain that the PURA would return to the Radical fold.10  
 
The other national republican parties were slow to organise here. Although local 
organisations which declared loyalty to the new Radical Socialist Party existed in 
some important settlements such as Cullera, Sueca, Villanueva de Castellón and 
Xàtiva, the Radical Socialist national leadership, for reasons which will be discussed 
below, did not make a concerted effort to organise.11 The Derecha Liberal 
                                            
local organisation, which appears high.  Vicent L. Franch i Ferrer, El Blasquisme: Reorganització i 
conflictes polítics 1929-1936, Xàtiva, 1984 p. 35 (Franch, El Blasquisme). 
9 El Pueblo, 25 June 1930. The event which triggered this particular proclamation however was the 
opening of a centre much closer to the city, in the pueblo of Sedaví in the horta. 
10 The Alianza was an ad hoc alliance of republican politicians which took part in the negotiations 
which led to the broader alliance of anti-dynastic forces in August 1930 known as the Pact of San 
Sebastian. On the Alianza, see Ben-Ami, Origins, pp. 68-76. Ben-Ami has suggested that by the end 
of 1929 the PURA was fully in Lerroux’s camp, but in reality the agreement was not yet sealed. Ben-
Ami, Origins, p. 59. In fact, Lerroux encouraged the creation of a city branch of the Radical Party 
which was active in these first months of 1930 but lost support as the PURA inched closer to Lerroux, 
and became virtually inactive. El Mercantil Valenciano, 15 February 1930. 
11 Xàtiva had a Radical Socialist organisation by at the latest 15 February 1930. Organisations existed 
in Cullera, Sueca and Villanueva by May 1930. El Progreso (Xàtiva), 15 February, 10 May and 24 
May 1930. Organisations were also set up in the smaller settlements of Llosa de Ranes and Manuel.  
El Progreso (Xàtiva), 26 June and 6 December 1930.  ‘Xàtiva’ is the valenciano version of the 





Republicana (Republican Liberal Right or DLR)  was founded in August 1930, and 
branches were set up immediately in Valencia city and in Xàtiva and shortly 
thereafter in Gandia, while branches were being formed in eleven other important 
settlements by December 1930.12 It does not however seem to have expanded 
beyond these locations  until March and  April 1931 when further branches  were 
formed; typically the core support for the DLR was former members of the dynastic 
Liberal Party.13  
 
2.3 A Party in Search of a Programme 
 
Faced with likelihood of an imminent Republic, the PURA now for the first time had 
to produce a practical programme of action. At a time when the need for unity in order 
to ensure the downfall of the monarchy was paramount, it had to produce something 
behind which republicans of a wide range of views on the subject of social and 
economic change could unite. Faced with these challenges, it produced a list of ‘high 
level’ policy options which shied away from detail.      
 
Thus the PURA now declared itself to be: 
…a popular, laic, free, social and national party. Popular because it springs 
from all the people,…..from all classes and social professions….because the 
Nation must be the harmonic integration of all the forces and ideologies and 
                                            
12 El Demócrata (Xàtiva), 16 August 1930; El Pueblo, 20 and 29 August and 14 September 1930; El 
Mercantil Valenciano, 20 August 1930 ((Xàtiva and Gandia); the eleven settlements were: L'Alcúdia, 
Antella, Benifairó de la Valldigna, Canals, La Llosa de Ranes, La Pobla Llarga, Llocnou d'En 
Fenollet,  L'Ènova, Rafelguaraf,  Senyera, and Villanueva de Castellón.  El Demócrata (Xàtiva), 13 
December 1930.   
13 In Xàtiva the DLR had its own weekly newspaper, El Demócrata, which had formerly supported the 
dynastic Liberals.  Some of the more significant centres set up in March and April 1931 were in 
Requena, Alzira, Manises Mogente and Paiporta. El Pueblo, 29 March 1931 and El Mercantil 
Valenciano, 29 March 1931 (Manises); El Mercantil Valenciano, 7 March 1931 (Alzira); El Mercantil 
Valenciano, 7 April 1931 (Mogente); El Mercantil Valenciano, 4 April 1931 (Paiporta). The PURA 
courted the new unaligned republican centre in the Liberal Party’s traditional stronghold of Requena 
assiduously but failed in this attempt. It joined the DLR instead in March 1931. Requena was the 
stronghold of the Garcia Berlanga Pardo family; El Pueblo, 3 March 1931. In Gandia, the DLR does 
not seem to have emerged from the former Liberal Party but was formed by local leading figures in 
industry and commerce who had not hitherto been very active politically. Antonio  Calzado Aldaria 
and Luis Sevilla Parra,  La IIª República a Gandía, Centre d'Estudis Alfons el Vell, Gandía, 2000, p. 




not the patrimony of a single, class, doctrine or organisation…Laic 
because…it represents the liberty of thought….because it respects all… 
ideals…it protects the free expression of religious opinion….social because it 
aspires to the betterment and happiness of all….society, eliminating misery, 
overcoming...unjust inequalities, championing the dignity of work and 
proposing mutual support …. 
 
It proclaimed itself to be a strong supporter of private property. The ‘national’ element 
boiled down to a short statement that it was a patriotic national party but one which 
believed in a federal structure for the Spanish State.14 
 
The PURA also proposed: 
… the stimulation and protection of small-scale property and capital for 
workers and peasants, the organisation of unions, co-operatives and societies 
of mutual support, the creation and support of agrarian savings banks and 
workers’ pension funds, conciliation between workers and employers disputes 
in order to support industry, the elimination of large scale landholdings 
[latifundios] and unviable smallholdings [minifundios], and the establishment 
of progressive income taxation, or in the alternative, extra taxes on the great 
fortunes.15 
 
It also supported an eight hour working day, the prohibition of child labour for those 
under fifteen years of age, the prohibition of home–based labour, a particular concern 
in the local textile trade where workers, mainly female, toiled for long hours on low 
pay. The one rather radical measure, the prohibition of latifundios, was unlikely to 
impact Valencia severely since Valencia had few very large holdings. Redistributed 
land was to be worked individually, not collectively.16 All of this placed it firmly in the 
mainstream Spanish republican tradition, but it could be read as placing the PURA 
in the centre of the Spanish political spectrum and hence close to the Radicals 
                                            
14 Ideario: programa político reglamento del Partido de Unión Republicana Autonomista de la 
provincia y Junta Municipal de Valencia (PURA, Ideario), pp. 243-246. This pamphlet was originally 
published in 1932 but has subsequently been republished as an Appendix to Franch, El Blasquisme, 
pp. 242-258. Page references are to the reprinted version. Although published in 1932, this was, with 
minor modifications, the programme which the PURA agreed at its June 1930 Assembly. El Pueblo, 
10 June 1930. See also Proyecto de programa y bases del Partido Unión Republicana Autonomista, 
Valencia, 1930 (PURA, bases). Cucó accurately describes these statements as ‘diffuse’. Alfons Cucó, 
‘Sobre El Radicalismo Valenciano’, Hispania, 1969, (Cucó, ‘Radicalismo’), pp. 117-129 at p. 123.     
15 PURA, Ideario, p. 245.     




ideologically. However, this programmatic vagueness was common within Spanish 
republicanism and in itself did not necessarily mean that the PURA was committing 
itself to a centrist line. It did in the event commit to the Radicals, but it would be a 
mistake to view this statement of principles as some sort of deep-rooted ideological 
commitment.   
 
This type of broad statement was also fully in the tradition of republican ideology in 
the belief that deep-rooted social conflicts and the necessity for the state to exercise 
a coercive function were not endemic to all social organisations and states, but were 
rooted in the form of government, the monarchy, which ruled Spain. There was an 
element of ‘magical thinking’ in the belief that the creation of a Republic would, of 
itself, go a long way to solving these problems and herald in an almost utopian world. 
This idealisation also had its parallels within the anarchist movement, which had a 
close relationship with the PURA during the early years of the century.17  
 
Thus the Republic was described by El Pueblo as ‘a régime of pure justice, that 
excludes nobody,’ and stated that ‘we are republicans and only republicans for we 
understand that there exist magnificent solutions for all social, political and economic 
problems in our ideal.’18 These solutions would not imply any major upheavals in 
class relations, for the ‘affairs of Valencia belong to all’ it maintained: ‘To those above 
and those below, to master and worker, for each are equally deserving of respect.’19 
From these doctrinal concepts it derived its idea of the state and the nation, 
understood as the ‘harmonic integration of all forces and ideologies, which is not the 
patrimony of a single class, doctrine or organisation’.20 In the Republic the ‘…norms 
                                            
17 This is not an original point. José Alvarez Junco has pointed out the similarities in this area (as well 
as the differences) between Spanish republican ideology and anarchism. See  José Alvarez Junco, 
‘El anarquismo en la España contemporánea’ Anales de Historia Contemporánea, No. 5, 1986, pp. 
189-200, and his La ideología política del anarquismo español (1868-1910), Siglo Veintiuno de 
España, Madrid, 1976.     
18 El Pueblo, 17 April 1931 and 9 January 1931 respectively. 
19 El Pueblo, 9 January 1931.      




of justice and equality will open [the way] for the development of human society in a 
fraternal and harmonic way, without a sudden rupture in historic continuity’.21 
 
This attitude was consistent with the views of its founder Blasco Ibáñez who, while 
in exile, had proclaimed in 1925 that the very fact of the arrival of the Republic would 
be transformative for Spanish society:  
With the Republic Spain will begin a new History. Only the Republic can give 
to our Nation a glorious and peaceful new ideal. We want our national horizon 
to expand, but without the use of force, without wars or conquests, through 
the influence of spirit, through the commonalities of our race and the common 
love of liberty.22 
 
And added that this could happen without any difficult social transformation since 
‘[Spain]….could become a Republic without any risk to the social and economic 
order, [which] will outlast any mere change in the political system.’23 
 
There is little in blasquista policy beyond these generalities. Since it is clear that the 
PURA did not envisage any fundamental shift in the balance of political and economic 
power in society, the apparently impossible would be achieved: a new order would 
be created without alienating or threatening any political or social group.24 The party 
in fact was not only quite open about its ideological indifference to concrete issues, 
it proclaimed it as a strength, one leading member, Vicente Alfaro, going so far as to 
                                            
21 Ideario, p. 242. 
22 Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, Lo Que Sera La República Española: Al País  y Al Ejército, (Blasco Ibáñez, 
Lo Que Sera) at p. 234. All capitalisations, title and text, in the original. This was originally published  
clandestinely in Spain in 1925 on the presses of El Pueblo,  but has now been reprinted as an 
Appendix to Franch, El Blasquisme, pp. 195-241. The original had no pagination; page references are 
to the reprinted version.  
23 Blasco Ibáñez, Lo Que Sera, p. 234. Similar views were also expressed in his Una nación 
secuestrada. Alfonso XIII, desenmascarado, pamphlet, Montevideo, 1925. 
24 As Purkiss has commented: ‘Conspicuous by its absence was any serious programme to challenge 
the structural economic inequalities…’ Richard Purkiss, Democracy, Trade Unions and Political 
Violence in Spain: The Valencian Anarchist Movement 1918-1936, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 




say that: ‘The Republican Union has no programme. Perhaps it is the only party in 
Spain that neither has, nor needs, a programme’.25  
 
Only in the area of anti-clericalism did the PURA continue to adopt a radical line, 
primarily to maintain urban working-class support.  In July 1930 in Monserrat at the 
opening of a new PURA centre one orator argued for ‘…a radical means of 
suppression of all public religious activity, enforced by the threat of extradition’.26 El 
Pueblo   reported a talk  by Fernando Valera at which he described one town 
‘….which in its greater part is Catholic, spineless…. enslaved by religious dogma and 
which needs an operation to remove from its heart the putrefying arteries…’  
attacking the local clergy as  ‘slithering reptiles who conquer the throne of power’.27   
Diario de Valencia complained that: ‘The sterility of our republicans has not modified 
with the passage of time… today they produce the same ideas that they did 25 or 30 
years ago …..which leads them to conflate the terms ‘republican’ and ‘anti-clerical’ 
as if they meant the same.’28 
 
2.4 The Struggle for the Leadership of the PURA: Fernando Valera and the 
Rise of Sigfrido Blasco 
 
The one outstandingly able newcomer to the PURA leadership, and potential threat 
to the PURA’s ‘old guard’, was Fernando Valera Aparicio.29 Of minor nobility and a 
former student of the philosopher and essayist Miguel de Unamuno, he had 
                                            
25 El Pueblo, 11 June 1931. Vicente Alfaro was a member of the PURA’s supreme governing body, 
the Federal Council. Little had changed in this respect since 1903 when the local Socialists described 
blasquismo as a party ‘without any kind of programme’. The Socialists, of course, meant it as a 
criticism. Cucó, Radicalismo, p. 117. See also my article  ‘“Moderate” Conservatism and the Second 
Republic: The Case of Valencia.’ in Martin Blinkhorn, (ed.) Spain in Conflict, 1931–1939, London and 
Beverley Hills, 1986, pp. 132-159.  
26 El Pueblo, 26 July 1930. 
27 El Pueblo, 8 March 1930. This was Borriana, in the province of Castellón. 
28 Diario de Valencia, 7 September 1930.  
29 Valera held a number of minor ministerial posts during the Republic and became the last Prime 
Minister of the republican government in exile. Francisco Javier Paniagua Fuentes and José Antonio 
Piqueras Arenas (eds.), Diccionario biográfico de políticos valencianos 1810-2006, Institució Alfons 




graduated from Salamanca University when he was just eighteen years’ old.30 A 
mason, intellectual and writer, he had great charisma.31  Because of his abilities, he 
had gathered around him a group of many of the more able and radical members of 
the PURA.32 
 
Throughout 1930 Valera’s activities were critical in the revitalisation of the PURA; 
Valera and his closest supporters poured most of their energy during 1930 in 
organising its youth movement, named simply the Juventud Republicana (Young 
Republicans). Although formally attached to the PURA, the organisation stressed 
that it represented a very broad ideological home and was intended to attract all 
young republicans.33 
  
Valera was a brilliant speaker. The PURA deployed him in some of the most 
important anti-regime public meetings, such as the meeting held at the end of August 
1930 at the Teatro Apolo in support of amnesty for political and social prisoners and 
the meeting of Republican Solidarity held on 19 October in the bullring.34 The leading 
blasquista Gerardo Carreres commented: ‘Every time Valera speaks, a new casino 
of Unión Republicana is born’ while a DLR weekly described him as someone whose 
                                            
30 He was also a member of the Theosophical Society, a believer in the esoteric doctrines of Helena 
Petrovna (‘Madam’) Blavatsky. Theosophist ideas were common currency in Spanish republican and 
anarchist circles at the time. On this, see Esteban Cortijo: ‘Fernando Valera Aparicio: teósofo, mason 
and republicano’ in Jose Antonio Ferrer Benimeli, Las Masonería en la España del Siglo XX (Vol 1), 
Cometa, Zaragosa, 1996, pp. 287–308. 
31 On his active masonic activities, see El Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica/ Logia 
Masónica/Legajo 201/ Expediente A-6.   
32 These included José Cano Coloma, Pedro Vargas and Miguel San Andrés. San Andres and Cano 
Coloma were young activists but already well-known. The veteran Pedro Vargas was by profession a 
lawyer who had defended leading CNT militants in a number of high profile criminal prosecutions 
taken in the 1920s. See Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, pp. 74, 79 and 121; Paniagua and 
Piqueras, Dbpv, p. 562. 
33 The establishment of this youth organisation was widely welcomed by both the Radical Socialists 
and the DLR.   See for example the article in the Radical Socialist weekly El Progreso (Xàtiva), 7 June 
1930 which described the initiative favourably  as one to unite ‘all’ the young republicans. See also 
the favourable coverage in El Demócrata (Xàtiva), 27 September and 18 October 1930. 
34 On the August meeting, see El Pueblo, 27 August 1930 and Fernando Valera, Discurso 
Pronunciado en el Teatro Apolo de Valencia, en el gran comicio pro-amnistia de los presos político-
sociales celebrado en el mes de Agosto de 1930. Pamphlet, no date. The text of his October speech 
is reprinted at Pronunciado en el grandioso Mitin de Solidaridad Republicana, celebrado en la Plaza 
de Toros de Valencia, el domingo 19 de octubre de 1930, pamphlet originally published in 1930 but 





actions ‘have placed him at the head of the republican legion in Valencia…his name 
is spoken of …everywhere as a hope for the future of the country’.35 One writer 
commented that ‘the Valencian masses considered him as a second San Vicente 
Ferrer..…this young man, a brilliant orator, gained the respect of the most 
distinguished republican leaders’.36 His national profile was growing too, and he 
became a regular writer in the Madrid daily newspaper El Liberal.37 
 
Valera was close to Marcelino Domingo and others who had become disillusioned 
with what they saw as the overly conservative tendencies of the Alianza Republicana 
and had broken away from the Radicals to form the Radical Socialists in July 1929.38  
There was thus both personal and ideological ties between Valera and the Radical 
Socialists. At Valera’s request, the Radical Socialists had agreed not to actively 
organise in Valencia.39 It is difficult to see why they would agree unless they expected 
that the PURA would be absorbed by them, or at least fall under their influence. This 
implies that they expected Valera to become the PURA’s leader. 
 
The evidence is limited as to what transpired at the PURA’s June 1930 Provincial 
Assembly, but Valera failed to get the leadership vote postponed and instead, 
Sigfrido Blasco was appointed. The reporting of the Assembly in El Pueblo was so 
opaque that it is not possible to follow events in detail, but it suggests  some 
opposition to Sigfrido’s election.40 Sigfrido was formerly proposed by Samper and 
                                            
35 El Demócrata (Xàtiva), 8 November 1930.  
36 El Mercantil Valenciano, 21 October 1930 and 15 May 1931; Salvador Senda, Impacto de 
Krishnamurti, Orion, Mexico, 1987 p. 17. Vicente Ferrer was a medieval Valencian Dominican friar. A 
widespread cult developed around him in much of mainland Europe and in Latin America. 
37 See for example the prominent articles featured on the front page of  El Liberal; El Liberal (Madrid), 
28 December 1930, 22 February 1931 and 18 March 1931. 
38 Juan Avilés Farré, La Izquierda Burgesa y La Tragedia de La II República, e-book, Comunidad de 
Madrid, Madrid, 2006, pp. 50-51. 
39 Álos Ferrando mentions Valera’s request, but does not explore why the Radical Socialist Party 
would agree, Vicente R. Álos Ferrando, Reorganización, supremacia y crisis final del blasquismo, 
1929-1936, Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Valencia, 1992, (Álos Ferrando, Reorganización), p. 29.    
40 In what might be viewed as a veiled criticism of the events of the Assembly, Fernando Valera 
warned the ‘…old leaders and authorities’ of the PURA that they had ‘…a moral obligation to grant 
the coming of age of the organisation if they want to avoid it becoming a …mockery of democracy’. 
Fernando Valera, Manual del Republicano, original published 1930 by Cuadernos de Cultura and 




Marco Miranda, two of the most prominent figures on the right and left respectively 
of the Party.41 Sigfrido was elected by acclamation, so there was no written record of 
the vote. Party infighting continued as Valera organized an unsuccessful attempt to 
unseat many of the ‘historic’ Republicans and replace them with his own men as 
candidates in the April municipal elections, but he did not succeed.42 
   
The ‘old guard’ leadership were fully committed to supporting the Radicals and 
needed a leader who shared their view. There was no obvious alternative leadership 
candidate to Valera, although there had been rumours that Ricardo Samper coveted 
the job. Samper however, although a former blasquista mayor of the city, was too 
unpopular with the grassroots as he was closely identified with the urban business 
elite.  He had also become rather unpopular with many of his erstwhile colleagues 
for taking no part in conspiratorial activities against the dictatorship and, with the fall 
of Primo, had allegedly briefly flirted with the local supporters of the liberal monarchist 
Santiago Alba.43  
 
In the absence of a clear alternative to Valera, the ‘old guard’ sought a ‘straw man’ 
who would be popular with the blasquista masses, but easily influenced, and they 
found him in the person of Sigfrido Blasco. Sigfrido’s key advantage was his great 
personal wealth and his ownership of El Pueblo, which he had purchased from Azzati 
in March 1929.44 Marco Miranda alleges that Ricardo Samper had encouraged 
Sigfrido to buy it, by implication as a first step in a future leadership bid.45 The official 
PURA line at the time of the purchase was simply that Azzati was very keen that the 
                                            
41 El Pueblo, 10 and 11 June 1930. Marco Miranda does not state why he supported Sigfrido at the 
Assembly, but he recounts Sigfrido’s overtures of friendship and offer of journalistic work at El Pueblo, 
which may have influenced his decision. Vicente Marco Miranda, In Illo Tempore, Valencia, 2005, p. 
411. (Marco Miranda, Tempore), p. 411. 
42 Álos Ferrando, Reorganización, pp. 68 and 104. 
43 Samper’s conservative politics can be seen in his interview in Las Provincias, 26 February 1930. 
44 La Voz Valenciana described his fortune as ‘enormous’. La Voz Valenciana, 25 September 1933. 
45 A number of sources allege that Samper was the PURA’s éminence grise, but by way of example 
see Marco Miranda, Tempore, p. 411. Marco Miranda may well have had leadership aspirations 
himself and later felt a great deal of personal antagonism to both Samper and Sigfrido Blasco; as a 




newspaper remained in the ownership of a member of Blasco Ibáñez’s family.46  
Whatever the motive, the  aquisition of El Pueblo by Sigfrido gave him huge potential 
political leverage as a party power-broker.  
 
Ownership of  El Pueblo, personal wealth, and the machinations of Samper were key 
factors in the  victory, but Sigfrido  also had the  advantage of being Vicente’s son.47  
As  the daily La Voz Valenciana commented: ‘In Valencia to say Blasco is to name a 
dynasty which commands respect, submission and obedience.’48  Whatever the 
reasons, it is clear that Sigfrido was not elected because of ability.  Damningly, even 
Samper could not find  any personal qualities which marked Sigfrido out as a 
potential leader. In proposing Sigfrido at the June 1930 Provincial Assembly, Samper 
could only commend his: 
… name, youth, economic means, and time. The name carried the history of      
the Party… Youth is energy and life…Economic means are important 
because…his independence and enthusiasm enable him to dedicate all his 
time to work for the Republican Party…49 
 
Most contempory commentators were dismissive of  Sigfrido. Diario de Valencia 
described Sigfrido as a ‘poor caricature’ of his father.50 Barely articulate and an 
atrocious public orator, he was described by Manuel Azaña as ‘a very poor speaker’  
and as  a ‘complete and utter fool’ (‘Este Sigfrido tiene ocho patas’).51  Marco 
Miranda, who seems to have turned against him at any early stage, described him 
                                            
46 Vicente R Alós Ferrando, Félix Azzatti, Diputación de Valencia, Valencia 1997, pp. 77 and 167;  
Julio Just Gimeno, Siembra Republicana, Renovación Tipográfica, Valencia, 1930, p. 131. 
47 Following Spanish tradition and law at the time, Sigfrido’s correct surnames were not Blasco Ibáñez 
but Blasco y Blasco, his paternal and maternal surnames, but he regularly used his father’s paternal 
and maternal surnames in order to capitalise on the political and cultural significance of the name 
‘Blasco Ibáñez’. He is listed in the Cortes records as ‘Sigfrido Blasco-Ibáñez Blasco’. He had an older 
brother, Mario, and a sister, Libertad. Mario was a blasquista activist, but held no leadership position. 
Libertad does not appear to have been very active politically. Las Provincias, 29 January 1930; 
Paniagua and Piqueras, Dbpv, p. 18.   
48 Quoted in El Pueblo, 2 January 1932.  The editor and owner of the PURA weekly in Alzira, Leonardo 
Cervera, expressed his doubts about Sigfrido when he commented following his election that,  ‘...even 
if [Sigfrido] were to have no merits other than to be the son of Vicente Blasco  Ibáñez, we fully support 
him to represent us with dignity and to be the official carrier of our banner’; Fraternidad (Alzira), 15 
June 1930. 
49 El Pueblo, 10 June 1930.  
50 Diario de Valencia, 10 December 1930. 
51 Manuel Azaña, Diarios completos; Monarquía, República, Guerra Civil, Crítica Barcelona, 2000 
(Azaña, Diarios completos), p. 283. The literal translation of this phrase (‘This Sigfrido has eight legs’) 




as semi-literate, as somone  ‘who found it hard to write a letter’ let alone edit a 
newspaper.52 During his five years as a Deputy to the Cortes, he was barely visible.  
His maiden speech provoked much ridicule, and he rarely spoke again.53  
   
Valera had lost the leadership battle, but the PURA could not easily dispense with 
him. His talents as an orator, his popularity in the city, and the personal loyalty he 
commanded within the Young Republicans and in the town of L'Alcúdia, made it 
necessary for the PURA to continue to deploy him as an important propagandist and 
to allow him to stand as part of the PURA slate in the April 1931 municipal elections.54 
But it is evident that the blasquista mouthpiece remained very nervous of him. El 
Pueblo rarely published articles by Valera but decried those ‘…who propagate 
malicious and tendentious notices…’ about the relationship between Valera and the 
leadership. In February 1931 it noted that ‘Many are surprised, and with reason, that 
the young republican battler Fernando Valera does not write in El Pueblo with the 
regularity that we all would desire’. It lamented that readers were being deprived of 
‘… a pen so substantial, brilliant, and entertaining,’ but claimed that Valera had 
simply been too busy.  
 
It seems that, with the defeat of his attempt to place his supporters on the city 
municipal electoral slate, Valera had become determined to leave and on leaving to 
split the party; in any case, by at least February 1931, rumours were circulating to 
that effect. El Pueblo denied the rumours, condemning those who wanted to: 
                                            
52 Marco Miranda, Tempore, p. 411. Most of the editorial duties at El Pueblo were in reality  carried 
out by Enrique Malboysson. Sigfrido was commonly insulted as an ‘illiterate’ by his political enemies; 
see for example República Social, 15 September 1933; the occasion was Sigfrido’s appointment as 
Sub-Secretary of Labour under the short-lived September 1933 Lerroux government. On the 
Valencian Socialists’ response to Sigfrido’s appointment, see Sergio Valero Gómez, Reformismo, 
Radicalización y Conflicto Interno en El Socialismo Español. La Federación Socialista Valenciana 
Durante la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil (1931-1939), Doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, 
2012, p. 220. 
53 The occasion was Sigfrido’s attempt to justify his campaign against Indalecio Prieto in El Pueblo 
after Prieto had refused to give a well-remunerated state job to Sigfrido’s father-in–law. Azaña 
described the deputies as having ‘roared with laughter’ (‘se reían a carcajadas’) during the speech.  
Diario de las Sesiones de las Cortes Constituentes, 18 November 1931; Azaña, Diarios completos, 
p. 283. 
54 El Pueblo reported that in L'Alcúdia  a large number of local republicans sported a breast pin, 




‘manufacture some absurd and imaginary antagonisms’ between Valera and the rest 
of the PURA, and describing the rumour-mongers, bizarrely, as ‘… bad republicans, 
perverts and the androgynous [ones]…’.55  
 
Although Valera never formally admitted to seeking leadership of the PURA, 
subsequent actions once the Republic arrived showed that he had both leadership 
ambitions and abilities, and it was a common rumour that Valera was poised to take 
over.56  Had he succeeded, it seems that his aim would have been to prise the PURA 
away from the Radicals and instead ally them with, or merge with, the Radical 
Socialists.  
 
Valera had every reason to believe that his decision to split the PURA and to build a 
provincial affiliate of the Radical Socialists would succeed. He was extremely able, 
well-connected with the Madrid political elite, and had gathered around him some of 
the most talented and popular figures from within blasquismo. He was also very 
popular among working–class Valencians, and in the Valencian celebrations for the 
proclamation of the Republic on 14 April 1931, the republican crowd had granted 
Valera the ultimate accolade of carrying his portrait alongside those of their secular 
saint, Vicente Blasco Ibáñez; pictures of the other members of the current crop of 
PURA leaders were nowhere to be seen.57  
 
2.5 ‘We Must Cease to be a Crowd and Become an Army!’:  the DRV is Born 
 
The apparent exceptionalism of the DRV and the otherwise unusual prescience of 
Luis Lucía at the end of 1929 in writing his manifesto for a new political party of the 
right are readily explicable in terms of the development of Valencian politics in the 
                                            
55 El Pueblo, 21 February 1931.  
56 See for example the remarks in the Radical Socialist weekly Renovación (Requena), 28 June 1931. 
According to Renovación it was common knowledge that Valera was expected to become leader. On 
Sigfrido’s comments, see El Pueblo, 15 May 1931 and La Voz Valenciana, 22 May 1931.  




first part of the twentieth century. This had forged a capable and battle-hardened 
leadership team which had already created La Agrupación Regional de Acción 
Católica (The Regional Group of Catholic Action, or ARAC) in 1923, the precursor to 
the DRV with broadly the same political programme. This left the DRV well placed to 
adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. The timing of the publication of Lucía’s 
book En Estas Horas de Transición (‘In These Hours of Transition’), intended to be 
the programme of a new political party could hardly have been bettered, appearing 
as Primo’s regime fell and the Berenguer government was announced.58   
 
Horas had its origins in a series of newspaper articles written by Lucía during 1929 
intended for publication in Diario de Valencia.  The contents of horas are not 
particularly impressive or original, consisting of an amalgam of orthodox social-
catholicism and of the theoretical precepts of the most moderate faction of Carlism. 
Perhaps its most striking statement related to its reaffirmation of the Catholic doctrine 
of ‘accidentalism’ that the form of government is not what is important, but the 
government’s ideological content. Horas proclaimed:  
…..as Catholics, in principle, we are indifferent to all forms of government and 
that our attitude would have to be the same to any Spanish governmental 
structure: but we recognise, as citizens, that the monarchist regime is the 
regime which has developed from tradition and sentiment and has deep roots 
in the national conscience…..for the markedly anti-Christian tendency of its 
enemies, we believe today in the necessity of defending it.59   
 
All of these ideas were present in the programme of ARAC. Despite the lack of 
originality or of intellectual rigour, horas is an important document politically since it 
became, and remained, the only clear statement of the DRV’s ideological position 
throughout the entire period of the Republic.60 
                                            
58 Luis Lucía Lucía, En estas horas de transición; hacia una política de principios cristianos, de 
afirmación de soberanías sociales y de preocupación por las realidades regionales, Valencia, 1930 
(Lucía, horas). Reprinted with a selection of other writings and with an introduction by Vicent Comes 
Iglesia, Valencia, 2000. Page references cited are to the reprint.     
59 horas, p. 138. 
60 The only other work published by the DRV on ideology merely republished edited excerpts from 
horas. This was Derecha Regional Valenciana. Su historia. Su ideario. Su táctica. Su obra. Su 
organización, Valencia, 1933. This latter work was published as part of the DRV’s 1933 electoral 




The launch of the DRV had an impact on local politics and by the end of March 1930 
it claimed, probably with some exaggeration, ‘thousands’ of members.61 Money was 
evidently not a problem. Its first central offices opened at the end of March and 
boasted a library, a lecture room, numerous offices and a number of coffee shops.62  
Diario de Valencia was full of coverage of the DRV, but it was developing only within 
city limits; there are no reports of any propaganda action elsewhere. Its first centre 
outside the city was not established until January 1931 and even then that was in 
Godella, a settlement located in the horta.63  
 
2.6 ‘Authority, Property, Liberty, Family, Regionalism and Defence of the 
Economy’: the Struggle for a Rightist ‘United Front’  
 
The monarchists never succeeded in putting in place a co-ordinated response to the 
republican threat, at national or local level. In Valencia as elsewhere the deals were 
highly localised, and fragmented.  The parties of the Restoration system were 
demoralised while the successor to Primo’s organisation, the Unión Monárquica 
Nacional (National Monarchical Union or UMN) failed to build a credible organisation 
here. Formally constituted in Valencia city early in July 1930, it barely existed 
elsewhere with the exception of Gandia where it launched a weekly magazine in 
October 1930.64 It did however launch a daily newspaper in the city in February 1931 
and claimed 4,000 members.65  
 
Outside of the city, there were no serious attempts by the dynastic forces to organise. 
There were many complaints in the republican press of a return to the old political 
                                            
61 Diario de Valencia, 30 March 1930. 
62 Diario de Valencia, 16 March 1930. In contrast the PURA never had a distinct headquarters or party 
bureaucracy.  
63 For Godella see Diario de Valencia, 11 January 1931 and 30 January 1931 and Rafael Valls 
Montés, La Derecha Regional Valenciana, 1930-1936. El catolicismo político valenciano, Alfons el 
Magnànim, Valencia, 1992, p. 85. The next centre outside the city was opened in Puçol, also in the 
horta; see Diario de Valencia, 24 February 1931.  
64 Diario de Valencia, 5 July 1930; El Mercantil Valenciano, 6 July 1930 and 9 October 1930. 
65 This was La Idea, which existed from 1 February 1931 to 16 April 1931. The claim of 4,000 members 




ways of caciquismo, complaints echoed by the UMN newspaper La Idea when it 
commented, ‘Where are the meetings of electoral propaganda? There are none. 
Nothing has changed…The candidates make no attempt to appeal to the people…it 
is enough for them to go to the Civil Governor!’66 The city was different. Here, the 
DRV worked hard to assemble a coalition for the planned general elections, inviting 
all monarchist groups to form a ‘United Front’ of ‘all socially conservative forces’. The 
distribution of seats in the pact, to be called the concentración monárquica 
(monarchist concentration), reflected the relative dominance of the DRV. Fourteen 
of the thirty two seats were allocated to it, although the DRV was to subsequently 
allege that it had ceded considerable ground to others in the interests of monarchist 
unity.67 
 
2.7 ‘War against the Current Régime which has Ruined the Country’: the 
Republican Propaganda Drive   
 
The thrust of the republican organisational and propaganda drive nationally was 
firstly to frustrate the attempts of the Berenguer government to return to the ways of 
the ‘turno’ and secondly to galvanise the broad anti-regime sentiment which now 
existed within the country.  In reality Valencian republicans had been engaged in a 
fourteen month campaign against the monarchy by the time of the April municipal 
elections; Ministry of the Interior files show that it was one of the major centres of 
republican agitation in the country.68    
 
The PURA was important enough to be invited to nominate a speaker for the meeting 
of Republican Solidarity held at the end of September 1930 in the Madrid Plaza del 
                                            
66 La Idea, 11 February 1931. 
67 Diario de Valencia, 26 March 1931; El Mercantil Valenciano, 26 March 1931; Álos Ferrando, 
Reorganización, p. 53.  
68 AHN/ FC_M_Interior/ Leg 45 A / Caja  2 / Exp 7 and  AHN/ FC_M_Interior/ Leg 51 A / Caja 2 / Exp 
14. The latter file contains the requests made to the civil governor to authorise political meetings. The 
file contained only one request during 1930 for a meeting by a rightist group, the Jaimists, in Tavernes 




Toros.69  A further milestone was the holding of the meeting of republican solidarity 
on 19 November in the Valencian bullring, at which over 20,000 were present, with 
a further 80,000, who could not gain admission, milling outside.  Major figures from 
the national republican organisations were in attendance.  The keynote speech was 
allocated to Lerroux.  Prominent blasquistas had a high profile at the meeting. 
Sigfrido Blasco presided, while Vicente Marco Miranda and Fernando Valera both 
delivered speeches.70 
 
2.8 ‘Our Dear Colleague, El Pueblo of Valencia’: the PURA and the CNT 
 
The PURA helped cement the support of the CNT union federation in opposition to 
the monarchy, utilising the campaign for an amnesty for social and political 
prisoners. To this end, it fielded Fernando Valera to speak at the CNT organised 
meeting in the Teatro Apolo at the end of August 1930.71  The links between the 
PURA and the Valencian urban working class were aided by the industrial 
effervescence which occurred throughout 1930 as a result of the response of the 
CNT, now busily reorganising, to the social, economic, and political situation. The 
city was relatively untroubled by major disputes in the first months of 1930, but 
Sagunt and Buñol, both significant settlements, faced problems. More than 450 
workers had been laid off in the steelworks of Port de Sagunt, and the newspapers 
reported extremes of hunger, poverty and unsanitary conditions. Over 2,500 
workers here came out on strike in February 1930.72 Although the strike was settled 
in March, extremes of deprivation were reported for much of this and the following 
year.73 A bitter three month dispute had also been waged in the cement factory in 
                                            
69 It nominated Marco Miranda. El Mercantil Valenciano, 30 September 1930. 
70 El Pueblo and El Socialista, 21 October 1930. 
71 El Pueblo, 27 August 1930. 
72 On the strike in Sagunt see the various telegrams between the Civil Governor and the Ministry of 
the Interior at AHN/ FC_M_Interior/Leg 40 A caja 2. In his telegram of 27 February 1930, the civil 
governor charged that the PURA was exploiting the position by arranging for the children of strikers 
to be brought to the city to be billeted  with sympathisers. He reported that Sigfrido Blasco had 
personally paid for a lorry with food supplies to be sent to Sagunt ‘with a view to electoral propaganda’; 
but whether politically motivated or not, the need of the people in Sagunt was genuine and their 
children were suffering.  
73 See for example El Pueblo, 23 August 1930; Las Provincias, 13 September 1930; and El Mercantil 




the blasquista stronghold of Buñol, but trouble re-occurred in November when the 
owners recruited ‘scabs’ from Murcia and Alicante.74 
 
The PURA provided strident support to the CNT affiliated unions. Issues came to a 
head in December in the dramatic escalation of the long-running dispute in the city 
involving wood-workers, when the transport unions as an act of solidarity announced 
that they would boycott all attempts to ship finished product if the employers did not 
negotiate. The revelation that one of the shipping companies had employed gunmen 
to combat the striking shipyard workers was the trigger for a major conflagration. El 
Pueblo first published the revelations on 4 December. Amid a crackdown by the 
authorities, which included the arrest of many local union leaders and the seizure of 
El Pueblo’s print-run for 6 December, followed a few days later by its indefinite 
suspension, the CNT declared a forty-eight hour general strike.75 There was general 
agreement that the city had never known a more widely-observed strike, but the 
strike was clearly not revolutionary in intent, since it was time-limited (at forty-eight 
hours), the six specific demands made were far from revolutionary, and there was a 
promise that utility supplies would not be disrupted.  
 
Almost immediately after the strike ended news reached Valencia of the rising 
against the regime in Jaca by the republican captains Galán and García Hernández. 
There was enthusiastic backing in Valencia for a general strike in support of the 
rising. Martial law was declared and the city overrun with troops. Blasquista City Hall 
councillors were detained in Valencia’s Model Prison. Other PURA leaders went into 
hiding.76 All these events boosted PURA prestige among CNT activists, with even 
                                            
74 Las Provincias, 11 April 1931; El Pueblo, 20 November 1930; Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist 
Movement, p. 122.  
75 Diario de Valencia, 10 December 1930; El Mercantil Valenciano,  11 December 1930; El Pueblo,   
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of example, see El Heraldo de Madrid, 10 December 1930 and El Liberal (Madrid) 12 December 1930; 
El Pueblo was allowed to resume publication on 6 January 1931.  




Solidaridad Obrera in Barcelona referring to ‘our dear colleague, El Pueblo of 
Valencia’.77  
 
2.9 The Municipal Elections of April 1931 and the Fall of the Monarchy  
 
As the elections approached Valencian city republicans had every reason to feel 
supremely confident. Mobilisation and propaganda throughout 1930 and the first 
three months of 1931 had been fought on terrain chosen by them. The prestige of 
the monarchy had declined yet further from a very low base and showed no signs of 
recovering.  Nationally the monarchist forces had been slow to respond tactically to 
the republicans, and had found it impossible to put in place a nation-wide strategy.  
Whilst in Valencia city the monarchists had managed to put in place a broad coalition, 
they had to fight in a city where the ‘turno’ had been decisively broken many years 
before. Nationally the republicans had managed to turn the municipal elections into 
a plebiscite on the monarchy and the monarchist forces found it impossible to fight 
the campaign on local and administrative issues. Most reluctantly, they were forced 
to accept the plebiscitary nature of the elections, which favoured political 
organisations with the capacity to mobilise large numbers of voters.  
 
As leader of the republican list in the city, the PURA appeared unstoppable. With a 
strong and well-resourced organisation, it had the electoral machinery to deliver 
success. The events of December 1930 guaranteed the electoral support of rank and 
file CNT members. With its own daily newspaper El Pueblo, it controlled an extremely 
effective propaganda machine and it led a republican coalition which could boast the 
support of one other morning daily newspaper, El Mercantil Valenciano, an extremely 
influential newspaper which had by far the largest circulation of any Valencian daily.78 
The two other morning dailies, Las Provincias and Diario de Valencia were 
                                            
77 Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 126. 
78 There is no independent source for newspaper circulation but relative sales can be gauged from 
postal records showing the costs of postage. By this measure, El Mercantil absolutely dominated the 
market and sold more than eight times the circulation of Diario de Valencia and El Pueblo. Joan Brines 
i Blasco, ‘La diffusion del periodismo en el País Valenciano (1909-1938)’, Anales de Historia 




unequivocally monarchist. There were two evening dailies, of much lower 
circulations, La Correspondencia de Valencia and La Voz Valenciana. Neither were 
republican, but both were somewhat lukewarm in their monarchism with La Voz 
Valenciana closer to the local followers of Santiago Alba.79  
 
In the two week period leading up to the municipal elections the pace of meetings 
and demonstrations on the republican side increased dramatically. In the period 29 
March 1931 to 11 April 1931 the local press reported 165 anti-regime (republican 
and pro-amnesty) meetings and demonstrations, 146 in the province and nineteen in 
the city.80 Virtually every settlement of significance in the province had at least one 
such event; some had two: an extraordinary feat of organisation and a testament to 
the commitment, drive and determination of local activists. 
 
A final deal was concluded only on 31 March for the city. This reflected the PURA’s 
dominance. Of the thirty two candidates, the PURA had twenty one, the DLR five; 
the PSOE three, the AVR two and the Reformists one.81 The necessity of attracting 
Catholic voters motivated the allocation of five places to the DLR. The DLR 
candidates were all placed in the most affluent districts. Amongst the DLR candidates 
was the highly respected Professor of Law, Mariano Gómez Gonzaléz, provincial 
leader and member of its national executive.82  
 
                                            
79 Commonly referred to as Albistas. Alba, while remaining monarchist, was seeking to negotiate a 
measure of constitutional change which might accommodate some moderate republicans.  In practice 
this meant continued support for the monarchy as an institution but criticism of the current king.  La 
Correspondencia and La Voz became conservative republican newspapers shortly after the Republic 
was established.  
80 El Pueblo, El Mercantil Valenciano, Diario de Valencia and Las Provincias, 29 March 1931 to 11 
April 1931 passim. 
81 The Sorianistas were too weak to warrant a seat, but in any case the PURA refused to have any 
dealings with them.  Álos Ferrando, Reorganización, p. 50. 
82 He remained a member of the national executive of the Progresistas, the faction of the party which 
remained loyal to Alcal-Zamora after it split. ABC (Madrid), 6 August 1931. Former President of the 
Valencian Ateneo Mercantil, he was appointed the first republican rector of the University. During the 
Civil War, he was appointed President of the Supreme Court. See Pascual Marzal Rodriguez, Una 
Historia sin justicia: cátedra, política y magistratura en la vida de Mariano Gómez, Universidad de 
Valencia, Valencia, 2009, and Pedro Pablo Miralles Sangro, Al servicio de la Justicia y la República, 




In the province too the republican forces had good reason to feel reasonably 
confident, even though the ‘turno’ had never been broken except in a few large 
settlements such as Alzira and Buñol. With centres in virtually every settlement of 
significance, the PURA could for the first time contest the election in the monarchists’ 
traditional terrain. The socialist led union the Unión General de Trabajadores had 
been growing strongly in the province, but this did not immediately translate into 
political support for the Socialists, and it is probable that the short-term result of the 
growth of the UGT meant further support for the republicans at the polls, which meant 
in most cases the PURA.83 The republicans understood that it was the major 
settlements which were key, given the plebiscitary nature of the elections; they knew 
that they did not need to win the majority of seats to deliver a decisive blow to the 
monarchy, provided that they won the cities.   
   
The Valencian monarchist campaign was couched in the catastrophist language 
which ‘demonstrated how quickly the Right fell back upon the bellicose language and 
martial imagery which integrist Spanish Catholicism, with its uncompromising 
rejection of pluralist modernity, had long since made its own’.84 Such bellicosity on 
this occasion in fact concealed a major tactical weakness, since it implicitly 
acknowledged that these elections were plebiscitary. Diario de Valencia proclaimed: 
It is not a question of Monarchy or Republic. On one side, communism with 
all the horrors of Soviet Russia….. On the other side, European civilization, 
child of Christian civilisation, which proclaims religion, authority, family, 
property and liberty….85 
 
                                            
83 The socialist UGT union grew in numbers from 8,904 members in 1922 to 29,417 by 1931. Cucó, 
Radicalismo, p. 123. In contrast, in the April 1931 elections, less than 5 per cent of the councillors 
elected were members of the PSOE. Sergio Valero Gómez, Republicanos con la monarquía, 
socialistas con la República: La Federación Socialista Valenciana (1931-1939), Universitat de 
València, Valencia, 2015, pp. 42-43. 
84 These are Mary Vincent’s words with reference to Salamanca, but they apply equally here. Mary 
Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic. Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1930–
1936, Oxford, 1996 p. 147. ‘Integrism’ was a movement opposed to all attempts within Catholicism to 
engage with liberalism.  See Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939, Cambridge 
University Press, New York and Cambridge, 1975, p. 11. 




The republican forces sought to calm down the atmosphere but maintain pressure 
on the monarchy by arguing that a vote for the Republic would not bring in social 
revolution but was simply a manifestation of the overwhelming popular will. On the 
plebiscitary nature of the elections, El Pueblo commented that: ‘…We are the 
immense majority, conscious of the extent to which the regime has 
decayed…Valencia, liberal and republican cannot forget its mission in this 
transcendent hour for Spain…’86 Voters were urged to ‘Fulfil your duty as patriots 
and vote for the Republic.’87 
 
When the results were announced, nationally the monarchists had achieved a 
numerical victory thanks to their traditional domination of rural areas, but the results 
in forty five out of fifty two provincial capitals resulted in a landslide victory for 
republicans. They took this as a plebiscitary verdict against the monarchy.88 In 
Valencia the position was even more decisive. Here, republicans had achieved a 
landslide result in the city but, unusually, a winning position elsewhere. In the city, 
republicans won every single district, winning clearly even in the three most affluent. 
Elsewhere they obtained more than 70% of the vote. In the Vega, where many of the 
voters were the supposedly conservative peasants of the horta, they achieved 
75.5%.89  
 
Fifty seats were at stake. All of the 32 candidates of the republican alliance were 
elected. The monarchist concentration gained sixteen seats of which eight were for 
the DRV, four for the Conservatives, two for the Prietistas, one for the UMN and one 
for the Unió Valencianista Regional. The other two seats were for the Albistas who 
had been excluded from the monarchist list and stood independently. The Albistas 
had both stood in the working-class district of Ruzafa, where the republican vote had 
reached eighty per cent, and in a further humiliation for the monarchist concentration, 
                                            
86 El Pueblo, 11 April 1931. 
87 El Pueblo, 7 April 1931. 
88 Ben-Ami, Origins, p. 238. 
89 El Pueblo, 14 April  1931; Luis Aguiló Lucía, Las elecciones en Valencia durante la Segunda 
Republica, Valencia, 1974, p. 46. In the event the Sorianistas put forward one candidate, who obtained 




both Albistas had obtained more votes than the highest placed candidate of the 
monarchist list.90   
 
Losing Valencia city was not a shock for the supporters of the regime as this was 
expected, given its long history of republicanism, but it had not expected such an 
overwhelming result against the monarchist slate, and they had certainly not 
expected to lose the rest of the province. Although formal official results for the 
province were never formally ratified, even here republicans achieved a majority. 
Results for 138 of the towns and larger villages in the province, which meant most of 
the population centres of importance,  were published in the Republican paper El 
Mercantil Valenciano and  they showed the election of 685 republican councillors 
compared to 650 monarchists. In the twenty largest settlements in the province, 
republicans had won a clear majority in thirteen; they had a clean sweep in the 
second most important settlement after the city in terms of population, Alzira.91  
 
The fall of the monarchy was sudden as the armed forces and the security services 
withdrew their active support and events moved at a rapid pace with the republic 
being proclaimed throughout Spain. In Valencia, local republicans created a 
temporary Provisional Republican Council to take control, consisting of Fernando 
Valera, Julio Just and Pedro Vargas of the PURA, and Juan Pascual Leone, brother 
of the blasquista Alvaro Pascual Leone, for the AVR. Juan Pascual Leone was 
appointed acting mayor of the city, a post he held for just six days.92  
 
El Pueblo of 15 April carried a proclamation from the Provisional Republican Council 
urging calm:   
The sovereign nation has implanted the Republic, that is the government of the 
people, by the people. It is in everyone’s interests, therefore, that the new 
                                            
90 El Pueblo, 14 April 1931; Álos Ferrando, Reorganización,   p. 57. 
91 In Alzira, of the twenty four councillors elected, twelve were Socialists, seven PURA members and 
5 of the DLR. Pilar Rovira Granero, Mobilització social, canvi polític i  revolució. Associanisme, 
Segona República i Guerra Civil. Alzira, 1900-1939, Germania, Alzira, 1996, p. 148.   




regime....acquires from the beginning the most high prestige of authority. That 
neither disorder, indiscipline, crime nor persecutions disfigure the purity of its 
origin. The Republic is concord, peace and justice for all Spaniards, and we are 
confident that all, even its adversaries of yesterday will become   its enthusiastic 
defenders….all meetings should be held in an atmosphere of peace, order and 
respect for all. Citizens….should prevent all excess and attacks against 





Nationally, the anti-dynastic forces had shown tactical and strategic expertise in the 
speed in which they had organised opposition to the regime and most crucially had 
succeeded in ‘framing’ the municipal elections as plebiscitary so that their victory in 
the cities of Spain caused the monarchy a fatal blow. In Valencia, the victory had 
been even greater since most important settlements as well as Valencia city had 
delivered an outright, in many cases overwhelming, republican victory. The key 
player in these events in Valencia had been the PURA.   
 
The forces of the right were in disarray, and the DRV was not yet a significant force 
even though it had made an impressive start. The initial, apparently unassailable, 
strength of the PURA presented a formidable challenge.  As the republican regime 
began to implement its legislation and forces to the regime’s left and right began to 
mobilise, the complex relationship between the PURA and the DRV, combined with 
the dynamics of their involvement in national politics would prove to be of decisive 
importance to the evolution of local politics, but for now the initiative, and the prime 
responsibility, lay with the PURA. 
 
 
                                            




3 ‘IF ALL SPAIN WERE LIKE THIS’: VALENCIA FACES THE NEW REPUBLIC 
 
The journey [that is, to Valencia] has served to test the republican 
enthusiasm of all the pueblos we passed. Whole villages rushed to 
meet us on the road; they made us get out of our cars and almost 
crushed us with hugs and embraces. If all Spain were like this, there 
would be no problem. 
 




The overwhelming victory for the republican and socialist alliance in the April 
municipal elections put the political forces of the new Republic in complete control 
throughout Valencia. In practice, this meant the PURA. With its long history of 
dominance of City Hall, its rapid growth throughout much of the province during 1930 
and the success of its campaign in the April 1931 elections, its leaders must have 
viewed the future with supreme confidence. In this chapter, using insights from 
political science theory on the key issues facing new democracies, I will argue that 
the fluidity of politics in these first few months were crucial to the direction of political 
travel and in the Valencian context, placed a heavy onus of responsibility on the 
PURA. 
 
Establishing control of Valencia in the context of a society where the political culture 
was still largely driven by the experience of the Restoration system, I will explain the 
manner in which the PURA gained control of all the key levers of local government 
and with these, the powers of patronage. I will also explain why the PURA failed in 
the responsibilities placed upon it for reasons derived from its many years of political 
domination of the city under the Restoration system and its need to maintain working-





The province which the PURA had mastered presented an economy and social 
situation which although volatile, appeared benign compared to much of Spain. Pay 
levels and standards of living were fairly reasonable for Valencian agricultural 
workers (taking into account the subsistence farming which they carried out on their 
small plots to supplement wages). Wages in Valencia city, while not particularly good 
compared to other major urban centres, were not at the lower end of the spectrum. 
Local agriculture had benefited during the 1920s from the strong increase in demand 
for the orange crop, and the strong performance of Valencian wine exports.  
 
Valencia had been only moderately affected by the economic crisis triggered by the 
Wall Street Crash as it was an economy heavily dependent on agricultural exports 
and the devaluation of the peseta by over 40 per cent in the following two years 
helped boost exports. During the first third of the twentieth century there had been a 
significant extension of land ownership, giving rise to a large increase in the number 
of small-holding peasants, in a province where land ownership, although far from 
evenly divided, was not as inequitable as much of Spain. Only the growth in influence 
and size of the CNT, and early signs of conflict and volatility in industrial relations, 
caused grounds for concern.  
 
I will argue in subsequent chapters that the PURA had an opportunity to radically 
impact the political culture of Valencia province in a way which could have reduced 
political polarisation, but that instead it took a path which seriously worsened the 
situation. I will discuss why the PURA acted as it did and set out the consequences. 
Demonstrating that it had changed very little from the days when violence had been 
a key tool to control the streets it established a culture of intolerance, violence and 
demonization of its political opponents and it became notorious for mendacity and 
corruption, using taxpayers’ money to fund a blasquista ‘street army’ of paid thugs. 
It also encouraged and entrenched anti-clerical policies which went beyond the law, 
and its local leadership in some settlements established an anti-clerical discourse 





The PURA had freedom to think carefully about the nature of its political alliances at 
the national level, and whether it wished to maintain its current close relationship with 
Lerroux’s Radicals. It had many options. It could have maintained that alliance 
without seeking to influence the Radicals political line.  It could have remained with 
the Radicals but asserted a degree of autonomy on national (as well as Valencian 
specific) policy issues, acting as part of a clear left wing of the Radicals.  It could 
have left the Radicals and forged a different relationship with other republican forces. 
It could have acted as an independent republican party of the left of centre, avoiding 
strategic alliances but perhaps seeking to act as a bridge between the Radicals and 
the left republicans. It could have chosen to ally itself with, or even merge into, the 
Radical Socialist Party, with which it arguably should have had much in common.1  
 
The PURA chose to tie itself to the Radicals and there is little sign subsequently that 
the PURA tried to decisively influence the direction of political travel of the Radicals 
until, in the second bienio, the future of the PURA itself was imperilled. Such 
autonomy as the PURA sought to establish during the first bienio was limited to 
matters directly impacting upon Valencia province, and the PURA deputies were 
otherwise slavish in following the official line of the Radicals parliamentary caucus.2 
The Radicals in turn seemed perfectly content to turn a ‘blind eye’ to what has was 
happening in Valencia, provided that the PURA continued to support them. 
 
3.2  April 1931: Spain’s Emergence as a New Democracy 
  
In my view most historians of the Second Republic have given insufficient stress to 
just how crucial the first few months of the Republic were in establishing the inter-
                                            
1 ‘The party which was created by Blasco Ibáñez could have been the most formidable bastion of 
republican democracy had it joined a national party and abandoned its exclusivist criteria …With this 
step it would have gained many more supporters in the City and in the province…’ El Progreso 
(Xàtiva), 12 September 1931. El Progreso was a Radical Socialist publication, and there is little doubt 
that the ‘national party’ referred to here was the Radical Socialists.   
2 Diario de sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de la República española, comenzaron el 14 de 




party dynamics and the ideological direction of the various parties.3 While all 
recognise the extremely difficult social, economic and cultural/religious 
circumstances of Republican Spain, insufficient focus has been placed on the ‘new 
democracy’ dynamic.  
 
Yet with the arrival of the Republic one sees throughout Spain the classic signs of 
party building in a ‘new democracy’, a polity where few organisations can claim a 
deep political legacy, where there is limited ideological clarity within and between 
many of the parties, and no or little prior commitment by most voters to any particular 
political grouping. In this situation, it is common for there to be a multiplicity of newly 
created parties, many of which have strong personalist rather than ideological 
differentiation, simultaneously trying to recruit at a rapid pace, build strong party 
organisations, develop and differentiate their ideologies from competitors and appeal 
to voters.  
 
Under these circumstances, parties form, merge and split with often bewildering 
regularity as it becomes clear which leaders seem more capable of garnering support 
from overlapping groups of voters. An even higher level of complexity (and instability) 
can arise where, as in the Spanish case, the institutions of the central state were 
notoriously weak, political cultures were highly fragmented and decentralised, and 
the process of transition resulted in complex bargaining not only within localities but 
also with emerging national organisations. Valencia was but one provincial example 
of this, even though in one respect it was an exception to the broader Spanish 
position in that the PURA had a long history and overwhelming provincial support.  
 
Considerable work has been carried out by political scientists on ‘new democracies’ 
with much attention focussed on Latin America and the new European democracies 
                                            
3 The works of Shlomo Ben-Ami and Mary Vincent are exceptions to this; see Shlomo Ben-Ami, 
The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978, and Mary 
Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca 1930-1936, 




which were created with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The events in Portugal 
following the ‘Revolution of the Carnations’ of April 1974 have also been intensively 
studied, as has the Spanish democratic transition following the death of Franco.4 
Political scientists have observed in country after country the phenomenon whereby 
a large number of political parties contest the first of several elections without 
securing sizable electoral support. Although Spain was not as badly affected by this 
level of fragmentation as some, it was still a notable aspect of this early period. Such 
fragmentation is widely seen by political scientists as undesirable in all new 
democracies as potentially leading to future political instability, but the evidence is 
mixed as to whether, and under what circumstances, this initial period of 
organizational confusion significantly influences future political stability and the route 
of political contestation.  
 
Scholars working within the social cleavage tradition of political science have long 
stressed that the translation of social cleavages into political oppositions is by no 
means automatic. Lipset and Rokkan for instance, are clear that ‘... cleavages do not 
translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course’, and they argue 
that a ‘crucial point in the discussion of the translation of the cleavages structures 
into party systems [are] the costs and the pay-offs of mergers, alliances, and 
coalitions.’5 Implicit in this comment is the assumption that a major determinant in 
this process is the attitude of the political elites, although during the process of party 
and ideological formation grass-roots pressure can play an important part. Many 
instances could be cited where cleavages have not translated to the national political 
                                            
4 There is a vast range of literature covering the Spanish transition post Franco, the Portuguese 
revolution, and the experience of Latin America and Eastern Europe, but for a useful relatively recent 
review of Spain see Omar G. Encarnación, Spanish Politics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2008. On 
Portugal, see Fernando Rosas (ed.), Portugal e a Transição para a Democracia, Colibri, Lisbon, 1999. 
For a geographically broad review, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political 
Economy of Democratic Transitions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, and Simon 
Bornschier, ‘Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies’, Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009, 
pp. 1-13. Available on-line at: https://www.lrd.ethz.ch/index.php/lrd/article/view/lrd-2009-6/18. 
Accessed 18 December 2015.         
5 Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter 
alignments: cross-national perspectives’, pp. 1-64 at p. 62 in Lipset and Rokkan, (eds.), Party Systems 




arena, but by way of example, class has only occasionally surfaced as a key 
cleavage in the national party system in the United States of America. 
 
This observation by Lipset and Rokkan does not in itself imply that initial behaviour 
and bargaining is inevitably crucial, but work by, among others, Jakub Zielinski, goes 
further and does support the view that this early fluidity can be critical in deciding 
which pre-existing social conflicts are translated into durable underlying areas of 
political contestation.6 Using a game-theoretical model, Zielinski argues that this 
initial period is highly significant in that it can determine how and to what extent the 
axes of political competition are driven by or can diverge from underlying social 
conflicts. Therefore, he argues, party systems in new democracies should be seen 
as critical founding moments when political elites forge long-term political identities 
that define the party system for years to come. This somewhat extreme position is 
open to criticism since the party system is unlikely to become institutionalized if it 
fails to represent salient divisions in the electorate, but in stressing the importance of 
this first formative phase of party development, I would argue that Zielinski has some 
important theoretical insights which can be applied to Spain.  
 
This approach emphasises how the bargaining process among factions in the 
creation of parties capable of winning power can be crucial in deciding which 
cleavages are accented and which downplayed or even eliminated from the 
subsequent political discourse. This bargaining process can only be understood in 
the broader political context, as it is this broader political environment which helps 
define the perceived threats which the various factions have to counter, with whom 
they bargain, and whether or to what extent they are prepared to relegate some 
ideologies which reflect or accentuate cleavages out of the equation in order to form 
an electorally viable party. In a polity with a relatively uniform political culture this 
process may be less complex than in Spain, but in a society such as Spain with a 
                                            
6 Jakub Zielinski, ‘Translating Social Cleavages into Party Systems: The Significance of New 
Democracies’, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2, Jan. 2002, pp. 184-211; see also his On Political Parties 




diffuse and highly varied political culture the bargaining necessarily required 
consideration of the complex interaction between the national and local dimension.   
 
In terms of the ‘new democracy’ dynamic, the PURA, given its overwhelming local 
dominance, was in ‘pole position’ in terms of the bargaining process. Although 
constrained by the exigencies of the need to form national alliances, it was able to 
set the local ‘ground rules’ for political action in the new democracy, the nature of the 
relationship with other political actors, particularly other republican forces, the 
manner in which it would manage the relationship with the local Socialists, and its 
response to the growth of the ‘accidentalist’ right. It had the time, and freedom, to 
develop a long-term political strategy to maintain its hegemony and to establish a 
strong and stable local base for republican democracy.  
 
The reality was that it showed no sign of analysing its situation in these terms. Its 
agenda remained that of historic blasquismo which meant control of Valencia and 
little interest in the national picture beyond the fact that within a republican regime it 
could consolidate its mastery of local power. In ideological terms it had little to say 
about the new republican reality and continued to fixate on anti-clericalism. Although 
it could not prevent the issue of religion becoming a central fact in Republican politics, 
it was in a position to influence just how strongly the religious issue arose as a key 
cleavage within local politics.7 Its decision, for reasons of internal PURA needs, was 
to stress the issue from the very beginning, in contrast to the Radical Party nationally, 
which although still secular in orientation was busy shedding its historic anti-clerical 
rhetoric. As the PURA faced the Republic, it saw, not the Second Spanish Republic, 
but its traditional municipal regime writ large. 
 
                                            
7 On the history of blasquista anti-clericalism, see Silvia Magenti Javaloyas, L’anticlericalisme 
blasquista. València: 1898-1913, L Xara, Simat de la Valldigna, 2001, and her articles ‘La cuestión 
religiosa: 1899-1902. Los católicos valencianos y su respuesta política,’ Saitabi, No 47, 1997, pp. 
393-404, and ‘El problema religiosa en la primera década del siglo XX: “clericalismo” y 




3.3 The PURA and Caciquismo  
 
Prior to the establishment of the Second Republic Spain had largely failed in its 
attempts to build a genuinely democratic polity. The Restoration ‘turno’ system, under 
which power would alternate between the two parties of the establishment, and in 
which the overall results of what were ostensibly democratic elections were settled 
in advance, had the appearance of representative democracy but rarely involved 
much effort to engage with the electorate.8  Manipulation of the political process by 
local notables, known as caciques, was central to the system. Physical repression 
was crucial, with the army as ultimate guarantor.9  
 
Simply by the fact of the Republic’s existence the nature of caciquismo had changed. 
In a strict sense caciquismo, defined as the political practice of the Restoration 
system, whereby local notables delivered a pre-arranged electoral result under a 
relatively unified system of political control directed from Madrid, no longer existed. 
The fracturing of the traditional elite, and the entry into power of new oppositional 
forces, none of whom gained hegemony nationally, made that impossible. But where, 
as in Valencia, a political party had overwhelming domination, something with many 
of the same characteristics could continue to exist at the provincial level, particularly 
when the local hegemonic grouping could count on the support of the provincial civil 
governor.   
 
                                            
8 The traditional view of the Restoration system as a wholly artificial ‘democratic’ system controlled by 
the social and economic oligarchy has been subject to revision in recent years, but the limited attempts 
to inject some genuine democratic elements into the system largely failed. See Javier Moreno-Luzón, 
Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902–1931, Sussex Academic Press, 
Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2012. 
9 On the army’s role within the Restoration system, see Carolyn Boyd, Praetorian Politics in Liberal 
Spain, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1979, pp. 3-25. The word cacique is of South American origin to 
describe heads of indigenous tribes and was adopted by the Spanish conquistadores to describe local 
leaders co-opted by the Spanish imperial system. The term was adopted for Spanish domestic 
purposes to describe the carefully managed but ostensibly democratic system during the Restoration 
using the power of local notables (caciques), in particular powerful local landowners, to successfully 
deliver the desired electoral outcome. See José Varela Ortega (ed.), El poder de la influencia: 





It is not a surprise that, measured against the tests of long established functioning 
democracies in more economically developed societies, the Second Republic fell 
short of the highest ideals.  Apart from the inevitable volatility and potential instability 
arising from the generic ‘new democracy’ dynamic discussed above, elements of the 
old political system derived from the Restoration were bound to ‘bleed’ into the new 
regime to some degree. Caciquismo was a symptom of the weakness of the Spanish 
state, and this weakness could not be eradicated overnight.    
 
In judging the performance of Spanish republican politicians nationally, and the 
performance of the PURA in its own fiefdom, these factors need to be born in mind. 
The use of particularist methods of patronage to achieve political ends, either through 
caciques directly or through local government institutions (these are not mutually 
exclusive) was part and parcel of PURA culture. The populist discourse which the 
PURA had developed to mobilise the urban masses against its enemies once again 
came into play. It deployed intemperate language and violence towards opponents.  
These were features inherited from the Restoration system and exacerbated by the 
‘new democracy’ dynamic, especially since Spain had little pre-existing democratic 
tradition.10 But the fact that some measure of imperfection from the theoretical ideal 
was inevitable does not excuse the manner in which the PURA deployed all of these 
practices systematically towards its political enemies for as long as it could, which 
was at least until the DRV, in the person of Luis Lucía, became a government Minister 
on 7 May 1935. Even less should a party which claimed to represent the 
consolidating fulcrum of the Republic in Valencia be expected to depart so radically 
from democratic practice.    
 
The PURA was plagued throughout the years of the Republic with allegations that 
the party had become the main refuge of caciques in Valencia, but the limited 
evidence available suggests that much of the initial (pre-republican) growth in the 
PURA did not come from the influx of caciques and their clientelae. The causes of 
                                            
10 The Eastern European experience of transition from communism to democracy shows that  
countries with a democratic tradition such as Poland and the then Czechoslovakia made the transition 




PURA malpractice, at least in 1930 and through the early months of the Republic, 
cannot therefore be laid primarily at the door of local caciques. In general it seems 
that when the PURA attempted to woo local caciques, they resisted its blandishments 
at this stage of the political game.11 The PURA was clearly keen to bring them on 
board, as evidenced by the significant resources devoted during 1930 wooing the 
powerful cacique of the Liberal Party for the Requena-Utiel area, José Garcia 
Berlanga Pardo, who had inherited the role from his father, Fidel.12  
 
But once the Republic was declared, things began to change and the PURA became 
the main beneficiary of caciquismo in Valencia because it was overwhelmingly the 
most important political party. As under the Restoration, caciques wanted to join a 
‘winning team’ and in Valencia there was only one, the PURA.13 The extent to which 
cacique ‘entryism’ fundamentally altered the social basis of support of the PURA is 
however unclear. The newspapers are full of accusations that the PURA had become 
the main refuge for local caciques, and the accusations are often highly specific. In 
broad terms, there is little reason to doubt that the allegations were correct, but great 
care must be taken in evaluating specific allegations. The accusation of ‘caciquismo’ 
against one’s political enemies became a standard trope within the political discourse 
of the Republic, and was an easy label to brandish in situations where personal 
grievances and antipathies might be the driving force.  
 
Whatever the origins of the new members, the rate of growth during 1930 suggests 
that insufficient effort was made by the leadership to ensure that new members were 
integrated in a way consistent with modern mass democratic organisations and in 
                                            
11 La Voz Valenciana, the Albista evening daily, surveyed the machinations of local caciques 
throughout the province in a series of articles which ran from 9 to 27 May 1930. None of the articles 
mention any involvement by the PURA. 
12 This attempt failed. La Voz Valenciana, 14 May 1930; Alicia Yanini and Rafael Zurita Aldeguer. 
‘Comunidad Valencian’ in Varela Ortega, poder, pp. 283-324; Vicente R. Mir Montalt, ‘Elecciones 
partidos y politicos en la Valencia del Siglo XX’ in Manuel Chust Calero (ed.), Historia de la Diputación 
de Valencia, Diputació de València, Valencia, 1995, pp. 545-596 at p. 562. 
13 Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 
1931–1936. Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2000 (Townson, Crisis) at p. 
43 gives an example of caciques clambering to join the left republican party Acción Republicana in 





keeping with the broader aims of the party. I have already explained that the PURA 
did not develop, and was not interested in developing, an organisation capable of 
imposing discipline on individual members or branches. The failure to follow such 
procedures does not however seem to have affected the direction of policy, and the 
evidence supports the view that the drivers of that remained the traditional city-based 
leadership.  
 
3.4 The PURA Leadership  
 
The city-based ‘old guard’ were politicians who had grown up in the vicious street 
politics of the provincial capital during the first third of the twentieth century, and who 
saw no need to change their style of operation in the new democratic framework. For 
them, success in politics was measured by establishing full political control of the key 
levers of local government, holding together its traditional urban coalition, and taking 
command of the streets. Much of the politics of Valencia during the Republic, at least 
until the PURA started to come apart during 1934, was conditioned by the PURA’s 
attempts to continue to apply the traditional blasquista approach to politics, not only 
in Valencia city but also throughout the province.14  This was a politics devoid of 
tolerance and lacking in fundamental democratic mores.  
 
There were four fundamental reasons for this crude, intolerant and at times violent 
behaviour. Firstly, the establishment of hegemony in Valencia city during the 
Restoration in opposition to the two official parties of the Restoration system had 
required an efficient political machine, the ability to dispense patronage, and 
ruthlessness. These aspects of blasquismo would not disappear overnight simply 
because there was now a parliamentary democracy. Secondly, in order to mobilise 
its masses it developed a populist discourse which required a constant search for 
                                            
14 Ramiro Reig goes too far however in arguing that once blasquismo extended itself beyond the city, 
it ‘carried the seeds of its own destruction’. The leadership had choices and could have behaved 
differently. Its subsequence collapse was far from inevitable. Ramiro Reig, ‘Entre la realidad y la 
ilusión: el fenómeno blasquista en Valencia, 1898-1936’, in Nigel Townson (ed.), El republicanismo 
en España (1830-1977), Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1994 (Townson, republicanismo), pp. 395-424 




enemies; easy under the Restoration when the enemy was the system itself, but 
harder to sustain under the Republic which required an even more extreme 
discourse. Thirdly, personalities played a part, both in respect of the initial conflict 
between Blasco (and subsequently Azzati) and Soriano, and it continued during the 
Republic in the hostility between Sigfrido Blasco and Fernando Valera.  Fourthly, the 
leaders of the PURA were well aware of the potential fragility of their broad inter-
class coalition, especially given the loss of working–class support to the Radical 
Socialists in some locations, and the increased penetration of anarcho-syndicalist 
ideology.  
 
The rapid collapse in this support for the PURA in 1934 was to prove that the coalition 
was indeed highly fragile, but hindsight is not necessary to explain the violence of 
the blasquista response to politicians seen as potential competitors in 1931. The 
belief that their hegemony could be easily threatened was a reality from 1931 and 
that was a major cause of their continued espousal of violent rhetoric and the attempt 
to control the streets. It was also the reason why the PURA declined to follow the 
Radical Party in playing down its historic anti-clericalism.   
 
3.5 PURA Hegemony 
 
Blasquista strength in the city in April was reflected in the dominance of its municipal 
candidates in the republican list, which represented 66% of the total: if anything an 
understatement of the party’s relative position. The other anti-monarchist forces in 
the city and the province were far inferior in terms of support. Although the Socialist 
union, the UGT, had been growing strongly, this had not yet resulted in any significant 
increase in the strength of the PSOE in the city or in the province.15  Other republican 
                                            
15 The Socialists candidates in the April municipal elections in the city represented 9% of the total 
republican candidates. The Socialists’ poor showing in the April 1931 elections throughout the 
province demonstrate their inability, at least in the short-term, to capitalise on the growth in the UGT. 
Aurora Bosch, ‘Un vehículo de movilización política: el sindicalismo agrario valenciano durante la 
Segunda República y la Guerra Civil’, in Manuel Chust Calero and  Salvador Broseta (eds.), La pluma 
y el yunque: El socialismo en la historia valenciana, Universitat de València, Valencia, 2003, pp. 77-




political parties were slow to organise or did not organise at all. In terms of grass-
roots propaganda, outside the city and a small number of other locations, the PURA’s 
activists had the field almost entirely to themselves. The forces of the right were in 
disarray, and the DRV was not yet a significant force. 
 
In terms of local government, the PURA was in an enviable position. The Provisional 
Government had granted the PURA a large controlling majority on the administrative 
committee which had replaced the elected executive of the Diputación Provincial 
(Provincial Council). Diputaciones were important entities in respect of the 
management, co-ordination and financing of a range of provincial-wide services, 
including the building and maintenance of roads, and the operation of many social 
services, such as hospitals, orphanages and some aspects of education. As such, 
they were major employers, and a powerful force for political patronage. The PURA 
also had majority control at City Hall in the third largest city in Spain, and it was by 
far the strongest force at municipal level throughout the province. Control over City 
Hall and many of the larger municipal settlements within the province reinforced the 
ability of the PURA to dispense patronage.16  
 
This power increased at municipal level as it dawned on many republican councillors 
who were not PURA members (and some monarchist councillors) that the PURA was 
in an unassailable position. Although this did not always happen immediately, many 
councillors subsequently defected to the PURA. This seems clear from a report 
prepared for the Ministry of the Interior in October 1932 by the Civil Governor, Luis 
Doporto. The report was comprehensive, covering all 262 pueblos in the province. 
Excluding the city, it listed 1,175 PURA councillors out of a total of 2,587, that is, 46% 
of the total, and showed the PURA with outright control in 113 of the 262 councils, 
that is, 43%. There were a further 20 councils where the PURA was undisputedly the 
                                            
16 On the PURA’s majority in the Diputación, see Archivo General y Fotográfico de la Diputación de 
Valencia (AGFDV), Actas de la Diputación de Valencia /A.1.1/Vol. 84/1931/ 15-30 April 1931/pp. 19-
20. The precise function of Spanish Diputaciones had changed over time, reflecting the tension 
between centralised and devolved administration; the Republican constitution  had downgraded the 
powers of a Diputación to some degree, reflecting the greater importance put on individual 




largest single group; combining these with those where the PURA had an outright 
majority, the PURA probably had effective control in over half of the municipalities.  
 
Where the PURA did not have effective control, in the vast majority of cases, no-one 
did. Councillors for other parties were, with a few geographical exceptions, thinly 
spread, with no one political group being able to establish outright control or even 
establish a decisive influence. In very few locations could any single political grouping  
seriously challenge the PURA. By far the most important example was the Socialist 
dominated municipality of Alzira, the second largest settlement in the province with 
a population of over 20,000 people. Radical Socialists who held 12% of councillors 
throughout the province were actually the second strongest grouping (the Socialists 
were only the third with 7% of councillors) but there were few places where they had 
control, and none of these were in the major population centres.  
 
The two largest settlements which they controlled were L'Alcúdia and Carlet, both of 
which had populations slightly in excess of 5,000 people. In reality therefore only 
Alzira presented an important centre of resistance to the PURA’s hegemony.17 
Municipal control should not necessarily be conflated with local political strength, 
especially in respect of the Radical Socialists, which only became a serious provincial 
force after the municipal elections had been decided. There were locations such as 
Carcaixent, Cullera, Sagunt, Sueca, and Llíria, where the Radical Socialists had 
significant and often majority electoral support, but did not run the council. But the 
lack of municipal dominance hampered attempts to fully consolidate their local 
political position.  
 
The only real potential countervailing force to the PURA’s mastery of the province 
was the civil governor. A civil governor, agent and representative of the central 
Spanish state, was an extremely powerful figure with a wide range of powers. He 
                                            
17 There are errors in the report, dated 11 October 1932, but the broad thrust is clear and probably 
accurate overall. It is held at Archivo General de la Administración (AGA) / Sección Política y Sección 




had strategic oversight, and if he wished operational command, over the forces of 
law and order, in particular the civil guards and assault guards. He was the authority 
who granted (or withheld) the right to hold public meetings, could suspend elected 
municipal officers, and in practice was the person to whom the Ministry of the Interior 
listened when he asked for town councils to be replaced by steering or administrative 
committees (comisiones gestoras) and decided the political composition of the new 
committees.18 The civil governor had power to intervene in industrial disputes and in 
extremis impose solutions. Although in theory subordinate to the provincial Regional 
Labour Delegate, an appointment of the Ministry of Labour, on such matters 
governors often ignored the Labour Delegate. He also had the power under 
republican legislation to invoke a temporary suspension of certain civil liberties, and 
while these powers were in force, he could censor newspapers and other media 
(including suspending publications entirely), forbid all political meetings and impose 
detention without trial.   
 
Although in theory politically neutral, the politicisation of these posts was intense and 
in reality most civil governors favoured the cause of the political party which had 
sponsored them.19  During the first bienio there were two periods, one of six and one 
of two months, where Valencia had civil governors who were members of the Radical 
Party and who blatantly favoured the PURA. These were Francisco Rubio 
Fernández, who was in post for the last six months of 1931 until the Radicals 
withdrew from the governmental coalition, and Alberto Aguilera Arjona, who was 
appointed on 14 September 1933 during the first short-lived Lerroux government and 
remained in post until April 1934.20 Although for the majority of the first bienio the 
PURA faced civil governors who were either neutral to their interests or hostile, the 
periods of Radical civil governors were important, and included the October 1931 
                                            
18 In the common parlance of the time, steering committees were referred to simply as ‘town (or city) 
councils’, the members as ‘councillors’, and a president as  ‘mayor’ although strictly speaking these 
were not the correct terms. For simplicity I have followed the common parlance.     
19 Townson, Crisis, p. 47. 
20 Joan Serrallonga I Urquidi, ‘El aparato provincial durante la Segunda República. Los gobernadores 
civiles, 1931-1939’, Hispania Nova, No 7, 2007, pp. 139-192 at p. 189. Rubio regularly clashed with 
the Labour Delegate, Antonio de Gracía, a member of the Socialists. Richard Purkiss, Democracy, 
Trade Unions and Political Violence in Spain: The Valencian Anarchist Movement 1918-1936, 




partial re-run of the Constituent Cortes elections and the November 1933 general 
election. Although a civil governor had no direct control over electoral matters, his 
command of the forces of law and order allowed him to ‘turn a blind eye’ to electoral 




Valencia was a province in which the circumstances for the Republic could hardly 
have been more propitious. With a relatively benign social and economic situation 
and a long history of support for republicanism, there was an opportunity to build 
robust republican institutions and take steps to integrate local workers and to attempt 
to reach out to erstwhile opponents of the regime. In a part of the country where the 
‘turno’ had long been partly ineffective, there was a possibility to integrate elements 
of the old political system without seeking to co-opt them into unquestioning loyalty 
towards the new dominant political party. One cannot know whether such an attempt 
would have had any great level of success, but it is clear that, if it were to be 
attempted then the PURA would have to be the driving force. The PURA as the 
dominant political party had an unparalleled opportunity to set the political agenda 
and help stabilise the new regime. Yet its behaviour showed that it had little to no 
understanding of the true ‘soft power’ it could have deployed in a new and altogether 
more fluid political landscape than the Restoration system within which it had been 
created and which it fought. Instead it sought complete dominance without any 
attempt to reach out to others.  
 
In these critical early days of the Republic the complete lack of strategic skills of its 
leadership were made manifest. Its dominance of local government was almost total 
and it had absolute control over local powers of patronage. From this position of 
strength it had little to fear from other republican groups, and probably little to fear 
from the Socialists too given their relative weakness here. It could have set a different 
agenda than the one it actually followed, especially given the ‘new democracy’ 
dynamic, presenting itself as a tolerant example of the new Republic, yet from the 




groups and, in indulging and sometimes actively encouraging anti-clericalism, it 
helped create the conditions for the rise of the confessional DRV which was to 
become the most important threat to PURA hegemony.  









4 ‘TO BE AN ANTI-BLASQUISTA IS TO BE AN ENEMY OF THE REPUBLIC’: 
THE CREATION OF THE VALENCIAN RADICAL SOCIALISTS, THE 
CONSTITUENT CORTES ELECTIONS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF 
CATHOLIC REPUBLICANISM. APRIL 1931 TO OCTOBER 1931 
 
It seems that here there is no other Republican than Don Sigfrido [i.e. 
Blasco]. Here no-one can be a Republican without a patent granted by 
Don Sigfrido. Here nobody can be anything without Don Sigfrido. 
El Mercantil Valenciano, 24 June 1931 
In Valencia all spirit of tolerance has been lost, and social and political 
gangsterism (pistolerismo) reigns supreme. 




In this chapter I describe the split in the PURA which led to the creation of the 
provincial branch of the Radical Socialist party and the subsequent use of violence 
by the PURA against the new party. I will also show that in the first months of the 
Republic this intolerance also extended to the DLR and to the new confessional 
rightist party the DRV. I then explain why the PURA refused to accept any threat to 
its political hegemony.  
 
Facing a huge weight of expectation, the Provisional Government moved quickly to 
emphasise a clean break with the monarchy, and begin the process of transforming 
Spain. Ruling initially by decree, it was announced that general elections for the 
Constituent Cortes would be held within three months. It was this backdrop which 
framed the manner in which local, and in this case Valencian, politics played out. In 
Valencia it was primarily the PURA which would determine how Valencia would 
respond and contribute to the national situation. The PURA’s immediate behaviour 
was telling. By its response to the newly created Radical Socialists, to the DLR and 
to the DRV it demonstrated that from its perspective nothing had changed locally 




brook no opposition, whether from its erstwhile republican allies and those who had 
stood on a monarchist ticket in the April municipal elections. Of the national 
organisations which had an important political presence in Valencia, only the 
Socialists, who were not yet seen as a serious threat, were tolerated, at least for now.  
 
4.2 ‘The Voice of the People is the Supreme Law’: the Creation of the 
Valencian Radical Socialists   
 
In May 1931 Fernando Valera announced the formation of the provincial affiliate of 
the Radical Socialist Party.1  The Radical Socialists were not completely new to the 
province, but as yet they had no provincial organisation. Joining Valera were the 
popular leftist blasquistas José Cano Coloma, Pedro Vargas and Miguel San Andres. 
Already established local organisations enrolled immediately while unaffiliated 
republicans in L'Alcúdia promptly signed up, too.2 Shortly thereafter the PURA split 
in the important settlement of Llíria, with the majority grouping leaving to join the 
Radical Socialists.3  
 
Valera became an important national political figure.   One of the Radical Socialists’ 
key ideologues, he wrote its statutes which advocated inter alia a decentralised 
organisational structure. Elected to the national executive committee in May 1931 he 
received the fourth highest vote.4 Following the Constituent Cortes elections he 
became one of its leading parliamentarians.  
                                            
1 Diario de Valencia, 8 May 1931.                 
2 Francesc Andreu Martínez Gallego ‘El socialismo de los tres nacimientos: en los origenes de las 
Agrupaciones Socialistas de l’Alcúdia’, p. 54. Paper available on-line at: 
http://www.pspvlalcudia.org/HistoriaPSPV.pdf. Accessed 6 January 2016; see also his Agricultores 
solidarios. El cooperativismo en 1'Alcudia, 1908-1999, Cooperativa Agrícola Ntra. Sra. de L'Oreto, 
L'Alcúdia, 2000, (Martínez Gallego, Agricultores solidarios), pp. 169-232. 
3 In the June Constituent Cortes elections, the Radical Socialists obtained 65% of the vote here, 
compared to the PURA’s 28%.  Josep Daniel Simeón Riera, ‘Partidos políticos y bases sociales en la 
Llíria republicana’ Lauro, No 2, 1986, pp. 143-165, See also his Entre la rebel·lia i la tradició: Llíria 
durant la república i la guerra civil, 1931-1939, Diputació de València, Valencia, 1993, pp. 127-128.  
4 Behind, in descending order, Álvaro de Albornoz, Marcelino Domingo and Eduardo Ortega y Gasset. 
Juan Avilés Farré, La Izquierda Burgesa y La Tragedia de La II República, e-book, Comunidad de 




The party’s Valencian manifesto was an implicit criticism of the PURA, arguing for 
national organisations because, it said, these would improve the stability and 
efficiency of the nascent republic.5 The PURA, although closely allied to the Radicals, 
remained a provincial party. In a pointed dig at the careerism of the leadership of the 
PURA, and the appointment of the completely inexperienced Sigfrido Blasco as 
leader, the manifesto denounced:  
All forms of caciquismo, all personal power, however just the prestige of the 
one who represents it [a clear reference to the exploitation of the name of 
Blasco Ibáñez] ... [The Radical Socialist Party] has aims quite distinct from the 
attainment of personal ambitions.6 
  
Consistent with its traditional populist discourse, the PURA responded furiously, 
immediately declaring ‘Open War’ on the ‘traitors’ of the Radical Socialists; El Pueblo 
subjected them to every insult.7 The long tradition of politically motivated street 
violence, especially the bitter dispute between Blasco Ibáñez and Rodrigo Soriano, 
was now invoked by El Pueblo, the comparison of Valera to Soriano carrying an 
implicit threat of violence.8 Sigfrido Blasco was compared to Jesus Christ, Valera to 
Judas.9  Valera, ‘the Extremaduran Child Jesus’, ‘this maniac, this self-proclaimed 
Messiah’ was a ‘false Apostle’ whose only purpose was to lead his followers away 
from the true path, the republicanism of Blasco Ibáñez.10 This intolerance of 
divergent views, and the implicit threat of violence, was a deep-rooted feature of the 
PURA’s populist discourse, and it remained dominated by an ‘old guard’ who had 
experience and often directed the violent street politics with which blasquismo had 
                                            
other publications. See for example Liberalismo, Cuadernos de Cultura, Valencia, 1930; and Manual 
del Republicano, Impresos Serna, Mislata (Valencia), 1930. 
5 Manifesto published in Diario de Valencia, 8 May 1931. 
6 Diario de Valencia, 8 May 1931.    
7 El Pueblo, 15 May 1931; El Mercantil Valenciano, 27 June 1931. For an analysis of the bitter 
exchanges in El Pueblo and El Mercantil Valenciano, see also Vicent Franch i Ferrer, El Blasquisme. 
Reorganització i conflictes polítics 1929-1936.  Ajuntament de Xàtiva, Xàtiva, (Valencia), 1984 
(Franch, El Blasquisme), pp. 131-151.      
8 On the bitter fight with Soriano, see Antonio Laguna Platero, El Pueblo: historia de un diario 
republicano, 1894-1939, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1999, pp. 110-115.          
9 El Pueblo, 20 October 1931. 
10 El Pueblo, 9 July 1931, 6 November 1932 and 23 June 1931. The animosity felt towards Valera 
was genuine and, in the case of Sigfrido, evidently enduring. Franch i Ferrer states that during a 
personal interview he held with Sigfrido in Valencia in January 1981, Sigfrido, then 79 years’ old, 
continued to describe Valera and his supporters as simply ‘traitors’, Franch, El Blasquisme, pp. 109-
110. This in spite of the fact that Valera had been the last republican Prime Minister in exile from 1971 




become closely associated. Paradoxically, fear of the growing radicalisation within 
the working-class seems to have entrenched them in their use of violence even as 
they could boast the greatest level of power they had ever achieved.   
 
The PURA ensured that the Radical Socialists were excluded from the Alliance of 
the Left (the Alliance) which fought the Constituent Cortes elections and the Radical 
Socialists had to fight alone for the majority slate in both the province and its 
provincial capital.11 The Alliance won the majorities in both city and province 
comfortably but the Radical Socialists did well, winning the minorities in both electoral 
districts.12  A highlight of their campaign was the two meetings held in the Mestalla 
stadium on 15 and 20 June at which leading national Radical Socialist politicians 
were the main speakers. Estimates for each meeting varied between 40,000 to 
60,000 attendees, an impressive feat of organisation in the circumstances.13 
 
The Radical Socialists’ respectable showing in the elections provoked the PURA to 
escalate hostility. ‘To be an anti-blasquista means to be an enemy of the Republic’ 
declared El Pueblo ominously.14  A few days later in an incident which bears all the 
hall marks of a stage–managed affair, and triggered by some highly provocative 
words from PURA councillors, a crowd in the public gallery, armed with guns and 
clubs, disrupted a meeting of City Hall and forcibly ejected the Radical Socialist 
councillors.15 No attempt was made by PURA councillors or council employees to 
restrain the crowd or to restore order.16  
                                            
11 El Pueblo, 4 July 1931.   
12 For an explanation of the Spanish electoral system and the electoral results in Valencia, see 
Appendix C.  
13 La Voz Valenciana, 15 June 1931; La Correspondencia de Valencia, 15 June 1931; Las Provincias, 
16 June and 21 June 1931; Avilés, Izquierda Burgesa, p. 101. 
14 El Pueblo, 25 June 1931. 
15 Actas de Junta Municipal, Valencia (AJMV), Volume D 423, July-September 1931, 2 July 1931. See 
also El Mercantil Valenciano, 2 July 1931. 
16 La Voz Valenciana, 2 July 1931. PURA councillors refused to guarantee the physical safety of the 
Radical Socialists if they returned. The Radical Socialist Cano Coloma alleged that some of those 
who brandished pistols were municipal functionaries. La Voz Valenciana, 10 October 1931. Although 
there had been street violence on many occasions in Valencia before, this was the first time that a 
City Hall council meeting had been disrupted, at least according to El Mercantil. El Mercantil 




El Pueblo complained, admittedly with some justice, that the Radical Socialists 
should have resigned their seats since they were elected on a PURA ticket. It 
continued in a tone which left little doubt that the campaign of violence had not yet 
ended:  
The voice of the people is the supreme law, and the people condemn, and 
since these very people always demanded the death of a thief when they 
manned the barricades, it is not surprising that now… they demand their 
political death.17    
 
The threat was clear; the Radical Socialists would not be permitted to return to City 
Hall, and moreover action against them would continue until they had been 
eliminated as a political force.   
 
Other republicans were not slow to condemn the PURA, the Albista newspaper La 
Voz Valenciana commenting:  
….In the  name of a democracy that has taken very hard knocks recently we 
protest at what happened yesterday…the extreme gravity of these events…go 
against the reputation which Valencia deserves as a democratic and free 
city...18 
 
In the event the term ‘political death’ proved tragically not to be a mere metaphor 
when a Radical Socialist supporter was shot dead, and another wounded, in October 
during the campaign for the partial Constituent Cortes elections. These incidents 
occurred in the main Radical Socialist powerbase outside the provincial capital, 
L'Alcúdia. Incidents of a less serious nature also occurred in Catarroja and 
Campanar. The Civil Governor, a Radical, was widely suspected of turning a blind 
eye to PURA misbehaviour.19 Accounts differ as to who initiated the shooting in 
L'Alcúdia, but except for blasquista sources, other reports put the blame squarely on 
the PURA.20  
                                            
17 El Pueblo, 3 July 1931. 
18 La Voz Valenciana, 2 July 1931. 
19 La Voz Valenciana, 2 October 1931.        
20 El Pueblo, 2 October 1931 not surprisingly blamed the Radical Socialists. La Correspondencia de 
Valencia, consistent with its supposed ‘apoliticism’ refused to apportion blame; La Correspondencia 
de Valencia, 2 October and 3 October 1931.  El Mercantil Valenciano, La Voz Valenciana, and Diario 




The occasion was a planned private PURA meeting, as permission had been refused 
for a public one.21 According to La Voz Valenciana, the hostility between local 
members of the PURA and Radical Socialists had commenced when the local PURA, 
led by one Rafael Sanchis, had tried but failed to get the municipal election results 
overturned (there was a May re-run here which delivered a Radical Socialist majority) 
and the democratically elected council replaced with a PURA-controlled 
administrative commission.22 The speakers planned for the late night meeting were 
Marco Miranda and Sanchis. Although the meeting was supposedly private, Sanchis 
appeared on the balcony of the PURA casino and addressed the crowd gathered 
below, allegedly delivering a string of insults to the Radical Socialists. While he was 
still speaking, shots rang out directed at the local Radical Socialist casino. The man 
killed was a prominent local Radical Socialist.  
 
The PURA members found themselves trapped in the blasquista casino by the 
enraged crowd. They were eventually freed by civil guards who arrived from the city, 
as the local forces were overwhelmed. Some PURA members were arrested for the 
crime. No evidence tied Marco Miranda or Sanchis to the shooting, and they denied 
all involvement, although the crowd seems to have held Marco Miranda responsible; 
it was subsequently suggested that only the arrival of the civil guards had saved him 
from a lynching.23 
                                            
sympathetic to the Radical Socialists; El Mercantil Valenciano,  2 October and 19 October 1931; La 
Voz Valenciana, 2 October and 3 October 1931; Diario de Valencia,  3 October 1931; La Tierra 
(Madrid), 26 October 1931; El Progreso (Xàtiva), 3 October 1931; El Radical Socialista, 1 October 
1932.  
21 Francesc Andreu Martinez Gallego, Construint la ciutadania: una història contemporánia de 
l'Alcúdia 1801-2002. História de l´Alcudia, Vol. II, Ajuntament de l´Alcúdia, L´Alcúdia (Valencia), 2002, 
pp. 480-484 (Martinez Gallego, Construint la ciutadania). 
22 La Voz Valenciana, 2 October 1931. The PURA apparently tried again following the appointment of 
a Radical Civil Governor; El Progreso (Xàtiva), 11 July 1931.     
23 For Marco Miranda’s version of events, see his In Illo Tempore, Consell Valencià de Cultura, 
Valencia, 2005, pp. 390-392. The incident is reported extensively in El Mercantil Valenciano, 2 and 
19 October 1931; Diario de Valencia, 3 October 1931; La Voz Valenciana 2 October and 3 October 
1931; La Correspondencia de Valencia 2 October 1931; and La Tierra (Madrid), 26 October 1931. 
For a report from the Radical Socialist perspective on the first anniversary of the incident, see El 
Radical Socialista, 1 October 1932. See also the telegrams of protest to the Ministry of the Interior 
held at the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN)/ Serie A/FC_M_ Interior Leg 6A/ Caja 2/ Expediente 22. 
It has been suggested by Franch i Ferrer that the gunmen were a group of guardia civica from Valencia 




Whilst the PURA proclaimed their innocence, the Radical Socialists counselled 
peace: ‘when others seek to engender fratricidal war is the precise moment when we 
must…maintain serenity in our conduct, [and] peace in the spirit…24 It seems doubtful 
however that the PURA intended anyone to be killed, if for no other reason than its 
provocateurs were in hostile territory and heavily outnumbered. Probably what was 
intended was to provoke an incident with the aim of suppressing voter turnout in the 
coming elections. This backfired.25   
 
4.3 ‘Enemies of the Work of Vicente Blasco Ibáñez’: the Attack on the DLR 
 
The importance of Catholic republicanism has tended to be underplayed by 
historians yet in the early months of the Republic the position of Catholic 
republicanism was crucial. Had they been able to build on their early success they 
could have consolidated significant Catholic support for the Republic and reduced 
the possibility of a mass, non-Republican Catholic political party developing. The 
national demise of the DLR was therefore central to the religious polarisation which 
severely weakened the Republic since it resulted in the elimination of a Catholic 
republican tradition.26   
 
Given the strategic decision by the Radical Party to seek as broad a base of support 
for the new regime as possible, it would have made sense for the Radicals to make 
overtures to the DLR, but this did not happen as the DLR was seen as a direct 
competitor. In contrast, the Radicals were happy to reach out and seek an 
accommodation with liberal former monarchists such as the ex-Constitutionalists of 
Melquíades Álvarez, because: ‘tainted by their monarchist past and circumscribed 
by their localised political bases [they] were strategic if not ultimately subordinate 
                                            
24 La Voz Valenciana, 2 October 1931. 
25 Martinez Gallego comes to the same conclusion. Construint la ciutadania, p. 484. 
26 This point has been made most clearly by Mary Vincent in her Catholicism in the Second Spanish 




allies for the Radicals.’27 The PURA mirrored the Radicals in seeking to attract the 
support of another personalist and liberal former monarchist group, the supporters of 
Santiago Alba, the Albistas. No doubt they were also attracted by the possibility of 
making the local daily evening newspaper La Voz Valenciana, owned and edited by 
the Albista José Aparicio Albiñana, a blasquista mouthpiece.28  
 
The Valencian DLR had good reason to feel confident about its future. Valencia was 
one of the few places nationally where it had genuine pockets of support.29 The first 
two republican civil governors were DLR members, which gave the local party an 
extra line of communication to Madrid and influence over local patronage. It also had 
the support of a number of very prestigious figures, including the academic Mariano 
Gómez and Vicente Fe Castell, editor of the highly influential republican newspaper 
El Mercantil Valenciano, the newspaper with by far the greatest daily circulation of 
any Valencian daily.30  
 
Many commentators see the demise of the DLR in the response of Catholics to the 
events of 10 to 12 May when various religious buildings were put to the torch by anti-
clerical mobs in a number of cities, including Valencia. If Valencia is any guide, the 
results of the partial municipal elections in May suggest that the DLR may have been 
capable of recovery.31 Valencian primary sources report significantly different figures 
as to the number of seats contested, but all agreed that the PURA won easily with a 
                                            
27 These are Townson’s words. Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics 
under the Second Republic 1931–1936. Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 
2000 (Townson, Crisis), pp. 32-33. 
28 In fact the local Albista faction did not join the PURA until shortly before the 1933 general elections. 
La Voz Valenciana, 18 and 19 October 1933. 
29 Luis Iñigo Fernández, ‘La derecha liberal republicana. Un modelo de organización de un partido 
republicano conservador durante la Segunda República española’, (Iñigo Fernández, ‘Un modelo’), 
Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie V, Historia Contemporánea No 12, 1999, pp. 133-178.  
30 The two civil governors were José Centeno González and Federico Fernández Castillejo. According 
to Azaña, El Mercantil sold over 60,000 copies daily. Manuel Azaña, Diarios completos, Monarquía, 
República, Guerra Civil, Crítica, Barcelona, 2000, pp. 475-476.  
31 Evidence from Salamanca also suggests something similar. Vincent, Catholicism, pp. 160-161.The 
important of the church burnings are stressed by Miguel Maura, one of the leaders of the DLR, in his 




percentage vote of between 44% and 53%, while the DLR came second with a 
percentage vote close to 25%.32 
  
The PURA was shocked by this success for the DLR and ensured that the DLR did 
not form part of the Alliance, alleging that the Radical Socialists and the DLR were 
working in league to undermine the PURA: ‘For us the two [i.e. the Radical Socialists 
and the DLR] are the same thing: declared enemies of the work of Vicente Blasco 
Ibáñez.’33 El Pueblo regularly filled its pages with hostile comments about the DLR, 
prompting the DLR to complain that:   
We have been unjustly attacked ...and suffered violence, [and] threats...tactics 
of the old abominable regime, which certain parties wish to resuscitate, and 
who seem to think that to say certain blasphemous, truculent and gross 
phrases gives them the monoply of republicanism in this province.34  
 
As Iñigo Fernández has demonstrated, the DLR never managed to become a 
modern political party, but remained a party of notables; when attacked it did not 
have the means to mobilise mass support.35 In the June elections the DLR fared 
badly everywhere, but in Valencia its decline was particularly marked, primarily 
because of the intensity of the hostility from the PURA and the DLR’s complete 
                                            
32 El Pueblo, Diario de Valencia and Las Provincias, 2 and 3 June 1931 provide similar figures both 
for the number of seats contested (at the low end of the range) and the percentages reported. Data 
from the Archivo General de la Administración (AGA) at Sección Política y Sección Organización y 
Estadistica de la Vida Local/ 8/ Cuestiones Electorales/ Caja 44/00266/ Legajo 1 are at the high end, 
showing more than 1,410 seats up for contestation. Sergio Valero Gómez, in his thesis Reformismo, 
radicalización y conflicto interno en el socialismo español: la Federación Socialista Valenciana 
durante la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil (1931-1939), Doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, 
2012, (Valero Gómez, Reformismo), at p. 80 sets out his calculations based on his work with the same 
sources and especially the AGA raw data. This produces 1,419 councillors with 632 for the PURA and 
348 for the DLR. He reports 67 seats for the Radical Socialists and 30 for the Socialists. The remaining 
334 seats he reports as being won by: ‘others’ 238; monarchists 87; and the DRV 9.  
33 El Pueblo, 19 June 1931. 
34 Las Provincias, 19 June 1931; El Mercantil Valenciano, 21 June 1931. 
35 Luis Iñigo Fernández, La Derecha Liberal en la Segunda República Española, Universidad Nacional 
de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, 2000. See also his articles ‘La ideología de la derecha liberal en 
la España de la Segunda República (1931-1936)’, Spagna contemporanea, No 17, 2000 59-74; ‘El 
republicanismo conservador en la España de los años Treinta’ Revista de estudios políticos, No 110, 
2000, pp. 281-296; ‘Una República para todos los españoles. Los grupos centristas durante la II 





electoral isolation. Valencia was one of only three provinces where the DLR was 
forced to go to the polls without a single electoral ally.36   
 
4.4 The Constituent Cortes Elections of June 1931 in Valencia 
 
As Townson has pointed out, the Republican-Socialist coalition suffered multiple 
fractures throughout Spain, and the precise nature of the local electoral coalitions 
which emerged depended more on localised conflicts, personalities and the relative 
strength of the various parties rather than any broader strategic intent.37 In Valencia 
the PURA was quite capable of winning in both the city and the province had it gone 
to the elections alone, which left it free to dictate terms. The Socialists had been  
proponents of maintaining the April 1931 coalition, but they eventually accepted 
PURA terms and joined the Alliance.38 
 
The Alliance fielded a majority list with five candidates for the city and a majority list 
of ten for the province. The list of five for the city only contained one member of the 
PURA, Sigfrido Blasco, and one candidate for the Socialists, Francisco Sanchis. The 
other three candidates were leading national figures: Alejandro Lerroux for the 
Radicals,  Manuel Azaña for Acción Republicana, and the former Constitutionalist 
leader, Melquíades Alvarez. Given the relationship of the PURA with the Radicals, 
the presence of Lerroux is understandable, but it is unclear why the PURA were 
ready to cede three seats overall.39  
 
                                            
36 The other two were Ciudad Real and Avila. Juan Avilés Farré, ‘La Derecha Republicana 1930-
1936’, Revista de Estudios Sociales, No. 16, Jan-April 1976, pp. 77- 117. 
37 Townson, Crisis, pp. 54 -58.              
38 El Mercantil Valenciano, 7 June 1931. 
39 Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia (BOPV), 29 and 30 June and 1 July 1931. Lerroux 
actually stood in five places: Cáceres, Huesca, Madrid, Tenerife and Valencia, and was elected in all 
of them; he accepted Madrid. Azaña stood and was elected both in the Baleares and Valencia; he 
accepted Valencia. Melquiades Alvarez stood successfully in Madrid and Valencia, and he accepted 
Valencia.  Cambios de Diputados en las Cortes Constituentes 1931-1933. Renuncias y Elecciones 




The Radical Socialists fielded a majority slate for both the city and the province while 
the DLR fielded a majority for the province but only a minority for the city. There was 
no formal DRV candidature but for the capital a last minute ‘write in’ candidature of 
two, Lucía and García Guijarro, was launched.  The elections occurred in an 
atmosphere of ‘complete tranquillity’ in the words of Las Provincias.40 The Alliance 
triumphed easily, taking the majority for both the city and the province, while the 
minority went to the Radical Socialists in both (Fernando Valera and Pedro Vargas 
were elected for both the city and the province, and Miguel San Andrés for the 
province).41 The Alliance victory in the provincial capital was overwhelming, with over 
57% of the vote on a turnout of just over 65%, and extremely impressive in the 
province where it polled 48% on a turnout of 72%.42  
 
The Radical Socialists were probably disappointed with their 17% in the city and 22% 
in the province but still came second. The DLR fared disappointingly in the province, 
polling some 13% of the vote, but was humiliated in the capital, polling under 10%, 
slightly less than the DRV ‘write-in’ candidature. In the city the Alliance did best in 
strongly working class areas, but the Radical Socialists did well here too, suggesting 
that they were making inroads into traditional blasquista support.43 
 
There was no second round of elections required in Valencia, but on 4 October; a 
partial re-run was required for both city and province to fill vacated seats. In the city 
there were two candidates for the seat vacated by Lerroux. The PURA candidate 
                                            
40 Las Provincias, 30 June 1931. Although violence had been deployed against the DRV during the 
campaign, it would seem that the vote itself was honest throughout the city and province; at any rate 
there were no complaints made by any of the participants.   
41 BOPV, 29 and 30 June and 1 July 1931. 
42 BOPV, 29 and 30 June and 1 July 1931. See Appendix C for an explanation of how these 
percentages were calculated. My analysis of the June results broadly follows the analysis by Valero 
Gómez, Reformismo, at pp. 87-90, which is the most complete and rigorous analysis produced to 
date.  
43 Results in the surrounding villages which formed part of the city for the election showed a rather 
different pattern. The DRV did particularly well in some of the settlements situated in the horta nord, 
an area where the Catholic right had been traditionally strong. In one pueblo, Vinalesa, it actually 
gained most votes, while it did well, too in Alboraia, Meliana, and Burjassot, coming second to the 
Alliance. María José Sigalat Vaya, La II República en Alboraia, 1931-1936, Ajuntament d'Alboraia, 




was Joaquín García Ribes, opposed only by a Radical Socialist candidate, Jesús 
Rubio Villanueva. In the province there were two vacancies for the seats vacated by 
Valera and Vargas. There were five competing candidates: Hector Altabás for the 
PURA; José Cano Coloma for the Radical Socialists; Antonio de Gracia Pons for the 
Socialists; Mariano Gómez for the Progresistas (the section of the former DLR which 
was led by Alcalá-Zamora); and Luis García Guijarro for the DRV. In the city the 
PURA candidate won easily with over 66% of the vote while in the province Altabás 
and Cano Coloma were elected with 39% and 21% of the vote respectively. The 
surprise however was the vote received by the DRV candidate, García Guijarro, who 
rceived 19% of the vote, just 1,820 votes behind Cano Coloma.44  
 
4.5 ‘Always on the Side of the Principle of Authority’: the DRV and the 
Republic   
 
As it faced the new republic the DRV had to decide its attitude to the new regime. 
Having long advocated a form of ‘accidentalism’, the DRV found this transition easier 
than most. Whilst the DRV never fully resolved its attitude, the evidence suggests 
that much of its leadership was genuinely prepared to work within the structures of 
the new republican regime.45  
  
At this stage the DRV was a small city-based organisation. To transform itself into a 
mass party it would have to build a coalition which included disillusioned conservative 
republican voters, the apathetic, and those who had until recently opposed the 
Republic.  Although with the benefit of hindsight it might appear that there was a 
huge untapped pool of support, the situation was altogether more politically fluid than 
that in the summer and autumn of 1931. Effective leadership and first-rate 
organisational skills would be needed to eliminate the DLR as a serious force, and 
to attract the majority of Catholic voters. This would not be a simple task. With 
                                            
44 BOPV, 6, 7 and 8 October 1931. 
45 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss in detail the nature of Spanish ‘accidentalism’ and 




virtually no councillors at this stage, and no municipalities under its control, the DRV 
lacked any established footholds within the province; it would have to create these 
from scratch.46  
 
Progress in growing the organisation was slow. By the end of 1931 the DRV had 
established just 74 local organisations but only 29 existed by the end of June.47 This 
slow growth posed a problem in deciding how to respond to the Constituent Cortes 
elections. The initial decision was to fight the elections for both the city and the 
province, fielding a majority list in both cases.48  The DRV subsequently decided to 
withdraw, on the ground that violence would make it impossible to campaign. Two 
incidents in Llíria and Alaquàs provoked this change of heart. In Llíria, a closed 
meeting of the DRV was invaded violently by an unidentified group of protestors, 
while in Alaquàs a far more serious incident occurred during an open DRV meeting. 
Alaquàs is a settlement in the horta and a mob from outside, apparently a group of 
PURA supporters from the city’s port, tried to disrupt the meeting. During the 
disturbances a number of guns were fired into the air; DRV activists were reduced to 
taking refuge in a private house as the anti-DRV crowd outside set fire to the DRV 
members’ cars.49  
                                            
46 The shortage of councillors was a problem for the DRV. A report by the civil governor in October 
1932 on the relative number of councillors of each political party showed the DRV with only 152 
councillors out of 2,587, a mere 6 % of the total. Although there are errors in the report, so clear-cut 
is the position that correcting these errors would make little difference to the outcome. The report  is 
held at AGA / Sección Política y Sección Organización y Estadistica de la Vida Local/ 8/ Cuestiones 
Electorales/ Caja 44/00266/ Legajo 1. The wholesale dismissal of leftist councillors after the October 
1934 events and the installation of administrative committees gave the DRV many more councillors, 
but not municipal control, as the PURA had a majority on all of these committees.  
47 Derecha Regional Valenciana. Su historia. Su ideario. Su táctica. Su obra. Su organización. Political 
Secretariat of the DRV, Valencia, 1933, p.  100; Joaquín Tomás Villarroya: ‘Las agrupaciones locales 
de la derecha regional valenciana,’ Saitabi, No. 17, 1967, pp. 129-156 at p. 130.  Slightly different 
figures were reported in an article published in Diario de Valencia late in 1932; Diario de Valencia, 1 
December 1932. 
48 Diario de Valencia, 8 May 1931. 
49 There was a dispute as to who fired first, but it seems to have been the case that the first shot was 
fired by a DRV supporter. La Correspondencia de Valencia, 13 June 1931; Diario de Valencia, 13 and 
14 June 1931; El Mercantil Valenciano, 13 June 1931; Las Provincias, 14 June 1931; El Pueblo, 13, 
14 and 15 June 1931. See also Vicente Comes Iglesia, ‘La política como tension social. Un incidente 
local con repercusión nacional’, Quaderns d'investigació d'Alaquàs, Vol. 24, 2003, pp. 79-87, and  
José Royo Martínez, ‘Noticias de Alaquàs en el Diario de Valencia (1911-1936)’, Quaderns 
d'investigació d'Alaquàs, Vol. 28, 2008, pp. 53-19 at pp. 140-143. In the event the DRV subsequently 




The violence was a response to the DRV’s refusal of an electoral deal with the PURA. 
Just what type of electoral agreement the PURA had in mind was never explained. 
Given their very different electoral constituencies, it is unclear what benefits either 
would have received from a formal  alliance. Probably what was on offer was a tacit 
agreement that the PURA would not seek to disrupt DRV meetings, or direct 
propaganda against them.  These events demonstrate that the PURA was aware of 
the potential threat from the DRV to its hegemony, and was determined to pursue a 
policy of containment, hoping to lock it into a subservient role. If the policy of 
containment failed, the PURA was prepared to resort to violence.50  
 
In October the DRV did fully participate in the provincial partial election. The choice 
of the prominent social-catholic García Guijarro as parliamentary candidate was 
significant. García Guijarro, a former  Deputy to the Cortes was very well known.51 
One of the leading figures within the orange exporters’ organisation the Unión 
Nacional de las Exportación Agrícola, his candidature was calculated to appeal to 
large-scale agriculturists and especially orange-growers but also to appeal to other 
orange-growers in a market increasingly dominated by small-scale producers.  
 
He campaigned at the height of the conservative response to the laicising clauses 
being introduced into the Republic’s constitution, allowing the right nationally, and 
the DRV locally, to portray itself as the defender of Catholicism. The banner of the 
defence of Catholicism and his reputation as a defender of agrarian interests were 
all crucial factors in attracting the support of the leaders of the Valencian Sindicatos 
Agrícolas. Many of the DRV’s electoral and general propaganda meetings 
throughout the province were held, in the absence of the DRV having its own centres, 
in the buildings of Sindicatos Agrícolas and in the warehouses of large orange 
growers. The Sindicatos Agrícolas had been founded by social catholics and they 
                                            
obtained 9,483 and 9,052 votes respectively, beating the highest placed DLR candidate, Sánchez-
Guerra, who obtained only 6,210 votes. BOPV, 29 and 30 June and 1 July 1931. 
50 During the 1933 electoral campaign Lucía confirmed that the PURA had offered an alliance for the 
Constituent Cortes elections. The offer was repeated before the 1933 general elections and the DRV 
once again rejected it. Diario de Valencia, 14 October 1933 and 26 November 1933. 




remained one of the primary networks of transmission of these ideas to their 
members.52 Beyond that, García Guijarro’s ‘near miss’ was unexpected and 
gratifying while almost as satisfying for the DRV was that the Progresista candidate 
(the faction of the former DLR now led by the President of the Republic)  came bottom 




The PURA had now consolidated its hold on power. It gained nine parliamentary 
seats for the city and province combined, while two other Valencian republicans who 
subsequently joined the Radical Party had been elected, too. The Socialists, 
obtained three and the Radical Socialists four.54 Blasquismo had  managed this at 
considerable cost to the health of the Valencian polity.  It had re-introduced the 
violent street politics   which had disfigured the the city in the first years of the 
twentieth century. In terms of political discourse, and in classic populist style, it had 
made commonplace the deployment of a ‘… a course and uncontrolled plebeianism 
which confuses liberty and libertinage, ideals and idolatrous hero-worship, 
democracy and corruption and radicalism with violence’.55 In doing so it sought to 
transform all of its political opponents into deadly enemies, delegitimising their right 
to participate within the democratic framework and implicitly at least justifying the use 
of violence. Time would tell what would be the results of the PURA’s approach, as 
the political turbulence of the republican years unfolded.  
                                            
52 One of the most important centres of social-catholicism captured for the DRV was Gandía where 
the powerful and prestigious figure Joaquín Ballester who edited the social-catholic weekly the Revista 
de Gandía, gave it wholehearted support. See Lluís Sevilla Parra, ‘Joaquín Ballester en el context del 
catolicisme polític valencià: 1900-1936,’ Aguaits, 1999, No. 16, pp. 43-67, and Antonio 
Calzado Aldaria and Lluís Sevilla Parra,   La IIª República a Gandía, Centre d'Estudis Alfons el Vell, 
Gandía, 2000, pp.145-147. On the importance of the Sindicatos Agrícolas in delivering mass support 
to the Spanish right, see Juan José Castillo Alonso: ‘Modulaciones ideológicas del catolicismo social 
en España: de los circulos a los sindicatos.’ Revista española de opinión pública, No. 45, 1976 pp. 
37-76, and his  Propietarios muy pobres, Servicio de Publicaciones Agrarias, Madrid, 1979. In the 
Valencian context, see Martínez Gallego, Agricultores solidarios, especially pp. 54-70.   
53 BOPV, 6, 7 and 8 October 1931. 
54 Twenty seats in total were at stake. The other two Deputies were Manuel Azaña and Melquiades 
Alvarez. 













5 ‘THE VIRUS OF EVIL’: THE RISE OF THE DRV, ANTI-CLERICALISM AND 
THE PURA’S GROWING HOSTILITY TO THE SOCIALISTS. NOVEMBER 
1931 TO OCTOBER 1932  
` 
The constituted powers…want to infect the souls of the innocent with 
the virus-of evil…we want to place a barrier against the corruption of 
the infants…. 
 Las Provincias, 19 July 1932  
...They [the PURA] want the Republic for themselves alone….They 
worship the lowest instincts of man; they mislead the masses…they 
only believe in their despotism and how to maintain it…. 
Fernando Valera, El Radical Socialista, 9 April 1932 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will explain the circumstances under which the first cracks began to 
appear in the PURA’s control over Valencia as it found itself completely isolated from 
all other local republicans, alienated the Socialists, and faced the growing threat from 
the rapidly growing DRV. The PURA’s response was to blame the central 
government for the growing economic problems faced by urban workers and to stress 
its anti-clericalism in the hope of maintaining working class support. I will explain why 
the deployment of anti-clericalism became increasingly ineffective and why the 
PURA went on to escalate its rhetoric against the Socialists and once again to use 
violence.   
 
5.2 Anti-clericalism and the Rise of the DRV  
 
Throughout Spain the anti-clerical decrees of the first months of the regime caused 
consternation among Catholic citizens.  These measures secularised the education 
system, banned members of religious orders from education, industry and 
commerce, dissolved the Society of Jesus and ended all state financial support for 
the clergy. Of these, the question of laic education was one of the most politically 




strongest possible terms. Pius XI in his encyclical on the Christian education of 
children asserted that education was ‘first and super-eminently’ the function of the 
Church.1   
 
As many historians have noted, Spanish Catholicism had developed a highly 
sophisticated network of lay associations.2  Even outside of the strictly religious 
sphere, Catholics were actively encouraged to socialise within a hermetically sealed 
Catholic world, while news would be filtered through the medium of the so-called 
‘good press’. Within days of the creation of the Republic, the Church began to rally 
its supporters behind a programme which emphasised not only the defence of 
Catholicism but stressed social conservativism where the defence of religion was 
seen as synonymous with ‘…the conservation of property, hierarchy in society and 
in work.’3   
 
It is now commonplace to view the policy of the new Republic towards the Catholic 
Church as representing a major tactical error, allowing its political opponents to 
appear as defenders of Catholicism. This is undoubtedly correct but it seems highly 
likely that a large-scale mobilisation of Catholics behind confessional politicians 
would have occurred no matter how moderate the republican programme had been.  
It is however possible that a less aggressive secularising programme might have 
alienated fewer Catholics,  and enabled the survival of a conservative Catholic 
republican option capable of capturing a significant proportion of Catholic votes, 
either in parties such as the DLR (or its successors) or within the Radical Party. 
 
                                            
1 Mary Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic. Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 
1930–1936, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, (Vincent, Catholicism), p. 135. 
2 The best analysis of this network can be found in Rafael Cruz Martínez, En el nombre del pueblo, 
Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2006, but an excellent summary can be found in Maria Thomas, The Faith and the 
Fury: Popular Anticlerical Violence and Iconoclasm in Spain, 1931–1936, Doctoral thesis, Royal 
Holloway, University of London, 2012, (Thomas, Popular Anticlerical Violence), at pp. 88-89.   
3 El Debate, 28 April 1931, quoted in Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. Reform, 




As republican legislation took a radical turn, the ability of politicians of the 
‘accidentalist’ right to present themselves as defenders of religion proved to be their 
best ‘recruiting sergeant’. If there was anything atypical about Valencia, it was the 
strength of the Catholic network and the manner in which it had already been 
politicised in earlier years. The DRV was now ideally placed to harness it. DRV 
leaders were already leading figures in local Catholic organisations. Virtually all had 
been active in the elite Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNP: the 
National Association of Catholic Propagandists). The ACNP had a significant 
influence on the development of the ‘accidentalist’ right at the national level, in 
parallel with  its role in reorganising Acción Catolica.4  Lucía was  Secretary of the 
ACNP’s Regional Directorate.5  
 
Within weeks of the creation of the Republic, the accidentalist right were given a 
great propaganda gift when anti-clerical riots occurred. These commenced in Madrid 
on 10 May after a pro-monarchist demonstration and soon spread to the rest of the 
country, including Valencia. El Pueblo hardly calmed the atmosphere when, reporting 
the events in Madrid, it described the pro-monarchist demonstration as: ‘A 
Monarchist Criminal Action’ and went on: ‘As reprisals against the criminal plans of 
the priests and alfonsists, various convents have been set on fire...’.6  The problems 
in Valencia started on the evening of 12 May. A crowd, estimated to be in the region 
of 3-4,000 strong, gathered outside City Hall. PURA leaders called for calm and 
throughout the subsequent events did their best to prevent problems, as all 
                                            
4 Vincent, Catholicism, p. 120. 
5 Rafael Valls Montés, La Derecha Regional Valenciana, 1930-1936. El catolicismo político 
valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1992 (Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana), p. 59, footnote 
24. Watanabe has studied the relationship between the CEDA leadership and the ACNP and has 
documented 118 ACNP members who were also CEDA leaders; of these, 21 were in the DRV. Of all 
Spanish cities, only Madrid and Salamanca had more ACNP members than Valencia. Valencia was 
also a stronghold of the ACNP influenced Catholic student movement. Chiaki Watanabe, 
Confesionalidad católica y militancia política: La Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas y 
la Juventud Católica Española (1923–1936), UNED, Madrid, 2003, pp. 67, 76 and 396-437.       




subsequent reports confirm.7 That night various religious buildings were ransacked 
and set on fire.8  
 
The Catholic press when opposing the secularising measures of the republican 
constantly used language which suggested a Manichean choice between good and 
evil. Diario de Valencia warned of: ‘the abyss and disaster into which the enemies of 
our Religion are determined to drag us’.9 Particularly emotive was the decision to 
implement a single, secular education system which was presented as virtually a 
declaration of war on Catholics. Images of infection, of corruption, of decay, of evil, 
abounded. According to Elias Olmos, priest, Catholic propagandist and DRV 
member, the impact of laic education on Spanish children would be disastrous: 
..laic education… [is] without faith, without hope, without fear of God, without 
a moral compass ...laicism…is hatred to the death of the Church.  It is 
persecution, with no scope for compromise...10  
 
For an anonymous correspondent in La Provincias, the motivation of republicans in 
imposing a laic school system was ‘….to infect the souls of the innocent with the virus 
of evil…’11 while a social catholic newspaper which looked favourably on the DRV 
charged that republicans ‘….instead of cleaning the atmosphere… malignantly flood 
it further with corrupting emanations…’12 
                                            
7 La Correspondencia de Valencia, 11 and 13 May 1931; Diario de Valencia, 19 May 1931; El 
Mercantil Valenciano, 19 May 1931; Las Provincias 13 and 14 May 1931; El Pueblo, 12 May 1931; 
La Voz Valenciana, 13 and 14 May 1931. Official reports of these events in a number of Spanish 
provinces, including Valencia, are included at Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) / Sección 
Gobernación / Valencia / Legajo 16 A / Expediente No 17. The best summary of the events in Valencia 
can be found in Richard Purkiss, Democracy, Trade Unions and Political Violence in Spain: The 
Valencian Anarchist Movement 1918-1936, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton,  Portland and Toronto, 
2011, (Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement), pp. 127-128.  
8 There were also incidents in Carlet,  Gandia and Xàtiva, places of strong religious and anti-clerical 
sentiment. Diario de Valencia, 19 May 1931; La Voz Valenciana, 18 May 1931; Aurora Bosch 
Sánchez, ‘Agrociutats i anticlericalisme a la II República’ L' Avenç, No. 204, June 1996, pp. 6-11 at 
p. 8.  
9 Diario de Valencia, 21 August 1931. 
10 El Sueco (Sueca, weekly), 24 April 1932. Olmos may have left the DRV at some time during 1932; 
at any rate he ceased to feature in official DRV propaganda events and henceforth avoided clear 
identification with any specific rightist political grouping although he remained a high profile and bitter 
opponent of the republican secularising legislation.  
11 Las Provincias, 19 July 1932. 




Taking advantage of the reaction against anti-clericalism the DRV advanced into 
country areas and invested huge efforts into its propaganda campaign. In the first 
half of 1932, 527 meetings were held.13 The DRV stated that it grew fastest in those 
areas where ‘persecution’ was greatest.14 In this process the support of the 
Sindicatos Agrarios was crucial. Valls has shown from the Causa General records 
that almost 40% of provincial DRV members were farmers, owners and tenants, who 
worked small to medium plots of land. It was this 40% who most relied on the support 
of the Sindicatos Agrícolas.15 The leadership of the Sindicatos provided a ready-
made local leadership structure for the DRV, gave the DRV an initial operational 
base, and a network for the purposes of propagandising. Many papers such as El 
Sueco in Sueca and El Obrero Setabense in Xàtiva had close relations with the local 
Sindicatos and were highly sympathetic to the DRV although they never formally 
supported it. In some places such as Gandia however, long established social-
catholic weeklies formally proclaimed for the DRV.16   
 
The creation of a youth section and a women’s section were an essential part of the 
development of the DRV. The Juventud de la Derecha Regional Valenciana (Youth 
of the Valencian Regional Right, or JDRV) only began to expand late in 1931. It grew 
quickly and by November 1932 when the JDRV Regional Federation was created it 
claimed 10,000 members.17 The DRV’s women’s section, Acción Cívica de la Mujer 
                                            
13 Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana, p. 92; Lucía said the DRV held 1,073 meetings in two years; 
Luis Lucía Lucía, La Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, (pamphlet), La Voz 
Valenciana, Valencia, 1933, p 14. This extraordinary level of activity was gently mocked in the right-
wing satirical weekly Gracia y Justicia, which published a fake DRV publicity notice: ‘Meetings for 
today. One at 10; another at 11; another at 12; another at 1; another at 2 and then at hourly rests until 
1 in the morning. There will be meetings held in all the pueblos of the province, and wherever 
opponents announce a meeting, we will hold four for training purposes.’ Gracia y Justicia, 2 April 
1932. 
14 Report of Francisco Bosch Marin to the Third Assembly. Diario de Valencia, 29 November 1932. 
15 Their Sindicato in the Valencian case would typically be a member of the Federación Valenciana 
de Sindicatos Agrícolas (FVSA), in turn affiliated to the national Confederación Nacional-Católico 
Agraria (CNCA). On the FVSA, see Samuel Garrido Herrero, El sindicalisme catolic a La Safor, 1900-
1936: Catolicisme social i politic en una comarca del Pais Valencia, Centre d'Estudis i Investigacions 
Comarcals /Alfons el Vell, Valencia, 1987, and his El Sindicalisme Catòlico-Agrari al País Valencià 
(1906-1923). Cooperativisme confessional, millora tècnica i mobilatció camperola a Espanya després 
de la crisi agrària finisecular, Doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, 1993. On the CNCA, see Juan 
José Castillo, Propietarios muy pobres: sobre la subordinación política del pequeño campesino en 
España, Servicio de publicaciones agrarias, Madrid, 1979.   
16 In Gandia the publication was the Revista de Gandia.  




(ACM), as with other women’s sections of what was eventually to form the CEDA, 
was established to take advantage of the extension of the suffrage to women and in 
the context of the perceived legislative attack on Catholicism.18 It expanded quickly 
and by November 1932 claimed 50,000 members.19  
 
By November 1932 Bosch Marín claimed that the party had 150 committees in the 
province and that total DRV membership (including members in Alicante and 
Castellón) had reached 100,000.20  The arrival of the DRV as a major political force 
was clear to all.  In April 1932 the evening daily newspaper La Voz Valenciana ran a 
series of interviews with prominent figures from across the political spectrum, asking 
them how they saw the development of Valencian politics. Virtually all saw the DRV 
and PURA as being the two major political parties in the future.21    
  
From a leftist perspective, the scale of the threat from the DRV was understood: 
….and behind them [the leaders of the DRV] invisible, but prepared, are 
the bosses, [the orange exporters’ organisation] the UNEA, the shippers, 
the religious congregations, the Church, the confessional Sindicatos 
Agrícolas…the reactionary technocrats who survive, thanks to 
republican mercy, buried deep in the bureaucratic organs of the State. 
They are all within one force: the Regional Right…it is a terrible political 
force which is preparing for the supreme struggle: the coming 
elections.22 
 
                                            
18 On ACM see Rafael Valls and Isabel Morant Deusa, ‘Acció Cívica de la Dona, secció femenina de 
la Dreta Regional Valenciana (1931-1936)’, in Various authors, Homenatge al doctor Sebastià Garcia 
Martínez, Generalitat Valenciana and Universtitat de València, Vol. 3, 1988, pp. 431-446. See also 
Joaquín Tomás Villaroya: ‘Las agrupaciones locales de la Derecha Regional Valenciana,’ Saitabi, No. 
17, 1967, pp. 129-156 at p. 149 (Tomás Villaroya, ‘Las agrupaciones’).  
19 ACM Assembly held as part of the Third Assembly of the DRV; Diario de Valencia, 29 November 
1932.  
20 Report of Bosch Marín to the Third Assembly of the DRV; Diario de Valencia, 29 November 1932. 
Statement of Bosch Marín to El Debate, 27 November 1932.   
21 Interviews were published on a daily basis throughout April, but see especially La Voz Valenciana, 
2 April, 5 April, 7 April, 12 April, 13 April, 15 April, 19 and 20 April 1932.  




5.3 Anti-clericalism in Valencia during the Second Republic 
   
With the arrival of the Republic the PURA tried, as in the past, to deploy anti-
clericalism as a mobilisation stategy for the party, but found its attempts to be 
increasingly ineffective. Its difficulties were rooted in a number of factors, of a national 
and local character. Nationally, as Thomas has argued convincingly, changes 
provoked by  industrialisation, rural-urban migration and the effects of the First World 
War altered the face of popular anti-clericalism as workers and their organisations 
began to construct a strongly anti-clerical ‘workers’ public sphere’, which, by 
implication, was  largely freed from the control of republican anti-clerical discourse.23  
 
In some places this manifested itself in a high level of grass-roots anti-clerical activity, 
typically where other factors triggered such behaviour.24 But in Valencia this grass-
roots activity was intense in some places and barely noticeable in others. The reason 
for the divergence I would suggest is that one important aspect of this change in 
workers’ anti-clericalism is that it became ‘embedded’ into a full-blown critique of the 
entire system. This relegated anti-clericalism to a ‘second order’ problem which gave 
it limited salience and hence limited potentiality as a mobilisation strategy unless 
other factors came into play.25 There was undoubtedly a deep pool of anti-clerical 
feeling in much of the province, but this ideological transformation meant that the 
PURA could no longer simply deploy anti-clericalism when it suited it.  
                                            
23 Maria Thomas, ‘The Faith and the Fury: The Construction of Anticlerical Collective Identities in 
Spain, 1874–1931’, European History Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2013, pp. 73–95 at p. 75; and her 
Popular Anticlerical Violence,   p. 80.  
24 Thomas, in respect of Madrid and Almería, Juan Manuel Barrios Rozúa for Granada and  María del 
Pilar Salomón Chéliz in respect of Aragon, have all produced a wealth of local evidence describing 
anti-clerical pressure from workers demanding faster and more radical measures than the republican 
government was willing to countenance. Thomas, Popular Anticlerical Violence, p. 57; Juan Manuel 
Barrios Rozúa, Iconoclastia (1930-1936). La ciudad de Dios frente a la modernidad, Universidad de 
Granada, Granada, 2007 and ‘La legislación laica desbordada: El anticlericalismo durante la Segunda 
República’, Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie V, Historia contemporánea, No. 12, 1999, pp. 179-224; 
María del Pilar Salomón Chéliz,: ‘El discurso anticlerical en la construcción de una identidad nacional 
española republicana (1898-1936)’, Hispania Sacra, No. 54, 2002, pp. 485-497 at p. 495.   
25 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview 
and Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 26, August, 2000, pp. 611-639 at pp. 614 and 
619-621 state that the mobilising potency of ‘collective action frames’ that is ‘action-oriented sets of 
beliefs and meanings’ are reduced where they have less centrality and hence less resonance. Note 




As the nature of the social base of support for the PURA seems to have varied 
significantly in different parts of the province, deployment of anti-clericalism as a 
province-wide strategy was in any case problematic. Anti-clericalism was not simply 
confined to the city. Particularly important centres were the larger towns, that is those 
with more than 10,000 inhabitants: Alzira, Algemesí, Carcaixent, Cullera, Gandia, 
Xàtiva, Ontinyent, Requena, Sueca, Tavernes de la Valldigna and Torrent.26  In a 
number of these towns there was a very sizeable Catholic minority, often from 
families with a history of Carlist struggle, whilst the PURA faced serious competition 
from the Radical Socialists who had more credence as an anti-clerical force. Such 
settlements may well have harboured a large minority who became alienated from 
the regime at an early date although there is no conclusive evidence to support this 
assertion.   
 
The growing radicalisation of workers, the increasing autonomy of their ideological 
position and hence their anti-clericalism, the variability in the depth and salience of 
anti-clericalism in different parts of the province, and the impact of competition from 
the Radical Socialists, weakened the ability of the PURA to play the anti-clerical card. 
It was however one of the few weapons remaining which it could utilise to garner 
popular support. With the arrival of the Republic, far from moderating its rhetoric, it 
upped the stakes. 
 
In contrast to the rather timid approach taken by Lerroux, the PURA’s official 
mouthpiece came down enthusiastically for the suppression of all religious orders.27 
Throughout the first months of the Republic El Pueblo waged an anti-clerical 
campaign that was exceptionally verbally violent. In August it proclaimed that: ‘If the 
Republic does not confront the clerical problem in a courageous and implacable 
manner we will face a new civil war which will destroy Spain.’28 Declaring itself to be 
                                            
26 Aurora Bosch Sánchez, ‘Agrociutats i anticlericalisme a la II República,’ L' Avenç, No 204, June 
1996, pp. 6-12. 
27 El Pueblo, 30 August 1931. For Lerroux’s attitude see Jose M. Sánchez, ‘The Spanish Church and 
the Revolutionary Republican Movement 1930-1931’, Church History, Volume 31, No. 4, December 
1962, pp. 430-439.       




solidly for the suppression of the religious orders, it charged that: ‘Ten thousand 
monks and nuns are too many hábitos for a country where too many workers do not 
have winter clothes!’29 In November the PURA threatened darkly that if the Jesuits, 
which it described as ‘irreconcilable enemies of the Republic’ were not dealt with by 
the Cortes: ‘…the people will take their own action’.30   
 
Outside the city it is necessary to consider how the official line of the party translated 
into attitudes and actions. Angel Luis López Villaverde has pointed out that in terms 
of understanding how anti-clericalism was used as a mobilising force the situation at 
the local level was crucial.31 Issues such as the secularisation of the local cemetery, 
the banning of religious processions, and the restrictions on Catholic funerals were 
the key triggers for Catholic mobilisation.32  
 
In Valencia, at least, it is clear that there were wide variations in implementation; in 
some places the legislation was more or less ignored, while in others over-
enthusiastic officials interpreted the law very rigorously.33 The Republican legislation 
controlling Catholic burials was often interpreted so strictly that they became, in 
practice, almost impossible to carry out.  This was celebrated by the blasquista Julio 
Just, who said that the Republic had ‘abolished’ them.34 The PURA campaign against 
Catholic funerals caused near riots in Torrent, and in Xeraco, Silla and in Puig.35 In 
                                            
29 El Pueblo, 30 August 1931 and 16 September 1931. Hábitos  is difficult to translate in this context 
but is being deployed as a synecdoche since it can mean, respectively, religious costumes or habits, 
people in clerical orders, and the religious order itself.   
30 El Pueblo, 12 November 1931. 
31 Angel Luis López Villaverde,  ‘El conflicto católico-republicano "desde abajo", 1931-1936’ in Julio 
de la Cueva Merino and Feliciano Montero García (eds.),  Laicismo y catolicismo. El conflicto político-
religioso en la segunda república, Universidad de Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares, 2009, pp. 389-442 at 
pp. 390-391. 
32 Emilio Grandío Seoane, ‘Sobre el apoliticismo. CEDA y Acción Católica: Política y religión’, in 
Feliciano Montero García (ed.), La Acción Católica en la II República, Universidad de Alcalá de 
Henares, Alcalá de Henares, 2008 pp. 89-113 at p. 94. 
33 For over-enthusiastic interpreatation of the rules see  Antonio Calzado Aldaria, Segunda república 
y guerra civil: la Vall d'Albaida, 1931-1939, Associació de Veïns el Llombo, Ontinyent (Valencia), 
2012, pp.70-73, and his ‘Apunts Sobre L’Anticlericalisme Durant La II República: Les Comarques 
Centrals Valencianes (1931-1939)’, Alba, Nos. 16/17, 2001-2002, pp. 104-131, at pp.107-109. 
34 Diario de Valencia, 8 April 1932 and 19 July 1932.   
35 La Correspondencia de Valencia, 7 April 1932; Diario de Valencia, 27 March 1932; El Mercantil 




one incident, tragedy struck.  In Masamagrell, the refusal of the blasquista mayor to 
allow a Catholic funeral brought armed Catholics onto the streets who threatened 
that the funeral would go ahead, if necessary by force. Las Provincias carried a report 
which portrayed this response by Catholics as a ‘tipping point’ after many months of 
arbitrary anti-Catholic actions by the blasquista mayor.36  The brother of the mayor 
attacked and stabbed one of these armed men, a DRV activist, who later died.37   
 
Despite the deserved reputation which the Radical Socialists had throughout Spain 
for the strength of their anti-clerical position, the situation within Valencia was 
complex. The party’s official provincial weekly newspaper, El Radical Socialista, 
consistent with the provincial leadership’s attitude, did not devote a great of coverage 
to the subject and the language used was usually restrained in tone.38 Some local 
provincial branches did engage in extreme rhetoric such as those in L'Alcúdia, Carlet, 
Carcaixent and Llíria where they were the predominant republican grouping.39 There 
is no evidence of any attempt to provoke local conflicts.40  In Carcaixent, a town with 
a long tradition of anti-clericalism, there was strong opposition to the return of the 
keys of religious buildings to the clergy who had evacuated their premises in fear 
during the May 1931 events.41 
 
In spite of this, in Carcaixent and also in Llíria there seems to have been little anti-
clerical agitation until at least February 1936.42 The Radical Socialists were more 
                                            
36 Las Provincias, 26 March 1932. 
37 La Correspondencia de Valencia, 25 March and 26 March 1932; Diario de Valencia, 26 March 1932; 
El Mercantil Valenciano, 25 March 1932; Almanaque de Las Provincias, 1933, p. 57; Las Provincias 
wrongly described the victim as an ‘autonomist’ (that is a PURA member).  Las Provincias, 25 March 
1932. 
38 El Radical Socialista was published from December 1931 to March 1933. 
39Josep Daniel Simeón Riera, Entre la rebel·lia i la tradició: Llíria durant la república i la guerra civil, 
1931-1939, Diputació de València, Valencia, 1993, rebel·lia), pp. 127-128; and his ‘Partidos políticos 
y bases sociales en la Llíria  republicana’, Lauro, No 2, 1986, pp. 143-165. 
40 On L'Alcúdia, see Francesc Andreu Martinez Gallego, Construint la ciutadania: una història 
contemporánia de l'Alcúdia 1801-2002, Ajuntament de l´Alcúdia, L´Alcúdia (Valencia), 2002, p. 485.  
41 Out of a population of just over 15,000 people, over 2,000 signed a petition protesting against the 
return of the keys.  A copy of the petition is held at the AHN / Serie A/FC_M_ Interior Legajo 6A /caja 
2. The civil governor had to intervene to compel the councillors to hand them back. María José Sigalat 
Vayá, La Segunda República y la Guerra Civil en Carcaixent: 1931-1939; undergraduate dissertation, 
Universitat de València, Valencia, 1999, pp. 159-160.    
42 Josep Daniel Simeón Riera, ‘La cultura popular i el terror revolucionari de 1936: el cas de la ciutat 
de Llíria,  Afers, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1986, pp. 229-246, at p. 235, and his rebel·lia at p. 177. Thomas reports 




provocative where they were the minority, such as in Gandia, Xàtiva and Ontinyent. 
In Gandia the PURA and the Radical Socialists were both very anticlerical but the 
Radical Socialists outflanked the PURA and seem to have been most successful in 
attracting the electoral support of local CNT members.43 In Xàtiva the local Radical 
Socialist party under the leadership of José Fabra Torres was so extreme that the 
local PURA weekly asked rhetorically, referring to Fabra ‘Does he aspire to be the 
most crazy anticlerical in all the world? To eat all the priests…?’44 
 
5.4 ‘The Ruin of the Nation and the Shame of the Republic’: the Attack on 
the Socialists  
 
The PURA was becoming increasingly hostile to the PSOE.  Although much of this 
derived from the national political dynamic with the growing Radical Party enmity 
towards the PSOE, it also had local causes, primarily in growing signs that popular 
support for the PURA was weakening. The PURA had also been damaged by the 
events surrounding the destruction of the University by fire in May 1932, which had 
highlighted PURA incompetence in managing the fire service, but fissures in its 
support had already appeared with the increasing radicalisation of the Valencian 
working-class, demonstrated by growing CNT militancy and a large increase in 
membership of the UGT.45  
 
                                            
reference to this supposed incident; Maria Thomas, Popular Anticlerical Violence, p. 105. The source 
is El Debate. 19 February 1936, over four years’ later. This incident sounds very similar to an incident 
which actually occurred in Valencia city early in 1932, and may have been misreported by El Debate.   
43 Antonio Calzado Aldaria and Luis Sevilla Parra,  La IIª República a Gandía, Centre d'Estudis Alfons 
el Vell, Gandía, 2000, p. 155. 
44 El Demócrata (Xàtiva), 20 February 1932. Fabra was also a councillor. In his first intervention in the 
Town council he asked that all religious symbols be removed from the cemetery, and subsequently 
argued for the complete secularisation of the cemetery, which meant the abolition of a Catholic 
cemetery, a breach of republican law.  On his call for the ‘total secularisation’ of the cemetery, see 
Actas del Junta Municipal, Játiva (Xàtiva), 1 November 1931 and 5 January 1932.  
45 On the fire see La Correspondencia de Valencia, 13 and 16 May 1932; Diario de Valencia, 14 May 
1932; El Pueblo, 13 and 16 May 1932; Las Provincias, 13 May 1932; El Radical Socialista, 21 May 
1932; El Socialista 13 and 14 May 1932; La Tierra, 14 and 15 May 1932; The Times (London), 14 
May 1932. The most comprehensive coverage is in the Almanaque de Las Provincias, 1933, pp. 161-




Although 1932 had been a relatively peaceful year for industrial conflict nationally, 
Valencia bucked this trend, as Purkiss has noted, with 1932 being a year of 
intensified strike activity.46 One of the most important of these strikes was that of the 
city electricity workers, whose union was a CNT stronghold, and which began on 12 
April 1932.  The union tried hard to win over public opinion and they were backed by 
the blasquistas who attacked the attempts of the civil governor and the Ministry of 
Labour to force the workers to go to arbitration. The CNT were ideologically opposed 
to state-sponsored arbitration, and this presented an opportunity for the PURA to 
curry CNT favour while attacking Doporto, a member of Acción Republicana, and the 
local Delegate of Labour, Antonio de Gracia, who was also a socialist councillor at 
City Hall.47  City Hall went so far as to organise a subscription in favour of the strike.48 
 
As El Radical Socialista put it: 
 [The PURA has] … gone on the attack against the local socialists…to see if 
they can bring back into the fold…those workers who they have so many times 
fooled and who now, convinced of the farce, buy La Tierra and support the 
Alianza de las Izquierdas.49  
 
The PURA also noted with alarm the growth in membership of the UGT. By October 
1931 the provincial UGT had over 29,000 members, compared to 8,900 in 1922.50 
Most of this growth was achieved among rural workers who joined unions affiliated 
to the agrarian organisation the FNTT (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la 
Tierra, or National Landworkers Federation); by June 1932 the FNTT in Valencia had 
over 24,000 members, the fourth largest membership in Spain.51  The Socialists were 
                                            
46 Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 169. 
47 El Pueblo, 12 May 1932; Sergio Valero Gómez, Reformismo, radicalización y conflicto interno en 
el socialismo español: la Federación Socialista Valenciana durante la Segunda República y la Guerra 
Civil (1931-1939), Doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, 2012, p. 167. 
48 Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, pp. 169-171. The strike was eventually resolved in June.  
49 El Radical Socialista, 28 May 1932. La Tierra was the Madrid-based newspaper of the extreme 
petit-bourgeois left which courted CNT members. It also supported the short-lived Alianza de las 
Izquierdas, organised by the extreme-left parliamentary deputies known as the jabalíes (wild boars). 
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estudio cuantitativo de la C.N.T.’, Saitabi, No. 20, 1970, pp. 181-202, at pp. 185-186. 
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not yet credible political competitors, but the local UGT showed itself ready to provide 
tacit support to the Radical Socialists.52  
 
The first steps towards delegitimisation of the Socialists commenced in October 1931 
when a well-known blasquista described the PSOE as: ‘a left which is intent on the 
subversion of order’.53  The PURA once again sought to play on the historic belief 
that Valencia had been neglected by central government to deepen hostility towards 
the Socialists. The decision by government in July 1932 to award the contract for the 
building of two large boats to Bilbao, a Socialist stronghold, rather than to Valencia, 
was ideal for this purpose.54 The Socialists, charged El Pueblo, were: ‘the ruin of the 
nation and the shame of the Republic’.55 
 
This enmity towards the Socialists was not all that unusual within the Radical Party 
especially at provincial level; in many areas of Spain, and especially the south, the 
parties clashed constantly.56 Yet in many places the hostility was highly localised and 
rurally based, whereas the hostility of the PURA was centrally directed, and fanned 
by the consistently extreme anti-socialist propaganda which emanated from El 
Pueblo. The most persistent and aggressive attacks on  the Socialists in the entire 
Valencian press came, not from rightist publications such as Diario de Valencia and 
the monarchist Las Provincias, but from the republican El Pueblo.57   
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54 The contract was worth 28 million pesetas. El Pueblo, 5 July.1932; El Mercantil Valenciano, 5 July 
1932. 
55 El Pueblo, 16 July 1932. 
56 Townson, Crisis, p. 98. 
57 For particularly extreme examples, see El Pueblo 5 February, 10 February and 27 February, and 
11 and 12 March 1932. The ferocity of the dispute with the Socialists has also been noted by Sergio 





The PURA’s open hostility to the Socialist party, and to the central government of 
which the Socialist party was an important component, predated the formal 
declaration of the Radical Party’s move into open opposition to the ruling coalition 
(although the Radicals had left Government in December 1931).  In a largely 
symbolic move at the national level, since the PURA continued to vote the Radical 
Party line, in April 1932 the PURA officially declared itself to be in opposition to the 
government, a step further than Lerroux was yet prepared to go.58  
 
Matters came to a head on 9 July during a meeting of the City Hall. During one of his 
rare appearances in the council chamber, Sigfrido Blasco strongly criticised the 
actions of the PSOE councillors, which was the signal for riots erupting in the public 
gallery; as the two socialist councillors attempted to leave, they were physically 
attacked and one, Antonio de Gracia, was injured.59 The majority of the local press 
unanimously condemned the incident. There were suggestions, as with the earlier 
expulsion of Radical Socialist councillors, that the whole affair had been carefully 
stage-managed by the PURA.60 The Socialists announced that they were 
withdrawing from the council. The incident, intended to underline PURA hegemony 
in city urban politics, backfired in that it provoked the withdrawal of other councillors 
in a gesture of solidarity with the Socialists. There were now so few councillors that 
this gifted the DRV the ability to deny the PURA a quorum which weakened 
dramatically its hold over City Hall.61 
 
                                            
‘Los líderes en la picota. El liderazgo en las luchas entre el socialismo y el blasquismo durante la 
Segunda República’, Saitabi, Nos. 64-65, 2014, pp. 241-254.  
58 Townson, Crisis, pp. 117-118. 
59 Antonio de Gracia was also the Delegate of Labour. Sigfrido Blasco had personal reason to dislike 
the socialist councillors since they had alleged that he had made improvements to his home without 
obtaining the necessary licenses and had not paid his property taxes. La Correspondencia de 
Valencia, 19 July 1932; Las Provincias, 14 July 1932. 
60 AJMV, Vol. D 427, 9 July 1932 Minutes of Ordinary Council Meeting; La Voz Valenciana, 11 July 
1932. 
61 Those who now withdrew were the Progresistas   (the faction of the former DLR now led by the 
President of the Republic), and the two small regionalist parties the Agrupació Valencianista 
Republicana (AVR) and the conservative but now republican Unió Valencianista Regional (UVR). At 






A year after the PURA consolidated its hold on Valencia with its success in the 
October 1931 partial re-run of the Constituent Cortes elections, the political 
landscape already appeared far more problematic. Locally, the rise of the DRV gave 
the PURA for the first time a serious political rival. Attempts by the PURA to play the 
anti-clerical card in order to maintain popular support had proved of limited success 
since growing working-class radicalisation and the change in the nature of popular 
anti-clericalism made it very hard for the PURA to present itself as the champions of 
the poor against the Church, especially given the growing conservatism of the 
PURA’s trajectory. The PURA’s anti-clericalism had in some ways proved counter-
productive since it had helped accelerate the growth of the DRV.    
 
Searching for alternative mechanisms to maintain working-class support, the PURA 
once again looked for enemies to blame and sought to exacerbate internal working-
class rivalries by attacking the PSOE in increasingly hostile terms. This was 
consistent with the national strategy of the Radical Party, but the extremely vitriolic 
nature of the polemic in Valencia was partly derived from its fear that the support of 
the working masses was ephemeral. The PURA once again broke with democratic 
norms and fell back on its traditional tactic of intimidation, as it had deployed a year 
previously against the DLR and most notoriously against the Radical Socialists. This 
time the tactic seems to have been completely counter-productive, since it left the 
PURA totally isolated among the republican forces in Valencia and weakened its hold 
over City Hall. With no desire to break its relationship with the Radicals, without 
political allies to its left, and with dwindling working class support, it needed to buy 
time while it reformulated its political strategy and decided how to deal with the 
growing threat from the DRV. In the event, it decided on a policy of rapprochement 









6 ‘THEIR MONSTROUS COALITION’: THE DRV-PURA RAPPROCHEMENT. 
OCTOBER 1932 TO OCTOBER 1933 
 
The offensive against Valencia appears to be deliberately planned. The 
Valencian economy is suffering so much damage that one begins to suspect 
the possibility that a secret plan has been formulated in order to destroy the 
vitality of our region and our economy….so that other, more favoured regions 
will benefit from our labour and our progress.  
Roger Boty, a prominent blasquista, August 1933  
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will address the developing relationship between the DRV and the 
PURA and explain why it occurred. The main focus of this relationship was the 
orange production and exporting crisis and the manner in which both parties 
successfully channelled resentment against the economic hardship which arose 
against the central government. I will also explain how the campaign successfully 
mobilised many poor farmers and how this helped pave the way for the electoral 
successes of the PURA and to a much lesser extent the DRV in the April 1933 
municipal elections. The campaign also contributed to the growing demoralisation of 
the ruling parties and indirectly was a factor in bringing about the short-lived Lerroux 
government of the autumn of 1933 and the victory of the centre and the right in the 
November 1933 elections.  
 
6.2 Reasons for the Rapprochement 
 
There were at least three reasons why a closer relationship made sense. Firstly, both 
parties wanted to maximise popular resistance to the central government. The PURA 
had bound itself to the national strategy of Lerroux, which sought to break the 
republican-socialist alliance and replace it with an entirely republican government. 
The DRV and the CEDA were ready to work with anyone who could help weaken the 
central government. Secondly, both parties needed to extend and deepen their local 
support throughout the province by appealing to the small-holding peasantry, whose 




leftists was a desired outcome, and the provincial affiliates of the parties in central 
government could not fail to be tarnished by a successful campaign.1  
 
In many ways it was an easier call for the PURA to push for such an alliance, because 
it remained the most powerful party, and it hoped to lock the DRV into a subservient 
role. The DRV saw this, as it had showed when it rejected the approaches made by 
the PURA for the June 1931 elections, yet on this occasion, it not only changed its 
mind but seems to have made the first approach and signalled that it accepted the 
PURA’s dominant position. The question arises as to why it did so. Unfortunately 
there is no direct evidence available which would enable a definitive conclusion to be 
drawn, but the following suggestions are consistent with what is known. 
 
From a strategic perspective, joining a campaign designed to undermine the national 
government carried less risk for the DRV than it did for the PURA.  As a confessional 
rightist political party the DRV was totally opposed to most of the legislative 
programme of the first bienio and anything which weakened central government was 
seen as a step towards eliminating this legislation. It also made sense for the DRV 
to concede leadership to the PURA, because this made it much harder for the central 
government to portray the campaign as an anti-republican one.  
 
What made the proposed campaign so attractive to the DRV highlighted the dangers 
for the PURA. To maximise the short-term political benefits, the PURA had as much 
                                            
1 The class interests of the leadership of both parties were also closely aligned. The membership of 
all the main agricultural and industrial pressure groups during the Republic shows them to have been 
virtually monopolised by leading blasquistas and DRV members, with an almost even split between 
them. By way of example, the Valencian Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of Agriculture 
throughout the republican period was dominated by them and evenly divided. For more detailed 
information, see Almanaque de las Provincias, 1930-1934 (5 volumes) passim. Both parties were 
close to the Valencian economic elite which consisted of some fifty individuals, composed of large 
landowners and farmers, exporters and industrialists but dominated by individuals connected to the 
orange industry. Albert Girona y Albuixech,  ‘La clase dominante valenciana en los años 30: 
respuestas económicas y sociales’ in Bosch et al, Estudios sobre La Segunda República, (Bosch et 





interest as did the DRV in portraying the entire central government as hostile and 
monolithic, which was entirely consistent with its traditional hostility to the political 
centre, but in the longer term this was risky. The PURA, with its long tradition of 
militant anti-clericalism, was closer in policy terms to the government that it was 
attacking than it was to the Radicals and this gave  its anti-governmental line a 
contradictory nature. In addition, there was no guarantee that the PURA’s attempt to 
tie the DRV into subservience within Valencia would succeed. Both parties were 
locked into a competition for mass peasant support, and no-one could predict who 
would be the victor.       
 
A further difficulty was the DRV’s suspicion of the PURA. The PURA had a long 
history of only making alliances from a position of strength when it could exert 
significant control over its allies. In situations where political opponents were seen 
as serious rivals to the PURA’s hegemony, it had a record of treating them not simply 
as political opponents but as deadly enemies to be crushed. The DRV expected to 
become the dominant political force in Valencia, and undoubtedly envisaged the 
likely PURA reaction if it were to come close to fulfilling its aims.  
 
One factor which may have helped the DRV overcome its suspicion concerned the 
situation at City Hall. A long-term consequence of the expulsion of the PURA’s 
opponents from City Hall was that the PURA struggled to achieve a quorum at 
meetings and had to rely on the attendance of DRV councillors. This gave the DRV 
an effective power of veto. The constraining of the PURA majority curtailed the 
party’s ability to exercise its traditional powers of political patronage. As El Radical 
Socialista commented:  
During the discussion of the municipal budget, it has been definitively 
demonstrated that the PURA and the DRV are not Siamese twins. The only 
one authentically Siamese is the PURA, which could not live another hour in 
the municipality….if it were not joined at the stomach with the DRV.2  
 
                                            




The power which the DRV now held at City Hall over the PURA was regularly 
lampooned in the local leftist press, of which Illustration 9 opposite is but one 
example. The sheer incompetence shown by the PURA leadership in creating this 
situation probably gave the DRV leadership confidence that it would be able to outwit 
the PURA in future political struggles.  
 
To side-step any suggestion that the campaign was anti-republican, both parties 
needed a cause which could be presented as ‘apolitical’, uniting Valencia against the 
centre. The PURA took the initiative in creating the narrative, and focussed on two 
issues. The first was the proposed regulatory reforms to deal with the orange crisis, 
presenting the proposals as malice from a hostile government. This was designed to 
unite smallholders behind the interests of the exporters and shippers, and the PURA 
and the DRV. The second was the launch of a campaign for a statute of autonomy. 
Both parties intended to use the campaign to weaken the government whilst the 
PURA hoped that an autonomy statute (if the campaign were successful) would 
deepen its local dominance. Both strands could be presented as a patriotic Valencian 
crusade against a faceless distant administration.   
 
6.3 The Peasantry, Politics, the Land and the Economic Backdrop 
 
Valencia was not seen by the government as a province which required radical 
agrarian reform; the registry of land prepared for the purposes of the Republic’s 
agrarian reform legislation (of land potentially subject to expropriation) included only 
63,787 hectares of land or 5.9 per cent of the total land in Valencia.3 In the coastal 
plain where the majority of the small-holding peasantry lived, even less of the land 
was impacted, as is shown at Illustration 10 at page 156. Although there remained 
                                            
3 Juan Romero González, Propiedad agraria y sociedad rural en la. España mediterránea. Los casos 
valenciano y castellano en los siglos XIX y XX, Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación 




great contrasts in the size of aicultural holdings, most of the land was worked by 
small-holders, a point expanded in Appendix D. 
 
               ILLUSTRATION 9 (CARTOON): ‘EL BURRO Y EL CAVERNÍCOLA’      
Source: El Radical Socialista, 16 July 1932 
 
The cartoon, titled ‘The Donkey and the Caveman’ and in parenthesis ‘fable of a municipal session’ 
concerns the inadvertent granting to the DRV of the power to frustrate all municipal business by 
denying a quorum. It clearly references Christ entering Jerusalem on the back of an ass, but on this 
occasion it is the DRV riding the PURA ass (which is wearing a Phrygian cap, the symbol of 
republicanism) and entering Valencia. Note the symbols of religion and of earthly and heavenly 
mastery (the cross and the crown) worn by the DRV, also referring to Christ the King and hinting at 
the DRV’s supposed covert monarchism. The term ‘cavernícola’ (caveman) was a standard term of 
abuse on the Spanish left for a political reactionary and especially for a Carlist. The words at the 
bottom of the cartoon, in valenciano, are an old and well-known catalan/valenciano saying which 
translates as ‘the brays of an ass will not reach heaven’ and on this occasion can best be interpreted 











Great contrasts in the size of agricultural holdings, most of the land was worked by 
small-holders, a point expanded in Appendix D. 
 
The key reason that peasant farmers could be mobilised against the government was 
their increasingly self-identification as owners and the fear that this might be put at 
risk if their ability to maximise income in the short term was frustrated. This was not 
simply ‘the illusion of independence’ as Malefakis puts it. Owning even a very modest 
amount of land provided a genuine degree of insulation from the level of risk that the 
completely landless day-labourer faced.4 Tenants also were increasingly acting as if 
they were owners, which in a sense they were. They had begun to establish what 
amounted to de facto quasi proprietorial rights over land improvements.  Landlords 
were increasingly prepared to concede such ‘rights’ over the land and to sell the land 
to tenants at a low price. This willingness by landlords was partly because the 
exceptional level of farm-specific (and irrigation-specific) knowledge required to 
ensure continued productivity in what was a highly fragile eco-system mitigated 
against replacing tenants with employees. In addition there was increasing 
resistance by communities against attempts by landlords to increase rents and to 
dispossess and replace tenants. All this virtually eliminated a free market in leases, 
leaving landlords with a very low return on their investment.5  
 
                                            
4 ‘It was not the standard of living but the illusion of independence which the possession of property 
gives that separated the non-revolutionary from the revolutionary peasant’. Edward Malefakis, 
Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970 
(Malefakis, Agrarian Reform), p. 5. Compare this somewhat dismissive analysis with the thoughtful 
analysis by Scott of the crucial importance in owning even a little land in the struggle against 
starvation;  James Scott, Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Resistance in South-East 
Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984, p. 24. 
5 José Ramón Modesto Alapont, ‘Costumbre y coacción social: la formación del arrendamiento rústico 
valenciano (1880-1940),’ Historia agraria, No. 51, 2010, pp.  45-80 at p. 46.  On the highly specialised 
knowledge needed, and the struggle to establish de facto rights over improvements, see Samuel 
Garrido Herrero, ‘Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del equilibrio en la 
Valencia del siglo XIX’, Working Paper, Sociedad Española de Historia Agraria, DT-SEHA No 10-09, 
September 2010, available at: http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6529951.pdf. Accessed 2 February 
2017. See also Samuel Garrido Herrero and Salvador Calatayud Giner, ‘La compra silenciosa. 
Arrendamientos, estabilidad y mejoras en la agricultura valencianan de regadío (1850-1930)’, 
Investigaciones de Historia Económica, No. 8, 2007, pp. 77-108, and their ‘The Price of 
Improvements. Agrarian Contracts and Agrarian Development in Nineteenth Century Eastern Spain’, 




Increasing rights over land did not transform them into some kind of rural petit-
bourgeoisie.  Poor peasants typically engage with the economy in a multi-faceted 
way, as subsistence farmer, as agricultural producer, as employer, as employee, and 
as ‘head of house’ of a family group who work the farm but also work for others. The 
net impact on the peasantry during the first bienio of the decline in prices and demand 
for crops, the increase in wages, and growing unemployment, is far from clear. There 
are severe difficulties in constructing a dynamic economic model capable of 
capturing this complex reality. This is a fundamental methodological problem, 
common to the study of peasant societies.6 
 
During 1931 and 1932 it seems that peasants, smallholders and the landless in the 
orange-growing areas probably did well economically. In this predominantly export-
driven agricultural economy, the worst effects of the international economic 
recession in the period 1930 to 1932 had been largely offset by the devaluation of 
the peseta (by over 40 per cent).7  Although income from selling crops had declined, 
this was more than counter-balanced by the increase in wages and from the 
reduction in working hours, which in turn freed up more family labour to be deployed 
on the family farm.8  
 
In contrast, most poor peasants in the vine and cereal growing areas of the interior, 
and the rice growing area to the south of Valencia, experienced the Republic as a 
period where their economic situation did not improve and in many cases actually 
                                            
6 ‘Thus each of the important shifts in tenure and production creates not only victims and beneficiaries 
but also a substantial strata whose interests are not so easily discerned’, James Scott, ‘Everyday 
Forms of Peasant Resistance’, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1986, pp. 5-31 at p. 14.  
7 Jordi Palafox Gamir, ‘Problemes econòmics i resposta política al País Valencià durant els anys 
trenta’, in Dolors Bramon et al, Raons d’identitat del País Valencià Pèls i senyals Valencia, 1977 pp. 
129-157 at p.135. 
8 Traditionally, labourers in the orange industry had worked all daylight hours, but by a decree of 1 
July 1931, a national maximum working day of eight hours was imposed for most agricultural tasks. 
Malefakis, Agrarian Reform, p. 167.  In some orange-growing areas such as Alzira and Carcaixent, 
where workers were well-organised and militant, wage increases seem to have exceeded the average 
increase of 30 per cent reported by the local economic research group the Centro de Estudios 
Económicos Valencianos (the Centre of Valencian Economic Studies, or CEEV). Reported in Jordi 
Palofox Gamir, ‘Agricultura d’especulació i crisi econòmica. El País Valencià durant els anys trenta 
(1930-1936)’,   Estudis d'historia agraria, No. 3, 1979, pp. 139-162 (Palofox, ‘especulació’), p. 145, 




worsened.9 By September 1933 conditions had worsened markedly for all as the rural 
economy was now hit by a significant increase in rural unemployment.10   
 
6.4 ‘The Offensive Against Valencia Appears to be Deliberately Planned’: 
the Economic Crisis and Escalation of the PURA’s Campaign Against 
the Government 
 
The deteriorating economic and employment situation provided a potent backdrop to 
the growing rapprochment between the PURA and the DRV.  Their campaign centred 
on the government’s proposals to ameliorate the orange crisis. The roots of the crisis 
can be found in the very rapid expansion of the industry during the 1920s, driven by 
the increasing involvement of poor farmers.11 As Abad, Palafox and Garrido have 
conclusively shown, the economic disaster which affected growers during the 
Republic had five main causes: the severe frosts of 1931, 1934 and 1935, the 
inconsistent and sometimes low quality of the crop, the lack of standardised 
marketing and labelling, the absence of any meaningful regulatory control over export 
quality, and increased international competition, most notably from Palestine.12  
Although the world depression had an adverse impact, its impact has been 
                                            
9 For wheat, see Malefakis, Agrarian Reform, pp. 236-237. For the vine, see El Mercantil Valenciano, 
18 January 1930, Las Provincias, 4 March 1930 and El Agrario Levantino, May 1930 and June 1930. 
For rice, see Salvador Calatayud Giner, ‘Tierras inundadas. El cultivo del arroz en la España 
contemporánea (1800-1936)’, Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American 
Economic History, No. 1, 2002, pp. 39-80, at p. 65. 
10 El Agrario Levantino, September 1933.  Aurora Bosch Sánchez, ‘Sindicalismo, conflictividad y 
política en el campo valenciano durante la II República’ in  Bosch et al, Estudios,  pp. 217-306 at p. 
252.  
11 On this, see Samuel Garrido Herrero, ‘“The Anticalifornia”. Family farming, prices and quality 
product in the Spanish citrus industry (1840-1936)’, Research Paper of the Asociación Española de 
Historia Económica DT-AEHE Nº 0701 Madrid, 2007 (Garrido, ‘Anticalifornia’), at pp. 23-25. Available 
at http://www.aehe.net/2007/03/dt-aehe-0701.pdf. Accessed 2 May 2015. 
12 The 1931 frost occurred in January, before the arrival of the Republic but the crops of 1931/1932 
and 1932/1933 had to deal with the damage to the reputation of the Spanish orange which earlier 
frosts had helped produce. Vicente Abad García, Historia de la naranja (1781–1939), Comite de 
Gestión de la Exportación de Frutos Cítricos, Valencia, 1984 (Abad, Naranja), pp. 281-284 and 316-
317. See also Palofox, ‘especulació’, pp. 139-162, especially pp. 153-160.  Garrido has discussed the 
development of the orange industry in a wide range of articles, but of particular relevance to the 
situation under the Republic are Samuel Garrido Herrero, ‘Oranges or “lemons”? Family farming and 
product quality in the Spanish orange industry, 1870-1960’, Agricultural History, Vol. 84, No 2, 2010, 
(Garrido, ‘Family Farming’) pp. 224-243, and his ‘Anticalifornia’. Garrido has estimated that there were 
at least 15,000 brand names being used for Spanish oranges throughout Europe; ‘Family Farming’ at 
p. 236. On the frosts, see Lluis Font de Mora, Taronja i Caos Economic, 3i4, Valencia, 1971, (Font de 




overstated.13 The United Kingdom had pledged to give preferential treatment to her 
dominions and colonies, and had imposed a tariff on others, but the main competitor 
to the Spanish crop was Palestinian fruit, which was not given preferential trade 
terms.14  
 
It was the poor peasant growers who were most vulnerable to even a modest 
reduction in export volumes and prices. Their entry into the trade frequently involved 
land which was only marginally suited to the crop and most vulnerable to suffer frost 
damage. Garrido has shown that growers could maximise income (at least in the 
short term) by forcing yields, but forcing yields by over-use of fertiliser reduced quality 
and made the crop more susceptible to dehydration when frost occurred, rendering 
the fruit inedible.15 During the 1920s and 1930s Valencia faced some of the worst 
frosts of the twentieth century with 1934 and 1935 being exceptionally bad. The 1935 
frost could be described as a catastrophe; in the province of Valencia alone, total 
agricultural losses were calculated at over 300 million pesetas.16   
   
Smallholders were in a difficult position. Since they had no financial reserves, 
maximising current income was extremely important, but long-term damage to the 
crop’s reputation could also be disastrous.  The attempt by central government to 
impose controls to ensure that only good quality fruit was exported would inevitably 
result in an initial loss of income. Growers were therefore easy prey to the arguments 
aggressively articulated by exporters and shippers, who were bitterly opposed to the 
imposition of controls under any circumstances, since their remuneration was based 
on volumes sold, with the growers carrying the entire risk of price fluctuations.17  The 
shippers had little long-term strategic interest in the reputation of the Spanish orange, 
                                            
13 See for example the otherwise excellent brief synthesis by Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic 
and the Civil War, 1931–1939, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965, pp. 89-90. 
14 On the pledge, see David L. Glickman, ‘The British Imperial Preference System’, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 61, Issue 3, 1 May 1947, pp. 439–470. 
15 Garrido, ‘Family Farming’ pp. 233-234.  Luis García Guijarro, Efectos de las Bajas Temperaturas 
en las Plantas y Frutas de Agrios, Unión Nacional de las Exportación Agrícola, Madrid, 1927, p. 12.       
16 Serious frosts occurred in 1920 (twice) 1925, 1926 (twice) and 1931. Font de Mora, Taronja, p. 133. 
On 1935 see Albert Balcells, Agitación Social y Crisis Económica en Cataluña de 1930 a 1936, Ariel, 
Barcelona, 1971, pp. 272-273.  




as in better times their boats could always be deployed elsewhere, but they had a 
vested interest in maximising shippable loads in the short term as foreign owners 
were facing a severe drop in shipping rates in other markets as a result of the 
international economic depression.18  
 
The Minister of Agriculture issued a decree in April 1933 in an attempt to deal with 
the quality control problem. This decree mandated that government appointed 
inspectors with the power to inspect oranges destined for export could reject sub-
standard fruit. The export of frost-damaged, unripe and irregular-shaped fruit was 
banned and ships were required to meet certain basic standards of hygiene, 
temperature control and ventilation.19  For the longer term, the government planned 
to develop a new export fleet designed to break the hold of the shippers. These 
proposals were perceived as a frontal attack on the power of the agricultural and 
exporting oligarchy, and the fierce reaction to it was entirely predictable.20  
  
The coalition of opposition to the government was led by three organisations, the 
PURA, the DRV, and the fruit-exporters organisation the Unión Nacional de las 
Exportación Agrícola (the National Union of Agricultural Exportation, or UNEA). 
Since UNEA members were paid on the basis of the quantity and not the value 
shipped, measures which might restrict quantity, or increase shipping costs, 
represented a direct assault on their profits. Even if profits had not been threatened, 
                                            
18 For 1931-1932, see Almanaque de Las Provincias, 1933, p. 377. Britain dominated international 
merchant shipping and it is likely that the vast majority of the ships involved were British owned. Sir 
Archibald Spicer Hurd (ed.), Britain’s Mercant Navy, Odhams, London, 1943. More than one thousand 
boats carrying oranges left Valencia in the season 1931/1932, and of those less than 100 were 
Spanish owned.    
19 Text of the decree in El Mercantil Valenciano, 5 April 1933. 
20 The local oligarchy must have noted the success of the large-scale landowners in wheat-growing 
areas in mobilising Castillian smallholders against the government. This openly political campaign 
occurred during the autumn and winter of 1931, and according to Preston its success was one of the 
main factors in ensuring the support of the smallholders of Castille for the right in the 1933 general 
elections.  Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution in 
the Second Republic, Routledge, Second Edition, New York, 1994, pp. 58-60. See also Carlos 
Hermida Revillas, ‘La política triguera en España y sus repercusiones en el bloque de poder 1890-




this notoriously reactionary organisation was unlikely to be supportive of the 
government.21 
 
In spite of the fact that no Spanish Government had any practical way of influencing 
immediate world demand for the Spanish orange, and that the only way to restore 
the Spanish product’s reputation was rigorous quality-control, the campaign alleged 
that the crisis which growers now faced, far from having anything to do with the 
quality of the crop, was one which was exclusively of the government’s making. Local 
readers of El Pueblo were assured that there was no genuine problem at all either 
within world markets or within the structure of the orange growing industry, and that 
Valencia was being held back by malice. As one prominent blasquista said, ‘The day 
that the Valencian nation is once again independent (sic)….. the rest of Spain will 
have ceased to exist for Europe and American as an economic entity’.22  
 
Facts seemed not to be important in the context of the campaign. According to Diario 
de Valencia: ‘…the decree…will end in the death of our enormous fruit-related 
wealth’.23 El Pueblo declared that: 
A Government hostile to Valencia, supported by servile traitors [a reference 
to the local Socialists and Radical-Socialists] are intent on ruining the most 
prosperous region [of Spain], destroying a wealth created by the 
Valencians…this is the cause of the sickness (mal), of the current damage…24 
 
                                            
21 Abad, Naranja, pp. 238-241 and 252-255. In November 1931 the UNEA referred to the agrarian 
politics of the Mussolini regime in glowing terms. Abad, Naranja, p. 284. The influential Madrid daily 
El Imparcial referred to the UNEA as ‘...an organisation within which reactionaries, Carlists and the 
most important monarchists… have found refuge…’ Quoted in El Radical Socialista, 12 November 
1932.         
22 This was Roger Boty; El Pueblo, 17 November 1932. 
23 Quoted in Rafael Valls Montés, La Derecha Regional Valenciana, 1930-1936. El catolicismo político 
valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1992 (Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana), p. 208. If the 
reporting of the situation in Xàtiva is any guide, orange-growing peasants throughout the province 
were subjected to a similar barrage of propaganda. For example, see the DRV publication El Agrario 
of 10 August 1933 and the PURA publication El Demócrata for 8 April and 25 April 1933.   
24 El Pueblo, 8 April 1933. La Correspondencia de Valencia and Las Provincias supported the anti-
government line in respect of the orange crisis, although neither were as hostile in tone as was El 
Pueblo. La Voz Valenciana after some initial prevarication broadly supported the campaign, but 




Roger Boty was even more forthright in placing the blame on the Government: 
The offensive against Valencia appears to be deliberately planned. The 
Valencian economy is suffering so much damage that one begins to suspect 
the possibility that a secret plan has been formulated in order to destroy the 
vitality of our region and our economy….so that other, more favoured regions 
will benefit from our labour and our progress.25 
 
The belief that Madrid was deliberately destroying the Valencian economy was also 
used as the major argument for political autonomy.26  In October 1932, this second 
strand of the attack on the government was launched, with Diario de Valencia 
responded enthusiastically calling it ‘opportune and necessary’ and declared that ‘we 
are decided and enthusiastic supporters…’27 As it supported the autonomy initiative, 
the DRV now acknowledged the PURA as the dominant political force in Valencia, 
which was a covert signal that they wanted to work with the PURA.28 With the 
introduction of autonomy as a theme, the leaders of the campaign hoped to extend 
the salience of their propaganda beyond orange-growers. The rhetoric became yet 
more extreme: ‘Every hour that passes’ said El Pueblo ‘the central power adds a new 
reason to complain, a further oppression: the liberating desire for total autonomy 
continues to grow’.29  The DRV followed a similar line: ‘We are not Valencian 
separatists’ said José Palmer Navarro of the DRV, ‘although unarguable facts propel 
us towards this position….we cannot and must not be at the mercy for another 
moment of a central power…which is ruinous towards our wealth and our feelings’.30 
 
                                            
25 El Pueblo, 12 August 1933.  
26 The longstanding belief that Madrid ignored Valencia in favour of the protectionist demands of the 
wheat growing and industrial elites of Castille and Catalonia was solidly based in historic reality, which 
gave the allegation additional force, even though on this occasion it had little merit. Lucía’s manifesto 
of his new party devotes a whole section to the neglect of Valencia under Primo. Luis Lucía Lucía, En 
Estas Horas de Transición, Valencia, 1930. Reprinted with an introduction by Vicent Comes Iglesia, 
Institució Alfons el Magnánim, Valencia, 2000, pp. 141-159. This theme dominates Lucía’s 1917 work, 
Problemas regionales. Valencia ante la Guerra, Diario de Valencia, Valencia.  
27 Diario de Valencia, 30 October 1932. 
28 For over a year the DRV had claimed that it was now the dominant political force but this 
acknowledgement was the price demanded by the PURA, according to a statement made by Lucía 
and reported in Diario de Valencia, 26 November 1933. 
29 El Pueblo, 5 July 1932. 




In reality the rationale for the campaign had little to do with any true regionalist 
sentiment in either party.31 Both parties had small regionalist elements with little 
influence over policy, as can be seen by their behaviour from late 1933 until February 
1936 when the centre-right was in power: neither the DRV nor the PURA showed the 
slightest interest in the achievement of autonomy.32 The autonomy campaign proper 
lasted from February to June of 1933.  Seventeen large meetings, well-organized 
and financed by the state (because in theory the campaign had been run not by 
political parties but by the town councils and the Diputación) were held throughout 
the province at which prominent figures for both organisations regularly spoke.33 The 
campaign was strongly supported by all Valencian dailies apart from the liberal El 
Mercantil Valenciano.34 It ended abruptly with nothing, apparently, achieved. As an 
article in the conservative evening paper La Correspondencia de Valencia put it 
‘….but the day after, as if it were a toy, they abandon the pretence as if it were 
destroyed. It melts away, as a silent mist…’35 In reality its true purpose was that it 
served the PURA and the DRV, as the local Socialists charged ‘….as glue for their 
monstrous coalition’.36  
 
As the orange crisis continued, the PURA responded by declaring a policy of total 
non-cooperation with the government.  Domingo had announced the convocation of 
                                            
31 There is now a very substantial body of literature on the question of Valencian regionalism. There 
are far too many publications to mention, but some of the more important general works on the subject 
are: Alfons Cucó Giner, Papers publics, Fernando Torres, Valencia, 1983; Joan Fuster, Nosoltres els 
Valencians, Edicions 62, sixteenth edition, Barcelona, 1996; and Josep Vicent Marqués, País Perplex: 
Notas Sobre la Ideologia Valenciana, 3 i 4, Valencia, 1974.     
32 The abandonment of any meaningful commitment to regionalism by the DRV caused the new rightist 
party Acció Nacionalista Valenciana, established by former DRV members, to protest that: ‘the DRV 
has made it clear that it has committed itself to the trajectory, clearly fascist and unitary, which is that 
of  Señor Gil Robles’. El Cami, 5 May 1934. Quoted in Alfons Cucó Giner, El Valencianisme Politic 
(1874-1936), Garbi 2, Valencia, 1971, p. 252, note 78. 
33 The fact that the campaign, a covert attack on the government, was funded by the state was pointed 
out by Luis Doporto, the civil governor. Interview with El Sol reporter, quoted in El Mercantil 
Valenciano, 15 March 1933. The official files of the Diputación on the autonomy campaign are held at 
Archivo General y Fotográfico de la Diputación de Valencia /General A/Central/3.1.2/Secretaria 
General Expedientes Generales/Cajas 36-38. 
34 Positive reporting occurred on an almost daily basis. The owner and editor of La Voz Valenciana, 
José Aparicio Albinaña, took an active part in the campaign and was a speaker at a number of the 
public meetings. In Xàtiva. the PURA publication El Demócrata and the DRV weekly El Agrario 
strongly supported the initiative; as did the social-catholic weekly El Obrero Setabense; see their 
issues of February 1933.   
35 La Correspondencia de Valencia, 30 June 1934. 




an assembly of orange growers to be held in Madrid on the 20th April.  This was 
meant to be an open forum at which growers could vent their grievances and suggest 
improvements to the proposed measures. Madrid was chosen as the venue to 
remove participants from the politically charged atmosphere in Valencia.  The mayor 
of Valencia city, Vicente Lambiés, immediately called a rival meeting to be held in 
Valencia on the 16 April. The Valencian meeting was fractious and hostile, as the 
supporters of the government’s proposals struggled to be heard. 
 
El Mercantil Valenciano complained that small growers and independent exporters 
were denied the right to speak. Pedro García, Socialist Deputy to the Cortes and the 
Provincial Secretary of the FNTT, was heckled so badly that he had to abandon his 
speech. Other supporters of the government proposals were shouted down. Lambiés 
then terminated further debate and introduced a pre-prepared composite motion 
which called for: the rejection of any compromise with the government’s measures 
and revocation of the decree; and demanded both an orange exporting subsidy and 
a rail subsidy. Lambiés ruled that the assembly must either accept or reject the 
motion in its entirety, without amendment.  Some participants reacted strongly 
against this ruling and the meeting broke up in chaos; Lambiés later claimed that the 
assembly had rejected any deal with the Government, even though no such decision 
had been reached.37   
 
El Socialista decried the ‘psychosis’ which seemed to underlie the campaign, while 
La Voz Valenciana, the independent but strongly conservative Republican paper 
which had been broadly supportive of the campaign now charged that ‘Depraved 
appetites have made of the Levantine crisis a recruiting office [for opponents of the 
Government]’.38 The orange issue was taken up nationally by the Radical Party. El 
Socialista commented that: ‘The rigid instructions which the Radicals have sent out 
to their propagandists are to stress the problem of the orange above all else…those 
                                            
37 For various accounts of the Assembly, see La Correspondencia de Valencia, 21 and 22 April 1933; 
Diario de Valencia, 18, 19 and 21 April 1933; El Mercantil Valenciano, 18, 19 and 21 April 1933; Las 
Provincias 18, 19, 20 and 22 April 1933, and El Pueblo, 18 April 1933.     




who travel the breadth of Spain, have strict orders to talk of the orange….the 
Government has encountered the most serious obstacle in its path’.39 
 
Domingo’s own assembly met in an emotionally charged atmosphere, but enough 
growers turned up to give it credibility.40  Domingo made it clear at the meeting that 
he intended to force his measures through if necessary, even without co-operation; 
this remark was met by thunderous applause.41  On the face of it, this would not have 
been easy to achieve. Much of the Valencian orange industry had in effect declared 
war on the government. The shippers and large growers were experts at 
brinkmanship and they had in reserve the implied threat of an exporters' strike that 
had been used so effectively against the monarchy in 1931 when it had attempted to 
reform the industry.42  
 
The Valencian campaign was timed to perfection in terms of the targeting of   
Domingo. The wheat campaign and political resistance to the agrarian reform 
legislation had virtually destroyed his reputation, and he had completely lost the trust 
of the Prime Minister. Domingo was now coming under attack from the majority of 
his own party for his decision to keep the Cortes minority of the Radical-Socialists in 
a coalition which contained the Socialists. Faced by opposition from within the 
government, and without, and overwhelmed by his killing workload, he seemed to 
have no stomach for the fight.  
   
According to Azaña, Domingo instinctively sought to avoid conflict and despite the 
bravado expressed during the 20 April meeting, three days later he completely 
capitulated at a second Madrid assembly, this time packed with the anti-government 
forces that had boycotted his previous meeting. Domingo revoked the decree, 
                                            
39 El Socialista, 15 April 1933.  In Xàtiva the local socialist weekly Trabajo condemned the: ‘…..odious 
and disastrous propaganda against the Republic carried out by the …agrarian-radical-autonomist-
monarchist-catholic-reactionary block’. Trabajo, (Xàtiva), 17 August 1933. 
40 Las Provincias condemned those who attended this assembly on the grounds that: ‘…they have 
given the impression that Valencia is divided’; Las Provincias, 22 April 1933.  
41 El Mercantil Valenciano, 21 April 1933. 




introduced a reduced rail tariff (to 50 per cent) and granted growers a subsidy on 
each 46 kilo box.43  The government’s key tactical mistake had been not to offer from 
the beginning up-front financial help to the growers, which might have opened a 
wedge between the smaller-scale growers and the exporters and shippers.  
 
The proposal to reduce the domestic rail-tariff (by 50 per cent) to stimulate domestic 
consumption of the orange was insufficient because domestic consumption was low 
and change would take time. This reduction also required legislation, and the 
intransigent opposition of the Radical Party in the Cortes meant that this measure 
had stalled, with no certainty that it would pass. Even so it seems that Domingo, 
allowed himself to be unduly panicked and that, had he held firm, he could have 
weakened the stranglehold that the exporters held over the industry.  
 
An export strike would have hit shippers and exporters hard financially; the shippers, 
who were badly affected by the worsening impact of the international depression, 
were much weaker than in 1930 as demand for their boats was low. A shippers’ strike 
was by 1933 probably a bluff. A strike if implemented may well have lost them the 
support of the small-holders which they were so assiduously courting. According to 
periodicals which supported the government, a considerable proportion of growers 
were opposed to the campaign.44  
 
                                            
43 On Domingo as Minister of Agriculture, see Malefakis, Agrarian Reform, pp. 250-252, Nigel 
Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 1931–1936. 
Sussex Academice Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2000, p. 172, note 55, and Juan Avilés 
Farré, La izquierda burguesa en la II República, e-book, Comunidad de Madrid/ Consejería de 
Educación, Madrid, 2006. pp. 189-190. Azaña’s verdict of Domingo is damning: ‘That’s what Domingo 
is like: whenever confronted by any difficulty, he runs. Don’t lead, don’t govern; stay in power by being 
facile, that is to say, by being useless, by being a failure……’ Malefakis, Agrarian Reform, p. 250, note 
48. The Radical Party refused to lift its opposition in the Cortes to a rail subsidy. Lerroux eventually 
granted a free vote after the PURA threatened to leave the Radicals, the only occasion during the first 
bienio that the PURA stood its ground against the Radicals. With PURA and Federal support, the 
measure was passed. El Mercantil Valenciano, 28 and 30 April 1933; El Pueblo, 28 April 1933.       
44 El Socialista probably exaggerated when it claimed that about half of all growers backed the 




The government proposals had some surprising supporters. Juan Bautista Planelles 
Granells, a prominent Carlist and president of a growers’ and exporters’ organisation 
not aligned with UNEA, strongly approved. When he sought to explain the position 
of his organisation in Las Provincias, it refused to publish his letter, on the rather 
feeble grounds that it was ‘too long’.45 José Almenar, ex-President of the FVSA, the 
social-catholic provincial federation of Sindicatos Agrícolas, and as such no partisan 
of the centre-left government, welcomed the measures.46 Other important figures 
within the business and financial elite also refused to back the campaign of 
vilification, including one of the most influential figures on the right in Valencia, 
Ignacio Villalonga, who declared in July 1933 that he understood the need to improve  
quality control and described the continued export of low quality fruit as ‘suicidal 
egotism’.47  
 
That this attack on the government proposals was nakedly political is clear from the 
fact that most of the measures proposed and which the Valencian agrarian elite so 
bitterly opposed during 1933 were implemented, with limited resistance, by the new 
centre-right administration in October 1934.48 Marcelino Domingo contrasted the 
attitude of the PURA in government to the orange crisis to that of spring 1933: ‘Before 
today’s [crisis, their] conduct: calm, disciplined, silent; to that of the discordant 
opposition of yesterday: haughty and insulting…To those men who see politics as a 
                                            
45 Las Provincias, 20 April 1933. Planelles Granells stood as a parliamentary candidate in the 
constituent elections of 1931 and in the 1933 general elections in Castellón. On Planelles’ 
candidatures, see Vicente Alós Ferrando, Castellón y la segunda república: aspectos electorales, 
(pamphlet), Anubar, Madrid, 1978, (Alós, Castellón), pp. 6-17. During the 16 April meeting, Planelles 
Granells complained of coercion and not being allowed to speak. El Mercantil Valenciano, 18 and 19 
April 1933.   
46 Almenar also attempted to speak at the 16 April 1933 meeting, but he was shouted down. El 
Mercantil Valenciano, 18 and 19 April 1933.   
47 This is especially significant since in July 1933 Villalonga left the small rightist party the UVR and 
joined the DRV. He was elected deputy for the DRV in the 1933 and 1936 general elections in 
Castellón; Diario de Valencia, 18 July 1933; Alós, Castellón, pp. 12-22. The Villalonga family were 
one of the wealthiest families in Valencia; Miquel Àngel Fabra i Sánchez, ‘Valencianisme i 
economia: Ignasi Villalonga (1895-1973)’, Arguments, No. 2, pp. 59-79. 
48 Palofox, ‘especulació’, pp. 156-158, his Les Propostes dels Grups Econòmics del PV Davant la 
Crisis dels Anys 30, pamphlet, Reial Societat Econòmica d’Amics del País València, Valencia, 1982, 
pp.15-17, and his Atraso económico y democracia. La Segunda República y la economía española, 




means to plunder, as a superficial vanity, as egotism, as a means to dominate and 
to control; opposition is desperation and power is satisfaction…’49 
   
6.5 The April 1933 Municipal Elections 
 
The acid test for the joint PURA and DRV political campaign against the central 
government was the municipal elections of April 1933.  These covered only those 
councils where administrative committees had been imposed and only a small 
number of seats were up for election in Valencia, less than 0.5 per cent of the total. 
Of the 344 council places in the 44 pueblos where elections were held, 159 anti-
government republicans, 87 DRV members, and only 98 pro-government councillors 
were elected.50  The PURA was the most successful party, as it gained 41 per cent 
of the seats and effective control in 18 of the 44 councils contested but the DRV won 
only 25 per cent of the posts, an extremely poor result compared to the CEDA 
nationally. Only in Andalucía did the CEDA do worse, while in Castille it obtained 




The PURA and the DRV had worked with energy but little regard for the truth in order 
to maximise opposition to the government. This aligned both with their local political 
goals, and with the national strategies of the parties to which they were affiliated, the 
Radicals and the CEDA. They could therefore feel well satisfied.  But the success of 
the campaign and the subsequent April municipal election results exposed the 
limitations of a longer term alliance in continuing to meet both parties’ strategic 
concerns.  Whilst the PURA still hoped for a future alliance, the poor municipal 
                                            
49 El Mercantil Valenciano, 28 February 1934. 
50 366 posts were up for contestation but 18 seats were not declared officially because of irregularities. 
Official final results for these 18 seats were never published. Exact figures on a party basis show the 
defeat of the left. For the left: Socialists: 50; Radical Socialists: 44; Acción Republicana: 4. For the 
centre: PURA: 142; Conservatives (of Miguel Maura): 17. For the right: DRV: 87. La Correspondencia 
de Valencia, 24 April 1933; Diario de Valencia 25 and  26 April  and 13 June 1933. 




electoral results of the DRV showed that it was the PURA which had benefited most 
from the campaign.52  
 
The DRV also seems to have lost support by its decision not to pact with the 
Traditionalists but go to the polls alone. Although Traditionalists gained no seats, 
there is evidence of growing strength and confidence locally.53 Additionally, it seems 
that not all rightist-inclined voters were supportive of the decision of the DRV to fully 
identify its cause with that of the agrarian elite. The lesson which the DRV seems to 
have learned from these elections was that it could not hope to attract sufficient votes 
to supplant the PURA if it stayed too close to it. 
 
These lessons were soon to be applied. By the summer of 1933, the Azaña régime 
looked increasingly fragile, with the threatened disintegration of the Radical 
Socialists, increased hostility from Catalan regionalists, and disenchantment of the 
Galician ORGA. The adverse results for the government in the elections for the Court 
of Constitutional Guarantees shattered its morale and the possibility of an early 
election loomed yet larger.54 The PURA’s need for an electoral alliance with the DRV 
therefore became increasingly important. With the loss of support on its left, and the 
alienation of all leftist political groupings, it ran a serious risk that, if it had to go to an 
election alone, it would lose to the DRV.  
 
From the DRV’s perspective, an offer of the minority on a future electoral slate held 
little allure. It knew that it had the membership, the organisation and the finances to 
rival the PURA. The conclusion which the DRV must have drawn was that further 
collaboration with the PURA would do them more harm than good. As a confessional 
                                            
52 The PURA seem to have garnered many votes from rightists, as Lucía subsequently conceded;  
Diario de Valencia, 25 April 1933. 
53 Official results of votes cast for each party were not published, but no Carlist candidates were 
successful. El Tradicionalista claimed that fifty Carlist centres had either been opened or were in the 
process of establishment in Valencia by November 1931; El Tradicionalista, 26 November 1931. See 
also Luis Pérez Domingo, Mártires carlistas del Reino de Valencia 1936-1939, Luis Hernando de 
Larramendi, Madrid, 2004, pp. 22-31.      




catholic party, an electoral alliance with the ostensibly anti-clerical PURA would have 
undercut its entire purpose. CEDA affiliates elsewhere did form electoral alliances 
with conservative republicans, but only where the left had a real possibility of winning, 
which was not the case in Valencia. Both parties now had to decide how to proceed 
in the coming electoral campaign as, following a short-lived Lerroux government, the 















                                            
55 From the PURA’s perspective, this short-lived government was notable for giving it its first cabinet 
minister, Ricardo Samper, who replaced Largo Caballero as Minister of Labour. Samper, on the right 
of the party, set about amending the labour legislation of the Republic, the most important aspect of 
which was, from the Valencian perspective, the modification of the law of municipal boundaries to 
make Valencia a single entity. Other blasquistas, or Radicals with particularly close links to the PURA 
given posts by Lerroux at this time included: Sigfrido Blasco-Ibáñez Blasco (Sub-Secretary of Labour); 
Vicente Roig Ibáñez (Director General of Labour); Álvaro Pascual Leone (Head of Local 
Administration); and Enrique Malboysson (civil governor of Huelva). Almanaque de Los Provincias, 








7 ‘WAR WITHOUT LIMIT’: THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF NOVEMBER 1933 
IN VALENCIA 
 
Under all circumstances, no matter the actions, whatever the cost, and 
whatever it takes, the majority….had to be for the Radicals! The 
Valencian elections had to be for the Radicals, even though they had 
to commit the most scandalous abuses recorded in history.  




In this chapter I will explain why the PURA approached the DRV to form an electoral 
alliance and why the DRV rejected the advance. I will then describe how the PURA, 
bereft of any meaningful local electoral allies, was forced to go to the elections alone 
and, facing possible defeat, manufactured victory using every corrupt mechanism it 
could muster, including the use of extreme violence. I will show that the use of 
violence was the exclusive preserve of the PURA and that the political groups to its 
left and to its right not only avoided any use of violence, but were able to behave in 
a civilised way throughout the electoral campaign.  This election had a poisonous 
long term impact on Valencian politics.  
 
7.2 The PURA Spurned 
 
Once an election had been declared, the PURA desperately wanted an alliance with 
the DRV. The reasons for this were clear. By its behaviour towards the political 
parties to its left, the PURA had completely alienated them and inadvertently forged 
a close relationship between them, to the extent that when the election was called 
the local Socialists defied the national order to go to the elections alone but instead 
entered into an electoral coalition with the left republicans.1  
                                            
1 This was the Left Front, composed primarily of the Socialists and the Independent Radical-Socialists 




The growing strength of the Socialists and the PURA’s weakening grip on its urban 
working class supporters meant that the PURA faced a significant problem in holding 
together a large enough coalition of interests to win the majority. Although the Left 
Front was not powerful enough to win, the presence of a third important block meant 
that reaching the 40 per cent vote threshold to avoid a second round would be a 
challenge for any party. An alliance with the right would mitigate this concern.  
 
The PURA, had some reasons to think that an alliance with the DRV might be 
possible. The Radicals expected to have to make an accommodation with the 
‘accidentalist’ right after the elections.2  Given that the DRV was seen as the affiliate 
of the CEDA that was most sincere in its readiness to work within the Republic, the 
PURA presumably thought that an accommodation might be possible before, 
especially since they had worked together closely over the previous year to oppose 
central government. Accordingly, when general elections were announced for the 19 
November 1933, the PURA immediately began to woo the DRV. El Pueblo made a 
crucial distinction between the DRV and the other rightist groups: 
In these moments, it is crucial how one defines oneself so that others know 
the position taken towards the constitutional order, and the acceptance or 
otherwise of the Republic. It does not concern us if the party concerned places 
itself on the extreme right, as does the Valencian Regional Right…. These 
elements of the right support the Republic and want it to change and they work 
for the victory of their criteria.3  
 
This overture was rejected. The DRV responded by saying that it would go to the 
elections not as the minority on a PURA-DRV slate, but as the main component of a 
                                            
were: the local branch of  Acción Republicana (Republican Action, the party headed up by the Prime 
Minister, Manuel Azaña), the even less significant local Partido Republicano Democrático Federal, 
(The Republican Democratic Federal Party), and the tiny regionalist organisation the Agrupació 
Valencianista Republicana (the Republican Valencianist Group, or AVR). Only the anti-Socialist 
‘official’ Radical Socialists did not join; the ‘official’ party only put up one candidate for both the city 
and the province, which was Fernando Valera, a sign of its weakness here. 
2 Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 
1931–1936. Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2000, pp. 184-187. 




rightist United Front (Frente Único de Derechas) which would fight for the majority 
list.4    
 
PURA optimism was misplaced. An alliance with the PURA would have contradicted 
the national policy of the CEDA, which  wanted alliances with other rightists where 
this seemed the option most likely to lead to victory; it was only ready to ally with 
conservative and centrist republicans in areas where there was a real risk that the 
left, and specifically the Socialists, had a real chance of winning. At this stage, the 
left had no chance of victory in Valencia.5   
 
An alliance with the anti-republican  forces to its right was also consistent with the 
DRV’s ideology. The DRV may have been ready to accept the Republic as a form of 
government but this did not mean that it fully accepted liberal democracy. Although 
it was prepared to act within a democratic terrain it had fundamental objections to 
political pluralism. Diego Sevilla Andrés, a leader of the DRV Youth during the 
Republic, was right to draw attention to the DRV’s ‘very clear radically Mellist 
doctrinal background’.6 The leadership, in accordance with their Traditionalist 
ideological roots, exhibited a strong distaste for the modern liberal democratic society 
which they saw, in accordance with classic Traditionalist doctrine, as a society 
wracked with class warfare and atheism, as compared with the Catholic consensual 
                                            
4 Both Álos Ferrando and Comes Iglesia suggest that it was the PURA and not the DRV who rejected 
a deal; see Vicente R. Álos Ferrando, Reorganización, supremacia y crisis final del blasquismo, 1929-
1936, Ajuntament de València, Valencia, 1992, p. 177, and Vicent Comes Iglesia,   En el filo de la 
navaja: Biografía política de Luis Lucía Lucía, 1888-1943, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid 2003, (Comes, 
En el filo), p. 246. This is incorrect. Lucía stated that it was the PURA who proposed a deal and the 
DRV who refused; Diario de Valencia, 14 October and 26 November 1933.  
5 Richard Robinson, The Origins of Franco’s Spain: The Right, the Republic, and Revolution, 1931–
1936. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1970 (Robinson, Origins), p. 144. As the DRV weekly 
in Xàtiva commented: ‘The spectre of Marxism does not exist here in our province…If there had been 
the slightest chance that…the struggle of classes could have won here we would have gladly taken 
part in a circumstantial alliance but as there is no such danger we are happy to fight alone, with 
complete independence.’  El Agrario (Xàtiva), 2 November 1933.    
6 Sevilla Andrés,  Introduction to Luis Aguiló Lucía, Las elecciones en Valencia durante la Segunda 
República, Cosmos, Valencia, 1974, (Aguiló, Las elecciones), pp. 7-17 at p. 7. Juan Vázquez de Mella 
y Fanjul was one of the most important theoreticans of Traditionalism. On Mella see Martin Blinkhorn, 
Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939, Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge, 




and hierarchical society supposedly destroyed by the French revolution and modern 
capitalism.7  
 
Beyond the distaste for pluralism, its confessional nature made it an unlikely political 
bedfellow for a party which still saw anti-clericalism as part of ideology. Now that the 
controversial Law of Religious Congregations had been passed, Catholic emotions 
were running high. This law, among other restrictions, prevented the religious orders 
from engaging in educational work. This was seen by the confessional right as an 
intolerable attack on Catholicism itself. Lucía commented:  ‘if tomorrow the State 
intends to snatch my son, closest to my heart of anyone, and carry him by force to a 
laic school, first they would have to pass over my dead body’.8  
 
7.3 ‘The Most Scandalous Abuses Recorded in History’: the Election 
Campaign 
 
The general view of most historians is that the 1933 General Elections represented 
the most honest fought during the Second Republic, although recent research has 
established that violence was widespread.9 If the elections overall were honest, this 
is certainly not true of Valencia where the elections were among the most corrupt, 
bitter and bloody to occur during the history of the Republic.10 Elections here were 
                                            
7 One leading DRV figure, Juan Beneyto Pérez, was clear that: ‘it will not be possible to improve our 
situation under this false liberal and democratic regime….’Diario de Valencia, 5 September 1933. 
Beneyto Pérez, along with the DRV’s former Secretary General, José María Costa Serrano, was later 
to become an important ideologue for the Franco regime; see their El Partido. Estructura e 
Historia del Derecho Público Totalitario, Hispania, Zaragoza, 1939. 
8 Diario de Valencia, 27 November 1932. 
9 Roberto Villa García, ‘Political Violence in the Spanish Elections of November 1933’ Journal of 
Contemporary History, July 2013, No, 48, (Villa García, ‘Political Violence’), pp. 446-462, and his 
‘Violencia en democracia. Las Elecciones Republicanas en Perspectiva Comparada’ Historia y 
política, No 29, 2013, (Villa García, ‘Elecciones Republicanas’), pp. 247-267 at pp. 253-254. Villa 
García (correctly) points out that violence can accompany authentic outcomes. Villa García, ‘Political 
Violence’, p. 448. See also Manuel Álvarez Tardío, ‘Politics, Violence and Electoral Democracy in 
Spain: the case of the CEDA, 1933-1934,’ Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies Vol 
35, No 1, 2011, (Álvarez Tardío, ‘Electoral Democracy’), pp. 123-146.  
10 The corruption and violence is  borne out by the file of official telegrams, letters of complaint and 
other documents contained in the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN)/ Sección de Gobernación, legajo 
31A, caja 1; material relating to the Valencian elections  is the second largest for any Spanish 




contested by three main groups: the United Front, composed of the DRV and the 
Carlists, the Republican Alliance, composed of the PURA, the Radicals, and the 
Conservative Republican Party of Miguel Maura, and the Left Front.11  Given the 
relative weakness of the Left Front, the battle was between the United Front and the 
Republican Alliance.  Since the PURA saw the DRV as its main threat, it directed the 
bulk of its electoral propaganda against it. Initially, the focus of PURA propaganda 
was to try to get the DRV to reconsider an alliance; the threats of violence were thinly 
veiled:  
If under the pretext of the combat of Marxism they try to turn opinion against 
us, tarring us with the brush of crimes committed by those who are far 
removed from us, they will need to face the consequences of their approach. 
Think well: within the Republic and supporting the Republic: all. But against 
the Republic: nothing. War without limit and whatever happens will happen.  
The conservative classes will reap what they will sow.12  
 
If a deal was not reached, then the PURA threatened to unleash its mobs: 
The Right, crazy and absurd, say that they will win the majority, that they will 
steal it from the Republicans, and will impose on them, on the party of Blasco 
Ibáñez and on those who call themselves liberals, and they say that the hour 
has arrived in which they will impose the reign of Christ…. The Valencia that 
knew how to control and barricade the streets of the city…..will do whatever 
is necessary to save the Republic.13    
 
By this time, a formal pact with the DRV was not possible but the PURA clearly hoped 
that the DRV would agree to a de facto  acceptance of the minority by holding back 
the full force of its electoral machine, thus in effect gifting the majority to the PURA. 
                                            
Valencia. Villa García, ‘Political Violence’ at p. 455.  Useful general studies of the Valencian elections 
are Antonio Calzado Aldaria, ‘<<Para vergüenza de la República>>, La violencia electoral durant la 
II República: les elecciones legislatives de noviembre de 1933’, in Actes del Primer Congrés d'Estudis 
de la Vall d'Albadia. Aielo de Malferit (Valencia), 1996, and Joaquín Tomás Villarroya, ‘La campaña 
de la derecha regional valenciana en las elecciones de 1933.’ Saitabi, No. 14, 1964, (Tomás 
Villarroya, ‘La campaña) pp. 63-110. See also my article ‘“Moderate” Conservatism and the Second 
Republic: The Case of Valencia’ in Martin Blinkhorn, (ed.), Spain in Conflict, 1931–1939. Sage, 
London and Beverley Hills, 1986, pp. 132-159 at pp. 144-145. 
11 In Valencia, two Carlists were included on the United Front list  RE was not included; Comes Iglesia 
suggests that this was because of the poor relationship between Lucía and the Marqués de Sotelo, 
the RE candidate. Comes, En el filo, p. 246, note 6.   
12 El Pueblo, 14 October 1933. 




This would have required the DRV to betray CEDA discipline and to abandon its 
Carlist allies, something which it was not prepared to do.  In any case, the DRV 
expected to win. 
 
The blasquista propaganda attack on the United Front centred on the Traditionalist 
origins of the DRV’s leaders and on the clerical issue: ‘The candidacy of the Regional 
Right is a candidacy which is completely Carlist; for its history, for its methods, for its 
views, for the lineage and traditions which have created it’.14 Each day the official 
mouthpiece of the PURA was filled with reminders of the atrocities carried out by 
Valencian Carlists, and by implication its readers were invited to draw their own 
comparisons with the DRV as well as being explicitly warned  of the: ‘bloody instincts’ 
of the ‘heirs of Carlism…the reptiles  of reaction’.15  
 
Now the PURA moved into full anti-clerical mode. ‘Mexico gives us the lesson’ it 
maintained: ‘energetic measures, the closure of churches and the expulsion of 
reactionaries; this is what we have missed greatly here.’16 There were numerous 
allegations in the press of open campaigning for the United Front by local clerics and 
this played into the PURA’s hands. Such priests were warned to be concerned for 
their physical survival and even their lives: ‘we are in the street and we will find their 
lairs and we will pursue the vermin until we have conquered and destroyed them’.17  
 
                                            
14 El Pueblo, 7 November 1933. 
15 El Pueblo, 18 November 1933. 
16 El Pueblo, 21 November 1933. Mexico had certainly been an example of ‘energetic measures’; the 
failure of the so-called Cristero War or Cristiada of 1926 to 1929, an uprising by conservative Catholic 
peasants, resulted in a complete elimination of Catholic education, a policy which only began to be 
softened in 1935. There is a vast literature on the Mexican revolution and a significant amount on the 
Cristiada, but see in particular, Mathew Butler, Popular Piety and Political Identity in Mexico's Cristero 
Rebellion: Michoacàn, 1927-29. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, and Alan Knight, The Mexican 
Revolution, 2 Vols, University of Nebraska Press, 1990.     
17 El Pueblo, 18 November 1933. Antonio Calzado Aldaria points out that, in spite of the rhetoric, no 
serious incidents against Church buildings or personnel were reported during the campaign. Antonio 
Calzado Aldaria, Segunda república y guerra civil: la Vall d'Albaida, 1931-1939, Associació de Veïns 




Blasquista threats against the DRV, the call to emulate Mexico, and the hate-filled 
tone of the propaganda, revealed, not the strength, but the extreme weakness of the 
PURA’s position as it found itself without local electoral allies.18  
 
There was little point in the PURA dwelling on the supposed threat from the Left 
Front, which could not win. Neither would a focus on the Socialists at national level 
help, because the DRV could always out-flank it as an anti-Socialist force.   Instead 
it had to attack the DRV, playing on the history of the DRV, its Carlist origins and the 
threat it posed to a laic Republic in the hope that this might bring back to the PURA 
some of its traditional support.  As a party with hardly any meaningful policies, the 
PURA was forced to run a campaign based on fear, history, myth and symbols, 
designed to whip up popular resentment. This had been the traditional way the PURA 
operated in elections, but what worked well during the Restoration system proved 
unsuited to the Republic.  Given how closely the PURA had co-operated with the 
DRV over the previous year, and its own rightward drift, the credibility of the 
campaign was low before it started.  
 
Such an abrupt switch in attitude towards the DRV, which it had lauded as a party 
which accepted the Republic and was composed of Valencian patriots the one 
minute, and as recalcitrant unreconstructed Carlists the next,  could not fail to be 
seen by the electorate as meretricious opportunism. Whilst anti-clericalism was one 
card which the PURA could still play, this was also a two-edged sword. It alienated 
that part of the conservative Catholic small-holding peasantry which had voted for it 
in the April municipal elections, and drove them into the arms of the DRV. Since the 
                                            
18 Lerroux heading up their electoral list in the city provided some prestige and there were other 
Radical party candidates, but the only other political group in the Republican Alliance were the 
Conservative Party followers of Miguel Maura, a tiny organisation in Valencia. The PURA 
subsequently received a minor boost when the local Progresistas offered their support and when, 
following the decision nationally by Santiago Alba to join the Radicals, the local owner and editor of 
La Voz Valenciana, José Aparicio Albiñana, joined the PURA as did other local Albista notables.  La 
Voz Valenciana, 18 October 1933 and 3 and 14 November 1933; El Pueblo, 1 and 5 November 1933. 




Left Front was a far more credible anti-clerical force, there was a danger that stoking 
up anti-clerical feeling could drive voters to the left and thus backfire.19 
The DRV chose to fight a far more intelligent campaign than the PURA. Since the 
general election had been called because it was widely felt that the Azaña régime 
was no longer representative, it was inevitable that the focus of the campaign should 
be on the record of the government.  The DRV chose to concentrate on this, and 
presented itself, rather than the PURA, as the most viable conservative, indeed 
openly anti-revolutionary, alternative. The focus on the national picture was 
consistent with the CEDA line everywhere, which allowed the DRV to quote 
extensively from El Debate and other CEDA publications and to locate its 
propaganda within a clear, national, patriotic and Catholic narrative. Implicitly, the 
PURA’s propaganda was effectively dismissed as an irrelevant sideshow. 
  
The propaganda of the DRV was not short of language and imagery which suggested 
that Spain was heading for catastrophe. In this, its propaganda was virtually 
indistinguishable from that of the CEDA overall, presenting the electoral choice as a 
stark one between the forces of good (the confessional Catholic parties) and those 
of evil (the republicans and socialists).20  From this perspective, unity on the right 
was essential. Basing its campaign completely on fear, Diario de Valencia compared 
the United Front to the PURA and presented the former as the ‘the firmest and 
strongest anti-revolutionary barrier’.21 The Republican Alliance could not resist the 
left, it charged, because there was no longer any place for an independent centre: 
the struggle was Manichean, between ‘Moscow or Rome’ and the enemy was 
Socialism which ‘coldly says neither God, family, property nor social classes’.22 There 
                                            
19 As the party of Blasco Ibáñez, the PURA did however gain an electoral fillip when his body was 
returned at the end of October from Menton in the south of France, where he had died. From the 29 
to 31 of October, the President of the Republic and many leading national politicians, writers, artists 
and other luminaries attended the ceremonies, described by Tomás Villarroya as a ‘lay canonisation’.  
Tomás Villarroya, ‘La campaña’, p. 72. The term is apposite, as the announcement to the ‘people of 
Valencia’ from the Civil Governor in the Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia (BOPV), 28 October 
1933, demanding absolute order and respect during the process shows: ‘….a dissident voice would 
be a crime…a sacrilege.. No-one must offend the sacred memory of Blasco Ibáñez...’     
20 Rafael Valls Montés, La Derecha Regional Valenciana, 1930-1936. El catolicismo político 
valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1992, p. 177. 
21 Diario de Valencia, 17 November 1933. 




was therefore no middle ground, no possibility of compromise, in this struggle for the 
spiritual life of Spain.  
 
The United Front ran a superbly organised campaign, with most of the credit for this 
lying with the DRV. Evidently, money was no problem. During the campaign, 150,000 
copies of a book setting out the aims and achievements of the DRV were printed and 
distributed.23 The DRV proved itself more than capable in mobilising its peasant 
support in the countryside, using its considerable network of local offices.24 Every 
town, village and hamlet in the province was covered with posters, a large number 
of meetings were held, and on election day the number of (privately owned) cars put 
at the DRV’s disposal more than equalled the municipal vehicles used (illegally) by 
the PURA. The DRV used modern media effectively when it broadcast Lucía’s 
closing speech of the campaign on local radio.25   
 
Facing defeat, the PURA reverted to type and sought to command the street.  With 
the connivance of the Radical civil governor, Alberto Aguilera Arjona, the PURA 
acted.26 It unleashed the threatened violence: ‘we will do whatever is necessary [to 
prevent a DRV victory] whatever it costs and even if we must take the most extreme 
actions’.27 Blasquista violence fell into two distinct stages.  In the period prior to the 
                                            
23 This was: Derecha Regional Valenciana: Su historia. Su ideario. Su táctica. Su obra. Su 
organización, self-printed, Valencia, 1933 (DRV: Su historia). In excess of 100 pages long, it was 
officially sold at 1.5 pesetas a copy, but it seems that many were given away.     
24 In July 1933 it claimed 157 local groups, over 93 per cent of settlements of any importance; DRV: 
Su historia, p. 90. The PURA however, had effective control of approximately 200 town halls, as well 
as an extensive local organisation, too.  
25 The DRV had intended to make extensive use of the radio as a campaigning tool, but by a decree 
of 7 November, all political parties were forbidden from using the radio, except to transmit speeches 
made at authorised public events. Tomás Villarroya, ‘La campaña’, pp. 92-93. 
26 Luis Doporto had been replaced briefly (for three weeks) by Luis Peña Novo of the ORGA and then 
by Aguilera, who took over on 14 September 1933 and lasted until 7 April 1934. Joan Serrallonga i 
Urquidi, ‘El aparato provincial durante la Segunda República. Los gobernadores civiles, 1931-1939’, 
Hispania Nova, No 7, 2007, pp. 139-192 at p. 189. 
27 El Pueblo, 22 October 1933. La Correspondencia de Valencia, while supporting a victory for the 
‘centre’ largely avoided partisan statements. Not all PURA publications followed the line of El Pueblo. 
In Xàtiva the PURA weekly El Demócrata avoided all incitement to violence, concentrated on the 
national campaign and support for Lerroux and barely mentioned the DRV, while the DRV publication 
El Agrario and the social-catholic weekly El Obrero Setabense reported a broadly peaceful campaign. 
El Agrario, 23 November 1933 and El Obrero Setabense, 25 November 1933. Other important 
settlements such as Alginet and Carcaixent were also peaceful throughout. For Alginet, see Salvador 




eve of polling, the strategy seems to have been to dissuade the DRV from continuing 
to fight hard for the majority and to settle for the minority. These early incidents were 
carefully calibrated to damage property and cause alarm and thus hinder 
campaigning rather than cause physical harm.  
 
This included a threat to strip naked any women caught trying to buy votes. This was 
a veiled threat primarily against the most well organised women’s grouping, the 
DRV’s female section Acción Cívica de la Mujer.28 In La Pobla de Farnals, four 
bombs exploded in the home of the local DRV leader; in Godella a small explosive 
device detonated in the home of a Carlist leader; in Alcàsser two bombs went off, 
one in the home of a DRV councillor, and the other in the home of the president of 
the local confessional agrarian syndicate. In Gandía flysheets and graffiti appeared 
threatening death to anyone who voted for the United Front. The local DRV alleged 
that municipal employees (in a municipality run by the PURA) had been the 
instigators.29  Blasquista mobs systematically threatened members of Acción Cívica, 
and in Benigànim a PURA mob broke up a large religious meeting involving the 
Diocesan Deacon.30  
 
As polling day approached, PURA violence escalated.  On the eve of polling, in 
Valencia city a group of JDRV activists fixing up posters came under gunfire from 
persons unknown.  One of the JDRV volunteers was killed, and four other people 
were injured, three of whom were DRV members.  The same day a DRV militant was 
                                            
-352 at p. 339. For Carcaixent, see  Jaume Iranzo Pons i Josep Ll. Oroval Salom, ‘Estudi de dos 
Setmanaris de Carcaixent “El Avance” i “Juventud”, Juliol–Novembre de 1933’, Al-Gezira, No 8, 1994, 
pp. 335-354 at p. 351. Note that a lack of violence during the campaign did not necessarily imply a 
clean election: Carcaixent and Xàtiva were both affected by electoral malpractice.   
28 Tomás Villarroya, ‘La campaña’, p. 108. 
29 Diario de Valencia, 7 November 1933 (La Pobla de Farnals); Diario de Valencia, 14 November 1933 
(Godella); Diario de Valencia, 16 November 1933 (Alcàsser); Antonio Calzado Aldaria and Luis 
Sevilla Parra,  La IIª República a Gandía, Centre d'Estudis Alfons el Vell, Gandía, 2000, p. 190 and 
Tomás Villarroya,  La campaña’ p. 108 (Gandía). The La Pobla de Farnals bombs were large enough 
to cause serious structural damage. Some areas of the province on the other hand seem to have 
escaped violence. The DRV publication in Xàtiva praised the PURA alcalde for his generally respectful 
behaviour, although lamenting that during the election he had departed from his usual high standards. 
El Agrario, (Xàtiva), 23 November 1933.   
30 See the record of incidents in Alfara del Patriarca in Tomás Villarroya, ‘La campaña’, pp. 103 and 




killed in La Font d'En Carròs. Election day saw more violence.  In the DRV stronghold 
of Torrent, a polling booth supervisor for the DRV was killed when a group of gunmen 
opened fire; two other supervisors were injured, one of whom was a DRV member 
while the other was a blasquista. In Burjassot a PURA mob attacked and wounded 
two DRV activists.31   
 
On polling day, Valencia city continued to suffered serious incidents. Large groups 
of blasquista thugs ran amok through the streets, and invaded polling stations, 
intimidating voters and smashing ballot boxes. Three small bombs exploded and 
Diario de Valencia claimed that three people had been killed, six wounded and more 
than fifty ballot-boxes had been smashed.32 Fireworks were thrown at queues waiting 
to vote and some firecrackers went off in polling booths. Las Provincias alleged that 
many members of religious orders and the staff of a Catholic school were physically 
prevented from casting their vote.33 The DRV complained that the civil governor, a 
close friend of Lerroux, was nowhere to be seen on supposed grounds of illness but 
had failed to appoint an acting governor (a gross dereliction of duty which should 
have led to his dismissal) so that there was a power vacuum at the heart of the 
provincial governmental machine. The DRV further complained that there were no 
civil guards or other security forces to be seen on the streets to prevent the roaming 
bands of ‘gunmen of the Radical Party’ who were destroying the ballot boxes.34    
 
Violence was not the only weapon employed by the PURA: to the extent that the 
DRV voters could not be kept away from the ballot boxes, results were simply 
                                            
31 Diario de Valencia, 18 November 1933 and Las Provincias 18 and 19 November 1933  (for the 
attack on the JDRV); Diario de Valencia, 19 November 1933 (La Font d'En Carròs); La 
Correspondencia de Valencia, 20 November 1933 and Diario de Valencia, 22 November 1933 Las 
Provincias, 21 November 1933 (Torrent); Diario de Valencia,  21 November 1933 (Burjassot).        
32 El Mercantil Valenciano, 21 November 1933; Diario de Valencia, 22 November 1933; La Vanguardia 
(Barcelona), 19 November 1933. La Voz Valenciana, 20 November 1933. 
33 Las Provincias, 21 November 1933. 
34 Telegram, undated, but from contents clearly issued 19 November 1933, from Lucía to the Minister 
of the Interior, at AHN/ Gobernacion/Caja 1, Legajo 31/expediente 8. The civil governor made a 
number of allegations about the use of violence and other corrupt practices by the DRV but the 
governor was a tainted source, and I have not cited any of the examples he mentions because none 
have independent third party verification. These are to be found at AHN/ Gobernacion/Caja 1, Legajo 
31/expedientes 3, 4 and 8. On the civil governor’s close and long-standing friendship with Lerroux, 




falsified. The PURA employed all the traditional methods, such as the stealing and 
destroying of ballot boxes, the packing of ballot boxes with fake votes, the use of 
multiple voting on a massive scale, and in some cases the simple declaration of a 
PURA victory without an election even being held.35 There were over 800 polling 
stations in the province, and more than 50 reported serious irregularities, including 
the smashing of ballot boxes.36 In those polling stations where serious incidents had 
occurred, repeat elections were held over the following four days, which enabled the 
PURA to modify their strategy as the cumulative results unfolded. Votes were not 
only created for PURA candidates, but results suppressed for the United Front and 
for the Left Front.  
 
One particular oddity was that the PURA actively sought to boost the vote for the 
DRV candidate García Guijarro while it suppressed the DRV vote overall. It did this 
because it was not confident that it could manufacture enough votes to give its 
leading candidate, Vicente Lambiés, sufficient votes to reach the 40 per cent 
threshold required to ensure that there was not a second round.37 A comparison of 
the figures released by the DRV of what they claimed were the correct results for the 
province, and the official figures, show in the official figures an increase in the vote 
for García Guijarro of 919, while all other candidates for the United Front had a loss 
of over 6,000 votes each. The 919 votes took García Guijarro fractionally over the 
                                            
35 Comprehensive details of the DRV’s complaints are to be found in a report prepared by the DRV 
called ‘Anormalidad y falseamiento de la voluntad popular’ which was submitted to the Cortes on I 
January 1934 as evidence in order to get the result overturned. A copy of the report is held at Archivo 
del Congreso de los Diputados (ACD)/ General/Documentación Electoral/legajo 140/expediente 46. 
The worst incidents occurred in the following pueblos: Ademuz; Albaida; Albal; Albalat de la Ribera; 
Albalat de Segart; Alberic; L'Alcúdia de Crespins; Alfara d’ Algímia; Algemesí; Alzira; Aielo de Rugat; 
Ayora; Bellreguart; Beneixcar; Benaguasil; Beniflá; Benifairó de la Valldigna; 
Carcaixent; Càrcer;  Carrícola; Casa Altas; Casas Bajas; Castelló de la Ribera; Castelló de Rugat; 
Castellonet de la Conquesta; Castielfabib; Caudete de las Fuentes; Chiva; Cullera; Daimús; Dos 
Aguas; Enguera; Gandía; Gestalgar;  Llíria; Museros; Moixent; Novetlè; Oliva; Ontinyent; Paíporta; 
Pobla de Farnals;Pobla de Vallbona; Potries;   Quart de les Valls; Real de Gandia; Requena; Sagunt; 
Sellent; Serrá; Silla; Sueca; Torís; Torrent; Torres-Torres; Utiel; Villalonga; Villar del Arzobispo; 
Xàtiva; and Xeraco. ACD/General/Documentación Electoral/legajo 139/expediente 47.  
36 According to the DRV’s own submission of electoral irregularities to the Cortes, there were 848 
polling stations of which 54 reported serious irregularities. In terms of the electorate, the interference 
was much more serious than these numbers suggest. Of all 33 settlements which had populations of 
over 5,000 people, two thirds were effected. ACD/General/ Serie Documentación Electoral legajo 140, 
expediente 46. The Traditionalist deputy Lamamié de Clairac refers to there being 50 out of 808 polling 
booths where serious incidents occurred. Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes (DSC), 4 January 1934. 




critical 40 per cent, although in the event the offical result for Lambiés showed him 
exceeding the 40 per cent threshold too. 
 
Some of the results were quaint. In Bellús, part of the voting district of Xàtiva, of the 
228 voters, 750 votes were apparently cast for Vicente Lambiés of the PURA and 
1,180 for García Guijarro but none at all for anyone else on the United Front list.38  In 
Novetlè, within the same voting district, of the 372 voters, 342 votes were apparently 
cast for García Guijarro while Lambiés received 372 and virtually all the remaining 
votes were distributed among the other Republican Alliance candidates.39 In Serrá 
there was a recorded 98% turnout, 100% of whom apparently voted for the PURA 
list in the exact order they appeared on the voting card.  García Guijarro of the DRV 
mentioned that the result in Aielo de Rugat must have been the result of 
‘spontaneous generation’ as no election had been held there.40  
 
7.4 ‘A Repugnant Farce’: The Results 
 
A number of historians have remarked upon the reported very high level of voter 
participation without noting that the level was artificially inflated as part of the PURA’s 
campaign to ensure it won.41 Even after taking this into account, it is probable that 
                                            
38 The underlying voting data for each polling station has not in the main survived, but near complete 
records do survive for the electoral districts of Carlet, Ontinyent and Xàtiva. See Archivo General y 
Fotográfico de la Diputación de Valencia (AGFDV) /Censo y Estadística/Elecciones/C.1.2.2 
Expedientes Generales / Diputados A Cortes/ C.1.2.2.1/cajas 36-38. The information for Bellús, in the 
district of Xàtiva, is held within caja 38. Bellús had 228 voters. As each voter had ten votes, 2,280 
votes in total could be cast and the reported votes gave a 100 per cent turnout  and summed to 2,280 
(the Left Front received 350 votes) but any single candidate could only be allocated one vote per 
voter; multiple votes were not allowed. The reported figures, in the highly unlikely event that they had 
been genuinely cast, were clearly invalid and should not have been allowed to stand.         
39 AGFDV/ Censo y Eastadística/Elecciones/C.1.2.2 Expedientes Generales/ Diputados A Cortes/ 
/C.1.2.2.1/caja 38.    
40 ACD/General/ Documentación Electoral/legajo 140/ expediente 26. El Mercantil Valenciano, 29 
November 1933 (Serrá, Ayelo de Rugat).         
41 In Valencia city an 85.2 per cent participation is recorded, the highest of any parliamentary 
constituency in Spain. In the province too, the officially reported level was also high, at 70.5 per cent, 
compared to the national average of 67.4 per cent, and significantly higher than many constituencies 
which excluded a major city. Roberto Villa García, La República en las urnas. El despertar de la 
democracia en España, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2011, (Villa García, las urnas), p. 328. Diego Caro 
Cancela, ‘El anarcosindicalismo y la victoria del frente popular en las elecciones de 1936’, Historia 




actual participation was high. The three blocks had fought disciplined and superbly 
organised campaigns.42 It seems also that many members of the CNT here ignored 
the calls to boycott the elections.43  
 
The official results in the city gave the Republican Alliance 44 per cent, the United 
Front just under 39 per cent and the Left Alliance 17 per cent. In the province 
newspaper reports gave the Republican Alliance 40 per cent, the United Front 37 per 
cent and the Left Alliance 23 per cent. Illustration 11 opposite shows the geographical 
outcome by administrative district. The districts shown as ‘disputed’ represent the 
places where the most egregious electoral malpractices occurred and where the 
DRV in reality almost certainly won, albeit narrowly. These were all declared for the 
PURA and gave the PURA its overall narrow victory.44   
 
As in the province, the official count for the city gave the PURA a small majority over 
the DRV, in each case remarkably close to the 40 per cent minimum vote if the vote 
were to be declared valid. It is probably the case that the outcome of the result in the 
city was correct, but the result was very close, and it is unlikely that PURA would 
have let loose its mobs to rampage through the city breaking ballot boxes if it had 
been confident of victory. The Republican Alliance obtained fifteen seats in the new 
Cortes and the United Front five, four of which were for the DRV and one for the 
Carlists. 
 
                                            
42 … ‘the moral triumph has been for the Left Front… [it] has obtained almost 70,000 votes.’ Statement 
of the Federación Socialista Valenciana in República Social, 24 November 1933.     
43 The opponents of the anti-participation anarchist faction were in the majority here. These unions, in 
contrast to the ‘official’ CNT, did not organise a campaign of abstention but took an ambivalent 
attitude, not officially encouraging members to vote but warning of the dangers of fascism if the right 
were to win. Richard Purkiss, Democracy, Trade Unions and Political Violence in Spain: The 
Valencian Anarchist Movement 1918-1936, Sussex Academic Press, 2011, Brighton, Portland and 
Toronto, p. 206. 
44 Official results for the province were never published in the BOPV, but the draft results are held at 
AGFDV/Censo y Estadística/ Elecciones/C.1.2.2/ Diputados a Cortes/1 Expedientes Generales 
/C.1.2.2.1/AGDV, Sección Censo, Serie 1.2.2.1, caja 36. The official results for Valencia city were 








The Radical Party nationally badly needed this result. Lerroux was elected at the 
head of the list, and he took with him to the Cortes fourteen further centre deputies, 
twelve of whom were blasquistas.  According to Diario de Valencia, the whole of the 
national Radical Party strategy in the second round depended on the outcome in 
Valencia.  At the end of the first round, the Radical Party (including its PURA 
affiliates) had obtained only 79 seats; with the minority list in Valencia they would 
have had just 68.  Under these circumstances, and despite the serious splits on the 
left, it was thought that Alcalá-Zamora might be tempted to appoint an uneasy 
Socialist-Left Republican government to supervise the second round since it was 
clear that he would not deal with the CEDA, the largest electoral group.  
 
If a left caretaker government had been in office, the Radicals would not have been 
able to rely on sympathetic civil governors. For this reason, according to Diario de 
Valencia, Lerroux gave the PURA campaign of violence in the first round tacit 
support.45 For similar reasons the CEDA did not protest the Valencian results as 
vigorously as its Valencian affiliate would have liked, although without a 
parliamentary majority and faced with the opposition of the President to a CEDA–led 
coalition government, the CEDA did not have the power to demand a re-run.    
 
Since the CEDA ‘tactic’ saw the necessity of a period of government by the centre to 
prepare the ground for the eventual accession to power of the CEDA, at this stage it 
needed a relatively strong ‘centre’ grouping in the Cortes.  Thus it was in the interests 
of the CEDA nationally to let the Valencian result stand.  This put the DRV in a very 
difficult position, since the DRV could not be seen to collude in its own defeat, 
especially given the violence deployed against it. It is instructive that Gil Robles did 
not attack the Radicals/PURA for the use of violence in Valencia in the press or in 
the Cortes, he tried to prevent DRV anger from damaging the Radical-CEDA entente 
and, although Gil Robles nominally backed the DRV attempt in the Cortes to have 
the elections annulled, he quietly informed Cedista deputies that they could absent 
themselves from the final vote. Bosch Marín of the DRV later admitted in a speech 
                                            




that the DRV had accepted the fait accompli because it was necessary for CEDA 
strategy that Lerroux had sufficient parliamentary support.46 The Cortes vote was 
150:115 against annulment. Cedistas, Carlists and RE voted for annulment while the 
Agrarians, Radicals, left republican groups, the Catalan Esquerra and some 
Socialists voted against.47  
  
7.5  The Aftermath 
 
As the dust settled in the wake of what Lucía dubbed a ‘cannibalesque struggle’, and 
the Socialist weekly  República Social  a ‘repugnant farce’, the opponents of the 
PURA on Left and Right were absolutely clear that it was the PURA which was fully 
responsible for virtually all the violence.48  Diario de Valencia charged: 
Under all circumstances, no matter the actions, whatever the cost, and 
whatever it takes, the majority…had to be for the Radicals! The Valencian 
elections had to be for the Radicals, even though they had to commit the most 
scandalous abuses recorded in history.49   
 
García Guijarro of the DRV pointed out the paradox that the United Front and the 
Left Front had managed to run their campaigns peacefully, but had not been able to 
cohabit with the PURA, which had employed mobs and gunmen on a large scale.50 
                                            
46 Diario de Valencia, 27 February 1935. For the various manoeuvres in the Cortes, see William J. 
Irwin,  The 1933 Cortes Elections: Origins of the Bienio Negro, Garland, New York, 1991, pp. 229-
244, Villa García, las urnas, pp. 474-478, and Comes, En el filo, pp. 250- 252.   
47 DSC, 9 January 1934; Las Provincias, 10 January 1934. A rumour circulating at the time maintained 
that Gil Robles and Lucía did not press harder because Lerroux and Sigfrido Blasco threatened to 
burn churches if the result was not allowed to stand, but the rumour probably had no foundation. 
Robinson, Origins, p. 336, note 237 and República Social, 24 November 1933. 
48 Diario de Valencia, 26 November 1933; República Social, 1 December 1933.        
49 Diario de Valencia, 22 November 1933. 
50 El Mercantil Valenciano and Las Provincias, 15 December 1933. Recent research has sought to 
cast doubt on the PURA’s responsibility for the violence, instead attributing it variously to ‘syndicalists’ 
‘anarchists’ or the ‘FAI’. There is virtually no evidence to support this attempted attribution, which 
requires a decision to ignore large swathes of evidence including the comments of all the 
contemporary political actors (except PURA supporters), and parliamentary reports and speeches, 
putting the blame squarely on the PURA. See Villa García, las urnas, pp. 318 and 307, his ‘Political 
Violence’ at p. 453, footnote 17 and his ‘Las Elecciones Republicanas’, pp. 247-267 at pp. 253-254. 
See also Álvarez Tardío, ‘Electoral Democracy,’ pp. 123-146 at pp. 133-134. Villa García, and Álvarez 
Tardío are leading exponents of the view that primary responsibility for political violence in the 
Republic lies with the left. Evidently they are uncomfortable with accepting that an affiliate of the 




Lucía was so incensed by the corruption and violence that he sent a telegram to 
Lerroux, who headed the Republican alliance list in Valencia. The text read: ‘For the 
first time, he who leads the government will have gained his seat stained with blood. 
We are sorry for you and the Patria’.51  The Left Front put all the blame for the 
violence squarely on the PURA: ‘We send to the Regional Right our condolences’ 
ran a manifesto published by the Left Front: ‘Although we are irreconcilable enemies 
ideologically, we are the first to condemn these acts of political savagery [committed 




The manner in which the PURA victory was achieved had a profound effect on local 
politics. The party claimed as its virtues, as did the Radical Party nationally, 
moderation, toleration and belief in liberal democracy, but it behaved in a manner 
diametrically opposed to these values, which left it without a shred of credibility. 
Having used every kind of electoral manipulation, extreme violence and possibly 
even murder to achieve its goals, it was exposed simply as a cynical political 
machine, interested in power purely for its own sake and prepared to do whatever 
was necessary to retain it.  Without a credible ideology, or indeed any kind of moral 
compass, it was hard to see what the PURA could offer voters in any future 
democratic election. 
 
What is also the case, however, is that those within the DRV who argued for a firm 
commitment to the democratic process were severely damaged by the events of the 
election.  The local press was full of rumours that Lucía was having great difficulty in 
imposing CEDA discipline on his followers, not surprisingly in view of what his 
activists had suffered, and it was rumoured that the DRV was poised to leave the 
                                            
51 Aguiló, Las elecciones, p. 103. Gil Robles refrained from blaming Lerroux for the deaths of DRV 
members, and indeed apologised personally to Lerroux for Lucía’s telegram. Comes Iglesia, En el 
filo, p. 249.    




CEDA.53 The outcome of the elections had a radicalising impact on the DRV Youth 
as Bosch Marín admitted.54 As events were to show, the DRV would move sharply 
to the right after the election, and while much of the radicalisation arose from national 
politics and from the internal ideological changes within the DRV, the events of the 
election were important, too. The PURA had not only severely damaged, and 
possibly destroyed, its own credibility by ‘poisoning the well’ of democratic discourse 
and behaviour, but had assisted in the process of political polarisation within a 
broader society suffering the breakdown of belief in democratic norms.   
 
  
                                            
53 República Social, 5 January 1934. 
54 ‘…we have always acted within legality; but I also have to say that the youth are beginning to lose 








8 GOVERNMENT BY THE CENTRE AND THE SAMPER GOVERNMENT, THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE PURA AND REALIGNMENT ON THE LEFT. DECEMBER 
1933 TO SEPTEMBER 1934 
 
The working masses are leaving the Republican Union. Every day it 
loses more and more of the working-class spirit which gave it an 
authentically republican and revolutionary spirit....one cannot call 
oneself blasquista in Valencia and ally with Gil Robles in Madrid. 
República Social, 16 March 1934 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will explain the consequences for Valencian politics of the defeat of 
the left in the November 1933 elections and the resulting rightward move in national 
politics. I will describe how, with the establishment of a government of the Radicals 
supported by the CEDA, the PURA found itself as a part of the government machine, 
and show that its leadership demonstrated little interest in trying to influence the 
overall direction of political travel of the Radicals, except for its resistance to a 
softening of the anti-clerical legislation of the first bienio and its opposition to the 
reintroduction of capital punishment. I will describe how the PURA split as a 
dissenting minority who were unhappy with the growing rightwards direction of the 
government, especially its attitude to Catalonia, eventually seceded. This was 
despite the efforts of the newly appointed Prime Minister, Ricardo Samper, to limit 
the rightwards trajectory of Spanish politics.  Samper was  a leading PURA member 
and the first valenciano ever to be appointed Prime Minister.   
 
I will also explain how the national rightwards dynamic accelerated the desire for 
unity among the Valencian working class organisations which made the Valencian 
affiliate of the Alianza Obrera Antifascista (Antifascist Workers Alliance, or AOA) 
such an effective movement and able to resist attempts by employers to undo many 
of the economic benefits which the working class had managed to obtain during the 
first bienio. This organisation was particularly important in unpicking the bonds of 
loyalty which many workers felt towards the PURA.  I will show how moves towards 




summer of 1934, also accelerated the disengagement from the PURA of much of the 
rural section of its coalition, primarily small-holding peasantry, and boosted the 
political realignment on the republican left in Valencia. 
 
This realignment was aided by the existence of a strong and ideologically fairly 
coherent organisation, the Partido Republicano Radical Socialista Independiente  
(The Independent Radical Socialist Republican Party, or PRRSI), which formed the 
basis of the Valencian affiliate of the new Izquierda Republicana party (the 
Republican Left Party, or IR). Together all these factors resulted in the spectacular 
collapse of the PURA as a mass movement so that, by September 1934, just ten 
months after its election victory, it was virtually obliterated as a genuinely popular 
party (although its control over much of the machinery of government until May 1935 
meant that its leadership still had much influence in the province).  
 
I will describe too the lack of evidence that the DRV leadership made any attempt to 
influence the overall CEDA political line in this period, which was perhaps surprising 
in view of the DRV’s importance within the CEDA, the fact that Lucía was its deputy 
leader and that it had a number of talented parliamentary deputies. It is known that 
the DRV was experiencing pressure from its right wing, radicalised after the theft of 
the November 1933 election. Growing attention to its internal politics may also have 
been a factor in its minimalist profile in the Cortes. The DRV leadership, although 
able, and experienced in the complexities of Valencian politics, had learned their 
skills opposing PURA dominance in Valencia city but had never been part of the 
establishment parties of the Restoration system, since by background the majority 
had been Carlist. Thus they had always been outsiders, and had gained no 
experience in running even local government, let alone anything more. Navigating 
their way through a parliamentary democracy was a new skill for them and their lack 







8.2 The DRV Disoriented 
 
The DRV did not attempt during the emerging crisis within blasquismo to detach the 
PURA’s more ‘centrist’ supporters and to attract them to the DRV. Indeed, the DRV 
appeared to be more or less in hibernation in terms of local politics (and to have 
taken a very low profile nationally within the CEDA).1 No doubt an element in its 
decision not to attack the PURA was the CEDA’s need to maintain a Radical 
government in power for the time being, but there was probably more to it than that. 
In contrast to the first bienio, the DRV held few meetings, organised no political 
campaigns, and if the complete lack of reporting in Diario de Valencia is any guide, 
its local organisations were moribund. It seems that a profound rightwards shift was 
impacting the organisation revealing numerous internal stresses and while this was 
going on it looked inwards. The rightwards shift is apparent from the articles and 
editorials in Diario de Valencia which abandoned virtually all references to social-
catholicism and focussed heavily on national politics and law and order issues.  
 
This shift is to be found too in the growing disenchantment of the JDRV with 
democracy and its increasing identification with the CEDA youth movement the JAP 
which, unlike the JDRV, was organised as a militant elite, able to control its own 
membership and finances. There were rumours that the DRV was about to leave the 
CEDA, and that the JDRV was losing faith in democracy.2  Yet the DRV did not split, 
and eventually was able to recover its strength. Again there is an almost complete 
lack of evidence as to how this occurred, but as an integral part of the CEDA, an 
organisation which seemed on the point of taking power, dissidents had every 
incentive to buckle down and to work for victory.    
 
                                            
1 The official Cortes records show DRV deputies kept a low profile and rarely spoke in parliament.  
This included Lucía who barely intervened in parliamentary debates until he became a Minister in May 
1935 and had to comment by virtue of his ministerial responsibilities. Although Lucía was CEDA 
deputy leader the role of acting as official CEDA spokesman in parliament when Gil Robles was 
absent or indisposed was never taken by Lucía but by other leading Cedistas. Diario de las Sesiones 
de Cortes 1933-1935 (DSC), passim.   




8.3 The PURA  and the first Lerroux Governments of the Second Bienio 
(December 1933 to April 1934) 
 
The victory of the Republican Alliance superficially entrenched the PURA’s 
dominance, but appearances were deceptive. It had managed to gain votes from 
many conservative Catholics in the last elections, but violence and other corrupt 
practices now alienated them.3 But this was a minor factor compared to the 
haemorrhaging of support to its left. Working-class support for the PURA had 
become much more volatile since at least 1919 in the face of growing working-class 
radicalisation.4  
 
Now that a blasquista (Ricardo Samper) was in Cabinet, many blasquistas had 
important government jobs, and the party formed part of the Radicals’ ruling block, it 
could not blame central government for Valencia’s economic problems, or avoid 
responsibility for the reactionary direction of political travel.5 Nor could it disown the 
increasingly assertive right-wing of the Radicals, which had a prominent champion 
locally in the parliamentary deputy Vicente Roig Ibáñez, who was to prove a major 
embarrassment to the PURA.6 He was closely connected to the local industrial elite 
(his brother-in-law was the wealthy industrialist Vicente Noguera, a hate figure on 
the Valencian left) and wrote regularly in the conservative republican evening 
                                            
3 ‘Moderate people, of centrist views, who joined the autonomists because they believed that it was 
centrist, have learned the error of their ways and are leaving it. Violent actions have shown the seeds 
of disgust within the socially conservative who have joined us’ [that is, the DRV]. El Agrario (Xàtiva), 
4 January 1934. 
4 Richard Purkiss, Democracy, Trade Unions and Political Violence in Spain: The Valencian Anarchist 
Movement 1918-1936, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2011, (Purkiss, 
Valencian Anarchist Movement), pp. 29-30 and 42-45.    
5 A number of blasquistas followed Samper into Industry and Commerce. Vicente Iborra Gil became 
Director General of Commerce, and Luis Buixareu Director General of Industry. Juan Calot, who lost 
his seat in Castellón because of electoral malpractice, became Undersecretary at the Ministry. El 
Pueblo, 20 and 27 December 1933, 16 and 17 January and 22, 27 and 29 May 1934    
6 Roig Ibáñez had taken little part in local politics but was elected as a Radical for Valencia province 
in November 1933. It is unclear whether he ever joined the PURA; at any rate, official Cortes records 
show him as a member of the PURA minority, although he was subsequently to deny that he had ever 
joined; see http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/SDocum/ArchCon/SD 
HistoDipu.  Originally on the left of the Radical Party (his 1929 book Hacia el liberalism-socialista 
argued for a merger of traditional republicanism with socialism), he moved rapidly rightwards. On this, 
see his book La Primera Etapa de las Segunda República Española. La Semana Gráfica, Valencia, 
1932, especially pp. 20-35 and 55-57. See also Hacia el liberalismo-socialista, J. Pueyo, Madrid, 




newspaper La Correspondencia de Valencia, becoming editor in February 1934, and 
moving its editorial line sharply to the right.7   
 
It was Roig Ibáñez, not the de facto national leader of the Radicals’ right-wing, Rafael 
Salazar Alonso, who first proposed that the death penalty be restored.8 This was 
approved in April by the Cabinet, but defeated in the Cortes, most Radicals and 
blasquistas voting against.  The PURA tried to distance themselves from the 
reactionary stance of Roig Ibáñez by expelling him, although he claimed that he had 
never formally joined the PURA and therefore could not be expelled, pre-emptively 
formally distancing himself from the PURA in a letter he sent on 26 February.9 
 
PURA unhappiness first showed itself with Lerroux’s decision to bow to CEDA 
pressure and pay the clergy an annual stipend under a piece of legislation known as 
the Clerical Property Act. El Pueblo reaffirmed that: ‘Valencian republicans do not 
support the making of any concessions to any Church, whether it be Catholic or any 
other’.10 Many Radicals were opposed but few voted against; a majority of those who 
did came from Valencia.11 In this atmosphere of increasing unhappiness with the 
Radical’s readiness to reverse the anti-clerical legislation of the first bienio, and 
hostility between the PURA and Roig Ibáñez, some blasquistas agitated for a rupture 
with the Radicals. The decision by Marco Miranda in February 1934 to resign from 
                                            
7 La Correspondencia de Valencia, 1 February 1934. On the Noguera family and their economic 
importance, see Joaquín Azagra y Ros, ‘Urban Growth and 'Ensanches': Neighbours and 
Householders in 1930s Valencia’ in Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, Vol 75, No 5, 1998, pp. 133-155 at 
pp. 147-148, and Albert Girona Albuixech, ‘La clase dominante Valenciana en los Años 30. 
Respuestas económicas y sociales,’ in Aurora Bosch et al, Estudios sobre la Segunda República, 
Alfons el Magnánim, Valencia, 1993, (Bosch et al, Estudios), pp. 145-215 at pp. 185-189.   
8 La Tierra (Madrid), 27 February 1934.  
9 His letter of 26 February was carefully worded, referring to his ‘collaboration’ with the PURA and the 
need for this now to cease. La Correspondencia de Valencia, 2 and 3 March 1934;  El Sol, (Madrid), 
2 and 3 March 1934; La Tierra (Madrid), 3 March 1934.  
10 El Pueblo, 8 and 25 March 1934.   In reality, as El Pueblo now admitted, the PURA was seriously 
split on how to respond to the religious issue.   El Pueblo, 14 March 1934. 
11 Marco Miranda and Just Gimeno voted against, and Carreres abstained. The ‘conservative 
Republican’ Eduardo Molero, who had been elected as part of the Valencian Republican Alliance in 
November 1933, also voted against. The vote was 286 to 6, technically on the application of the 
guillotine on a finance bill. El Mercantil Valenciano, 5 April 1934; Richard Robinson, The Origins of 
Franco’s Spain: The Right, the Republic, and Revolution, 1931–1936. University of Pittsburgh Press, 




the Radicals was a first step, possibly designed to bring the crisis within the PURA 
to a head.12  
 
In April the PURA’s city assembly met to debate the situation. The deputies Just and 
Marco Miranda demanded that the PURA go into opposition.13 Samper resisted and 
insisted he would remain with the Radicals and leave the PURA if this happened.   
The atmosphere was acrimonious, and Samper’s speech was shouted down, in 
marked contrast to those of Just, Marco Miranda and Sigfrido Blasco, who were all 
cheered rapturously.14 There was a strong majority for leaving the government, with 
the proposal supported by seven out of the ten city wards.  Sensing the rising anger, 
El Pueblo maintained: ‘....all those who attended the assembly, and the Party, are in 
complete agreement in our total and absolute anticlerical characteristic, rabidly 
anticlerical.  The dispute is in the method.’15  
 
The final arbiter was the provincial organisation, and Samper and his supporters 
insisted that the decision must be placed before it, but it seems that Samper was not 
confident of victory, as the assembly was repeatedly postponed, and indeed never 
held. As it became clear that the PURA’s leaders would use any procedural device 
to prevent a rupture with the Radicals, dissident deputies decided to leave. By mid-
May there were reports that Marco Miranda, Just and Faustino Valentín were 
planning to join Martínez Barrio’s new Radical-Democrats.16 In the event, although 
Marco Miranda and Just initially formed part of its parliamentary minority, they never 
                                            
12 El Pueblo, 18 February 1934. He continued to vote the Radical line so this was largely symbolic. 
The rationale is suggested by Nigel Townson. Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: 
Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 1931–1936. Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland 
and Toronto, 2000, (Townson, Crisis), p. 231.  
13 El Mercantil Valenciano, 7 April 1934. 
14 La Correspondencia de Valencia, 9 April 1934; La Luz (Madrid), 10 April 1934; El Mercantil 
Valenciano, 10 and 11 April 1934; El Pueblo, 10 April 1934; El Socialista, 10 April 1934. Sigfrido on 
this occasion and on most others usually sided with the conservative tendency, but the name Blasco 
Ibáñez was still treated with reverence. According to Marco Miranda, Sigfrido feigned illness to prevent 
the meeting formally taking a decision, although under the PURA’s constitution the city assembly was 
in any case an advisory body only. It was the provincial assembly which was sovereign. Vicente Marco 
Miranda, In illo tempore, Consell Valencià de Cultura, Valencia  2005, p. 427.     
15 El Pueblo, 10 April 1934.   




joined, although Garcia Berlanga, Alvaro Pascual Leone, and Faustino Valentín 
did.17 
 
8.4 The Shattering of Working-Class Support for the PURA:  the Valencian 
Anti-Fascist Workers’ Alliance and Rural Unrest  
 
There has been much debate about what transpired in Spain in terms of workers’ 
rights and conditions after the November 1933 elections.18 What is clear however is 
that in Valencia, there was no clear overall pattern of a deterioration in wages or 
working conditions. Many workers and poor peasants did suffer severe hardship, and 
there were attempts, especially in the countryside, to reduce wages and work 
conditions, but these were generally unsuccessful.19 Although some of the economic 
hardship in the rice-growing areas was undoubtedly a result of deliberate politically 
motivated pressure by some landlords and larger-scale growers it was the general 
Europe-wide economic depression which was the main cause of suffering in these 
areas. This hurt Valencia’s economy disproportionately since this relied heavily on 
the export of agricultural products to northern Europe, although as already discussed 
the origins of the economic crisis in orange-growing areas had different causes.    
                                            
17 Diego Martínez Barrio, Memorias, Planeta, Barcelona, 1983 (Martínez Barrio, Memorias), p.228.  
Valentín was only briefly a member of the Radical-Democrats. Two months after the Radicals split, 
Just, Marco Miranda and Valentín together with Hector Altabás who was not a deputy, formed 
Esquerra Valenciana. Alvaro Pascuale Leone had been elected for Castellón. El Mercantil 
Valenciano, 26 July 1934. See also Vicent Franch i Ferrer, El Blasquisme Reorganització i conflictes 
polítics 1929-1936.  Ajuntament de Xàtiva, Xàtiva, (Valencia), 1984, pp. 158-161, and Alfons Cucó 
Giner, El Valencianisme Politic (1874-1936),   Garbi 2, Valencia, 1971,  pp. 253-54, and 438-40.      
18 For the view that something approaching a grass-roots counter-revolution was underway, see by 
way of example Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. Reform, Reaction and Revolution 
in the Second Republic, Second Edition. New York, Routledge, 1994, pp.  120-160. For a contrary 
view, see Townson, Crisis, pp. 202-205.   
19 Judged by the number of reported labour disputes and their outcomes workers’ organisations seem 
to have continued to function and the relative proportion of outright victories for workers or negotiated 
settlements does not appear to be dramatically different to the first bienio.  Eulalia Vega Masana, 
Anarquistas y sindicalistas, 1931/1936. La CNT y los sindicatos de Oposición en el País Valenciano. 
Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1987 (Vega, Anarquistas), pp. 263-277. Wages too remained high. A 
review of the local press reveals very few attempts by employers to pressurise workers to abandon 
UGT affiliated unions. In  the official monthly journal of the UGT, the Boletín de Unión General de 
Trabajadores, the editions for April and May published a large number of incidents nationally detailing 
employers attempts to destroy local UGT unions. The May issue does not report a single incident in 
Valencia and the April edition only two, in the settlements of Chiva and Chelva. Boletín de Unión 





Valencia had not faced the same degree of economic difficulty in the period 1930 to 
1933 as had many parts of Spain because the deep devaluation in the peseta had 
helped maintain overseas demand, but by late 1933 the situation began to change 
with the implementation of protective measures in the countries of northern Europe. 
An additional factor, for an economy heavily reliant on the orange crop, was the 
severe frosts affecting the 1933/1934 and 1934/1935 harvests (especially in January 
1934 and January 1935) which caused major, and, in the January 1935 case, almost 
catastrophic economic damage.20  Severe unemployment reached Valencia a little 
later than one would have expected; by September 1933 the ‘Levante’ now reported 
the fourth highest level of unemployment after Eastern Andalucia, Extremadura and 
New Castile.21  
 
The Valencian AOA was formed in January 1934, one of the first to be created in 
Spain. Although nationally this organisation proved ineffective, here it was highly 
successful and proved to be a major bulwark against a grass-roots counter-
revolution.22 The most energetic proponents were the dissident anarcho-syndicalists 
known as the Treintistas, the majority of whom were subsequently to form the 
Sindicatos de Oposición (Opposition Unions). Increasingly they looked towards the 
forging of some sort of organisation which would represent the entire working class.23 
Local Socialists responded enthusiastically. Despite the rapid rise of the UGT in the 
province, the union was not hegemonic in the city and was of a similar size to the 
                                            
20 Lluis Font de Mora, Taronja i Caos Economic, 3i4, Valencia, 1971, p. 133. 
21 El Agrario Levantino, September 1933.  Aurora Bosch Sánchez, ‘Sindicalismo, conflictividad y 
política en el campo valenciano durante la II República’ in Bosch et al, Estudios pp. 217-306 at p. 
252. The major reason for the ‘lag’ lies almost certainly in the level of economic migration which had 
operated as a ‘safety valve’ in the countryside, but which now rebounded with a vengeance as many 
of the economic émigrés returned home. Although Valencia was undoubtedly suffering severe 
unemployment, its position in the ‘league table’ is partly a statistical artifice reflecting the fact that it 
had a very high population density. About 5 per cent of the active population was unemployed, which 
was broadly in line with the national average.  Ismael Saz Campos, ‘República, Guerra Civil i 
Franquisme’ in Història del País Valencià, (5 vols.), Vol. V: Època contemporànea, Edicions 62, 
Barcelona, 1990, pp. 287- 302, at p. 298.  
22 On the Valencian AOA, see Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, pp. 210-216.   
23 In February 1934 they held their first regional congress, claiming over 23,000 members in total, of 
whom over 15,000 were members of unions in the city of Valencia, and a further 4.000 were members 
of other unions in the province. Vega, Anarquistas, pp. 167-193 and 280-282; Purkiss, Valencian 




Sindicatos de Oposición. This broad equivalence reduced the mutual fear that one 
organisation would dominate the other.24  
 
The AOA manifesto was not an openly revolutionary or insurrectionary document 
and stressed its defensive nature.25 Events were soon to test its mettle. From mid-
February to the beginning of May, a period of just over eleven weeks, the city of 
Valencia was convulsed by a number of industrial disputes which were the most 
severe it faced during the republican period and which culminated in an almost 
completely solid general strike.26 The immediate trigger for these events was the 
dispute at the Valencian plant of the Hidroeléctrica Española related to workers 
treated as casuals who wanted permanent contracts.27 Even most conservative 
commentators regarded the workers’ demands as reasonable but the management 
of the Hidroeléctrica refused to negotiate.28  As the dispute dragged on, it proved the 
catalyst for a number of additional disputes, and there were related serious incidents 
of industrial sabotage and violence affecting electricity and other key utilities. After 
unrest spread to the shipyards, a worker was shot dead.29 His funeral was a highly-
                                            
24 Precise figures for the UGT city membership are not held, but it did not exceed 19,000 and was 
thus of a similar size to   the Sindicatos de Oposición.  Vega Masana, Anarquistas, p.190; República 
Social, 26 January 1934. The AOA was also joined by the ‘Sindicatos Autónomos’, unions which had 
left the CNT during the bitter split with the Sindicatos de Oposición but did not wish to formally take 
one side or the other. Very little information is available on the number or membership of the 
Sindicatos Autónomos, but anecdotal evidence suggests membership levels were not high and in any 
case were highly volatile. The only working class organisation of any importance to decide not to join 
the AOA was the ‘official’ CNT, which opposed an alliance with what it saw as reformist forces.      
25 Andrew Durgan, BOC 1930-1936. El Bloque Obrero y Campesino, Laertes, Barcelona, Barcelona, 
1996. For the manifesto see El Mercantil Valenciano, 18 February 1934 and República Social, 2 
February 1934. 
26 There are useful general descriptions of these events in Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, 
pp. 211-216, Sergio Valero Gómez, Republicanos con la monarquía, socialistas con la República: La 
Federación Socialista Valenciana (1931-1939), Universitat de València, Valencia, 2015 (Valero 
Gómez, Federación Socialista Valenciana), pp. 267-277, and Vega, Anarchistas, pp. 200-205. 
27 Reports varied as to the precise number of workers involved but the highest figure quoted was 150, 
mentioned in the Boletín de Unión General de Trabajadores, June-July 1934, p. 115. According to 
this source, some of these ‘temporary’ workers had been with the company for more than fifteen years. 
28 Even La Voz Valenciana, which had been purchased by supporters of the  extreme-right 
Renovación Española in December 1933, saw the workers’ demands as perfectly reasonable. La Voz 
Valenciana, 2 May 1934. 
29 On the industrial sabotage, see Las Provincias, 11 March 1934; Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist 
Movement, p. 211 and Valero Gómez, Federación Socialista Valenciana, p. 270. On the killing, see 




charged event, with a huge crowd filling the centre of the city as the hearse passed 
by. Key PURA functionaries tried to join the funeral cortege but were turned away.30   
 
After six weeks of stalemate in the Hidroeléctrica dispute, the local AOA asked its 
member unions to declare a general strike for 23 April.  In response, security forces 
poured into the city and the strike committees of the Sindicatos de Oposición utilities 
union and of the AOA were arrested. On 23 April, the strike commenced; it was 
almost 100 per cent solid and caused severe disruption to the life of the city.31 The 
dispute was settled by government fiat, the first action of the new Samper 
government, on terms which were highly favourable to the workers.32 The power of 
the AOA was a crucial factor too in the ability of landless rural workers to maintain 
wage levels and good working conditions. Key crops were destined for export and 
had to be loaded onto boats in the ports of Valencia and Gandia, ports dominated by 
powerful unions affiliated to the Sindicatos de Oposición.  These unions were 
determined to ‘black’ crops picked by non-unionised workers or workers affiliated to 
‘scab’ unions.33  
                                            
30 Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 213. The general fear on the right that law and order 
was breaking down led the rightist press to severely criticise the civil governor, Aguilera y Arjona as 
being out of his depth. Faced with this opposition, he resigned. On the rightist criticism, see La 
Correspondencia de Valencia, 2 and 3 April 1934; Diario de Valencia, 3 and 5 April; Las Provincias, 
4, 5 and 6 April 1934. The arrival of a new governor, José Terreno, a Radical from Huelva, and a 
personal friend of Enrique Malboyyson, the editor of El Pueblo, did not result in any significant 
hardening of repression. 
31 Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 215. 
32 The government fiat (laudo) was dated 28 April but it took a few days before it became clear that 
the unions would accept it. The key demand of the strikers to be put on permanent contracts was not 
met, but employment was guaranteed for the next three years, and pay increases were granted. Any 
workers dismissed during this period would get financial compensation equivalent to any lost earnings 
over this three year period.  El Pueblo, Las Provincias and Diario de Valencia, 3 May 1934. Samper 
had not always behaved as a Minister over-sympathetic to the unions, but now Salazar Alonso 
complained that Samper showed himself willing to settle the strike at virtually any price, a sign perhaps 
of the continued political threat to the PURA if the strike were to continue. Rafael Salazar Alonso, Bajo 
el signo de la revolución, San Martín, Madrid, 1935, pp. 112-113.       
33 During the 1932/1933 season, an attempt had been made by some employers to do exactly that by 
trying to export oranges picked by members of Catholic unions affiliated to the Confederación de 
Obreros Católicos de Levante (the Confederation of Catholic Workers of the Levant, or COCL) but 
the Sindicato de Transportes in the port of Valencia ‘blacked’ the export of all oranges picked by 
COCL labour and the oranges were left to rot on the quayside. My interview with Señor Domingo 





The Hidroeléctrica victory and the behaviour of the PURA during the strike proved to 
be key events in the collapse of blasquismo. The party saw the enormous threat that 
the AOA posed to its working-class support by crystallising unified working-class 
opposition to the local establishment, and through its undermining of the PURA’s 
traditional ‘divide and rule’ policy. True to form, El Pueblo had charged that the desire 
of the Socialists to participate in the AOA was to use it as a device to take control of 
the Valencian working class.34 PURA attempts to stir up discord failed. Particularly 
disastrous was the attempt to disrupt the AOA by setting up committees of blasquista 
workers in opposition.  
 
In its analysis of the strike, the extreme-right newspaper La Voz Valenciana noted 
with great alarm that ‘…at the blow of the socialist bugle, all the workers obey, and 
the greatest outrages occurred …in those neighbourhoods which appear to be the 
[places of residence] of the clientelae of the autonomistas…’35 Reporting the strike 
from a libertarian perspective, and commenting on the attempt by the PURA to 
disrupt working-class unity, the libertarian theoretician José García Pradas wrote in 
La Tierra that: ‘The involvement of the [PURA] has been catastrophic. It has caused 
its own destruction. It is only necessary to do one thing: bury it.’36 
 
 
                                            
34 El Pueblo, 9 February and 11 March 1934. Apparently the PURA also sought to exacerbate divisions 
within the Sindicatos de Oposición by trying to help the ‘official’ CNT to rebuild in the city. At any rate, 
República Social alleged that the PURA controlled City Hall had allowed ‘the FAI’ to use the Teatro 
Apolo for a meeting without charging a fee, and had arranged free advertising for the event on local 
radio, too. República Social, 31 August 1934. 
35 La Voz Valenciana, 2 May 1934. It was not just the socialists of course, but the far right traditionally 
focussed on the socialist rather than the anarcho-syndicalist menace. República Social however was 
delighted to reprint this quote in full.  República Social, 4 May 1934. 
36 La Tierra (Madrid), 3 May 1934. As the socialist weekly Republica Social explained ‘…..The working 
masses are leaving the Republican Union. Every day it loses more and more of the working-class 
spirit which gave it an authentically republican and revolutionary spirit…[The PURA]…forgets that 
today the worker forges his class-consciousness in the [working class] organisation…. one cannot 
call oneself blasquista in Valencia and ally with Gil Robles in Madrid’. República Social, 16 




8.5 The Seizure of the Baton of Blasquismo:  the Creation of Izquierda 
Republicana in Valencia 
 
As the PURA collapsed, the political panorama changed rapidly.  Valencian left 
republicanism proved to be surprisingly resilient and was able to reorganise its 
fractured forces remarkably quickly and to form a Valencian affiliate of Izquierda 
Republicana (Republican Left, or IR) which proved to be highly disciplined, 
ideologically focussed, and well led.37 One of the reasons that it was able to grow so 
quickly was that it skilfully exploited the long republican blasquista tradition against 
the leadership of the PURA. During the first bienio the PURA had invoked the 
iconography of blasquismo at every opportunity, but by ceaselessly doing so it had 
devalued its ownership of its traditions allowing its political opponents to eventually 
co-opt them.38     
 
The impetus for the rise of IR nationally was the failure of the left in the November 
1933 elections and the realisation that unity was essential. In Valencia there were a 
number of specifically local factors which facilitated the drive for unity. The PURA’s 
exclusion of all its political opponents during the first bienio had forged close co-
operation among them. The growing anti-socialist sentiment in the national Radical 
Socialist organisation led to its split with Marcelino Domingo, head of the minority 
pro-Socialist faction, forming the new PRRSI.  Practically the whole of the Valencian 
Radical Socialists joined the PRRSI, which provided a strong ‘core’ around which a 
                                            
37 Little has been written on how IR became a powerful national force in a very short period of time. 
Few if any studies have looked at how the party was constructed from its fusion of its three founding 
entities, but it is clear at any rate from the experience of Valencia that a great deal of grass-roots effort 
was expended to recruit new members. Spanish republicanism had shown itself to be remarkably 
resilient in 1930 in building national organisation virtually from scratch across the country. The reasons 
for this resilience are still not fully understood, but the existence of non-aligned republican clubs in 
small towns, where everyone knew everyone else, and of masonic lodges in many places, helped 
create a web of sociability which were essential preconditions.       
38 The potency of the mythology is underlined by that fact that even the local Socialists sought to 
describe themselves as ‘blasquistas’, when they commented ‘…we should explain that we are 
blasquistas, that is admirers of the work of Vicente Blasco Ibáñez. What we do not understand is that 
there are admirers of his work as a revolutionary and anti-clerical who continue to support a party 
simply because he founded it, although that party is now….at the service of the greatest enemies of 




future united party of left republicanism could be built.39 By April 1934, just days after 
the national organisation had been formally constituted in Madrid, Valencia could 
boast its own branch of IR.40 It was immediately backed by the local left of centre 
republican daily El Mercantil Valenciano.41 Its leadership was formed almost 
exclusively from former members of Acción Repúblicana.42  Juan Peset, former 
Rector of the University of Valencia and one of the leaders of Acción Repúblicana in 
the city was now elected President of the provincial IR. Peset was a brilliant 
individual, apparently held in high esteem across the political spectrum.43  
 
As part of its attempt to rebuild the PURA’s inter-class coalition, IR claimed to be the 
true heir of blasquismo.44 Many leading figures in the former PRRSI had been 
prominent figures in the PURA such as José Cano Coloma, Pedro Vargas and Miguel 
San Andrés.45 That the mantle of blasquismo was important to IR is clear from the 
decision to make Blasco Ibáñez’s eldest son, Mario, Honorary President of the 
provincial organisation after he applied to join.46 The application was described as 
                                            
39 El Mercantil Valenciano, 26 September 1933 and 25 October 1933; Las Provincias, 19 and 20 
September 1933; La Voz Valenciana, 18 September 1933.  
40 Juan Avilés Farré, La Izquierda Burgesa Y La Tragedia de La II República, e-book, Comunidad de 
Madrid Consejería de Educación, Madrid, 2006 (Avilés, Izquierda Burgesa), p. 322. When in July 
1934 the dissident blasquistas were expelled it was reported that IR gained greatly from the influx of 
ex-blasquistas. In some cases blasquista casinos defected en masse. See the article by José García 
Pradas in La Tierra, 3 May 1934.     
41 Although El Mercantil never operated as an official IR publication, the support of such a prestigious  
newspaper gave IR a huge fillip. Avilés points out that there were very few daily newspapers of a left-
liberal persuasion in Spain, so IR in Valencia was in an enviable position. Avilés, Izquierda Burgesa, 
p. 381. 
42 There is no information as to why there was no resistance to this takeover. The executive of the 
new organization was elected in May 1934 at the First Provincial Assembly. Not one member of the 
February 1934 Provincial Committee of the PRRSI was elected. El Mercantil Valenciano, 10 February 
1934.   
43 See the collected essays in his honour, Pablo Rodríguez Cortés, Ricard Camil Torres Fabra, and 
María Isabel Sicluna Lletget, (eds.), Juan Peset Aleixandre, Médico, Rector y Político Republicano,  
Eneida, Madrid, 2011. 
44 The week-long general strike of the AOA in April/May 1934 was hailed by the local IR as 
‘unforgettable for its social significance, exemplary in its civil importance, fruitful’, a clear attempt to 
woo former working-class blasquistas. El Mercantil Valenciano, 16 May 34. 
45 Joan Brines Blasco, ‘Masonería y política en el país Valenciano’ in José Antonio Ferrer Benimeli, 
(ed.), La masonería en la España del siglo XX , Universidad Castilla-La Mancha, 1996, pp. 137-152 
at pp. 149-150.  
46 Sigfrido’s two surviving siblings had been PURA members and occasionally appeared at public 
events. Both it seems had become disillusioned with the rightwards turn in the PURA before the 
November 1933 general elections; according to El Sol, there was a rumour that his sister Libertad 
would appear on the electoral list for the Left Front in 1933, but in the event this never happened, 




‘the pure transmission of ideological hopes and morals’ (a clear reference to IR’s 
claim to have continued blasquismo).  El Sol reported that ‘The name of  Blasco 
Ibáñez personified by his two sons, Mario and Sigfrido, will now lead two parties who 
are in conflict......for some time it had been known on the street that there were 
significant political differences between the brothers....’47  
 
8.6 Arm in Arm with Lerroux: the Samper Government, April to September 
1934 
 
The appointment of the blasquista Ricardo Samper, a little-known figure nationally, 
as Prime Minister at the personal behest of the President, Alcalá-Zamora, provoked 
incredulity in parliament and outside.48 As he was not leader of the Radicals, he 
lacked authority from the outset. A man of a most unprepossessing appearance, he 
was described by the Ambassador of the United States to Spain, Claude Bowers, as 
‘…a provincial politician, of meagre ability and utterly without distinction or 
achievements.’49   It is generally accepted that the President wanted an easily 
manipulated Prime Minister and chose a second-rank figure for this reason.50  Even 
contemporaries who saw ability in Samper doubted that he was up to the job and 
damned him with faint praise, describing him variously as having ‘signs of 
                                            
47 El Sol (Madrid), 17 May 1934. According to La Tierra, Libertad and Mario joined ‘...to reclaim the 
memory of their father which has been used to justify things which could only result in destroying his 
reputation...even in Valencia, it was on the point of becoming something hateful....’ La Tierra (Madrid), 
17 May 1934. According to La Tierra, Mario was ill and depressed and living as a virtual recluse. He 
and his brother were no longer on speaking terms. 
48 In his diaries, Azaña notes that when it was announced, many provincial newspapermen initially 
refused to believe the news and thought they were victims of a practical joke from their Madrid-based 
colleagues. Manuel Azaña, Diarios completos: Monarquía, República, Guerra Civil, Editorial Crítica, 
Barcelona, 2000 (Azaña, Diarios completos), pp. 1017 and 1027; entry for 1 July 1936. The right-wing 
satirical magazine Gracia y Justicia had great fun with the appointment of a virtually unknown figure, 
describing how the news was supposedly received in a fictitious Spanish town, ‘When the news came 
through that Samper had formed a Government there was the most stupendous jubilation…and a 
spontaneous fiesta was declared…’. Gracia y Justicia, 5 May 1934.  
49 Claude Bowers, My Mission to Spain, Victor Gollancz, London, 1954, p. 77.  The most vicious 
description of Samper’s appearance comes from the Socialist deputy and historian Guillermo 
Cabanellas: ‘….a repellent face like a bird of ill omen, cross-eyed, bald, with the profile of a crane, 
hunchbacked ... [with a] round nose, [and] bulging eyes…’ Cabanellas also describes him as ‘…the 
coarsest, most mediocre and insignificant figure that has ever discharged this role’. Guillermo 
Cabanellas, Cuatro generales, Planeta, Barcelona, 1977, 2 Vols, Vol. 1, (Cabanellas, Cuatro 
generales), p. 299.  




intelligence’, and ‘a lively intelligence…the manner of a good lawyer’.51 Only in 
Valencia was his appointment greeted with much support, where there was 
understandable pride at least from anti-leftists to hear that, for the first time ever, a 
Spanish Prime Minister who was a valenciano had been appointed.52 
 
I have pointed out elsewhere that his appointment came at an opportune time for the 
PURA and the Radicals, and have argued that Lerroux’s resignation had been stage-
managed to assist Samper in his battle to keep the PURA from moving into 
opposition.53 The evidence for this is entirely circumstantial, but the PURA crisis at 
least explains why Lerroux decided not to veto a proposed Samper premiership, 
something which he could have prevented as leader of the Radicals, or to sabotage 
its ability to operate once it had been appointed.54 
 
Lerroux must have been seriously worried about the PURA. The defection of 
Martínez Barrio’s faction left him with about 90 deputies and the loss of the PURA 
would have reduced his contingent by ten more, assuming that Samper, joining Roig 
Ibáñez, remained with the Radicals. This would not only weaken Lerroux but 
reinforce the impression of a party disintegrating.  The appointment of Samper as 
Prime Minister gave the PURA greater access to the patronage system, one of the 
traditional methods by which the Radicals had maintained some degree of cohesion.  
 
                                            
51 By José María Gil Robles and Diego Martínez Barrio respectively. José María Gil Robles, No fue 
posible la paz, Ariel, Barcelona, 1968 (Gil Robles, No fue posible), p. 122; Martínez Barrio, Memorias, 
p. 221. 
52 El Pueblo was predictably ecstatic.  El Pueblo, 3 May 1934.  
53 Stephen Lynam, ‘“Moderate” Conservatism and the Second Republic: The Case of Valencia’ in 
Martin Blinkhorn, (ed.), Spain in Conflict, 1931–1939, Sage, London and Beverley Hills, 1986, pp. 
132-159, at p. 146. 
54 Lerroux’s inner circle urged him to veto the appointment and his own explanation as to why he did 
not veto Samper appear extremely unconvincing, as Townson has pointed out. Townson, Crisis, p. 
225. Lerroux claims that he allowed the appointment to go ahead for the sake of the country and not 







ILLUSTRATION 12 (CARTOON): ‘APURANDO LA COLILLA’   
Source: Gracia y Justicia, 25 August 34.  
This cartoon shows the Prime Minister, Samper, and the Minister of the Interior, Salazar Alonso, together. The 
most obvious translation of the title of this cartoon is ‘Final drag on the fag-end’. The verb ‘apurar’ has a number 
of meanings and the title can also be read as ‘Replacing the fag-end’ or ‘Cigar-ing the fag-end’ [a play on the 
word for cigar, a ‘puro’]. ‘Puro’ is also an adjective meaning ‘pure’ and in its feminine form [‘pura’] it corresponds 
with the acronym for Samper’s political party the PURA, a subtle dig at the PURA’s known corruption. The 
dialogue has Samper saying ‘This really hurts! I can’t smoke my cigarette anymore and it is beginning to burn 
me’. Salazar Alonso’s reply is ‘I can handle it’. The cartoon seeks to contrast the energetic and virile Minister of 
the Interior (the phallic implication of the large cigar which carries the words ‘Public Order’ are hard to miss), with 




Samper was on the right of the PURA, and on the centre-right of the Radicals 
nationally, but he was not an outright reactionary. Parliamentary arithmetic meant 
that his administration could do little to re-orientate policy towards a more centrist 
position, but as Townson has shown, given the little scope for manoeuvre he had, 
Samper did manage to modify the rightwards drift of the Lerroux administration and 
proved himself to be a more astute politician than his detractors had suggested.55 
Samper’s attempts to resist some of the more reactionary proposals of his Minister 
of the Interior provoked predictable hostility from the right. An example from the 
reactionary satirical magazine Gracia y Justicia is included at Illustration 12 opposite. 
Few contemporary observers and political rivals thought that his administration would 
last more than a few weeks. In the event it was to survive for five months under 
extremely difficult circumstances during the crisis in Catalonia, the dispute over the 
Basque autonomy statute, and the June harvest strike, while facing hostility from 
within his Cabinet from Salazar Alonso, from much of the Radical Party, barely 
hidden enmity from Lerroux, and continued pressure from the CEDA.   
 
Once Samper was Prime Minister, in a textbook example of what political scientists 
call ‘pork-barrelling’ or simply ‘pork’, Valencia began to receive particularly generous 
funding. By July 1934, El Pueblo was able to boast that for the first time ever, more 
money had been spent on improving the port of Valencia than on any other Spanish 
port.  Throughout the summer and early autumn, the PURA continued to publicise 
the amount of financial support being allocated to Valencia, including 500,000 
pesetas for the airport at Manises, which was now authorised for international flights, 
one million pesetas for unemployment in the province, and 500,000 pesetas for the 
sanatorium at Porta Coeli.56 This, however, did little to stem the loss of support for 
                                            
55 Townson, Crisis, pp. 242-270. 
56 On the Port, see El Pueblo, 29 July 1934; on Manises see El Pueblo, 24 August 1934 and Las 
Provincias, 11 September 1934; on unemployment relief see El Pueblo, 22 September 1934; and on 
the Sanatorium see El Pueblo, and Las Provincias, 26 September 1934. Compare these figures to 
the total of one million pesetas allocated to unemployment nationally in 1931 by the Caja Nacional de 
Seguro Contra  Paro Forzoso, an amount which represented less than 0.5% of the 1931 annual 
budget. Joseph Harrison, An Economic History of Modern Spain, Manchester University Press, 




the PURA, probably because having a blasquista Prime Minister completely 
identified the party with the policy direction of the government.  
 
As the summer arrived pressure increased from the Radicals’ right wing, and the 
CEDA, for an even more aggressive stand against the left.57  Samper had little choice 
other than to continue to pursue policies which the CEDA wanted.  On 4 May, a 
decree was issued annulling the expropriations made after the abortive August 1932 
coup. On 23 May the Law of Municipal Boundaries was repealed. Samper presided 
over the vigorous repression of the June national agricultural strike organised by the 
Federación Española de Trabajadores de la Tierra (Spanish Federation of Land 
Workers, or FETT, the renamed National Federation of Land Workers) which crippled 
the union until 1936.58  
 
8.7 The PURA and the Rabassaires 
 
PURA support from the small-holding peasantry was further weakened as a result of 
the handling of the crisis between the central government and the Catalan 
Generalitat. The Generalitat, dominated by the leftist Esquerra Republicana, had 
passed a Law of Family Leases on 11 April designed to give security to tenant 
smallholders (known as Rabassaires). The Lliga, the conservative Catalan party, 
saw the law as an unconstitutional attack on landowners’ property rights, and 
demanded that the central government refer the issue to the Court of Constitutional   
Guarantees, the judicial body established by the Republic to rule on constitutional 
matters.59  
                                            
57 Townson, Crisis, pp. 242-270.  
58 Rural workers in Valencia do not seem to have suffered greatly after the failure of the FETT harvest 
strike of June 1934 which had little direct impact. It was restricted to a small number of settlements 
and lasted for barely a week.  Repression of the strike in Valencia was mild, with few detainees, all of 
whom were released by 15 July. AHN/ Serie A/FC_M_ Interior/ Leg 50 A/ caja 2.  
59 On the dispute see Albert Balcells, El problema agrari a  Catalunya, Nova Terra, Barcelona, 1968, 
pp. 15-214; Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939,  Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1965, pp. 133-134; Robinson, Origins, pp. 187-188; Azaña, Diarios 




Many Spanish republicans viewed Catalonia as an island of liberal republicanism 
within a regime increasingly dominated by the right, and in Valencia sympathy went 
beyond that. There was a genuine philo-Catalanist strand in Valencian republicanism 
influenced by Valencian regionalism, which saw Catalonia as the vanguard region 
fighting against the centre. Valencian tenant farmers also saw parallels between the 
struggle of the Rabassaires and their situation since they relied, as did the 
Rabassaires, on the force of custom rather than law to provide security.60 Matters in 
Catalonia escalated when on 8 June the Court of Constitutional Guarantees came 
down in favour of the Lliga and the landlords and declared the law unconstitutional. 
The Catalan government the Generalitat responded by passing the law again and on 
June 12 the Esquerra withdrew from the Cortes.  
 
The majority of the Radical Party, the Lliga and the CEDA (including the DRV) 
demanded that the Generalitat cease its ‘act of rebellion’.61  Samper had limited room 
to manoeuvre although the PURA’s city organisation had already warned him of the 
dangers of an attack on the Generalitat when it launched an appeal to Samper to 
resolve the dispute: ‘In terms of the greatest cordiality between the Spanish State 
and that fraternal region’. At the same time three PURA Deputies, Valentín, Marco 
Miranda, and Just, wrote to Sigfrido Blasco warning him that the PURA would break 
up if the issue were not resolved.62   
 
In a desperate attempt to maintain his government and prevent the PURA from 
splitting, Samper succeeded in gaining CEDA support for a vote of confidence in his 
continued negotiations and to adjourn the Cortes for the summer.  This did not go far 
enough for the rebel blasquistas.  In the stormy Cortes session of 4 July, during which 
fist fights broke out and pistols were brandished, three members of the PURA, García 
Berlanga, Marco Miranda and Valentín, voted against the Samper government.63 The 
                                            
60 Strictly the ‘Rabassaires’ were share-croppers rather than tenants.  
61 A position also supported by El Radical, the PURA weekly in Xàtiva.   El Radical (Xàtiva), 16 June 
1934. 
62 El Mercantil Valenciano, 4 July 1934.  
63 As did the Valencian member of the Partido Conservador Eduardo Molero Massa. As García 




PURA expelled Valentín, regarded as the instigator of the violence. Marco Miranda, 
Just, Garcia Berlanga and Carreres resigned in protest.64 The Samper government 
continued to search for a solution to the Catalan crisis but the CEDA grew 
increasingly dissatisfied with Samper, arguing for a strong government, implicitly with 
the inclusion of CEDA ministers.65 On 1 October, the CEDA withdrew support and 
the government resigned. On 4 October, a new Lerroux government, including three 
CEDA ministers, was announced. In response the Socialists announced a general 
strike which in Asturias turned into a full-scale insurrection against the regime. The 





With the collapse of the PURA as a mass party, the ground was open for a major 
struggle for political supremacy between the DRV and the regrouping forces of the 
republican left. No-one could yet be sure if the PURA’s loss of much of its grass-
roots organisational base and of its working-class (and much of its poor peasant) 
support necessarily meant the absolute end of the party as an electoral force.  It is 
notable that all of the commentators who had stated that it had completely collapsed 
were on the left and therefore had a vested interest in discrediting it since they 
wanted its former supporters. Indeed, from comments made by the DRV after the 
February 1936 elections it is clear that this perception was not fully shared on the 
                                            
Valencian deputies voted in the following way. Against the Samper government: Valentín, Marco 
Miranda, Molero and García Berlanga. Just, who was absent from the Cortes, sent a telegram saying 
he would have voted against Samper. For the Government: Sigfrido Blasco, Ramón Cantos, Gerardo 
Carreres, Juan Chabret Bru, Roig Ibáñez, Vicente Lambiés, Angel Puig y Puig, Pascual Martínez Sala 
(all PURA or Radical Party members), Bosch Marín, García Guijarro, Lucía and Fernando Oria de 
Rueda (DRV); the Carlist Cárcer abstained. El Mercantil Valenciano, 7 July 1934.     
64 El Pueblo, 8 July 1934; El Mercantil Valenciano, 10 and 12 July 1934.Martínez Barrio, Memorias, 
p. 228. The decision of Carreres, who had been closely identified with the conservative faction of the 
PURA headed by Sigfrido Blasco is perhaps a little surprising. Carreres quietly returned to the PURA 
fold shortly thereafter.   
65 As the DRV publication in Xàtiva put it, ‘The revolution must be strangled with energy and without 
remorse’. El Agrario (Xàtiva), 27 September 1934.  
66 The best description of the fall of the Samper government is to be found in Townson, Crisis, at pp. 
264-269. There were rumours that the PURA had vetoed the inclusion of Lucía in the Cabinet, but Gil 




right, which expected the PURA to attract sufficient electors to split the non-
confessional vote and therefore to deliver the elections to the DRV.  
 
The PURA had little hope of returning to its former strength, but it was not 
inconceivable that sufficient numbers of conservative but non-confessional voters 
would stay with it and that some of the currently ‘autonomous’ casinos might return 
to the blasquista fold. This, combined with its control of the machinery of government, 
left the possibility that it might maintain sufficient electoral attractiveness to avoid 
future electoral oblivion, especially within an electoral system designed to reward 
broad electoral coalitions. The behaviour of the PURA leadership in the following 
months is not understandable unless one accepts that they did not see their position 
as entirely hopeless. It is probable, too, that the lack of localised political mobilisation 
by the DRV against the PURA was partly influenced by the need to help keep the 
Radicals in power as part of the CEDA tactic.     
 
What the PURA and the DRV could not prevent was the radicalisation of the 
Valencian working class and sections of the poor peasantry, part of a national 
phenomenon but driven provincially by the rise of the Valencian AOA and the 
industrial disputes of April and May 1934.  Neither could they prevent the rapid rise 
of IR which created a powerful political force on the left. In the coming months IR 
would be crucial in the development of Valencian politics and hold the key to the 
future fate of the PURA and hence, indirectly, the future political success of the DRV. 
     
In the context of growing political polarisation, even the elevation of Samper to the 
office of Prime Minister was a ‘poisoned chalice’ for the PURA. Samper had always 
been seen as on the right of the PURA and had never been popular with its working-
class base, but the benefits he now brought to Valencia in terms of increased 
financial support and more job-creation schemes were probably outweighed by the 
fact that, with a member of the PURA as Prime Minister, the party could not help but 





Although the PURA rarely described itself as ‘centrist’, by its alliance with the 
Radicals it was implicitly accepting that this is what it was at least in terms of national 
politics. Within Valencia the PURA had never truly operated mainly as an 
ideologically driven ‘programmatic’ party but was a confused hybrid of a patronage 
driven vote gatherer, allied with an ill-defined republican and populist ideology. For 
many years it had managed to hold together a disparate inter-class coalition by a 
mixture of patronage, pseudo radical rhetoric, anti-clericalism, street violence, anti-
socialism, regional grandstanding and populist attacks on the central government. 
Now it sought to continue to do this while in reality it moved increasingly rightwards 
in its politics within the highly politically charged atmosphere of the Republic. Its 
highly unstable coalition could not be maintained in this context, and it finally 
unwound under the pressures of the events of the first nine months of 1934.  The 
events of October 1934 radically transformed the national and local political situation 
and the PURA now had to face entirely unknown territory. Whether in this new 
situation there was any place for it, or indeed mutated blasquismo within any other 






9 ‘THE TWILIGHT AND DEATH OF SIGFRIDO’:  THE OCTOBER 1934 RISING 
AND GOVERNMENT BY THE CENTRE-RIGHT. OCTOBER 1934 to JULY 
1935 
‘Lucía, in government, is the twilight and then death of Sigfrido. That 
God’s head will roll to the feet of the new God…..’  




In this chapter I will describe the impact of the October 1934 events on national 
politics and their specific impact in Valencia. I will describe growing unity between 
the leadership of working-class organisations and explain why this unity inhibited 
rather than promoted insurrectionary attitudes. The immediate result was that so little 
happened in October that extreme repression could not be justified, resulting in a 
very limited crackdown on working-class and leftist organisations. These factors, 
combined with the radicalisation promoted by the serious repression in other parts of 
the country, especially Asturias, left a resilient broad leftist movement in Valencia 
ready to work together once martial law had been lifted. I will explain why it was 
difficult for employers and landowners to launch any coherent attack on working-
class rights given continued working–class unity, limited political repression, the 
continued ability of the dockers to control exports from Valencia and Gandia ports 
and the fragile nature of the main agricultural crop, the orange.  
 
I will describe why the strong rightwards turn in national politics left the PURA in an 
impossible situation. As the section of the Radicals most opposed to appeasement 
of the right on religious issues, and opposed to a full-bodied political attack on the 
left at the national level, the pressures on it to leave the Radicals continued to grow 
from whatever remained of its grass-roots support. In contrast, continued loyalty to 
the Radicals increased its control of local government as it benefited from the post 
October dismissal of leftist councillors throughout Spain. I will demonstrate that 
control of local government was in reality all that kept the party functioning as IR 





During this period although the evidence is limited and far from conclusive as to how 
this was achieved, the DRV not only managed to maintain the level of political 
support which it had achieved at the November 1933 elections but increased it by 
gaining a section of the peasantry which had hitherto supported the PURA. I will 
tentatively suggest how the DRV managed to achieve this at a time when many poor 
peasants were undoubtedly suffering badly under the governments of the centre and 
the right.       
 
9.2 The October 1934 Revolt in Valencia and its Aftermath 
 
The appointment of CEDA ministers provoked the declaration of a revolutionary 
commune in Asturias. In Madrid, there was an attempted general strike, and 
Catalonia declared independence. The Madrid strike petered out quickly and 
Catalonia was quickly brought back under central government control. In Asturias, 
the miners put up a bitter two-week fight against the army, but they were finally 
vanquished. The post revolt repression was exceedingly brutal and there were many 
atrocities, but these were mainly confined to Asturias.1    
 
As Purkiss has pointed out, after Asturias Valencia was the province where the 
Alianza Obrera was most important, and one might have expected more to happen, 
whereas the involvement was marginal.2 A general strike was declared in Valencia 
city, but lasted only six days and was almost completely peaceful.  Elsewhere in the 
                                            
1 There is a large body of history on the events of October 1934, but perhaps not surprisingly few give 
much if any attention to the limited events in Valencia. The events in Valencia are exhaustively 
analysed in Sergio Valero Gómez, Reformismo, radicalización y conflicto interno en el socialismo 
español: la Federación Socialista Valenciana durante la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil (1931-
1939), Doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, 2012, (Valero Gómez, Reformismo), pp. 296-306. See 
also Aurora Bosch Sánchez, ‘Sindicalismo, conflictividad y política en al campo valenciano durante la 
segunda República’ in Bosch et al, Estudios sobre La Segunda República, Alfons Al Magnànim, 
Valencia, 1993 (Bosch,  ‘Sindicalismo’), pp. 217-297 especially pp. 285-297, and Richard Purkiss, 
Democracy, Trade Unions and Political Violence in Spain: The Valencian Anarchist Movement 1918-
1936, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland, and Toronto,  2011 (Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist 
Movement), pp. 222-224.                




province there were a few minor incidents but the rising was to all intents and 
purposes over by 11 October.3  Martial law was declared throughout Spain and was 
not lifted until April 1935. This resulted in the closure of all union offices and of most 
socialist, anarchist, and anarcho-syndicalist publications.4  
 
Alianza Obrera leaders declared that Valencia had been assigned a ‘passive’ role in 
the movement by the Madrid based (and Socialist-controlled) strike committee.5 This 
supposed rationale made little sense as there was little national co-ordination and no 
strategic reason for Valencia to stand aside. Quite the contrary: by opening up 
another front there would have been increased chance of success. The real reason 
why so little happened here was the relative moderation of local Socialists and 
hostility from leaders of the Sindicatos de Oposición.  The latter, concerned by 
Socialist domination of the movement elsewhere and scarred from the adventurism 
of the CNT risings of January 1932 and 1933, saw a workers’ revolt in October 1934 
as yet another futile attempt to overturn the existing order.6  
 
Compared to elsewhere, in Valencia few union leaders or politicians were arrested 
and they were all released after a short period.7 The main focus of the national 
repression was to undermine the Socialists, and their relative weakness in Valencia 
may have been a further reason why so few resources were allocated to breaking 
                                            
3 La Correspondencia de Valencia, 12 October 1934 and Las Provincias, 14 October 1934; Valero 
Gómez, Reformismo, p. 302.  
4 In a sign perhaps of the greater repression faced by the Socialists as compared to the Sindicatos de 
Oposición, República Social, the newspaper of the Valencian Socialists, did not reappear until 
December 1935, while Sindicalismo, the publication of the Federación Sindicalista Libertaria, a self-
defined elite within the Sindicatos de Oposición, was able to recommence publication in April 1935, 
immediately on the lifting of martial law. The official publication of the Sindicatos de Oposición, El 
Combate Sindicalista, reappeared in September 1935. Eulalia Vega Masana, Anarquistas y 
sindicalistas, 1931/1936. La CNT y los sindicatos de Oposición en el País Valenciano. Alfons el 
Magnànim, Valencia, 1987, (Vega, Anarquistas), p. 209, and Francisco Javier Navarro Navarro, A la 
revolución por la cultura. Prácticas culturales y sociabilidad libertarias en el País Valenciano, 1931-
1939, Universitat de València, Valencia, 2004, p. 210.     
5 Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 223. 
6 Valero Gomez has noted that the socialist unions provided strongest support for the general strike; 
Valero Gómez, Reformismo, p. 298. A local leader of the Oposición in Carcaixent told María José 
Sigalat Vayá that there had been no rising in Carcaixent because it was seen as a ‘Socialist thing’. 
María José Sigalat Vayá, ‘Memòries de la Guerra Civil a Carcaixent’, Al-Gezira, No. 9, 1996, pp. 503- 
536, at p. 512.  




workers’ organisations. The manner in which martial law was implemented in 
different parts of Spain varied widely, largely because of the manner in which the 
military were organised as regional units under the control of regional Captains 
General, to whom each provincial military governor directly reported. Each Captain 
General had a great deal of discretion, while the military governor had significant 
power too. Under conditions of martial law, the military governor took over virtually 
all the political functions of the civil governor, including the direct command of the 
police, civil and assault guards.  
 
This was an efficient but diffuse system for maintaining central control which impeded 
the automatic imposition of a single policy line. A Captain General had a great deal 
of freedom as to how to interpret orders. He would often rely heavily on the views of 
the provincial military governor who was embedded within the local provincial political 
as well as military elite, usually knew the province well, and could carefully calibrate 
his response to local conditions. There is no information available on what transpired 
between the Captain General and his immediate subordinate in Valencia, but it is 
clear they formed the view that there was little danger as few troops appeared on the 
streets and it was the regular forces of law and order which maintained control.8     
 
One important consequence of the limited scope of the rising in Valencia was that 
the central government was given little excuse to unleash full-scale repression. The 
Radicals were not uniformly of the view that the events should be taken as an 
opportunity to decisively crush the left, whatever the instinct of the CEDA. Even some 
of the more reactionary Radicals continued to have some belief in political pluralism 
and the rule of law and felt constrained from supporting extreme repression. 
Additionally, there was an urgent need to concentrate resources where the threat 
                                            
8 The level of discretion was well illustrated by the situation in Catalonia, where the revolt was serious. 
The Captain General, Domingo Batet Mestres, took the decision to use the minimum force necessary 
to quell the rebellion and resisted pressure from General Francisco Franco, who was advising the 
Minister of War, to apply maximum force.  In contrast, in Asturias where the local military command 
structure was partly bypassed and operations were overseen directly by Franco, the repression was 





was most severe. The Ministry of War admitted that a rising elsewhere would have 
left the Army unable to cope.9  
 
In Valencia it seems that the Sindicatos de Oposición and the unions affiliated to the 
UGT managed to continue to function, presumably in a semi-clandestine manner 
given the imposition of martial law. Their resilience is demonstrated by the metal 
workers’ ability to strike immediately after martial law had been lifted in protest 
against the dismissal of colleagues on political grounds.10  It is also demonstrated by 
the ability of the Valencian Alianza Obrera to continue functioning after October 
1934.11  The unions’ continued resilience had important consequences in limiting the 
employers’ counter-revolution. The scale of the national repression helped to forge 
leftist unity throughout Spain, but because in Valencia repression was mild, this unity 
was able to manifest itself in a particularly powerful way and was an important factor 
in the continued growth of IR, the maintenance of working-class unity, and eventually 
the ease with which the Valencian Popular Front electoral coalition was agreed.   
 
In the orange-growing areas at least, employers were finding it difficult to reduce 
wages.12  Reasonable terms and conditions seem to have been maintained, no doubt 
because the threat of a dockworkers’ boycott on crops picked under conditions of 
semi-servitude still carried force, especially given the fragility of the orange crop.13  
                                            
9 Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution in the Second 
Republic, Routledge, Second Edition, New York, 1994, p. 78. 
10 Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 223 and Vega, Anarquistas, p. 278.  
11 Marta Bizcarrondo: ‘Socialistas y Comunistas ante la unidad: las Alianzas Obreras en 1935’ in 
Santiago Castillo, (ed.), Estudios de Historia de España: homenaje a Manuel Tuñón de Lara, Vol. 2, 
1981, pp. 95-111 at p. 109.    
12 The historians who have studied the situation in Valencia after the October 1934 events paint a 
picture of a consistent and effective rolling back of workers’ and peasants’ rights; see Purkiss, 
Valencian Anarchist Movement, pp. 222-226; Vega, Anarquistas, pp. 207-210, and Bosch, 
‘Sindicalismo’, pp. 289-291. The evidence which supports this is thin and is contradicted for much of 
the province. At any rate workers seemed able to fight back; Valencia suffered a higher than average 
number of strikes in 1934 compared to much of the country. Javier Puche and Carmen González 
Martínez, ‘Strikes and Rural Unrest during the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1936): A Geographic 
Approach’, Sustainability, Vol. 11, No 1, 2019, 26 pages. 
13 In Alzira for example, there were no negotiations on terms and conditions for the 1934/1935 harvest 
season, but with no involvement from the unions, the government simply imposed the terms and 
conditions which were in place for 1933/1934. Pilar Rovira Granero, Mobilització social, canvi polític i 
revolució. Associanisme, Segona República i Guerra Civil. Alzira, 1900-1939, Germania, Alzira, 1996, 




The catastrophic loss of much of the crop to frost also put a premium on selling what 
remained, which also safeguarded workers’ power. Given the nature of the available 
evidence, the conclusion that there was no consistent province-wide grass-roots 
counter-revolution must remain tentative. The main evidence consists of work 
agreements published by the Mixed Juries, but the formal agreement of a work 
contract and its practical implementation was not the same, so it is possible, but 
unproven, that the reality was less positive. Only with a sympathetic Civil Governor or 
sympathetic provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Labour in post could one expect to 
see enforcement action against non-compliance by employers. With both a Radical 
Civil Governor and Labour Delegate one would not necessarily expect enforcement 
action. And with very high levels of unemployment it is quite possible that wages and 
conditions remained high but that militant workers were now excluded from the 
benefits. All of this however is speculative. 
 
On the other hand, workers in the rice growing areas faced a precipitous drop in 
income, with wages falling to 8 pesetas compared to the previous figure of 14 
pesetas, at a time when export prices were returning to the level of 1931.14 A threat 
of a dockworkers’ boycott carried much less weight in the context of a crop such as 
rice with a long life which could be easily stored. Whilst it is difficult to disentangle 
how much of their economic suffering resulted from the economic depression and 
how much from a deliberate attack on workers’ rights, there is little doubt that here 
at any rate workers’ organisations were unable to resist abusive behaviour by 
employers.15 That there was abuse in much of Spain is beyond dispute; the Cedista 
Labour Minister, admitted in May 1935 that the Mixed Juries had been turned into 
instruments of social exploitation.16  
                                            
14 Salvador Calatayud Giner, ‘Tierras inundadas: El cultivo del arroz en la España 
contemporánea (1800-1936)’, Revista de Historia Económica, Year 20, Winter 2002, No. 1, pp. 39-
80 at p. 67.  A report in El Combate Sindicalista in September 1935 painted a bleak picture, ‘At night, 
thousands of men crowd around the church, lying on the floor, supporting themselves against the cold 
walls, eating bread and sardines, awaiting dawn when the landowner searches for the best offer, 
beating down the price until, desperate, they submit to the owner like beasts.’ This is the translation 
by  Purkiss in Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 224. 
15 On this, see the articles in El Combate Sindicalista of 20 September and 4 October 1935. 
16  Richard Robinson, The Origins of Franco’s Spain: The Right, the Republic, and Revolution, 1931–




9.3 The Consolidation of the Republican Alternative to the PURA: Izquierda 
Republicana 
 
By April 1935 with the lifting of martial law, IR was able to expand, although its first 
provincial congress was delayed and was not held until December 1935.17 It received 
a boost in May, when Julio Just, the ex-blasquista, joined, giving it its first provincial 
representative in the Cortes.18  Just had been regarded as being one of the most left-
wing (and able) figures in the PURA. A blasquista since he was fifteen and son of a 
close friend of Blasco Ibáñez, Just was a ‘true believer’.19    
 
Azaña chose Valencia as the first venue in his propaganda tour of 1935, designed to 
rally the republican left. Valencia was picked as a symbol of republicanism, just as it 
had been chosen by Alcalá-Zamora as the venue for his declaration of 
republicanism.20 A successful event would make a powerful statement about the 
changing balance of forces within republicanism, particularly as the PURA had 
master-minded what was probably the most hostile and sustained campaign against 
Azaña which had occurred in Spain.21 González Calleja has described the purpose 
of such mass rallies as a ‘…subliminally violent threat, an attempt at intimidation 
through the symbolic occupation of public space’.22 The timing was particularly 
auspicious (the date was 26 May) because it was held just three weeks after Lucía 
                                            
17 218 municipalities, out of the 264 in the province, sent representatives.  Marc Baldó Lacomba, 
‘Peset, la universidad republicana y la resurrección de la izquierda’ in  Pablo Rodríguez Cortés, Ricard 
Camil Torres Fabra and María Isabel Sicluna Lletget (eds.),Juan Peset Aleixandre, Médico, Rector y 
Político Republicano,  Eneida, Madrid, 2011, pp. 49-78 at p. 66.      
18 La Voz (Madrid), 23 May 1935. 
19 Subsequently a prolific author, Just had at this stage published two books, one a biography of  
Blasco Ibáñez and the other a collection of short essays on republicanism (and blasquismo) in 
Valencia. These were: Julio Just Gimeno, Blasco Ibañez i València, L’Estel, Valencia, 1929, and 
Siembra Republicana, no named publisher, Valencia, 1930. Both books are long on hagiography, 
short on criticism, but they establish Just as a true blasquista.   
20 On 13 April 1930, in the Teatro Apolo. Libertad (Madrid), 15 April 1930. 
21 ‘It is perhaps here in this province where Don Manuel Azaña has had to combat the most 
hostility…he has had also many sincere and loyal supporters, and many of those who previously 
opposed him recognize now how mistaken and unjust were their campaigns’. Izquierda (Xàtiva), 19 
May 1935. 
22 Eduardo González Calleja, ‘The symbolism of violence during the Second Republic in Spain, 1931–
1936’, in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (eds.), The Splintering of Spain, New Historical 





became a Minister, and Azaña was thus able to maximise the PURA’s 
embarrassment and to capitalise on Valencian republican hostility towards the DRV. 
 
The Mestalla stadium, the largest venue in Valencia with a capacity of over 80,000, 
had been used twice in June 1931 by the Radical Socialists, but had not been utilised 
since for political purposes. To the consternation of the right, Mestalla was filled to 
overflowing and many were unable to gain entry.23 The event was important too for 
its blasquista symbolism. On the platform sat not only the Honorary President of the 
provincial IR, Vicente’s son Mario, but also Emilio Azzati, the brother of Blasco’s 
successor as PURA leader, Félix Azzati. Abundant (and loud) vivas were heard in 
praise of Blasco Ibáñez, Mario Blasco, Félix and Emilio Azzati.24 
 
The opening section of Azaña’s speech, too, made it clear that IR not only claimed 
blasquista legitimacy but denied that any remained with the PURA:  
I had to begin in Valencia….because of the intensity, fervour and the glorious 
tradition of Valencian republicanism…which recognises the fertile fruits…of 
your Blasco Ibáñez [massive applause and vivas to Blasco Ibáñez]…thanks 
to the bad conduct of the leaders of part of republican opinion [here….they] 
have…contributed to the delivery…of the Republic into the hands of your 
adversaries made flesh: the Carlists.25   
 
                                            
23 ‘…not one extra person could have got into Mestalla.’ El Sol estimated that over 100,000 had arrived 
for the event. El Sol (Madrid), 28 May 1935.   
24 El Mercantil Valenciano and El Sol (Madrid), 28 April 1935. Azzati led the party from 1906 until his 
death in 1929. The PURA was evidently rattled by the presence of Mario at the meeting. An article in 
Antorcha used Mario’s depressed state to suggest that he was incapable: ‘…just as someone who is 
deaf cannot comprehend the symphonies of Beethoven…it is not possible that he would voluntarily, 
if he understood what was happening, grace with his presence a meeting which wanted to destroy 
the ...glorious Party founded by his no less glorious father’. Antorcha, 1 June 1935. A poor analogy 
given that for much of his creative life Beethoven was deaf. Antorcha first appeared on 9 February 
1935. It was supposedly the fortnightly newspaper of the PURA youth. Given the PURA’s low ebb, it 
must have had a derisory circulation and yet seems to have been well funded. Totally loyal to Sigfrido, 
in reality it seems to have been his personal mouthpiece from which he could criticise Lerroux while 
giving him a measure of ‘plausible deniability’.   
25 El Mercantil Valenciano, 28 April 1935. This was a clear reference to the arrival of the DRV in 




The significance of the rally was clear to political allies and opponents alike.26 Local 
republicans were in no doubt as to its significance. As one publication put it:  
…it has a special significance in the effect it has on Valencian politics….In 
Mestalla we saw clearly the radical transformation in Valencian 
republicanism….the Valencian people have finally realised that [in the PURA] 
the spirit of Blasco Ibáñez is not present….Mestalla will displace the 
autonomistas from the positions they occupy. Izquierda Republicana will 
replace them…27 
 
The left sought to interpret the Mestalla rally, not only as a clarion call for the 
reorganisation of the left and the electoral battle to come, but also as a plebiscite on 
the government. Its success caused concern on the political right in general and for 
the DRV and CEDA in particular, which responded by announcing their own rally to 
be held at Mestalla.  
 
9.4 The DRV’s Radicalisation after October 1934 
 
The events of October 1934 radicalised the DRV. Whilst the evidence that Lucía had 
evolved into a genuine democrat is persuasive, the DRV was always a loose coalition 
between those who shared his views, and those for whom any commitment to 
democracy and to the Republic was thin at best.28  Juan Puchades Montón, one of 
the DRV members closest to Lucía, maintained that in the first half of 1935 an 
important group of figures in the DRV deserted in disgust at Lucía’s moderation.29 
Diario de Valencia admitted in February 1936 that throughout 1935 the DRV had 
been losing members to the extreme right.30 Pascual Martínez Sala of the PURA 
                                            
26 The prestigious liberal daily El Sol described it as ‘the most important political event of recent 
years…’ El Sol (Madrid), 28 April 1935. 
27 Izquierda (Xàtiva), 2 June 1935. Antorcha claimed that it hoped that  Azaña would use the meeting 
to promote republican reconciliation, but was shocked to hear the ‘putrid bile’. Antorcha, 1 June 1935. 
28 At the Mestalla meeting, in a sign of his struggle with his opponents within the DRV, Lucía felt the 
need to address the anti-democratic forces in the DRV directly, ‘I am a democrat, but if you were not, 
I would only have to speak to you to convince you: give me a democracy.’ Lucía’s speech at Mestalla, 
Diario de Valencia, 3 July 1935.   
29 Information provided to me by Señor Joaquín Prats Cuevas in April 1975. Prats Cuevas interviewed 
the late Señor Puchades Montón during the course of the preparation of his undergraduate 
dissertation but did not cite the interview. Joaquín Prats Cuevas, Introducción a la Derecha Regional 
Valenciana (1930-1933), Undergraduate dissertation, Universitat de València, 1973.  




maintained in August 1935 that the DRV was now ‘profoundly divided’ and that the 
anti-Lucía group was ‘frankly Carlist: they do not support the Republic.’31  
 
The JDRV in particular was becoming strongly radicalised and turned towards 
paramilitary activity. On 19 May its leader Juan Alcocer was shot dead, apparently 
accidentally, while drilling at the Paterna military shooting range. All but the military 
were supposed to be banned from using it.  A leftist newspaper claimed that army 
officers had for some time been training the JDRV to act as a paramilitary unit.32  
After Alcocer’s death the youth fell under even more extreme leadership when it 
appointed José Maria Torres Murciano as its new President by acclamation (in 
defiance of DRV regulations, which insisted on a secret ballot). In his acceptance 
speech he proclaimed ‘Our ideal is the reconstruction of Spain, on the basis of a New 
State’.33  
 
9.5 Lucía in Government 
 
Lucía finally became a Minister in the most unabashedly reactionary Government of 
the entire Republican period. It may be significant that the CEDA’s deputy leader, a 
leading moderate, was offered the relative obscurity of the Ministry of 
Communications, a technocratic and largely uncontroversial post.  In spite of being 
in Cabinet, he continued to take a low profile in the Cortes, sticking strictly to his 
technical brief and intervening in debates only when absolutely necessary.34  
 
DRV deputies seem to have been all but invisible. They did not oppose the growing 
rightwards direction of legislation, and appeared unconcerned by the blockage of all 
                                            
31 El Mercantil Valenciano, 4 August 1935.  
32 Sindicalismo, 27 June 1935. Juan Alcocer was one of the few authentically working–class leaders 
within the DRV; he had been a member of the  Agua Gas y Electricidad union, a member of the 
Sindicatos de Oposición until he was expelled for acting as a blackleg in October 1934.  Sindicalismo, 
6 and 13 June 1935.    
33 Diario de Valencia, 18 June 1935; Las Provincias, 19 June 1935. 
34 As Minister he made just six statements in the Cortes, noted for their brevity. Diario de las Sesiones 




attempts at social-catholic reform, especially the attempts by Manuel Giménez 
Fernández, the Minister of Agriculture, to introduce agrarian reform legislation to 
support tenant farmers.35 Lucía’s few public comments suggest that he was 
personally supportive of the measures, but he apparently made little or no effort in 
the Cortes to rally the DRV behind them.36 The replacement of Giménez Fernández 
in March 1935 signalled the definitive defeat of these attempts. Worse, in July 1935 
measures were passed which removed the security of tenure previously provided by 
the legislation. This boosted the confidence of landlords and opened the way to a 
widespread attack on tenants’ rights, although some recent research suggests that 
the scale of the attack may have been exaggerated.37   
 
In spite of this, the DRV seems to have gained additional poor peasant support so 
that it eventually gained a bare majority of their vote. Subsequent electoral 
information suggests that while many poor peasants who had previously supported 
the PURA moved politically to the left, some did transfer their allegiance to the DRV. 
One reason for this was the DRV’s success in representing itself as the only political 
organisation capable of protecting Catholicism. Its portrayal of the Republic as a 
godless antechamber to socialist revolution left a section of the Valencian peasantry 
which was deeply religious nowhere to go politically, even if they saw their economic 
wellbeing threatened. It is unclear why previously some of them felt able to ignore 
the PURA’s rhetoric on religion, but they did. The great variation from settlement to 
settlement of PURA behaviour on the subject may offer a partial explanation. A 
further but probably minor factor in gaining their support for the DRV was the action 
                                            
35 It was rumoured that Gil Robles had wanted Lucía to be Minister of Agriculture in the October 1934 
cabinet instead of Manuel Giménez Fernández, but the PURA had vetoed him. Gil Robles denied this 
and implies that it was entirely his decision not to insist on Lucía in order not to give Lerroux further 
difficulties with the PURA.  Gil Robles, No fue posible la paz, Ariel, Barcelona, 1968, pp. 137-138.   
36 This inaction has been pointed out by Valls. See Rafael Valls Montés, La Derecha Regional 
Valenciana, 1930-1936. El catolicismo político valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1992 (Valls, 
Derecha Regional Valenciana), pp. 190-198. See also my article ‘“Moderate” Conservatism and the 
Second Republic, The Case of Valencia’, in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), Spain in Conflict, 1931–1939, 
Sage, London and Beverley Hills, 1986, pp. 132-159 at p. 148. 
37 Certainly recent work on Catalonia finds that the eviction of rabassaires was quite limited in scale 
compared to what has previously been suggested. See Jordi Domenech and Francisco Herreros, 
‘Land reform and conflict before the Civil War: landowner response to tenancy reform in 1930s 





taken by Lucía to use the disciplinary machinery of the DRV to prevent DRV tenant 
farmers from being evicted by unscrupulous landlords who were members. He called 
a meeting which resolved to set up a special tribunal empowered to expel any 
landlord who abused the security of tenure established by Valencian custom.38 There 
is no evidence as to whether this measure was ever applied and if so how effective 
it was, but it may have resulted in new DRV recruits as tenant farmers sought 
protection from the threat of eviction. 
 
9.6 Gil Robles and Lucía at Mestalla 
 
The CEDA had been deeply concerned by the success of Azaña’s Mestalla meeting. 
The 30 June meeting at which both Gil Robles and Lucía spoke was to be the CEDA 
and DRV’s reply, to be held not only at the same venue but, in a first for Spain, 
simultaneously at three locations: the Mestalla, Valencia’s bull-ring, and its horse-
racing track.39 The event also had a specifically Valencian theme, designed not only 
to proclaim the DRV as the most powerful force in Valencia but also to bolster the 
position of Lucía. The poster announcing the meeting proclaimed: ‘Two dates: 1930-
1935. Two men: Lucía-Gil Robles. Two institutions: DRV-CEDA. The same thought: 
God. The same service: Spain. The same success: their tactic.’40  There was a 
marked difference between the speeches of Gil Robles and Lucía. Gil Robles’ 
speech was combative while Lucía’s was conciliatory and preached the virtues of 
tolerance and of democracy for its own sake.41 There is little doubt that the event 
was a great success although perhaps not surprisingly the total numbers in 
                                            
38 Diario de Valencia, 18 and 19 December 1934, 9 and 14 March 1935. 
39 IR had referred to their Mestalla meeting as a ‘plebiscite’ on the government, and a DRV publication  
in anticipation of their meeting promised that this ‘….is what the left wants and they will have it after 
the meeting of the [Regional] Right on 30 June.’  El Agrario (Xàtiva), 17 June 1935. This was not the 
first mass meeting that Gil Robles had addressed during the first half of 1935, but it was the largest. 
Vicent Comes Iglesia,   En el filo de la navaja: Biografía política de Luis Lucía Lucía, 1888-1943, 
Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid 2003, (Comes, En el filo), p. 289; Robinson, Origins, p. 226.  
40 Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana, p. 9. The reference to 1930 in the ‘two dates’ part of the slogan 
was a clear reference to the foundation of the DRV and an acknowledgment that it was the first 
‘accidentalist’ entity to be created and the model, the DRV claimed, on which other CEDA affiliates 
were based.  
41 For a detailed analysis of the speeches, see Comes, En el filo, pp. 289-298 and Valls, Derecha 




attendance were disputed.42 Nationally the scale of the meeting, and its apparent 
success, were well-publicised.43 This placed the CEDA and the DRV on a ‘war 
footing’ against a resurgent left. 
 
9.7 The PURA’s Grip on Local Government Tightens 
 
Townson has pointed out that the October rising gave the Radicals an increased 
dominance of the machinery of local government as the replacement of elected local 
councils with administrative committees allowed it to significantly strengthen control. 
The CEDA made little headway in preventing this. Radicals controlled the Ministry of 
the Interior until March 1935 when the post was taken by Portela Valladares, a 
centrist republican from Galicia, who remained in the post until he became Prime 
Minister in December 1935.44 Portela, who did not have a party machine of his own, 
was extremely wary of the CEDA, and was content to let the Radicals monopolise 
these appointments.45  
 
This process was less dramatic in Valencia because the PURA already had effective 
control of most local councils and its dominance had tightened after the 1933 general 
                                            
42 Diario de Valencia claimed a total crowd of 200,000, while El Sol suggested 100,000; Diario de 
Valencia, 3 July 1935 and El Sol (Madrid) 2 July 1935.  Photographs published by the left showed a 
half empty stadium but the over-ambitious decision to spread the event over three venues makes it 
very difficult to gauge numbers simply from photographic evidence from Mestalla. El Mercantil 
Valenciano, 2 July 1935. Leftist opponents of the DRV alleged that large amounts had been spent to 
entice people to attend, including the provision of free train-tickets and free board and lodging while 
in Valencia. Izquierda (Xàtiva), 7 July 1935.    
43 La C.E.D.A, the official CEDA magazine, devoted eight of its sixteen pages to it. La C.E.D.A., 1 July 
1935. 
44 Pilar Mera Costas, Monárquico, republicano, liberal. Biografía política de Manuel Portela 
Valladares, Doctoral thesis, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 2016 (Mera Costas, Portela), pp. 151-
258. Salazar Alonso was not re-appointed when the October 1934 government was announced, but 
was replaced by another Radical and Lerroux loyalist, Eloy Vaquero Cantillo. Vaquero, while not as 
reactionary as Salazar Alonso, was nonetheless on the right of the Radical Party. Nigel Townson, The 
Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 1931–1936. Sussex 
Academic Press, Portland, 2000, p. 271.   
45 Mera Costas, Portela, pp. 154-155. Nationally over 2,000 socialist and left republican town halls, 
over 20 per cent of the total, were replaced with steering committees dominated by the centre-right 
(and in most cases the Radicals). One eighth of mayors were also dislodged. Gil Robles was still 
complaining to Lerroux about the Radicals’ monopoly of civil governor posts in November 1935. 




election when a change in the composition of the steering committee allowed the 
PURA to consolidate its majority in the Diputación Provincial.46 Twenty five town 
councils hitherto outside PURA control had fallen to them during 1934 as Salazar 
Alonso sacked or replaced suspended councillors and replaced them with PURA 
nominees. The most significant of these was the capture of L'Alcúdia, an important 
Radical Socialist stronghold.47 
 
Following the October 1934 rising the PURA’s hold over local government tightened 
further with a combination of steering committees to replace existing town councils 
and elsewhere the replacement of leftist councillors with interim councillors. The most 
important gain by far was that of the Socialist stronghold of Alzira, the second largest 
settlement in the province, which now fell to the PURA.48 Now the PURA held an 
absolute majority in virtually every town hall in the province which enabled, in the 
words of Townson ‘a massive exploitation of the public spoils system.’49    
 
The most dramatic change occurred at City Hall, where the boycott of council 
meetings by leftist councillors had left the PURA dependent on the DRV.50 Now the 
council was packed with PURA members. On 20 October, the civil governor ordered 
the summary dismissal of two councillors and the ‘temporary’ suspension of six more 
                                            
46 In February 1934 the PURA members duly voted themselves into all the key committees. The leader 
of the DRV minority, Manuel Simó, ironically congratulated the majority that ‘…he was pleased that 
the majority has been so kind as to relieve the minority of so many onerous duties’. Actas de la 
Diputación Provincial de la Provincia de Valencia (ADPPV), 10 February 1934. 
47 Archivo General de la Administración (AGA) Seccion Organización y Estadistica de la Vida Local/ 
Cuestiones Electorales/ Caja 44/00266 Leg 1. See also Francesc Andreu Martinez Gallego, 
Construint la ciutadania: una història contemporánia de l'Alcúdia 1801-2002. História de l´Alcudia 2 
Vols, Vol. II, Ajuntament de l´Alcúdia, L´Alcúdia (Valencia), 2002, pp. 563-564.  
48 Actas del Ayuntamiento de Alcira (Alzira), 9 October 1934; Rovira Granero, Mobilització social, pp. 
237-238. 
49 He is referring specifically to Barcelona, but it applies equally elsewhere. Why the CEDA did not 
use its presence in government more effectively to prevent this, or at least to demand a share of the 
spoils, is unclear. This seizure of local government by the Radicals was a common phenomenon, and 
in some locations was much more dramatic than in Valencia. In Badajoz, from a weaker base, the 
Radicals ended up controlling 161 of the 163 councils, while in Catalonia they now became the 
strongest force. Townson, Crisis, p. 279. 
50 No doubt because of greater DRV hostility following the November 1933 elections, the PURA had 
been trying since at least March 1934 to get central government to take action to restore their quorum 
at City Hall. See the report to the Minister of the Interior prepared by an (unnamed) official at City Hall 
dated 20 March 1934 contained at AGA/ Seccion Organización y Estadistica de la Vida Local/ 




while their conduct was investigated on the flimsy grounds of ‘lack of co-operation in 
the current events’ and an allegation that they had ‘met with extremist elements’.51 
To fill these posts, and the other ten posts which were already vacant, eighteen 
interim councillors were appointed.52 Of the eighteen, fifteen were members of the 
PURA, two were members of the Radical Party, and one was a conservative 
republican.53 This gave the PURA an iron grip over City Hall. The DRV were furious 
at this turn of events, and protested vigorously that the arrangements were illegal. 
The deputy leader of the DRV minority, Francisco Calatayud, charged that, ‘You have 
installed the dictatorship of a political party…. You have stolen from us the weapon 
of the ‘quorum’. Today you are the masters, you can do what you want…’54 
 
9.8 The PURA after the October 1934 Rising 
 
El Pueblo sniped at Lerroux from October 1934 onwards, regularly complaining that 
the decision to form a government with CEDA participation was a mistake, but 
nevertheless continued to support the government.55 A particular concern was the 
scale of the repression. Samper pleaded for moderation in an article published in El 
Heraldo de Madrid when he emphasised that tempers needed to cool and that 
intemperate action must be resisted: 
…The just application of sanctions to the leaders and the participants in the 
revolutionary movement must not inhibit the parties of the left which want to 
                                            
51 Actas de Junta Municipal, Valencia (AJMV), 20 October 1934. 
52 AJMV, 23 October and 5 November 1934. There were supposed to be fifty councillors, but of the 
fifty elected in April 1931, two had died while eight had to resign because of a conflict of interest 
leaving ten posts to fill. 
53 Las Provincias, 24 October 1934. 
54 AJMV, 29 October 1934. There were a number of alleged procedural and other irregularities related 
to the introduction of new deputies and the DRV implemented legal proceedings.  Whilst these were 
underway, the DRV boycotted council meetings. In the event, the final legal judgement (in March) 
while establishing that irregularities had occurred in the appointment of the new mayor, did not give 
the DRV what they really wanted, which was a declaration that the new councillors were invalidly 
appointed.  The full legal judgement is contained within a report dated 13 March 1935 held at AGA/ 
Seccion Organización y Estadistica de la Vida Local/ Cuestiones Electorales/ Caja 44/00266 Leg 1.  
55 As Sigfrido said in a speech in Alzira on 28 January 1935 to commemorate the death of his father: 
‘the right [in government] are our enemies, we robustly face them, in full hostility … between them 
and us there lies an abyss which can never be bridged.’ Antorcha, 9 February 1935. Samper himself 
was at pains to point out in an interview he gave to El Heraldo de Madrid that support for the Radicals 
would not weaken ‘We will continue to follow Radical Party discipline…we place all of our confidence 




serve the regime democratically. The Radical Party…. must be vigilant to 
ensure the principles of equanimity and careful deliberation, thinking not just 
of the moment,  which is often false, and always fleeting and transitory, but of 
the future of the Republic.56 
 
But events were to show how little influence the PURA (and the more liberal elements 
within the Radicals) had. An allegation that Samper when Prime Minister with his 
Minister of War, Diego Hidalgo, had not sufficiently prepared the State against the 
uprising of October 1934 was adopted by the CEDA, which demanded that they lose 
their ministerial posts. The CEDA’s real aim was to further weaken the Radicals’ 
liberal wing. Lerroux, by conceding this demand so quickly, demonstrated that he 
was not prepared to fight for those who argued for a more moderate line.57  
 
CEDA pressure on the Lerroux government continued, and even if Lerroux had 
wanted to (in fact there was no sign of this), he could do little to mitigate the impact 
of the hard line on law and order, particularly against working-class organisations. 
This was to prove profoundly damaging to the Radicals, because they could never 
hope to outbid the CEDA as the party of law and order, and thus inadvertently 
enhanced the appeal of the right while weakening itself. The continued repression 
helped create a new spirit of unity within the political forces on the left, which was 
ultimately to lead to the Popular Front. The CEDA, believing that it was close to 
absolute power, accelerated its political pressure on the Radicals. Increasingly, the 
CEDA stressed the unfitness of the Radicals to govern, launching in February and 
March 1935 a propaganda drive stressing the austerity and honesty of the CEDA 
and the corruption of the Radicals.  
 
Under increasing pressure from the CEDA for a greater say in the government, and 
for control of the all-important Ministry of War, Lerroux and the President, in an 
                                            
56 El Heraldo de Madrid, 15 December 1934. When the Cortes re-opened on 5 November 1934 
Samper eloquently pleaded with his fellow deputies that they should proceed with moderation and act 
as if the left-wing opposition was still present in the Cortes. DSC, 5 November 1934.    
57 El Heraldo de Madrid, 9 November 1934. Townson, Crisis, p. 275. Alejandro Lerroux, La pequeña 




attempt to buy time, announced a government of individuals nominated by the 
President, and closed the Cortes for a month.58 The CEDA responded with a massive 
campaign of protest and put the party onto an election footing. CEDA officials in the 
provinces either resigned or withdrew from governmental bodies en masse.59 After a 
sustained period of pressure and fraught negotiations, on 6 May 1935 a new Cabinet 
was announced which reduced the number of Ministries held by the Radicals to three 
and gave the CEDA five including Gil Robles as Minister of War. The composition of 
the new government marked a notable shift to the right, and was seen by the CEDA 
as the penultimate step before it took complete control.  There was significant 
resistance from within the Radical Party to the new government, led by the PURA, 
which saw with dismay the arrival in government of the DRV with the appointment of 
Lucía as Minister of Communications.60 
 
El Pueblo attacked the outcome as a ‘disastrous solution’ and went on to say that 
‘the impression throughout Spain is one of anguish and is an augur of a second blow 
on the path to a dictatorship of priests’.61 Sigfrido Blasco threatened that the 
composition of the new government would have ‘severe repercussions’ for both the 
Republic and for the Radical Party, without spelling out what these would be.62 In 
part this reaction was born of genuine concern for the political direction of the 
Republic, but it was also triggered by the fear that the presence of the DRV in 
government would fatally shatter the PURA’s control over local government, a fear 
                                            
58 Samper reported that Sigfrido Blasco had lobbied to be made a Minister, knowing that this was his 
sole chance to be appointed. Amongst other matters, this would have given him a life-long pension. 
In the event, the attempt failed. La Correspondencia de Valencia, 7 December 1936. Samper’s diary 
entries for 2 and 3 April 1935.  
59 There was a complete DRV boycott of the Diputación and of City Hall. See ADPPV and AJMV 
March-May 1935, passim.  
60 The DRV parliamentary deputy Francisco Bosch Marín joined him as deputy minister (‘sub-
secretaria’). El Agrario (Xàtiva), 13 May 1935. 
61 El Pueblo, 7 May 1935. 
62 El Pueblo, 8 May 1935. According to Samper, the PURA contemplated breaking with Lerroux, but 
were persuaded not to do so by the President, who wanted to avoid a further split in the Radicals. 
Samper’s diary entry of 7 May 1935, reproduced in La Correspondencia de Valencia, 8 December 
1936.  The opposition to the new government within the Radicals was not confined to the PURA. A 
quarter of the Radical’s deputies abstained in the vote of confidence, of whom one third were members 




which was no longer just driven by cupidity, but by fear for the survival of the party  
since it needed the control over local government to keep it on ‘life support’.  
 
As one IR publication put it, ironically comparing the PURA leader with his namesake, 
the protagonist of Wagner’s Siegfried and Götterdämmerung, ‘Lucía, in government, 
is the twilight and then death of Sigfrido. That God’s head will roll to the feet of the 
new God…..’63 Sigfrido Blasco subsequently published an extract of a letter he had 
sent to Lerroux in December 1935 which proclaimed that ‘…on the day you named 
a Minister of the Regional Right…you lost Valencia and destroyed our party’. The 
arrival of the DRV in government was clearly of great symbolic significance in 
Valencian politics, but in the short term there is little evidence that PURA control was 
loosened.64 In reality, the PURA deputies had nowhere to go. The more the PURA 
leadership  criticised the CEDA, the more the question as to why they continued to 
support the Radicals arose.65 The choice was stark: go into opposition and lose 
control over local government which in all probability would mean their collapse, or 
to soldier on regardless.66 
 
9.9 The PURA’s Mestalla Meeting of 7 July 1935 
 
The PURA had been extremely concerned by the IR and DRV/CEDA meetings in the 
Mestalla, which seemed to underline the PURA’s political irrelevance, and judged 
                                            
63 Izquierda (Xàtiva), 26 May 1935. 
64 El Pueblo, 24 March 1936. Sigfrido’s remarks in the spring and summer of 1936 need to be treated 
with great caution. In attempting to rebrand the PURA as a party of the progressive left, it suited him 
to try to blame Lerroux for every mistake the PURA made during the Republic. 
65 ‘…our attitude …is one of frank hostility…[we]…will never accept …a circumstantial collaboration 
with the right.’ Antorcha, 30 March 1935.   
66 This fear of the loss of control of local government rather than as Franch i Ferrer has suggested the 
offer of additional governmental posts (which never materialised), is a more likely explanation as to 
why the PURA did not break with the Radicals.  Vicent Franch i Ferrer, El Blasquisme Reorganització 
i conflictes polítics 1929-1936.  Ajuntament de Xàtiva, Xàtiva, (Valencia), 1984, p. 174. The inclusion 
of the DRV in government does not seem to have resulted in a weakening in the PURA command of 
local government, whereas Cedistas did make significant headway in some locations such as in 
Seville. Townson, Crisis, p. 293. Indeed, a week after the announcement of the new government 
seven new interim councillors, all members of the PURA, were appointed in Xàtiva giving the PURA 
complete control of the town hall for the first time. Izquierda (Xàtiva), 12 May 1935 and El Agrario 




that they needed their own meeting to  demonstrate that they were still a credible  
force. This decision was fraught with risks, as a failure to attract sufficient attendees 
would  graphically illustrate their decline. They faced real difficulties in mobilising their 
remaining supporters for what was clearly a defensive manoevre.  The Radicals had 
endured a year and a half of a gradual reduction of the party’s authority and its 
members were concerned at its contradictory approach to the repression of the 
October 1934 events.  
 
The Radicals were on the defensive, with a stream of corruption scandals 
undermining its authority. Yet to fill Mestalla the PURA needed the full support of the 
Radicals nationally, and it needed the only national figure capable of attracting the 
required crowds, which was Lerroux. Since the PURA had made very clear its 
opposition to the arrival of the DRV in Cabinet and had criticised Lerroux strongly 
this placed the PURA in a difficult situation, as it both criticised Lerroux and held him 
out as the saviour of the country. El Pueblo’s local publicity for the event had an 
uncertain tone, hardly surprising since the paper had spent many months attacking 
Lerroux for agreeing to bring the CEDA into government. 
 
This uncertainty was  reflected in El Pueblo’s decision to republish an article 
previously published in La Voz of Almeria by the leader of the Radicals there, an 
article which shared the PURA’s unhappiness with the rightwards direction of 
government and was hardly a conventional call to arms: 
 
   …our hope is that it will be in Mestalla that ….so many doubts and 
suspicions that have hovered over the attitude and words of the chief of the 
Radical Party [will disappear]...the resolution of the last crisis in such an 
anomalous way cost the autonomists dear, and it was only their loyalty to and 
the personal prestige of Lerroux…which managed to gain their 
support…..Republicans! For Spain and for the Republic you must go to 
Valencia…67 
                                            
67 El Pueblo, 3 July 1935. The official PURA manifesto for their meeting was a lacklustre affair: 
‘...Those who want the Republic to be more than a simple form of government but also a superior 




There were three speeches, by Sigfrido Blasco, Samper and Lerroux. Having invited 
him, Blasco and Samper could hardly reiterate El Pueblo’s earlier criticisms of 
Lerroux, and instead concentrated their attacks on the governments of the first 
bienio, which  ‘instead of establishing true republican norms, ….were dedicated to 
persecution,  to the creation of  hostility and the sowing of mistrust.’68 Lerroux’s 
speech was equally negative towards the left, but it ranged much wider and was an 
impassioned defence of his policies, in particular of his decision to govern jointly with 
the CEDA.69 None of the speeches invoked blasquismo, although there was a large 
portrait of Blasco Ibáñez prominently located within the stadium.   
 
The meeting must be judged a qualified success. In spite of the Radicals’ and the 
PURA’s loss of popular support during 1934 and 1935, a great effort must have been 
put into its organisation, because it is clear that there was a good attendance, as 
even La Voz Valenciana, the newspaper of RE, conceded.70 However given the 
context, no matter how many people were in attendance, the occasion was too 
defensive to work as a galvanising force. Both the IR and DRV/CEDA Mestalla 
meetings felt like opening skirmishes in a future electoral conflict, whereas the 
purpose of this meeting was unclear, if it had one beyond the PURA’s (and the 
Radicals’) desire to show that they were not a completely spent force.  
 
9.10 Conclusion  
 
The October 1934 rising and its aftermath profoundly exacerbated national political 
divisions and made the battle for a centrist Republic close to impossible. The extreme 
                                            
means....come to the meeting!’  La Correspondencia de Valencia and El Heraldo de Madrid, 5 July 
1935.  
68 These are Samper’s words. El Pueblo, 9 July 1935. They could equally be applied as a critique of 
the PURA’s own behaviour towards its political rivals in Valencia.  
69 There is an excellent summary at Townson, Crisis, pp. 308-309. 
70 La Voz Valenciana, 8, 11, 12 and 15 July 1935; Las Provincias 7 and 9 July 1935. An Izquierda 
Republicana weekly grudgingly conceded that ‘a fair number’ were in attendance. Izquierda  (Xàtiva),  
13 July 1935. Samper claimed that the true number had been 60,000 people. La Correspondencia de 
Valencia, 12 December 1936; Samper’s diary entry for 7 July 1935. Predictably, Antorcha thought it 
had been a resounding success, describing Sigfrido’s speech as ‘magnificent’, and perhaps damning 




brutality of the repression forged strong bonds of unity between left republicans and 
led to the rise of IR while the relative mildness of the repression in Valencia allowed 
working-class organisations to continue to function. On the right, the arrival of the 
CEDA in government, the October rising and its repression gave the CEDA and the 
DRV a rallying cry for mobilisation which led to increasing confidence that the 
success of its ‘tactic’ was in sight. This process of radicalisation seems to have tipped 
the internal balance of power in the DRV away from Lucía and towards those who 
had no faith in democracy.  
 
The political situation in Valencia was complex. The local working–class had shown 
little inclination to engage in revolutionary activity and the events of October 1934 
had largely passed it by. Repression here seems to have been relatively mild, leaving 
working-class organisations intact certainly in Valencia city and in the larger towns. 
A result of this was that once the political climate began to change in the summer of 
1935 with the lifting of martial law, the unions were able to fight back.71  
 
This process of radicalisation left the Radical Party nationally, and the PURA in 
Valencia, in an increasingly difficult position, as voters and supporters abandoned 
both organisations. Nationally the alliance with the CEDA cost the Radicals dear, but 
for the PURA the speed of the collapse in support was even more dramatic. With   
Samper no longer in the Cabinet, the party was increasingly marginalised within the 
Radicals and could only snipe from the sidelines at the increasingly rightwards 
direction of government. In the short-term, however, the PURA was able to find some 
solace in the fact that the repression actually increased its control over the machinery 
of local government. This increase was key to continued loyalty towards Lerroux and 
in the existence of the PURA as a functioning organisation. But it was in a trap which 
looked impossible to escape. Since it was not however prepared to take the logical 
                                            
71 In smaller settlements especially where there was a very high dependency on agrarian work, the 
forced closure of working-class organisations seems to have disrupted unions badly and certainly in 
the case of the CNT affiliated unions to have led to a precipitous drop in membership. Purkiss, 




step and go into opposition, it had no credible political line, and nothing of value to 
say.   
 
In this situation of extreme political polarisation, and in spite of the intensly localist 
nature of political culture throughout Spain, all political players in Valencia now 
looked towards the next general election. The symbolism of Valencia as a supposed 
bastion of Spanish republicanism, but also as the birthplace of the CEDA’s 
‘accidentalism’ assumed great importance. This led to Valencia becoming an icon of 
the battle to come with the phenomena of the ‘three Mestallas’. Spain  had never 
before had  political meetings on such a scale and yet within a period of six weeks 
Valencia had hosted three.  All three meetings carried two identical messages: that 
local politics were now subservient to the national struggle and that Valencia was a 





10 ‘THE ALI-BABA’S CAVE OF BLASQUISMO’: PURA FINANCIAL 




The decay of the…PURA…is important to us all…its immoralities…are 
known throughout all of Spain’.  
 
Article by José García Pradas headed ‘The Ali-Baba’s cave of 




In this chapter I will explain how the reputation of the PURA as a particularly corrupt 
organisation helped hasten its demise as a serious electoral force, inextricably bound 
up as it was with the fate of the Radical Party, as two nationwide scandals unfolded. 
Yet as the Radicals all but collapsed as a national party, the PURA, despite its mass 
loss of local support and its notorious reputation  somehow managed to maintain a 
measure of organisational cohesion. I will describe how this made it an apparently 
attractive player in the project of the centrist politician, Manuel Portela Valladares, a 
notable and cacique of the Restoration establishment, to partially ‘make’ the 
February 1936 elections.  
 
There is no conclusive evidence as to why the PURA showed more organisational 
coherence compared to the Radicals, but I suggest that this relative resilience 
derived primarily from the many years during which most of its leadership had worked 
together to dominate the politics of the city, whereas in many locations the Radical 
leadership was new. But this superficial resilience and the PURA’s relative 
attractiveness to Portela signified just how weak were the local political groupings 
from which he was attempting to build his ‘centrist’ project. In reality the PURA was 






10.2 Blasquista Financial Mismanagement and Corruption 
 
The PURA and the Radicals were indeed renowned for corruption. However care is 
needed in examining precisely what one means by ‘corruption’ and the extent to 
which the PURA and the Radicals were actually worse than other Spanish political 
parties. Relatively young democracies tend to suffer disproportionately from the 
practices of patronage, and Spain was no exception. The state the Republic inherited 
from the Restoration system was a weak state, and this weakness could not be 
eradicated overnight.   
 
The use of patronage to achieve political ends was an inherited feature and it was 
routinely practised to some degree by all the political parties who were in a position 
to do so. ‘Corruption’ in this sense was systemic, but was quite capable of co-existing 
with democracy and had the Republic existed for long enough, may well have been 
brought under control. As Townson has pointed out in the context of the Radicals, 
what distinguished them from the Socialist and republican parties was their personal 
greed: ‘the exploitation of the public sector for their own business or pecuniary ends’.1 
As will be seen, this was also true of the PURA, but in addition the PURA had a 
particular reputation throughout Spain for its financial mismanagement and 
incompetence, centred on its management of City Hall.   
 
The republican City Hall inherited an extremely difficult financial situation. The 
Spanish state was starved of funds, and at local government level the problems were 
acute in fast-growing cities which had to fund urban developmental projects. The 
local government tax base was very narrow, and relied heavily on sales taxes, 
particularly on consumables. There were systemic problems in collecting taxes,  
                                            
1 This is a direct quote from Townson; see Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist 
Politics under the Second Republic 1931–1936. Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and 




arising from an inadequate and corrupt bureaucracy, and resistance to the sales 
taxes, which were politically toxic to the poor since they were strongly regressive.2   
Significant public works had been carried out in Valencia city in the fifteen or so years 
before the Republic, which were funded by the issue of municipal bonds. Current 
taxation receipts were insufficient to cover year to year ordinary revenue costs, let 
alone interest charges and repayment of capital on those bonds, and in 1928 a 
further bond issue was made to refinance the entire cumulative deficit, which by then 
exceeded 125 million pesetas, a huge figure for a single municipality.3  As elsewhere 
in Spain, the onset of the economic depression of the 1930s made the position even 
harder to deal with given growing unemployment and the erosion of the municipal 
tax base, while little assistance financially was forthcoming from central government, 
which had to deal with the greatest budget deficit in the country’s history.4   
 
Even so, financial mismanagement of the city of Valencia was severe and closely 
related to the behaviour of the PURA as a particularist party and in particular to the 
use of patronage to bolster political support.  The PURA had long relied on the 
misappropriation of resources for these purposes, but under the monarchy it could 
present these actions as progressive measures in its struggle against the Restoration 
system. Under the Republic, however, no such gloss could be placed on this 
behaviour.5 Despite the raiding of reserves, the current account deficit rose to 15.5 
                                            
2 At City Hall, the PURA majority under the monarchy had wrestled with the difficulty of raising funds 
for the planned programme of urban renewal and job-creation given that a disproportionate share of 
the revenues derived from its own political clientelae. See Ramero Reig, Blasquistas y clericales. La 
lucha por la ciudad en la Valencia de 1900.  Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1986, pp. 361-404. There 
had been reform attempts under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Legislation introduced in 1924  
widened the tax base and made it less regressive, but the work was never completed.  
3 By way of comparison the 1931 annual budget for the Spanish state was a little over 200 million 
pesetas; Joseph Harrison, An Economic History of Modern Spain, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1978, p.131. By April 1931 a further current account deficit of four million pesetas had 
been incurred. On the finances of the city, see Juan José López Hernando, Hacienda local en 
Valencia 1880-1930: Presupuestos, reforma urbana y deuda municipal, Doctoral thesis, Universitat 
de València, 1983, and his article ‘Hisenda municipal i reforma urbana,’ Recerques, No. 15, 1984, pp. 
125-131. 
4 Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution in the Second 
Republic, Second Edition. Routledge, New York, 1994, (Preston, Reform, Reaction, and Revolution) 
p. 79. 
5 In the American municipal context, James C Scott points out that ‘Hints of municipal corruption and 
graft were winked at, even applauded, by the machine clientele as the social banditry of an urban 
Robin Hood….’ James C. Scott,  ‘Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,’ The American 




million pesetas by the summer of 1936 from the 4 million inherited from the 
Monarchy.6 The maintenance of a municipal dole, and the provision of public works 
to alleviate unemployment were expensive, and it was alleged by the PURA’s 
opponents that these actions were deployed primarily to provide work for PURA 
supporters. The fire service was also filled with poorly trained and badly led PURA 
members; its new head was the father of the blasquista deputy Julio Just, a man with 
no previous expertise in this important area.7 The municipal police, the guardia civica, 
employed only blasquistas who acted in a highly partisan way as the PURA’s ‘army 
of the street’.8  As a result, by July 1934 the financial situation at City Hall was critical, 
with many of the public work programmes abandoned because of lack of funds, many 
employees not having received their wages for over two months, and suppliers 
refusing to provide credit because previous bills had not been paid.9 
 
Prior to the Republic the PURA’s ability to misappropriate funds was constrained 
because this was confined to the city and even there they had to deal with a large 
monarchist minority and a hostile monarchist civil governor. Now however they had 
control of many of the town halls throughout the province, controlled the Diputación 
and for much of the Republic (and all of the second bienio) had a supportive civil 
governor. During the second bienio they were part of the governing party. With 
greater power, control over additional sources of funds and with less oversight, they 
were free to extend their patronage. Control of the Diputación was particularly 
                                            
between the regressive nature of the tax base and the need to deliver benefits to the urban poor made 
this a difficult balancing act. 
6 El Mercantil Valenciano, 17 May 1936. 
7 Public anger around the mismanagement of the fire service after the disastrous reaction to the fire 
at the University in May 1932 resulted in the Mayor, Vicente Alfaro, resigning. Alfaro was then expelled 
from the PURA. La Correspondencia de Valencia, 13 and 16 May 1932; Diario de Valencia, 14 May 
1932; Las Provincias, 13 May 1932; El Pueblo, 10 April and 10, 13, 15 and 16 May 1932;  El Radical 
Socialista, 21 May 1932; El Socialista 13 and 14 May 1932; La Tierra, 14 and 15 May 1932; The 
Times (London) 14 May 1932. 
8 El Mercantil Valenciano, 3 October 1931; 14 and 17 June 1933. These allegations were confirmed 
by a number of former CNT activists who I interviewed in Valencia in the summer of 1975. The late 
Señor Domingo Torres, one of the leading militants in the Sindicatos de Oposicion, and during the 
Civil War mayor of Valencia, was particularly forceful about this.  
9 See the report in La Tierra (Madrid), 12 July 1934. Much corruption was fuelled by simple greed, 
with some of the more egregious examples concentrated in the Diputación under the Presidency of 
Juan Calot. Calot was regularly accused of placing his friends in jobs within the Diputación especially 
into senior posts. La Voz Valenciana, 22 July 1931.There were regular reports in the press about his 
extravagant use of taxpayers’ money and unjustified expense claims, for example in La Voz 




important since it administered a range of province-wide activities, the most important 
of which was its responsibility to maintain and develop the provincial road network. 
Only PURA members were recruited to work on these projects.10 
 
The stench of corruption coming from City Hall reached a peak in the second half of 
1935 when information surfaced relating to a contract to build primary schools, 
awarded to one supplier for 63 million pesetas without putting the bid out to tender 
(in flagrant breach of the legal requirement to do so). The issue was seen as 
important enough to gain significant coverage in the national as well as the local 
press. Locally, the attack was led by Diario de Valencia which gave a great deal of 
attention to this issue in the summer of 1935.11 The campaign against the project 
was led by the DRV, and although part of the national CEDA campaign to weaken 
the Radicals by stressing the latter’s corruption, it was on this occasion at least based 
on genuine concerns. The DRV calculated that the overall cost could have been 
reduced by 30 per cent had there been a competitive tender.12 Although it was never 
proved that anyone had pocketed funds, lack of transparency and failure to follow 
established procedures left a suspicion that corruption as well as incompetence was 
involved.13 The project was eventually suspended by the Portela government on the 
grounds of illegality at the end of August.14   
                                            
10 Allegations of the partisan use of public funds were echoed by the civil governor, Luis Doporto, in 
January 1933, that: ‘During the last year so many of the public works have been carried out for political 
ends’ in a confidential report to the Minister of the Interior. Doporto singled out the Diputación for 
particular criticism; Archivo Histórico Nacional/ Serie A/FC_M_ Interior/ Legajo 56 A/Caja 
1/Expediente 4/Sub expediente 15. A review of the files of 544 employees of the Diputacion subject 
to Francoist ‘purification’ (depuraciones) after the war demonstrates that membership of the PURA 
was a precondition for employment as a labourer in the road building and maintenance unit. Archivo 
General y Fotográfico de la Diputación Provincial de Valencia (AGFDPV)/ Sección A/Central/ 6/1/18 
/Personal/Depuraciones y expedientes disciplinarios. 
11 La Libertad (Madrid), 2 and 6 August 1935. See also El Sol (Madrid), 3 August 1935. As the 
allegations related to municipal and therefore laic schools, this made them a particularly tempting 
target from the point of view of the DRV. 
12 Diario de Valencia, 27 June 1935. As Valls has noted, Diario de Valencia carried articles on this 
virtually on a daily basis throughout July and August. Rafael Valls Montés, La Derecha Regional 
Valenciana, 1930-1936. El catolicismo político valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1992 (Valls, 
Derecha Regional Valenciana), pp. 217-220.  
13 Actas de Junta Municipal, Valencia (AJMV), 21 and 24 June 1935; La Correspondencia de Valencia, 
26 and 28 June 1935. 
14 Diario de Valencia, 30 August 1935. Joaquín Chapaprieta, La paz fue posible, memorias de un 
político, Ariel, Barcelona, 1971 p. 182. The DRV used the school building issue as the main excuse 




10.3 Samper, Sigfrido Blasco and Corruption in National Government  
 
The appointment of Ricardo Samper as Prime Minister in April 1934 resulted in the 
PURA becoming directly implicated in a scandal known in the contemporary Spanish 
press as the ‘Rice-Maize’ affair.   This involved a deal to exchange surplus Spanish 
rice for Latin-American maize.  A secret contract was drawn up under which the 
Spanish state-owned export bank, the Banco Exterior,  agreed to allow three 
companies of wholesalers and exporters to establish a monopoly for the trade. A 
special low export price was fixed, on the condition that the rice not be sold into Spain 
but the condition was defined in a way which excluded the Spanish Sahara and the 
Canary Islands, where the dealers made a large profit competing with rice from the 
Spanish mainland which had been pegged at the official price. It was alleged that the 
manner in which the contract defined the national territory was deliberate.   
 
In effect this meant a transfer of potential revenues from hard pressed rice growers 
to a small cartel of dealers. Given that Valencia was one of the main rice-growing 
areas, this issue was particularly sensitive there.  The scandal broke when the 
Socialist deputy, Indalecio Prieto, obtained a copy of the contract and read out the 
details in the Cortes. Samper was forced to deny any knowledge of its existence and 
to denounce it as ‘immoral and illegal’. A Madrid daily, Luz, published a series of 
articles directly implicating a junior minister and leading blasquista, Vicente Ibarra, 
the Director of Commerce, in the negotiations for the secret contract.15  A commission 
of enquiry was set up, which absolved both Ibarra and Samper although the evidence 
against both was strong. Whatever the truth of the matter, the taint of the scandal 
stuck to Samper.16    
                                            
campaign by the CEDA to delegitimise republican institutions by withdrawing councillors. La 
Correspondencia de Valencia, 31 July 1935; Las Provincias, 3 August 1935; La Voz Valenciana, 29 
and 31 July 1935.     
15 Vicente Ibarra was a Samper appointee made when Samper was Minister of Industry and 
Commerce. 
16 Ramón Viguri, the main witness against Samper and a former director of the Banco Exterior, 
charged in Luz that Samper had known about the deal all along. On the ‘Rice-Maize’ affair, see Luz 
(Madrid), 15, 16 , 17, 18, 21, and 31 May, 1, 6, 9, 11, 12, 22 and 30  June  1934;  El Socialista, 25, 




Far more important was the final collapse of the Radical Party under the impact of 
two scandals, the ‘Straperlo’ and ‘Tayá’ affairs.17 The latter scandal had nothing to 
do with the PURA, but the former did.18 This concerned the alleged bribery of 
prominent Radicals by one Daniel Strauss, the promoter of a gaming machine similar 
to roulette, in order to get the game licensed.19 The individuals implicated included 
Alejandro Lerroux, Salazar Alonso, three other prominent Radical deputies and 
Aurelio Lerroux, the adopted son of Alejandro.  They also included Sigfrido Blasco, 
who Aurelio described as his ‘best friend’ and who it was claimed agreed to discuss 
the issue with Samper.20  
 
On 28 October the Cortes debated the findings of the parliamentary commission set 
up to investigate the affair. Eight people were named, including Salazar Alonso, 
Aurelio Lerroux and Sigfrido Blasco.21  All were condemned by the Cortes with the 
exception of Salazar Alonso, who avoided censure by a mere three votes because 
of the political support of the CEDA and the extreme right. Sigfrido was condemned 
by 190 votes to 70, the remaining Radicals by 166 votes to 14, the party at this stage 
having abandoned the chamber.22  
 
                                            
1935; El Mercantil Valenciano, 15 and 16 May 1934 and 6 and 12 June 1934, and  Diario de Valencia,  
15 May 1934. See also El Sueco (Sueca), 20 May 1934.  
17 The best general accounts of these scandals are to be found at Townson, Crisis, pp.  315-323 and 
332-337. On Straperlo, see also Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes (DSC), 22 October 1935. 
18 Although Samper’s intervention in the Tayá affair provoked his departure from the Radicals, as is 
discussed below.  
19 The events occurred during the period of the Samper government during the spring and summer of 
1934, but the facts only became widely known in October 1935. 
20 Townson, Crisis, p. 412, footnote 73. This was judged to be necessary because of the extremely 
bad relations between Salazar Alonso and Samper and the fear that Samper would veto an anticipated 
authorisation by Salazar Alonso. On this, see Sigfrido Blasco’s (rather feeble) intervention in the 
Cortes in his own defence. DSC, 28 October 1935. According to Strauss’s letter to Alcalá-Zamora, 
Blasco had reported that for a payment of 400,000 pesetas Samper had agreed not to oppose its 
authorisation. José María Gil Robles, No fue posible la paz, Ariel, Barcelona, 1968 (Gil Robles, No 
fue posible), pp. 291-308; Richard Robinson, The Origins of Franco’s Spain: The Right, the Republic, 
and Revolution, 1931–1936. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1970, pp. 232-33.  For the text 
of Strauss’s letter see El Mercantil Valenciano, 23, 25 and 27 October 1935.  Samper was 
subsequently acquitted for lack of documentary evidence.   
21 El Heraldo de Madrid, 26 October 1935. 
22 DSC, 28 October 1935; El Heraldo de Madrid, 25 and 28 October 1935; Townson, Crisis, p. 321. 
There is little doubt that those condemned by the Cortes had been involved in the scandal, but the 
evidence against Salazar Alonso was equally strong.  See also El Combate Sindicalista, 1 November 




These scandals, which were in reality examples of small-scale corruption, had such 
a devastating impact on the Radical Party because of the degree of political hostility 
which the party faced on all sides and its own inability to create a political counter 
narrative. Townson has shown that until at least October 1934 the Radicals managed 
to hold to a centrist political agenda and prevented a wholesale grass-roots reaction, 
yet none of  the achievements during this period seem to have been stressed by 
Lerroux or indeed by any of the Radical leaders. There appears to have been no 
attempt to communicate its achievements.23  
 
As Townson has put it: ‘The party possessed no major reformist ambitions, not 
even....a clearly defined programme.’ Lerroux was frequently absent from the Cortes, 
most of his ministers were regarded as lethargic and ineffectual, while the 
parliamentary minority was ill-disciplined and members were also frequently 
absent.24  This failure to articulate a programme and a clear narrative allowed its 
opponents, to its left and to its right, to paint a picture of the Radical Party as 
directionless and unprincipled, and subordinate to the CEDA. It suited the CEDA for 
this view to prevail because it was consistent with the CEDA ‘tactic’ to stress its 
primacy,  while it suited the left to accept the CEDA’s view because this allowed the 
left to portray the Radicals as traitors to the Republic.  Consequently, after the events 
of October 1934, with the increasing polarisation of society, Lerroux’s claim to have 
‘centred the Republic’, to have domesticated the CEDA and to have made it a true 
republican party, appeared less and less credible. The Radicals could no longer 
answer the fundamental question as to why they existed and showed a lamentable 
lack of effort in countering the allegations. This was why the allegations of corruption 
proved fatal.25   
 
                                            
23 Townson, Crisis, pp. 325-329 remains the best general analysis.  On the Radicals’ moderating 
influence, see in particular Townson, Crisis, pp. 201-270. 
24 Townson, Crisis, p. 211. I broadly follow Townson in his analysis in this section.  
25 Townson has pointed out that it took a far more serious scandal in France, the Stavisky affair, to 




10.4 The Disintegration of the Radicals and Samper’s Defection from the 
PURA 
 
The Radical Party began to disintegrate, with whole provincial branches 
disaffiliating.26 The PURA reaffirmed its commitment to the Radicals on 11 
November, but was forced to announce that Ricardo Samper (who remained a 
Radical) had resigned from it.27 The primary reason for Samper’s resignation was 
not ideological but personal antipathy towards Sigfrido Blasco who, in Samper’s view, 
had sought to incriminate him in the Straperlo affair.28 He seems also to have been 
encouraged to break all contact with the PURA on the advice of the President, who 
perhaps saw in Samper a possible ally in the building of a new centrist movement.29 
Samper’s diaries describe the fear within the PURA leadership that his resignation 
would cause them immense damage and the extraordinary efforts they made to 
persuade him to stay. According to Samper, he was threatened firstly with a 
campaign of calumny to be conducted from El Pueblo if he resigned, and ultimately, 
with a veiled threat to his own life, delivered in the presence of his family, by the 
PURA deputy and confidant of Juan March, Pascual Martínez Sala.30  
 
Samper was no longer a member of the PURA, but the Radicals were in turmoil, with 
Lerroux unsure as to whether he should remain as leader and the supporters of 
Santiago Alba pressing for Alba to take control. For a brief period Samper seems to 
have acted not only as parliamentary spokesman but also as the de facto leader of 
                                            
26 Townson, Crisis, p. 330.  
27 La Voz Valenciana, 12 November 1935; El Heraldo de Madrid, 11 November 1935. 
28 On the supposed ideological differences, see La Voz Valenciana, 12 November 1935 and Izquierda 
(Xàtiva), 16 November 1935. Samper’s diaries for the period 18 January 1935 to 26 November 1935 
are published in La Correspondencia de Valencia, 3 December 1936 to 31 December 1936.  In his 
entry for 22 October 1935 he writes of his disgust with Sigfrido: ‘Sigfrido Blasco had made himself 
sickening to me.  Being in his presence not only provoked in me a protest of the spirit but a physical 
revolt:  of the brain, of the eye, of the heart, of the stomach. A revolt of all my senses.’ La 
Correspondencia de Valencia, 22 December 1936.  
29 In his entry for 10 December 1935, he reports that the President had expressed pleasure that he 
had left the PURA and encouraged him to consider leaving the Radicals ‘with heavy hints that he 
might be able to help me achieve my political aims in other ways.’ La Correspondencia de Valencia, 
28 December 1936.  




the Radicals’ minority.31 The final conclusion of the Tayá affair, in reality an extremely 
minor issue which amounted to little more than high-handedness by Lerroux in 
authorising a payment without parliamentary scrutiny, proved the ‘last straw’ for 
Samper. This decision by Lerroux contravened the ruling by the quasi-judicial state 
body the Council of State, presided over by Samper, which had said clearly that 
parliamentary approval was required. Samper now resigned from the party, followed 
by a number of other Radicals, who included Vicente Lambiés, still, technically, a 
PURA deputy, and the Valencian Radical Roig Ibáñez.32 Samper also resigned his 
position as President of the Council of State, and now described himself simply as 
an ‘independent republican.’33  
 
As the Radical Party continued to disintegrate, the PURA’s loyalty remained unclear. 
The PURA had reaffirmed its support for Lerroux, but there were rumours that a 
majority of its members were going to leave the Radicals.34  In fact, it remained with 
the Radicals until after the appointment of the Portela government on 14 December 
when, but with no public announcement, it decided to defect to Portela. The only 
surprise is that the PURA, which had suffered many high–profile defections from 
early in 1934 and had lost much of its popular support, did not also fall apart. Its 
mastery of local government is part of the answer, but not a complete one; in other 
parts of the country the Radicals had as much control, but still disintegrated.  Neither 
is the quality of its leadership, which if anything was worse than that of the Radicals, 
and in Sigfrido Blasco it had a third-rate leader with very poor communication skills.  
 
                                            
31 On Samper’s role in the Cortes, see El Sol (Madrid), 15 November 1935 and El Heraldo de Madrid, 
3 December 1935. On Lerroux’s uncertain position, see Townson, Crisis, p. 330 and Octavio Ruiz-
Manjón Cabeza, El partido republicano radical, 1908-1936. Tebas, Madrid, 1976, pp. 520, 532 and 
534.  Samper believed that he would have become the new leader of the Radicals had he not been 
caught up in the Straperlo scandal. La Correspondencia de Valencia, 26 December 1936. 
32 El Sol (Madrid), 11 December 1935 and El Heraldo de Madrid, 19 December 1935. 
33 El Sol (Madrid) 25 December, 1935; El Heraldo de Madrid, 26 December 1935; La Voz Valenciana, 
27 December 1935. 
34 El Heraldo de Madrid, 6 and 7 November 1935; El Sol (Madrid), 8 November 1935. A rump of 
Lerroux loyalists within the PURA were rumoured to be ready to leave but remain with the Radicals. 
This group included the local Albistas, led by José Aparicio Albiñana. The Albistas did not however 
immediately leave the PURA, but did so in January 1936 when it became clear that Lerroux and Alba 
were unable to conclude an electoral pact with Portela. La Correspondencia de Valencia and La Voz 




There is no completely satisfactory answer as to why it was more resilient. Its long 
history as the dominant party in Valencia city and the close-knit nature of most of its 
ruling group were probably important. Some other factors may have played a part. It 
was not dependent on its relationship with a charismatic leader, whereas for the 
Radicals personal devotion to Lerroux often seemed to be the only binding force. 
The PURA had survived the withdrawal of Blasco Ibáñez from politics, and the death 
of his successor Azzati. Having appointed its far from charismatic third leader, 
Sigfrido, his complete lack of charisma  and incompetence may even have brought 
the other leaders together. The limited geographical area which the party had to 
control may also have helped it stay together. There were also rumours that Juan 
March, because of his long term business relationship with Martínez Sala, continued 
to be financially generous towards the PURA. 
 
10.5 The General Elections of February 1936 
 
Whatever the reasons, the party’s continued existence gave the PURA credibility 
with the President, Alcalá-Zamora, and the new Prime Minister,   Portela Valladares. 
Allies were required in their attempt to partially ‘make’ the elections of 1936 in 
Restoration style by appointing new civil governors throughout Spain and ‘packing’ 
as many state and local government institutions as possible with their own men. For 
once, the PURA’s reputation for electoral corruption, well–earned by its behaviour in 
the November 1933 elections, may have been a positive selling point.  The aim was 
not to win the elections (it was recognised that this would not be possible) but to 
ensure the creation of a sufficiently large centrist block of deputies in order to deny 
both left and right a majority.35  
 
                                            
35 On Portela and his attempt to construct a Restoration style Centre Party, see María del Pilar Mera 
Costas, Monárquico, republicano, liberal. Biografía política de Manuel Portela Valladares, Doctoral 
thesis, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 2016 (Mera Costas, Portela) and her ‘Diseño y 
construcción de un proceso electoral. Manuel Portela Valladares y las elecciones de 1936’, Hispania 




The PURA maintained its theoretical independence and never formally joined 
Portela’s party, but it was common knowledge that it represented Portela in Valencia. 
Portela clearly had high hopes for the province; in discussions with the President he 
marked out Valencia and Andalusia where he expected to do well. His party and local 
affiliates contested 100 seats nationally and of these, 10 were in Valencia, where 
Martí de Veses his nephew, and political and private secretary was selected for 
Valencia province as part of the PURA list.36  
 
The decision to ally with Portela strengthened the PURA’s hold over local 
government. The new portelista civil governor, Juan Ribes Sanchís, appointed new 
PURA dominated administrative committees to run important municipalities such as 
Tavernes de la Valldigna, Bétera, Mogente, Montesa and Llíria. In Alzira, Bicorp, 
Favara, Gilet, Oliva and Sumacàrcer, PURA control was tightened with the 
appointment of additional councillors. The vacancies on the Diputación arising from 
the resignation of the DRV and Agrarians were now filled by additional PURA 
members.37 
 
The PURA had little choice other than to ally with Portela if it wished to survive. If it 
had not, then many of its remaining local organisations would either have defected 
to Portela or, faced with the imposition of portelista steering committees, may well 
have defected to other republican organisations. As the publication of IR in Xàtiva 
put it:  
For those politicians without any ideals, the important thing is to find a place 
in any organisation which will allow them to share in the spoils of the 
state…If…Portela had decided to separate the party from the Diputacion 
Provincial and the town halls the….final catastrophe would be inevitable 
                                            
36 Manuel Portela Valladares Memorias dentro del drama español, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1988, p. 
168; Mera Costas, Portela, p. 183. 
37 Juan Ribes Sanchís, who was appointed on 21 December 1935, was an old friend of the President 
and a long-term political supporter of  the conservative republican, former Prime Minister and now 
Minister of Finance in Portela’s Cabinet, Joaquín Chapaprieta. Las Provincias, 22 December 1935. 
PURA control over the Diputación Provincial was tightened when five new members were appointed 
to replace the three DRV members and two others who were no longer able to attend. 
AGFDPV/Central /Diputados/Actas/A.1.1/Vol 90/1935 and 1936/pp. 190-192/7 January 1936. See 





….Now they will be centrists, with the same ease that they were firstly leftists, 
then fickle rightists. It is all the same to them.38 
 
The control of town halls gave the PURA continued power to dispense financial 
favours, ensure that employees were party members, and enabled them to ‘doctor’ 
electoral rolls in order to exclude rivals.39 The worst excesses occurred around Alzira, 
although similar incidents occurred around Sagunt, and to a lesser extent in Villar del 
Arzobispo.40 Pedro Vargas of IR complained of the circulation of false identity 
documents (which made multiple voting possible) issued by the Diputación.41 These 
incidents however were minor, certainly compared to the excesses of November 
1933.  The PURA probably hoped to use these methods to apply pressure as a 
bargaining counter in negotiations with the other electoral blocks since there was 
little hope that it could use them to manufacture victory.   
 
The PURA initially attempted to conclude a bargain with the Popular Front. ‘All 
republicans must work together against the common enemy in order to save Spain 
and the Regime,’ argued El Pueblo, ‘we must by an act of will forget old hatreds...’.42  
Sigfrido Blasco, comprehending the level of hostility towards the PURA locally, 
travelled to Madrid to meet with the National Committee of the Popular Front where 
he argued that the strength of the DRV in Valencia made it essential that the PURA 
should be included in the Popular Front.  The National Committee agreed to this, but 
                                            
38  Izquierda (Xàtiva), 4 January 1936. 
39 La Voz Valenciana noted the amount of time that PURA leaders were spending with the civil 
governor, commenting that ‘they are not there to discuss the latest film, but other things being 
prepared for [election day],’ La Voz Valenciana, 7 February 1936.  
40 In Alzira over 1,000 Socialists and more than 400 rightists were excluded from the electoral roll 
while many long-dead individuals were included. DRV councillors walked out in protest. Diario de 
Valencia, 13 November 1935; Izquierda (Xàtiva), 16 November 1935 and El Mercantil Valenciano, 
10, and 12 November 1935. See also El Mercantil Valenciano, 26 November 1935 (Sagunt) and Diario 
de Valencia, 13 November 1935 (Villar del Arzobispo). 
41 Arrue Asensi, ‘L’ambient electoral durant les eleccions de Febrer de 1936’, Arguments, No. 1, 1974, 
(Arrue, ‘L’ambient electoral’) pp. 171-72; Luis Aguiló Lucía, Las elecciones en Valencia durante la 
Segunda República, Cosmos, Valencia, 1974 (Aguiló, Las elecciones),  p. 138.  El Mercantil 
Valenciano, 8, and 9 February 1936.    
42 El Pueblo, 8 January 1936. Antorcha the magazine for its youth echoed the theme: ‘…we have an 
unlimited desire for republican reconciliation in order to save the regime…..we must unite…to beat 
the common enemy’. Antorcha, 28 December 1935. Portela had originally proposed alliances with the 
left and only turned to the right when these were rejected. Preston, Reform, Reaction, and Revolution, 




unusually allowed a local veto.  The Valencian Popular Front then rejected any pact. 
The publication of IR in Xàtiva probably summed up the general sentiment when it 
commented that:  
The actions of the son of Blasco Ibáñez are not the actions of a true 
republican…It is the anguished call of he who presides over the total ruin of 
his provincial republican empire….We also want unity between all authentic 
republicans but we want nothing to do with the hypocrites who have done so 
much damage to the Republic.43  
 
The PURA then approached the DRV for a deal, possibly encouraged by the offer of 
financial support from Juan March if a PURA-DRV deal could be struck.44 When the 
DRV rebuffed them, they were forced to fight alone. With characteristic bravado El 
Pueblo  proclaimed: ‘The enemies of blasquismo fester with the hatred and hostility 
they show towards it…we are disposed to close ranks…fighting hand to hand until 
we are victorious’.45  
 
Without an alliance the PURA had no possibility of winning any seats, but its hope 
was probably that it would be able to hold onto sufficient voters to make it impossible 
for any candidate to obtain 40 per cent of the vote in the first round and then gain 
seats as part of a second round alliance.46 This might explain why it concentrated 
virtually all of its propaganda against the left in an attempt both to staunch defections 
to, and to suppress votes for, the Popular Front. As Antorcha put it ‘we desire the 
                                            
43 Izquierda (Xàtiva), 8 February 1936.  El Mercantil Valenciano, 25 January 1936; El Pueblo, 24 
January 1936. The PURA publication in Xàtiva complained bitterly that ‘Izquierda Republicana would 
prefer that the Republic be destroyed before they would go to the elections with the blasquistas’. El 
Radical (Xàtiva), 30 January 1936.  
 44 Vicente R. Álos Ferrando, Reorganización, supremacia y crisis final del blasquismo, 1929-1936, 
Ajuntament de València, Valencia, 1992, pp. 239-240. Álos Ferrando does not cite his source, and I 
can find no independent verification for this. El Socialista, reported that it was the civil governor who 
had worked out a deal between the PURA and the DRV.  El Socialista, 16 February 1936. March was 
the key figure in obtaining the PURA’s agreement to the inclusion of Samper as a candidate, although 
Samper withdrew when he was offered an alternative in Madrid. There, hostility from the local Acción 
Popular resulted in his exclusion from the elections. On Samper’s search for a parliamentary seat, 
see Izquierda (Xàtiva), 4 January 1936, La Correspondencia de Valencia, 12 February 1936, El 
Heraldo de Madrid, 8, 11 and  13 February 1936, and El Sol (Madrid) 23 and 24 January 1936 and 
11 and 12 February 1936.     
45 El Pueblo, 24 January 1936.  
46 According to El Heraldo de Madrid, the PURA leadership fully understood that it had no chance of 




destruction of our enemies, those of always and the Johnny-come-lately leftists…we 
want their absolute destruction’.47  All of the propaganda was focussed on the 
Popular Front; in typical blasquista fashion, all the attacks were ad hominem, 
focussing mainly on the ‘betrayal’ of former PURA members and their allegedly 
secret devout Catholicism.48    
 
The concentration on the Popular Front suggests also that the PURA hoped that a 
DRV-PURA pact could still be created in a second round.49 The PURA’s actions 
during the campaign demonstrated that it knew it could not win. It conducted a half-
hearted campaign, held hardly any meetings, produced no local leaflets and routed 
most of its electoral propaganda through El Pueblo.50  As the campaigns of the 
Popular Front and the rightist coalition commenced, the PURA was increasingly 
squeezed and appeared less and less relevant. A sign of this was the defection of a 
number of the few remaining PURA social centres (casinos) to Popular Front parties 
early in 1936.51 
 
On the left, the Popular Front negotiations went smoothly; the Valencian Popular 
Front Committee was formed on 20 January, only five days after the formation of the 
National Committee. It helped that the strength of IR gave the alliance a vibrant core, 
while the proliferation of left groups made some form of grassroots co-ordination an 
urgent necessity if the left was to stand a chance of winning. Paradoxically the 
organisational disunity of the left seems to have helped produce a much greater 
cohesion.  On the right there was less urgency, possibly because the right seems to 
                                            
47 ‘Johnny–come-lately leftists’’ (‘Las izquierdistas de última hornada’). Antorcha, 14 February 1936. 
48 Antorcha, 25 January and 8 February 1936. 
49 The Popular Front mainly ignored PURA attacks, but was finally provoked to respond, ‘Against the 
[right], nothing. Not an allusion, not an attack, not the slightest skirmish…. against …the Popular Front, 
continued attacks, manoeuvres, abuse of power and electoral corruption. War without quarter, to the 
death’. El Mercantil Valenciano, 15 February 1936. 
50 Virtually no activity is reported in any of the daily newspapers. In the south of the province, the only 
leaflets produced were facsimiles of articles already published in El Pueblo. José Lendoiro Salvador, 
Segunda República y Guerra Civil en Ontinyent (València): de la Esperanza Republicana al 
Enfrentamiento Social, (1930-1939), doctoral thesis, Universidad de Educación a Distancia, 1999 
(Lendoiro, Ontinyent), p. 329. 
51 The refusal of the Popular Front to include the PURA seems to have sparked a further wave of 
defections from the PURA to IR; see Lendoiro, Ontinyent p. 329. See also El Mercantil Valenciano, 4 




have believed that the PURA, discredited as it was, would manage to garner enough 
votes to prevent a Popular Front victory. 
 
As all official Popular Front propaganda had to be vetted by all groups in the Popular 
Front, it inevitably tended to be fairly bland in tone.52 It barely mentioned the PURA, 
which it clearly did not see as a threat. The only Valencian daily to back the Popular 
Front, El Mercantil Valenciano, stressed that the aim of the Popular Front was simply 
to return to ‘...the era of peace, concord and intelligence which abounded in those 
glorious days of April 1931.’53 On election day the IR publication in Xàtiva urged 
readers to vote because, ‘the revolution which is made through the law…is realised 
through legal means, in complete peace…..’54  
 
The DRV’s position on electoral alliances was unclear. Lucía declared himself in 
principle ready to pact with conservative republicans.55  The reality was that most of 
the DRV leaders would not countenance any such pact. Instead, in Valencia the DRV 
rebuffed the PURA, the Agrarians and other conservative republican groupings and 
opened negotiations with the Carlists and RE.56  The negotiations were long and 
difficult, but eventually it was agreed that the Carlists were to contest one seat for 
                                            
52 The newspapers carry little of the electoral propaganda of the individual organizations which 
composed the Popular Front so it is difficult to judge just how representative the official material was. 
The only example I have been able to locate, that of the local communists, is rather more intemperate, 
inviting the voter to compare programmes ‘… the Popular Front: amnesty, bread, work, justice meted 
out to the murderers of the bieno negro, on the other, the conspiracy of the executioners, with their 
extermination of the working people.’ El Mercantil Valenciano, 19 January 1936. 
53 El Mercantil Valenciano, 16 February 1936. 
54 Izquierda (Xàtiva), 15 February 1936. 
55 He had acted as the main contact between Gil Robles and Portela and declared himself a partisan 
of the broadest electoral alliances possible in what he termed ‘a loyal and sincere Union of the Right.’   
Gil Robles, No fue posible, p. 413. 
56 During the run-up to the election the other leaders of the DRV informed Lucía that they would only 
agree to stand in the elections as DRV candidates if he agreed that this would not be interpreted by 
Lucía as committing them to the ’legalist’ tactic.  They further obtained from Lucía a pledge that he 
would support a rightist coup d’état if this were to prove necessary  Joaquín Arrarás, (ed.), Historia de 
la Cruzada Española, Ediciones Españolas, Madrid, 1939-1943, Vol. VI, pp. 462-463. See also the 
copies of the testimonies of the DRV leaders Costa Serrano and Maldonado which are held in the 




the province, RE one for the city.57 The rightist coalition ran an energetic campaign 
although this was virtually all down to the DRV.58  
 
In Valencia, as throughout Spain, and as in 1933, the right couched its propaganda 
in the most catastrophist terms, with the memory of the October 1934 revolt always 
near to the surface.  It chose to ignore the PURA, presumably because it saw that 
the right’s victory depended on the PURA maintaining a respectable level of support. 
The left, according to Diario de Valencia wanted to, ‘....deliver Spain to the dominion 
of invaders who arrive from the East, in the way of a new Islam, but substituting the 
red banner of their prophet Lenin and Marxism in place of the Koran.’59 Therefore, 
voters would have to decide: ‘....if Spain is to be a country of order….or if it is to be 
handed over, bound hand and foot, to …Russia, to become Europe’s second Soviet 
State.’60  
 
Once again, particular emphasis was placed on the women’s vote.  DRV propaganda 
played heavily on religion and on the basest and most unfounded sexual fears.  If 
the Popular Front won the election, an Acción Cívica spokeswoman predicted, they 
would immediately impose ‘free love’. Women, she maintained, would become ‘…the 
plaything for a little while of those without heart or soul.’61 The left, according to Diario 
de Valencia, wished to ‘...eliminate the rights of God…, tear out the idea of God in 
society, tear out the idea of God from the hearts of children, in order to produce 
generations of savages…’.62 Voters were told, in no uncertain terms, that Spain stood 
                                            
57 Diario de Valencia, 4, 5, and 7 February 1936; See also Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana, p. 
222. 
58 Even before the electoral campaign had officially commenced and within days of Portela becoming 
Prime Minister the DRV had held over 40 meetings in the city and the province. Las Provincias, 20 
December 1935. The campaign did not officially start until 7 January 1936 when the election date was 
announced. See also Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana, pp. 220-221. 
59 Diario de Valencia, 18 January 1936. The rightist coalition as well as being able to count on the 
support of   Diario de Valencia, Las Provincias and La Voz Valenciana, now received the complete 
backing of the formerly Radical supporting La Correspondencia de Valencia, still edited by Roig 
Ibáñez. See for example La Correspondencia de Valencia, 13 January 1936. 
60 Diario de Valencia, 30 January 1936. Quoted in Richard Purkiss, Democracy, Trade Unions and 
Political Violence in Spain: The Valencian Anarchist Movement 1918-1936, Sussex Academic Press, 
Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2011, pp. 228-229.  
61 Diario de Valencia, 8 February 1936. 




on the edge of an abyss, that their souls and those of their children faced the risk of 
eternal damnation, and that the only way to prevent these disasters was to vote for 
the right.  This as on all other occasions was a call to their ‘core constituency’ and 
was designed entirely to maximise turnout, not to convert waverers. 
 
10.6 The Election Campaign and Result 
 
The campaign was carried out in an atmosphere of calm compared with the 1933 
elections.63 There was little violence directed either against property or people. Prior 
to polling day the press reported only three incidents in Valencia city. Two members 
of the DRV youth were slightly wounded when unknown assailant(s) shot at a car 
carrying them back from a meeting.64 A policeman was wounded in the city after a 
scuffle with some local communists, while in the streets two small explosive devices 
detonated, causing little damage.65  
 
In the province as well, little occurred. In Villar del Arzobispo the leader of the DRV 
had his house damaged by a bomb, but no one was injured.  The only serious 
incident concerned a member of the Popular Front: a medical doctor who was an 
active member of the URN was gravely wounded in Xeresa by a local rightist.66 Some 
very minor incidents occurred elsewhere.67 On polling day, too, in marked contrast 
to 1933, there were few incidents. In the city PURA thugs tried to stop leftists from 
voting in the Teatro district, while in Misericordia a number of ballot boxes were 
                                            
63 The supposed ‘climate of violence which ruled in the Valencian region’ noted by Tusell did not exist, 
at least in Valencia and its province. Javier Tusell Gómez, Las elecciones del Frente Popular en 
España, Edicusa, Madrid, 1971 Vol. I, p. 247.   Arrue has shown that only in Alicante city did any 
serious violence occur.  ‘L’Ambient Electoral’ pp. 163-64. Tusell seems to have invented this 
phenomenon in his search to find some local reason to explain why the ‘moderate’ DRV ultimately 
turned to conspiratorial activity.        
64 El Mercantil Valenciano 28 January 1936; Diario de Valencia, 26 January 1936. 
65 El Mercantil Valenciano 29 January, 5 and 11 February 1936.   
66 El Mercantil Valenciano, 5 February 1936.   
67 In La Font d'En Carròs, Gandia and Cullera. See respectively Diario de Valencia, 11 February 1936; 
Antonio Calzado Aldaria and Luis Sevilla Parra, La IIª República a Gandía, Centre d'Estudis Alfons el 
Vell, Gandía, 2000, p. 209; and Ricard Camil Torres Fabra, ‘La dreta a la Ribera Baixa  durant el 
segle XX: una evolució històrica ?’, III Jornades d’ Estudis de Cullera, celebrades els dies 28, 29 i 30 




smashed.68 In the province the results seem to have been generally clean, although 
in Rafelbunyol more people apparently voted than appeared on the electoral 
register.69  
 
Nationally, the results which unfolded after 16 February showed a sweeping Popular 
Front victory in terms of seats, and a narrow victory in terms of popular support.  In 
Valencia turnout was slightly higher than the national average.70 The Popular Front 
won the city convincingly, taking five seats to the DRV’s two and obtaining 15,879 
more votes than the Right. The Popular Front received almost 50 per cent of the 
vote, and the DRV/RE almost 40 per cent.71  The highest polling blasquista, Sigfrido 
Blasco, obtained 15,826 votes, just under ten per cent of the total vote. Faced with a 
united leftist vote, the DRV never really had a chance of winning. Even if one 
combines the DRV and PURA vote, the Popular Front would still have won five seats, 
the DRV/PURA two. Compared to 1933, the PURA had lost some 50,000 votes, the 
left had gained 59,000 while the right had gained some 15,000 votes.72 The Popular 
Front candidates gained the majority of the former blasquista vote in working class 
areas and even some votes which had previously gone to the DRV.73  
 
 
                                            
68 Some clergy were insulted while they stood in line to vote in the city and in some nearby pueblos. 
La Voz Valenciana, 17 February 1936. 
69 The DRV registered a protest but did not pursue it as the recorded result here was ignored and not 
taken into account in the overall results.  Diario de Valencia, El Mercantil Valenciano and El Pueblo 
18 February 1936;  Las Provincias, 23 February 1936. The DRV blamed the violence and corruption 
on the PURA. The acting civil governor appointed by the Popular Front, Cano Coloma, records that  
Lucía declined to shake the hand of a leading PURA member immediately after the election, charging 
that ‘this hand of yours has been wiping your arse’ (‘esa mano se la mete usted en el culo’). José 
Cano Coloma, Vientos contrarios: recuerdos autobiograficos, Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Valencia, 
1984, p. 47. 
70 Aguiló, Las elecciones, p. 143.  
71 Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia (BOPV) 17 and 18 February 1936. Partial but more 
detailed information is held at AGFDPV/ Diputados a Cortes/Expedientes Generales/ Sección Censo 
y Estadística/ Elecciones/ C.1.2.2.1 /1936/ Cajas 36-39   
72 Diario de Valencia, 22 February 1936. 
73 Many individual members of the Sindicatos de  Oposición and of the ‘official’ CNT  voted for the 
Popular Front, as the CNT theoretician Emilio Mistral confirmed..‘…it is certainly true that the workers 
who support these organisations did vote and did so with foresight and with reason….’ El Pueblo, 28 




     





Illustration 13 opposite shows the provincial result by administrative district. Although 
all ten candidates for the Popular Front were elected, the result was very tight. The 
Popular  Front received just over 45 per cent, and the DRV/CT coalition slightly under 
44 per cent.74 The PURA did rather better than in the city, with their highest placed 
candidate, Martí de Veses, receiving slightly less than 18 per cent.75 In the province 
the Popular Front won the larger towns.76 In the second largest settlement, the 
Socialist stronghold of Alzira, where the PURA had worked hard to doctor the 
electoral roll, the Popular Front won almost 60 per cent, the PURA only 8.77  
 
The main beneficiary of the collapse in support for the PURA was Izquierda 
Republicana (IR). IR could not have reached this level of support unless many 
peasants who had previously voted for the PURA supported it. The DRV vote 
increased by approximately 34,000, that of the Popular Front by 80,000 (compared 
to the Left Front in 1933) while the PURA lost some 61,000 votes. Increased voter 
turnout meant that approximately 30,000 more people voted while the balance of the 
figures (23,000) is accounted for by the reduction in votes for other candidates. 
Illustration 13 shows the provincial result by administrative district.  
 
Assuming that new voters voted broadly along the lines of other candidates, and that 
most of the votes given to minority candidates in 1933 went to the left in 1936 (most 
of these minority candidates in 1933 were left of centre), a clear majority of the PURA 
vote of 1933 seems to have transferred to the Popular Front, although a significant 
minority went to the DRV.78 That being the case, it is probable that in the November  
                                            
74 BOPV 20, 21 and 24 February 1936. 
75 BOPV 20, 21 and 24 February 1936. Martí de Veses, a hitherto unknown figure in Valencian politics, 
obtained almost 20,000 votes more than the next name on the PURA list (Martínez Sala, who received 
just over 11 per cent of the vote). This is an odd outcome and may perhaps reflect some modest 
success in the PURA’s attempt to manipulate the result; perhaps there was an agreement between 
the PURA and Portela that Martí de Veses should top the PURA list.  
76 With the exceptions of the traditionally rightist centres of Ontinyent and Torrent. See BOPV, 20 
February 1936. 
77 BOPV, 20 February 1936. 
78 Roberto Villa García has calculated that only 44 per cent of PURA electoral support defected to the 
right and the balance to the Popular Front. See Roberto Villa García, ‘El Ocaso del republicanismo 
histórico: lerrouxistas y blasquistas ante las elecciones de 1936’, Anals de la Real Acadèmia de 




1933 elections a clear majority of poor peasantry voted either for the Left Alliance or 
the PURA, and it took defections from the PURA in 1936 to deliver to the DRV a 
majority of peasant voters. Overall, it appears that the DRV did obtain a small 




The second half of 1935 and the first months of 1936 demonstrated the apparent 
demise of the PURA. Trapped, as the Radical Party was trapped, in the poisonous 
embrace of the CEDA, outmanoeuvred locally by both the DRV and the newly 
resurgent republican forces to its left, and with mediocre leaders tainted by corruption 
and financial incompetence, it had nowhere to turn and nothing to say. Without a 
vision of the Republic and without a viable political programme, it could not provide 
a positive reason for anyone to give it electoral support and had to rely solely on 
there being sufficient electors scared of the alternatives.  
 
As it went into the elections, the leadership thought that it gain some parliamentary 
seats. Given Portela’s optimism about prospects in Valencia and the fact that he 
allowed a figure as important to him as Martí de Veses to stand as candidate, this 
must have been the case. The outcome of the election, therefore, was a shock. 
Neither the PURA not the DRV expected to see the majority of the PURA’s poor 
peasant supporters defect to the left. Yet this must have happened because the 
Popular Front could not have won in the province otherwise. In fact, the PURA seems 
to have held onto a much larger portion of its working-class and poor peasant vote 
in those places where both working-class militancy and republicanism had a long 
                                            
more pronounced shift in favour of the Popular Front, but these all concern larger settlements known 
to favour the left. See for example Pilar Rovira Granero, Mobilització social, canvi polític i  revolució. 
Associanisme, Segona República  i Guerra Civil. Alzira, 1900-1939, Germania, Alzira, 1996, pp. 230-
242; Amparo Álvarez Rubio, ‘Frente Popular’, in Jorge Hermosilla Pla (ed.), Catarroja Historia 
Geografía y Arte Vol. 1, Universitat de València, 2015, pp. 282-294 at p. 282, and Antonio Calzado 
Aldaria, ‘Tipología Electoral en Cullera durante la II República,’ in III Jornades d’ Estudis de Cullera, 
celebrades els dies 28, 29 i 30 de novembre de 1997, Ajuntament de Cullera/Setimig, Cullera, 




history, suggesting that there was still residual loyalty to the party in places.79 But 
beaten decisively at the ballot box, and with the loss of control of the machinery of 
















                                            
79 Having deep roots in Valencia city did not save the PURA, but the urban leadership was the faction 
of the party most compromised by its collusion with Lerrouxismo.  In traditional blasquista strongholds 
such as Bunyol, Cullera and Sagunt it polled 33, 26 and 28 per cent respectively. In contrast in some 
places the PURA vote was derisory. In Cheste, Ontinyent and Torrent it received between 2 per cent 








11 LEFT REPUBLICAN DISARRAY, THE DRV’S TURN TO PARAMILITARY 
ACTIVITY AND THE MILITARY UPRISING. FEBRUARY TO JULY 1936      
…..the evidence is clear that we are faced with the total failure of a 
system; it is democracy which is dying, sick with demagogy…Hours of 
transition. Hours of duty, of sacrifice, of patriotism.  
Leader, Diario de Valencia, 26 June 1936  
 
11.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter I will describe how the PURA, decisively beaten at the election, 
stripped of prestige, and excluded from any political influence and having lost control 
of local government, sought to rebuild and reposition itself politically. I will also 
explain how Valencian society was rapidly polarising, primarily but not exclusively 
around the issue of Catholicism. I will also describe how left republicanism generally, 
and in the Valencian context IR, found it increasingly difficult to maintain law and 
order, in spite of IR’s control of the local government. I will also analyse why the DRV, 
despite its image as the most pro-republican faction of the CEDA, did not prove to 
be a moderating influence, but instead was the decisive civilian force in the anti-
republican conspiracy.  The abortive coup in Valencia will also be considered, the 
reasons for its failure explained, and I will discuss how, with the explosion of violence 
and political polarisation which followed, the DRV and the PURA ceased to exist. 
 
11.2 ‘The PURA is not a symbol …of a political history which has run its 
course…..’1: the Attempt to Rebuild the Party 
 
The Portelista civil governor was immediately replaced by a member of IR, Braulio 
Solsona Ronda.2  The PURA lost control over local government; new steering 
                                            
1 El Pueblo, 9 June 1936. 
2 After a few days of temporary control by the local IR stalwart José Cano Coloma. El Pueblo, 21 
February 1936; La Voz Valenciana, 20 February 1936. Braulio Solsana wrote his memoirs in 1967. 





committees (comisiones gestoras) were installed everywhere except for City Hall. 
Following these changes, parties which formed the local Popular Front alliance were 
in charge, with a majority of most of the larger settlements now run by IR.3 In the 
Diputación Provincial a new steering committee of twelve members was imposed.4 
 
Only City Hall was an exception to this process until late June when a steering 
committee was finally imposed. It is not known why it was originally exempted, but 
one press report suggests that Esquerra Valenciana (EV) resisted.5 Instead, the 
decision was taken to remove interim councillors and to reinstate the council of April 
1931, insofar as this was possible, and to only include new interims to deal with 
vacancies because of deaths, illness, resignations or conflicts of interest.6 The 
reinstated councillors, together with the new interims, gave the Popular Front only a 
bare majority, but DRV councillors rarely attended after the general election, while 
the PURA treated the general election result as plebiscitary in respect of their position 
at City Hall, resigned most of their official posts, attended few meetings and when 
they did attend, showed little inclination to oppose the majority. The IR member José 
                                            
3 The allocation of councillors between the various parties affiliated to the Popular Front was meant 
to reflect their relative local political strength, and it does seem that in Valencia this process was 
broadly followed. Where data on the political affiliations of the individual councillors is held, IR is shown 
as the largest group, with approximately forty per cent of the posts, and the PSOE with approximately 
30 per cent.  Sergio Valero Gómez, Reformismo, radicalización y conflicto interno en el socialismo 
español: la Federación Socialista Valenciana durante la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil (1931-
1939), Doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, 2012, p. 393. Diario de Valencia listed the names of 
more than 100 pueblos which had voted for the DRV in the February 1936 elections but now had 
Popular Front gestoras. See Diario de Valencia, 20 February 1936 to 14 March 1936 passim. The 
most important place where the PSOE dominated was Alzira, where the PSOE had a strong majority. 
Las Provincias, 19 February 1936. 
4 With six members of IR, two of the URN, two of Esquerra Valenciana (valenciano: Valencian Left or 
EV), one of the Syndicalist Party and one of the PCE. Valencia was one of the few places where the 
Syndicalist Party had any significance. Archivo General y Fotográfico de la Diputación Provincial de 
Valencia (AGFDPV)/ Sección A/Central/ 1/Diputación en Pleno/1/Actas/1936/Vol. 91/23 April 1936.  
Presumably the PSOE did not wish to participate in the Diputación as its lack of presence is otherwise 
inexplicable.  
5 According to Diario de Valencia, although other newspapers did not report this. Diario de Valencia, 
23 February 1936.  
6 El Pueblo, 22 February, 12 and 18 March 1936; Las Provincias, 22 February 1936; Actas de Junta 
Municipal, Valencia (AJMV)/D441/Ordinary Meeting of 21 February 1936;  AJMV/D441/Extraordinary 




Cano Coloma was elected mayor.7 City Hall had been the centre of blasquista power, 
and this loss was of huge symbolic importance.8   
 
IR was now overwhelmingly the most important republican force, but in the city it 
faced some competition. The two (relatively minor) competitors were Martínez 
Barrio’s Unión Republicana (invariably referred to in Valencia as the Unión 
Republicana Nacional or URN to distinguish it from the PURA, the Unión 
Republicana Autonomista), and Marco Miranda’s EV, both of whom derived their 
support from former PURA voters.  Nationally, URN was created through a merger 
of the ‘orthodox’ Radical Socialists and Martínez Barrio’s Radical Democrats.9   
 
EV was of more importance. In July 1934 three dissident PURA parliamentary 
deputies, and Hector Altabás, a former deputy, announced the creation of EV. It 
became a vehicle for the political ambitions of one man, Marco Miranda.10 Marco 
Miranda was to claim that defecting blasquistas had given it material support in 
Valencia city with seventeen former blasquista social centres (casinos) joining.11 EV 
                                            
7 El Pueblo, 18 February 1936 and 18 March 1936; Las Provincias, 18 March 1936; 
AJMV/D441/Extraordinary Meetings of 17 and 20 March 1936. 
8 A steering committee was eventually imposed on 25 June composed of thirty seven members as 
opposed to the fifty members of the democratically elected council. By number of councillors, IR 
remained the most important organisation with twelve councillors, followed by the PSOE with eight. 
La Correspondencia de Valencia and Las Provincias, 26 June 1936. The other seventeen places were 
held (with the number of posts indicated in brackets) as follows: URN (4); PCE (4); Partit Valencianista 
d’Esquerra (4); EV (2); Syndicalists (2); Independent (1). The Partit Valencianista d’Esquerra (Left 
Valencianist Party, or PVE) was a tiny Valencianist party, largely confined to the city. It is not known 
why it was granted more councillors than the far more important EV. On the PVE, see Alfons Cucó 
Giner, El Valencianisme Politic (1874-1936), Garbi 2, Valencia, 1971, pp. 261-265.  
9 The Radical Democrats did not have a presence in Valencia. The ‘orthodox’ Radical Socialists had 
retained some support in Alcudia; see Francesc Andreu Martinez Gallego, Construint la Ciutadania: 
una Història Contemporánia de l'Alcúdia 1801-2002. História de l´Alcudia 2 Vols, Vol. 2, Ajuntament 
de l´Alcúdia, L´Alcúdia (Valencia), 2002, pp. 563 and 564. The URN claimed only 22 branches in 
February 1935 in the entire province, El Mercantil Valenciano, 13 February 1935.  In a sign of its 
weakness, gestoras of URN members only represented three per cent of the total. Valero Gómez, 
Reformismo, p. 393.  
10 El Mercantil Valenciano, 26 July 1934. The two other parliamentary deputies, Valentín and Just 
subsequently abandoned the idea of establishing a specifically Valencian party. Valentín joined the 
URN while Just joined IR. Altabás was a second rank figure while the only other significant figure in 
EV was the ex–mayor of the city, Vicente Alfaro. The first issue of its newspaper, La Bandera Federal, 
named after the original blasquista weekly, came out in September 1934. La Bandera Federal, 24 
September, 1934.     
11 Vicente Marco Miranda, In Illo Tempore, Consell Valencià de Cultura, Valencia, 2005, p. 429. EV 




presented itself out as a strongly valencianist and leftist organisation, targeting 
former blasquista working-class voters. According to Hector Altábas, ‘The only 
current politics is the struggle of the poor against the oligarchy… without blood, a 
new regime, with the new life it brings, cannot come into existence.’12  
 
In deciding whether to continue, and what ideology it should espouse, the PURA 
faced a dilemma. Decisively beaten in the polls, it could not claim to be the sole or 
even the main mouthpiece for ‘the people’ and its traditional populism was therefore 
redundant.  In the polarised atmosphere of 1936 it had next to no possibility of 
recreating the broad-based coalition which had been the strength of historic 
blasquismo. It needed a coherent ideology and a compelling narrative to explain its 
purpose but it was not clear that this project had any chance of success. The 
identification with the Radicals had proved disastrous whilst the ‘centrist’ option of 
Portela had been tried and failed. Any attempt to position itself on the left placed it in 
direct competition with other republican groups. Given the increasing use of direct 
action by workers and poor peasants, republicans of all political shades within the 
governing coalition found it increasingly difficult to control events and to impose their 
agenda. In this atmosphere, for a small organisation outside of the coalition to appear 
relevant seemed impossible.  
 
In spite of that, Sigfrido Blasco attempted to reinvent the PURA as an organisation 
of the left. On close inspection, this decision does not appear completely irrational.13 
In the February elections the PURA had been forced to fight alone. Electors were 
well aware of the way in which the electoral system worked, punishing those parties 
                                            
the Popular Front electoral list for the city in February 1936, coming fourth in the popular vote. Boletín 
Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia (BOPV), 17 and 18 February 1936.  Its first congress was not held 
until March 1936 and even then there were so few delegates that they could all fit into one of its local 
offices. El Mercantil Valenciano, 27 March 1936.  
12 Domingo Torres, the leader of the Sindicatos de Oposición, also spoke at more than one EV 
meeting.  El Mercantil Valenciano, 4 and 6 June 1935. Torres was careful not to openly support EV, 
but made it clear that limited political involvement by unions to secure the release of prisoners was 
necessary. See his article ‘Let us speak clearly’ in Sindicalismo, 7 August 1935.  
13 This was not a view evidently held by the new civil governor who reported that Sigfrido Blasco 
visited him shortly after his arrival in Valencia, and sought his counsel. Solsona advised him to retire 




which were unable to form broad electoral alliances. Thus anyone who voted for the 
PURA in 1936 must have realised that their vote was unlikely to count. Yet in the city 
the PURA’s share of the vote was approximately 10 per cent while in the province it 
was approximately 11 per cent.14  
 
El Pueblo was not therefore delusional when it asserted that the PURA ‘had been 
beaten, but not destroyed’.15 Although the February 1936 results clearly demonstrate 
an historic low in support, there seems to have been a surprising degree of loyalty 
towards the PURA in a few areas, although in others the party did virtually disappear. 
One difficulty was that its residual support came from two distinct and contradictory 
sectors. In the city its support seems to have come mainly from a section of the 
affluent middle classes who could not bring themselves to vote for the Popular Front, 
yet could not cross the ‘confessional barrier’ and vote for the DRV, while in parts of 
the province the PURA managed to retain a significant part of its poor farmer and 
landless agricultural labourer support. This happened where republicanism had deep 
roots and where working-class militancy related to anarcho-syndicalism had a long 
history.16 In the event, in seeking to rebuild it decided to build on its strong showing 
in these pockets of support in the province and it proclaimed that it would reorganise 
itself along openly ‘leftist and regionalist’ principles.17 
 
The PURA leadership showed unexpected energy in reorganising. There were 
wholesale resignations and purges of the ‘old guard’ with only Sigfrido surviving. El 
Pueblo was brutally frank about the corruption and other mistakes made during the 
earlier years of the Republic, ‘[the PURA is] ….now free of the burdens of egoism, of 
ambitions, of unfulfilled desires, and has separated itself from the agents 
provocateurs….our Party will rebuild its organisation.’18 Virtually every day El Pueblo 
                                            
14 Portela’s nephew, Marti de Veses, obtained 18 per cent and the rest of the PURA list about 11 per 
cent.   
15 El Pueblo, 29 February 1936. 
16 Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia, (BOPV), 20, 21 and 25 February 1936 and Las 
Provincias, 22 and 23 February 1936.   
17 El Pueblo, 24 March 1936. 




carried articles describing the reconstitution of the PURA across the province. It is 
not possible to ascertain just how successful this was in terms of the attraction of 
members, but as El Pueblo did not give numbers, one must assume that the results 
were modest. 
 
Significant effort and financial commitments were made in order to revive the party. 
Unlike the bourgeois parties to its left, it had the advantage of its own dedicated daily 
newspaper, a regular publication for its youth movement, such as it was, in Antorcha, 
while in at least one other settlement of importance, Xàtiva, it remained financially 
viable and continued to produce a regular newspaper.19   What is clear is that, while 
it may have lost a huge level of support, it does seem to have been able to maintain, 
broadly, the number of centres throughout the province which it had immediately 
before the Popular Front elections. At any rate, newspaper sources report very few 
defections during this period.20 If  Xàtiva is any guide, the 11 per cent of the vote it 
obtained here seems to have represented a solid base of support; at any rate in April 
the local IR continued to refer to the PURA as having ‘masses’.21 
 
As part of its decision to move the party to the left El Pueblo and Antorcha initially 
took a positive and respectful attitude towards the Popular Front, Antorcha stating 
that ‘we received with immense happiness the victory of the Popular Front and we 
cannot hide our satisfaction at the failure of the DRV…we do not want to remain at 
the margin of this rising movement’.22 El Pueblo also opened its pages once again 
to the CNT, autonomous unions and the Sindicatos de Oposición in its ‘Obreros’ 
                                            
19 This was El Radical, replaced in May 1936 by the fortnightly República, which continued to be 
published until the outbreak of the Civil War. Antorcha ceased to be fortnightly and came out at 
irregular intervals. What seems to have been its last issue appeared mid June. Antorcha, 15 June 
1936. 
20 Many blasquista centres would have already deserted. El Mercantil reported in March that the 
blasquista ‘Casa de Democracia’ in Vega Alta had left the PURA to join Izquierda Republicana. El 
Mercantil Valenciano, 27 March 1936. In May El Mercantil reported that there were a number of 
‘independent’ Republican circles, a phenomena which had not been seen since 1931, and which were 
probably formerly blasquista entities. One of these now joined Izquierda Republicana.  El Mercantil 
Valenciano, 13 May 1936. Apart from these two events, no other defections were reported during this 
period. 
21 Izquierda (Xàtiva), 4 April 1936. 




column. It also ran a regular (usually at weekly rests) ‘Social Questions’ section, 
sometimes devoting a whole page to the feature. Amongst its regular contributors 
was Emilio Mistral, a respected anarcho-syndicalist theoretician, close to the FAI.23  
Domingo Torres, the Oposición leader, was also an occasional columnist.  
 
Neither Mistral nor Torres wrote for financial reasons, and one needs to consider why 
they were prepared to write for El Pueblo. One obvious reason was that many of their 
members still read the newspaper. Writing here was thus a pragmatic response to 
the need to disseminate information; the CNT did not have a Valencian daily 
newspaper and El Mercantil Valenciano had never shown sympathy towards 
anarcho-syndicalist views. Such leading militants however would be unlikely to want 
to write in a newspaper whose reputation had been completely destroyed. The 
conclusion must be that El Pueblo at least had a chance to redeem itself in the eyes 
of these working-class militants.24  
 
On the 24 May the PURA held an Assembly, the first to be held since 1930.  This 
approved new statutes, elected its new executive, and confirmed Sigfrido Blasco as 
leader. It defiantly proclaimed ‘The PURA is not a symbol …of a political history which 
has run its course. It is a powerful river which flows to the sea however far it has to 
travel…’25 But although the PURA wanted to present itself as a leftist party, it could 
not and did not wish to present itself as a pseudo socialist party (it still hoped to 
recover some of the support it had received historically from CNT members). 
Supporting the central government was always a difficult line for the PURA to take 
because the more it pledged support for the government the less authentic the 
                                            
23 Emilio Mistral was one of the anarchist intellectuals from Túria who came to prominence in Valencia 
during 1935 and who subsequently became a regular contributor to the magazine Libre-Studio which 
was first published in December 1936. Francisco Javier Navarro Navarro, A la revolución por la 
cultura. Prácticas culturales y sociabilidad libertarias en el País Valenciano, 1931-1939, Universitat 
de València, Valencia, 2004, p. 224. 
24 El Pueblo’s zenith of leftism was reached when it published an article and an interview with a 
number of leading FAI-istas, including Garcia Oliver, both conducted by Emilio Mistral. Mistral 
complained of the ‘black propaganda’ in the press to which the FAI had been subjected, which sought 
to portray the FAI as a ‘mysterious sect formed by those who associate in order to commit criminal 
acts’ whereas according to Mistral, nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed the FAI was 
composed of ‘...some men of science, of kindness and of wisdom’. El Pueblo, 21 April 1936. 




support for the CNT appeared and the harder it was to explain why anyone should 
support the PURA rather than the party at the centre of government, IR, which was 
now also the main republican party in Valencia. 
 
11.3 The Left Ascendant 
 
The Popular Front victory had resulted in an explosion of political energy throughout 
Spain which the government, composed exclusively of republicans, found difficult to 
control. The left of the Socialist party, the CNT, the Sindicatos de Oposición and the 
PCE agitated for a rapid implementation of the Popular Front programme. The initial 
and most urgent demand was the release of around 30,000 political prisoners, most 
of whom had been arrested following the October 1934 uprising.26 A further demand 
was for the readmission of those workers who were dismissed from their jobs as part 
of the post-October 1934 repression.27  
 
As workers and poor peasants mobilised, there is little sign in Valencia that the 
republican forces which formed the government had any more success here than 
elsewhere in imposing their will. The civil governor was by all accounts a strong 
individual and as a valenciano he had a deep understanding of the intricacies of local 
politics.  Press censorship during this period was uneven but often fierce and the 
degree of severity varied from civil governor to civil governor. Braulio Solsona seems 
to have been fairly tough.28  
 
                                            
26 Richard Purkiss, Democracy, Trade Unions and Political Violence in Spain: The Valencian Anarchist 
Movement 1918-1936, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2011, (Purkiss, 
Valencian Anarchist Movement), p. 229.  
27 Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 230. In some cases workers who had been dismissed 
as a result of earlier state repression had not been readmitted to work and they were also included in 
the campaign. 
28 Civil governors had considerable freedom as to how tough to be under the ‘state of alarm’ which 
was maintained throughout this period and was inherited from the caretaker regime in charge before 
the Popular Front elections.  Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War 1936-1939, Cambridge, 




Even so, it is clear that he found it difficult to impose the writ of the government.29 
Despite attempts to have them reinstated, town hall employees continued to be 
dismissed simply because they were not supporters of the Popular Front, landless 
day-labourers and poor peasants occupied uncultivated land, failing to leave when 
directed to do so, and town halls closed down charitable activities carried out by 
religious orders despite his clear instructions to the contrary.30  Prominent local 
republicans seem to have done little to buttress his authority. There are virtually no 
reports in the local press of their attempting to mobilise supporters, while the official 
minutes at City Hall, in the Diputación or in the official records of the Cortes show 
commendable attempts to formulate strategies to alleviate unemployment, but 
beyond that little attempt to engage with the social unrest in the province. The 
impression is of a political class overwhelmed by events.31 
 
Care must be taken not to overstate the levels of disruption. As Sánchez Pérez has 
pointed out, a comparison with other European countries during the 1930s shows 
similar levels of industrial unrest. In France, there was industrial unrest of a far more 
severe scale than in Spain.32 Certainly, despite the incendiary rhetoric, there was 
nothing revolutionary about the behaviour of Valencian workers and peasants. Local 
socialists continued to behave in a reformist manner, while the CNT and the 
                                            
29 Although the intensity of censorship makes it difficult to form a definitive view. Maria Thomas writes 
that ‘…the state remained firmly in control of its machinery of coercion.’ Maria Thomas, ‘Political 
Violence in the Republican Zone of Spain during the Spanish Civil War: Evolving Historiographical 
Perspectives’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 52, Issue 1, January 2017, pp. 140-147 at p. 
146. This is correct, insofar that the majority of deaths during the spring of 1936 were caused by the 
security forces. But it does not necessarily follow that the ambience was not a difficult one, and 
statements which might be broadly true at national level are not always an accurate representation of 
the local experience. 
30 El Pueblo, 7 March 1936 (Circular from civil governor on dismissal of employees). Even where staff 
were not formally dismissed there were reports of staff being encouraged to ‘resign’ by threats. BOPV, 
9 May 1936 (teachers) and 21 May 1936 (doctors and other medical staff). Diario de Valencia, 28 
March 1936 (civil governor’s circular on religious orders).  
31 AJMV and AGFDPV/Actas/Vols. 90 and 91 and Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes (DSC), February-
July 1936 passim. See also Ricard Camil Torres Fabra, ‘La política del Frente Popular a través de 
las sesiones de las Cortes. La exigua participación de los diputados valencianos de IR’, in Pablo 
Rodríguez Cortés, Ricard Camil Torres Fabra, and María Isabel Sicluna (eds.), La represión 
franquista en Levante: La represión sobre Izquierda Republicana, Eneida, Madrid, 2012, pp. 21- 55. 
32 Francisco Sánchez Pérez, ‘Las protestas del trabajo  en la primavera de 1936’,  Mélanges de la 




Sindicatos de Oposición were preoccupied in rebuilding their unified organisation.33 
In the city there was only a limited amount of industrial action, none of which took on 
revolutionary overtones. In May there was an escalation of strike activity, with a 
serious construction workers dispute but most importantly a tram-workers’ strike 
which lasted for five days, and which ended with the enterprise being taken into what 
was intended to be temporary governmental control.34  
 
In the countryside although there were a significant number of strikes, most were 
short lived and free of violence.  The manner in which rural unrest is reported in the 
papers makes it difficult to be exact on the number of disputes which occurred, but 
assuming that every report of newly agreed labour contracts related to an actual or 
potential dispute there may have been as many as fifty disputes in May, and over 
forty in June.35 More important to the sense of growing lawlessness was the increase 
in the number of farm occupations and invasions, many of which seemed to be 
protracted disputes, although the vast majority do not appear to have involved 
violence.  
 
Land invasions were most commonly used to spontaneously work the land and then 
demand payment from the owners, actions which Malefakis has termed ‘self-
alojamientios’.36 Press censorship seems to have resulted in few of these incidents 
being reported, but this clearly does not tell the whole story since in early April the 
                                            
33 There is no evidence linking the Socialist agricultural union the FETT with any of the local agrarian 
unrest. The decision to end the split in the CNT had been agreed by the local unions at a regional 
conference held from 8 to 12 February in Valencia. Eulalia Vega Masana, Anarquistas y sindicalistas, 
1931-1936. La CNT y los sindicatos de Oposición en el País Valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, 
Valencia, 1987 (Vega, Anarquistas), p. 222. 
34 Albert Girona i Albuixech says that during the first six months of 1936 the city had faced ‘almost 
daily’ conflict, but this depends how one defines ‘conflict’; most incidents were trivial. Albert Girona i 
Albuixech, Guerra i Revolució al País Valencià, Eliseu Climent, Valencia, 1986 at p. 29.  On the strikes 
see especially El Pueblo throughout May but especially 9, 20, 22 and 27 May 1936. Vega describes 
the months of May and June as being ‘especially conflictive’ in the region, but this judgement seems 
to rely more on the degree of unrest in Alicante than Valencia. Vega, Anarquistas, p. 221. 
35 See also La Correspondencia de Valencia; Diario de Valencia; El Mercantil Valenciano; El Pueblo; 
Las Provincias and La Voz Valenciana, February to June 1936 passim. 
36 ‘Self-occupations’; Edward Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1970, p. 374. See also the Cortes speech by the DRV Deputy Bosch 




civil governor complained that illegal occupations of farms were ‘still occurring’.37 He 
ordered mayors to take the necessary steps to prevent these in terms that suggest 
some mayors were turning a blind eye, if not actually encouraging them.38 That they  
continued throughout April and May is clear from the demand made by an ad hoc 
assembly of local agriculturalists at the end of May that ‘…all invasions, illegal 
working of the land and other abuses…’ should cease immediately.39  
 
Throughout this unrest, remarkably little violence against the person occurred while 
nationally this was a very violent period.40 González Calleja has identified 351 deaths 
related to social and political violence in Spain in the spring of 1936, of which 132 
occurred in provincial capitals. No deaths occurred in Valencia city, and only three in 
the province. Since the population of Valencia represented about 4 per cent of the 
total national population, Valencia had one of the lowest levels of violence in the 
country.41 The city in particular was remarkably free of serious violence. Valencia’s 
population was one third that of Madrid, where there were forty four deaths 
associated with unrest while   Seville, which had two thirds the population of Valencia, 
reported 9.42 
 
Rather more important in creating a sense of lawlessness was an increase in anti-
clerical activity. Although many of these incidents were minor, measured by the 
degree of disruption to local life and the limited damage to property, anti-clerical 
violence was particularly emotive as a symbolic assault on the values of the 
conservative Catholic classes. The evidence as to the precise level of anti-clerical 
action within Valencia during this period is unclear. Some sources suggest that 
                                            
37 Only six such occupations, all of which occurred in April and May, were reported. These were in 
Ròtova, Campanar, Riola, Massalavés, Requena, and Gandia. Diario de Valencia, 4 April 1936 
(Ròtova and Campanar); El Pueblo, 9 April 1936 (Riola); Diario de Valencia, 29 April 1936 
(Massalavés). El Pueblo, 5 May 1936 (Requena) and El Pueblo, 15 May 1936 (Gandia). 
38 BOPV, No. 82 4/4/36 Circular No 1988 dated 3 April; Diario de Valencia, 4 April 1936.    
39 Assembly reported in Diario de Valencia and El Mercantil Valenciano, 29 May 1936. 
40 Eduardo González Calleja, ‘La necro-lógica de la violencia sociopolítica en la primavera de 1936’, 
Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez, No. 41, 2010, (González Calleja, ‘violencia sociopolítica’), pp. 
37–60.     
41 The Spanish population in 1930 was approximately 23,786,000 people while Valencia province had 
a population of 1,042,154; see www.populstat.info/Europe/spainc.htm. Accessed 8 June 2018.  




trouble began immediately after the Popular Front victory, while others place the real 
beginning from May.43 Diario de Valencia, a source unlikely to play down anti-clerical 
incidents, admitted in late April that ‘much’ of the province remained peaceful.44   
 
To Valencian Catholics the most important local religious event of the year occurred 
in May. This was the celebration of the transfer of the Virgin of the Disinherited from 
its Basilica to the nearby Cathedral. For security reasons, for the first time ever, the 
transfer was abandoned. Newspapers report that following Mayday there were 
churches and other religious symbols damaged in various towns in the province.45 
This escalation provoked the DRV deputies in the Cortes to protest. In a letter dated 
17 June, they alleged that within the diocese of Valencia forty churches and fourteen 
priests’ residences had been completely destroyed by arson in the ‘last three 
months’. In twenty eight other pueblos, according to the letter, the mayor had acted 
illegally in locking up the church and impounding the keys. The effect of this was to 
leave over 100,000 people in the diocese with limited or no spiritual support. In five 
pueblos the mayor refused to allow masses to be held in private houses, leaving 
these Catholics with no spiritual solace.46  
 
                                            
43 María Aurora Bosch Sánchez, refers to ‘....constant anti-clerical demonstrations from Feb to May 
1936.’; María Aurora Bosch Sánchez ‘La imagen de la derecha católica en el mundo rural’, in Aurora 
Bosch, Rafael Valls and Vicent Comes Iglesia, (eds.),  La derecha católica en los años 30: en el 
cincuentenario de la muerte de Luis Lucía, Ajuntament de València, Valencia, 1996, pp. 137-145 at 
p. 143. Her sole source for this statement is the Almanaque de Las Provincias, published shortly after 
the Nationalist victory and therefore not a dispassionate source. Vicente Cárcel Ortí also says that 
there were a significant number of incidents in the period 16 February to 1 April 1936 in the diocesis 
of Valencia, including many incidents in the province ‘according to official parochial data’ but without 
citing his sources, Vicente Cárcel Ortí Historia de la Iglesia en Valencia, 2 Vols, Arzobispado de 
Valencia, Valencia, 1986, (Cárcel Ortí, Iglesia en Valencia), at p. 785. Cárcel Ortí, a priest and a 
senior Vatican official, is one of the leading ‘martyrologists’ and tends to give even the tiniest incident 
a status it hardly deserves.     
44 Diario de Valencia, 24 April 1936. 
45 In Quart de Poblet, Alzira, Puebla Larga, Rafelguaraf, Llauri, Algímia d'Alfara and Barxeta. Diario 
de Valencia, 5 May 1936 (Quart de Poblet and Alzira); Diario de Valencia,  15 May 1936 (Puebla 
Larga); El Pueblo, 16 May 1936 (Rafelguaraf); Diario de Valencia,  17 May 1936 (Llauri; Algímia 
d'Alfara and Barxeta); El Pueblo,  23 May 1936 (Algímia d'Alfara). 
46 Diario de Valencia, 18 June 1936; DSC, 17 June 1936. Javier Tusell Gómez, Historia de la 
democracia cristiana en España, Madrid, 1974, Vol. 1 at p. 351. Since the diocese covered the 
majority of Valencian parishes, some in  Castellón and about half of those in Alicante, it is possible to 
reconcile the reference to the ‘last three months’ in the letter with the conclusions in this Chapter. 




11.4 The DRV Turns to Paramilitary Activity   
 
There has been a significant amount written in the last twenty years or so on the 
attitude of the leadership of the DRV to the conspiratorial activity which occurred 
between February and July 1936, and specifically on the position of Lucía.47 Little if 
any attention has been placed on the question of why a section of the DRV became 
probably the first affiliate of the CEDA to turn to conspiratorial activity. This thesis 
does not revisit the debate on Lucía but concentrates instead on why the DRV 
leadership turned towards conspiracy. Immediately after the February elections the 
leadership of the DRV met, the meeting having been convened by the General 
Secretary, Costa Serrano. Lucía presided over this meeting. Inter alia, it decided to 
create, in secret, militias within the DRV whose function would ostensibly be one 
primarily of self-defense and to intervene in matters of social unrest either in support 
of, or instead of, the governmental authorities. These militias were successfully 
established throughout the province.48  
 
Mere self-defence was unlikely to be the end goal of these militias since they 
unleashed a powerful internal insurrectionary logic, which in the charged atmosphere 
of the spring and summer of 1936 could have only one outcome. It seems that the 
DRV leadership deliberately set in place a dynamic which would lead to anti-regime 
activity, either because it collectively agreed in principle with this, or was reluctantly 
prepared to accept it rather than risk splitting the organisation. Different factions 
within the DRV leadership probably acquiesced with the decision for one or other 
                                            
47 The most convincing portrayals of Lucía as a democrat, distanced from the conspiratorial activity, 
is to be found in Chapter IV of the second part of Vicent Comes Iglesia, En el filo de la navaja: Biografía 
política de Luis Lucía Lucía, 1888-1943, Madrid, 2003, (Comes, En el filo), at pp. 317-371 and in 
Hilario M. Raguer Suñer, Gunpowder and Incense: The Spanish Church and the Civil War, Abingdon, 
2007, (Raguer Suñer, Gunpowder and Incense), pp. 180-184. For the contrary view, see Rafael Valls 
Montés, La Derecha Regional Valenciana, 1930-1936. El catolicismo político valenciano, Valencia, 
1992, (Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana), pp. 227-236.  
48 Comes Iglesia has argued that the post-electoral DRV meeting did not go so far as to authorise 
these militia groups (named shock or action groups) to act as anti-regime militias, or to conspire to 
overthrow the regime, and has argued that it was a smaller informal section of the DRV leadership, 
led by Costa Serrano, Manuel Attard and Joaquín Maldonado, who on their own initiative, and without 
authorisation from the rest of the leadership, sought to create from within these militia groups a smaller 
group of conspiratorial cells who were ready to engage in full-blown anti-regime activity. Comes, En 




reason or possibly a combination of the two. The entire DRV leadership can therefore 
be regarded as having given at least implicit consent to anti-regime paramilitary and 
conspiratorial activity. 
 
To date, no attention at all has been given to the question as to why the DRV is 
alleged to have been the first CEDA affiliate to take a paramilitary turn.49 This  
appears odd since the DRV was a party ostensibly committed to democratic activity 
and was regarded as the CEDA’s most genuinely accidentalist, indeed quasi-
republican affiliate.  Much of the national leadership of the CEDA had abandoned 
faith in the democratic and accidentalist route and were involved, in varying degrees, 
with military conpirators in various parts of the country, and the attitude of the DRV 
leadership was not, therefore, that  unusual. Generally however local CEDA affilated 
organisations do not seem to have been able to maintain organisational coherence 
and play key roles in the conspiracy, and it is this which truly distinguishes the DRV. 
Important subsidiary questions in relation to the DRV’s turn to conspiracy are: why 
was it felt by the military that the DRV was the appropriate civilian vehicle to help 
organise the conspiracy; and why was the JDRV able to maintain membership and 
a functioning structure and in so doing help ensure that the Falange remained a tiny 
organisation locally.50  
 
                                            
49 The source for the oft-repeated statement that the DRV was the first affiliate of the CEDA to 
renounce democratic norms and turn to conspiracy is Joaquin Arrarás in his Historia de la Cruzada 
Española, but given that conspiratorial activity is, by definition, carried out in secret, it is not at all clear 
how robust is his evidential base for such a definitive statement.  Joaquin Arrarás (ed.), Historia de la 
Cruzada Espanola, 8 Vols,  Ediciones Españolas, Madrid, 1939-40, Vol. I, pp. 462-3. Arrarás is 
moreover a tainted source since one of his aims in the section of the work dealing with the DRV is to 
emphasise the subsequent perfidy (from the Nationalist point of view) of Lucía by stressing his 
involvement in the conspiratorial activities from the outset.          
50 Lowe has convincingly challenged the historiographical orthodoxy that the membership of the JAP 
passed ‘en masse’ into the Falange following the CEDA defeat in the February elections. He 
demonstrates that in parts of the country there was a significant haemorrhage of support, but at a 
level which was not fatal to the JAP’s continued operation. In Valencia in contrast the evidence is that 
few JDRV members transferred their allegiances and that the local Falange remained very small. Sid 
Lowe, Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism: The Juventud de Acción Popular in Spain 
1931-1939, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2010 (Lowe, Juventud), p. 147. 
Mainar Cabanes estimates 400 members of the Falange in Valencia province in total at this time; 
Eladi Mainar Cabanes, L’alçament militar de juliol de 1936 a València, Benifairó de la Valldigna, 1996, 




The answers to these questions are intimately connected. By acting quickly in setting 
up its ‘shock group’ militia it had established credibility with the Unión Militar 
Española, a secret society of anti-republican military officers which had a presence 
in Valencia, and hence with the military plotters generally, at a time when both the 
local Falange and Carlists were still small in number. The DRV had close links with 
the military since at least the summer of 1935, when a senior military officer from the 
regional military command provided weekly military training for the JDRV.51  
 
The DRV were acknowledged by the military as being by far the most important 
player among the civilian conspirators. The knowledge within the DRV that they had 
clear lines of communication, and credibility, with the military plotters helped maintain 
morale among their conspiratorial elements and reduced the risk that they would 
leave to join competing organisations. This was less true in some parts of Spain 
where the CEDA and JAP did not have access to the plotters and some were 
therefore tempted to join ‘the fascists’ in order to receive their military instructions.52 
In contrast, the Falange in Valencia kept itself aloof from the military because it was 
preparing its own rising, although it was tiny here and in reality had no ability to mount 
a successful coup.53 
 
The DRV was able to maintain a high degree of cohesion because it had deep roots. 
It was a well-organised party, with enthusiastic activists and its ideology was still 
strongly influenced by the anti-democratic and insurrectionary culture of Carlism. Out 
of these Carlist traditions came a strong network of sociability, as manifested by its 
regular study groups and social and spiritual events. It boasted a strong leadership, 
many of whom had worked together for a long period, bonding in their struggles 
against blasquismo during the first third of the twentieth century, and building strong 
traditions of comradeship.  
                                            
51 Sindicalismo, 27 June, 1935. It was during exercises related to this training that the head of the 
JDRV, Juan Alcocer, was accidentally killed, as previously discussed.  
52 Lowe, Juventud, p. 130. 
53 Archivo Familia Lucía (AFL)/ Informe Costa Serrano. The references to the AFL in this chapter all 
relate to the statements made by the DRV conspirators Costa Serrano and Maldonado as part of the 




Much of its leadership had committed itself to insurrectionary activity in the event of 
a Popular Front victory. It had not staked all on the outcome of the election. It was 
therefore less shell-shocked by the electoral failure than the CEDA nationally, was 
ready to react quickly, and was in an ideal position to form the civilian component of 
a local conspiracy. For those who had decided that violence was the only way 
forward, there simply was no need to abandon the DRV and to join other more openly 
anti-democratic organisations, since the DRV could be, and was effectively turned 
into, a conspiratorial group. The DRV provided a better façade for conspiracy than 
other groups given its long stated commitment to democratic means.   
 
11.5 The Abortive Military Coup   
 
Preparations for the Valencian rising gained impetus with the meeting held in mid-
June at El Saler beach, when the military leaders of the coup made it  clear to their 
civilian fellow-conspirators that they were completely subordinate to the decisions of 
the military.54 In the days before the rising, Valencia was in a particularly febrile state, 
because of the attack by Falangists on the offices and studio of the radio station 
Unión Radio on the night of Saturday 11 July. A small group armed with pistols 
entered the premises and broadcast a brief announcement proclaiming the triumph 
of the fascist revolution.55 This action was remarkably stupid, since a national 
Falangist rising had not been planned and therefore the only possible outcome of 
this act was to heighten alertness on the republican side of the risk of a rising.56 From 
                                            
54 The civilian organisations represented at the meeting were the DRV, Renovación Española and the 
Comunión Tradicionalista AFL/Costa Serrano; Lowe, Juventud, p. 138. Lowe says that the Falange, 
rather than Renovación, were represented at this meeting; this is incorrect. Comes Iglesia, En el filo, 
pp. 356-357. 
55 AFL/Costa Serrano; Las Provincias, 15 July 1936. It was reported that one of the Falangists who 
attacked the radio station, Francisco Alegre Alcañiz, described in the press as the ‘local leader’ was 
arrested in Sueca. He was just 20 years old. Diario de Valencia, 16 July 1936. Solsona, Evocaciones, 
pp. 264-265.  
56 Indeed so stupid was the action that some of the plotters initially suspected that the incident had 
been the work of leftist agents provocateurs. AFL/Costa Serrano; Alfonso Maldonado Rubio, Joaquín 
Maldonado Almenar: Conversaciones, Valencia, 2006 (Maldonado, Conversaciones), p. 148. The 
national leader of the Falange, José Antonio Prima de Rivera, harshly criticised the incident from his 




this date guards were placed on the premises of prominent leftist organisations and 
workers’ groups, some of them carrying weapons, conducted street searches.   
 
On 17 July army officers in Spanish Morocco started the long-planned military 
rebellion which was the signal for the coordinated plan to overthrow the republican 
government in a coup d’état.  In the event the coup was only partially successful. It 
fractured the Spanish military and marked the beginning of the Civil War.57 The plan 
to take power was relatively simple: garrisons across the country were to rise, declare 
martial law, and a military government would then take charge to eliminate the 
‘chaos’ which had characterized the Republic. This was in the long Praetorian 
tradition of Spanish politics. 
 
Military support for a coup was lukewarm among important segments of the army, 
and there was even less support from the security forces, especially from the Assault 
Guards and the Civil Guards, where the level of support varied significantly in 
different parts of the country. The security forces proved reluctant to act in those 
places where there was mass working-class support for the left, where the risk of a 
successful counter-attack was seen as a serious problem.58 The rising was intended 
to be swift, but the government retained initial control of most of the country including 
all of the major cities except Seville. In Madrid and Barcelona the garrisons rose, but 
were defeated by an alliance of working class militias and security forces.  
 
In Valencia, there was sustained uncertainty. The local security forces, and workers 
groups, were already on high alert following the attack on Unión Radio. The late 
change of plan as to who would be in charge in Valencia gave the first blow to the 
                                            
57 The ostensible reason for the coup was the murder of the leading monarchist politician, José Calvo 
Sotelo, by assault guards in revenge for the murder of one of their members by members of the 
Falange. In reality the murder of Calvo Sotelo was the occasion, not the cause.   
58 Michael Seidman, Republic of Egos. A Social History of the Spanish Civil War, Wisconsin, 2002 




morale of the plotters.59 In addition the Valencian UME had been decimated by the 
recent series of arrests of its leadership.60 The local Falange had not been actively 
involved in the local conspiracy, and it was only on the 17 July that they were 
approached to support it. It was of limited use since following the attack on Unión 
Radio many of their leaders had been arrested while others were in hiding.  The 
former JDRV leader and now Falange militant, Torres Murciano, now offered 300 
members of the Falange, but admitted that only sixty were truly ‘men of action’.61   
 
Then the DRV plotters heard of the telegram which Lucía sent to the Interior Ministry 
on 18 July declaring his loyalty to the Republic. Although the plotters were later 
adamant that it had no impact on the conspiracy, since its  authenticity was widely 
questioned, it is difficult to believe that it had none. The republican authorities 
seemed to have believed that its propaganda impact could be significant, since it was 
read out regularly on the radio throughout the republican zone during these crucial 
few days.62  
 
Military forces held back, unsure how to proceed. The Captain-General of the Third 
Military Region, Martínez Monge, insisted that the army was loyal and that there was 
no need for concern. Local union leaders had to decide whether to take this 
statement at face value; by Sunday 19 as news came through of the successful 
                                            
59 The senior military figure in charge of the planned coup in Valencia, General González Carrasco, 
had originally been allocated to Barcelona but to his chagrin was sent to Valencia at short notice after 
General Goded, who had originally been given the responsibility for Valencia, demanded Barcelona.   
60 Mainar Cabanes, L’alçament, p. 85; Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 237.     
61 AFL/ Costa Serrano; Maldonado, Conversaciones, p. 152. 
62 AFL/ Costa Serrano; Purkiss, Valencian Anarchist Movement, p. 238; Valls, Derecha Regional 
Valenciana, pp. 234-235. It is now generally accepted that the telegram is genuine, although Lucía’s 
precise motives are still open to debate. He told José Cano Coloma, his initial defence lawyer in the 
Republican trial against him, that the motive had been to save the lives of DRV members if it seemed 
unclear as to whether or not the coup would succeed. Thus the motive was tactical rather than a 
statement of unambiguous Republican loyalty. Jose Cano Coloma, Vientos contrarios: recuerdos 
autobiograficos, Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Valencia, 1984, (Cano Coloma, Vientos contrarios,), p. 
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resistance to the uprising in Madrid and Barcelona they declared a general strike. 
The streets of the city were by now full of workers.  
 
On 19 July DRV volunteers were asked to accompany González Carrasco to the 
Captaincy General of the Third Military Region which was located on the Plaza 
Tetuán. The original plan was for the rising to start at 11.0 on Sunday 19 July. DRV 
volunteers were supposed to gather at the DRV headquarters, also located on the 
Plaza Tetuán, strategically placed opposite the Captaincy General. The intention was 
that at the agreed time DRV volunteers would fill the balconies of the DRV 
headquarters, guns pointed at the Captaincy General. Others would drive into the 
military building with González Carrasco. The aim was to pressure Martínez Monge, 
whose loyalties were unclear, to either support the coup or step aside in favour of 
González Carrasco. Fearful of the outcome, and hearing of the failure in Barcelona, 
González Carrasco postponed his entry until the following day. In the meantime, 
almost 200 DRV militants, supported by fifteen Falangists, remained hidden within 
the DRV headquarters.63   
 
By 20 July, the general strike was in force. On the previous day the new Giral 
government had sent instructions to all civil governors that arms were to be 
distributed to the workers, but Braulio Solsona refused.64 In the event left-wing 
elements in the security forces had begun to distribute weapons to the workers while 
weapons were also sent from the CNT and FAI in Barcelona.65 Following an incident 
where shots had been exchanged between CNT militants and DRV members 
supposedly adopting a discreet profile in the DRV headquarters, assault guards had 
stormed and secured the building.66  Machine guns manned by asaltos were set up 
on the roof of the building and other prominent buildings in the square pointing at the 
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headquarters of the Third Military Region.67 ‘What looked impossible to lose’ wrote 
Costa Serrano ‘now seemed impossible to win’.68  
 
By the end of July, the uncertainty in Valencia had not yet been resolved, while 
garrisons elsewhere in the province were awaiting the outcome of events at the 
military headquarters. Local republicans were particularly concerned by the situation 
in the infantry and cavalry barracks which were situated on the opposite side of the 
River Túria where the most committed supporters of the rebellion were based.69 At 
the beginning of August the stalemate finally broke when the rebel regiments were 
besieged by republican forces consisting of union militias, civil guards and assault 
guards. On 2 August the regiments suspected of rebellion surrendered, and 
republican victory in Valencia was assured.  
 
11.6 ‘The Vibration of Republican Fervour’: Anti-Clericalism and Social 
Revolution 
 
Throughout republican Spain the military rebellion had triggered a revolutionary 
process which led to the collapse of much of the state machinery and its replacement 
by ad hoc Popular Committees dominated by the armed workers who had helped 
defeat the rising.70  The revolution began with a wave of assassinations and 
destruction, while in the countryside CNT and UGT members’ occupied land which 
had been owned by known rightists. Rents were abolished and local property records 
destroyed.71 A wave of anti-clericalism resulted in numerous attacks on the property 
and the people of the church. As Seidman has pointed out, priests suffered their 
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70 Graham, Republic at War, p. 79. 
71 María Aurora Bosch Sánchez, Ugetistas y libertarios: guerra civil y revolución en el País Valenciano, 
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greatest massacre since the French Revolution.72 Nearly 7,000 members of the 
Catholic clergy were killed, including thirteen bishops, 4,172 diocesan priests and 
seminarists, 2,364 monks and friars, and 283 nuns.73  Valencia was hit particular 
hard by the targeting of religious personnel and buildings and in the city attacks 
started as early as 20 July. Valencia province recorded some of the highest levels of 
anti-clerical violence in the republican zone. 520 members of religious orders out of 
2,844 (18.4 per cent) lost their lives. In the archdiocese of Valencia 362 priests lost 
their lives out of 1,200 lay clergy.74  
 
In the city, official republican forces were hardly more successful in holding back the 
anti-clerical wave. On 19 July a group of construction workers (which was known as 
a stronghold of FAI sympathisers within the CNT) attacked the Dominican convent, 
and a number of churches, although the local UGT/CNT committee tried to protect 
these.75 The next day the majority of churches in the city were attacked, set on fire, 
and their treasures destroyed. Attempted arsonists came close to succeeding in 
burning down the Basilica of Our Lady of the Disinherited and destroying the figure 
of the Virgin, and only the prompt action of the mayor, Cano Coloma, prevented this 
happening.76    
 
 
                                            
72 Seidman, Egos, p. 29. 
73 These figures are now broadly accepted as accurate. Julio de la Cueva, ‘Religious persecution, 
anticlerical tradition, and revolution’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, 1998, No. 3, pp. 355–
69; Vicente Cárcel Ortí, La persecución religiosa en España durante la Segunda República (1931-
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11.7 Coda: the Demise of the DRV and the PURA 
 
Throughout Spain the events following the Popular Front victory until the military 
rising show a society which was strongly polarised between left and right, manifesting 
an increasing slippage away from the respect for liberal democratic norms, and the 
growth in the politics of the street in defiance of the attempts by the government to 
impose the rule of law. But there is little to no evidence that the forces on the left 
were preparing an insurrection or that the social effervescence could not, in time, 
have been solved if the Popular Front’s reform programme had been implemented.  
 
Industrial or agrarian unrest was not particularly severe in Valencia, but it was a 
centre of some serious anti-clerical incidents, at least from May onwards, which 
compounded the problems of the provincial authorities in maintaining order. These 
incidents were not contributory to conspiratorial activity because the decision to 
undermine the regime by the forces of the right and a section of the military had been 
taken before the Popular Front victory. But whether or not events might have played 
out differently had the working-class organisations not engaged in incendiary rhetoric 
and had industrial workers and poor peasants not been tempted to engage in direct 
action is unknowable. Throughout this process, the PURA was a peripheral 
organisation. In different circumstances it might have survived as a political party and 
perhaps even have recovered some of its prior support.   But this was not to be.  
 
Once the rising began, the doors were opened to a mixture of social and political 
hatreds and triggered a wave of assassinations. Real (and perceived) enemies of 
the left were rounded up and killed, including a number of former members of the 
PURA and many members of the DRV.77 Amongst the PURA, the key targets were 
the blasquista ‘old guard’. The former Deputies Pascual Martínez Sala, Gerardo 
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Carreres and Angel Puig y Puig were all assassinated in the early days of the rising.78 
Other prominent members of the PURA understood the danger they were in and 
sought to escape; the former Prime Minister Samper was captured while trying to 
leave the country and was imprisoned briefly, but was eventually allowed to leave.79  
 
It was unclear whether Sigfrido Blasco was in similar peril. In the first days of the 
coup it seems that he and the new leaders of the PURA were not under immediate 
threat, perhaps because the PURA’s leftward move gave him some measure of 
protection. On 19 July El Pueblo declared that the PURA ‘…feels in its soul the 
vibration of its Republican fervour’.80 On 29 July, after a short period of closure El 
Pueblo was permitted to re-open, still as the official mouthpiece of the PURA, and it 
was permitted to remain within PURA hands until 11 August when ownership was 
summarily transferred to the local URN. No information is available as to why the 
PURA was allowed to keep control for a period, but the position was then reversed. 
This change seems to have coincided with information provided to Sigfrido that his 
life was now in danger. He went into hiding and managed to escape with the 
assistance of some local workers who were either CNT members or members of the 
small ultra-leftist group the POUM.81  
 
As the largest rightist party, the DRV took the brunt of political repression.  It probably 
would have faced this whether or not it had been an active participant in the 
conspiracy because it was increasingly seen on the left, especially in the turbulent 
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months immediately before the rising simply as yet another variant of ‘fascism’. The 
front-rank leadership in fact escaped relatively lightly from the repression, with only 
one DRV parliamentary deputy killed. This was Francisco Bosch Marín, who was 
captured on 19 or 20 August attempting to cross over to rebel lines. He was detained 
on a prison-ship which was attacked by a militia and was assassinated along with 
the 150 other prisoners.82 Three other senior DRV leaders suffered the same fate.83 
The parliamentary deputies Ignacio Villalonga and Luis García Guijarro were both 
visiting locations where the coup was successful, while other deputies went into 
hiding and were subsequently able to escape into Nationalist territory.  The leading 
conspirator José Costa Serrano was able to escape from the Republican zone as did 
the prominent JDRV member and co-conspirator Joaquín Maldonado after a brief 
period of imprisonment by the Republic.84 DRV members lower down the hierarchy 
suffered extremely badly from the reprisals, especially in smaller settlements. This 
was largely because the Republic had lost control in the countryside and smaller 
towns and villages.85  The Causa General records list those killed behind republican 
lines; where political affiliations are shown, DRV deaths represented 73 per cent; the 
Carlists 9 per cent, and the Falange 11 per cent.86   
 
The PURA and the DRV both met their end in the first few weeks of the rising. The 
DRV was proscribed immediately in Republican territory and the PURA a month later. 
The PURA had been a shadow of its former self for well over a year, and despite the 
efforts of Sigfrido Blasco in attempting to rebuild it in the first months of 1936, a limited 
amount had been achieved. The uprising meant the total destruction of the DRV. All 
of the party’s assets were seized and Diario de Valencia ceased publication. It was 
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never to appear again.87 Lucía was to be the only person involved in the conflict to 
face the ordeal of being tried for treason by both sides, and was condemned to death 
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The debate concerning the supposed centrist politics of the Radicals stands to be 
reconsidered in the light of the Valencian experience. The Radical self-defined as a 
consolidating force of the centre, whose declared aim was to attract as many 
Spaniards as possible to their centrist (in reality a rather conservative republican) 
agenda. The PURA committed itself fully to the Radicals national strategy, and thus 
implicitly to this centrist agenda, but within Valencia sought to present themselves as 
the champion of local workers and of having a somewhat vague but broadly left 
populist ideology. It was never able to resolve this contradiction between centrism 
and supposed radicalism. 
 
The PURA was in a particularly strong place to contribute to the consolidation of the 
Republic had it chosen to do so, given that it had a number of advantages over the 
Radicals nationally. It boasted a dominance in the city which it had maintained for 
the first third of the twentieth century (with the exception of the dictatorship of Primo 
de Rivera) and it had retained a level of prestige locally which the Radical party did 
not possess. Having kept a functioning shadow organisation during the dictatorship, 
it mobilised quickly after the fall of Primo, and by the summer of 1930 had succeeded 
in extending its organisation through much of the province.  
 
As the ‘first mover’ locally in a decidedly fluid political landscape and with a well-
functioning and dominant organisation, it was in an ideal position to set the political 
agenda and influence the direction of political travel. But it was unable to do so. 
Losing its most able leadership cadre early in the existence of the Republic with the 
defection of Fernando Valera and his supporters it was left with a thoroughly 
mediocre team incapable of strategic insight. Caught in the contradiction between its 
national allegiance and its traditional support base in Valencia, it seems to have had 
no interest in promoting republican consolidation, or at least regarded this as 
synonymous with its desire for continued political domination. This obsession with 
mastery was entirely consistent with the behaviour and left populist ideology of the 




opponents and present itself as the only genuine mouthpiece for ‘the people’ and the 
sole repository of republican virtue. To that end it sought to eliminate firstly its 
republican political rivals, especially the Radical Socialists and the DLR, and 
secondly the Socialists. In this process, it had no compunction in stirring up extreme 
personal animosities with the use of wild and demagogic language and was prepared 
to go beyond this into violence in order to deny its political opponents political space. 
More than once this unleashing of violence resulted in deaths, in murky 
circumstances which do not rule out the possibility that murder had been committed.   
 
Deciding that the DRV would not be a threat to PURA hegemony, it initially spared it 
from the worst of PURA inspired aggression. The PURA worked closely with the DRV 
during 1932 and much of 1933 in an alliance designed to destroy the national 
government, and from the PURA’s perspective, bring the Radicals to power. The 
manner in which it sought to do so, portraying the central government as an enemy 
of Valencia and mobilising the small-scale peasant farmers against the governing 
coalition was entirely consistent with its behaviour against opponents in the past. 
This alliance succeeded in weakening the left republican–Socialist regime, but also 
gave a significant boost to the growing DRV which, to the PURA’s consternation, 
became a serious threat to the PURA. The degree of violence then unleashed by the 
PURA against the DRV in order to win the November 1933 general elections injected 
intense bitterness into Valencian politics, helped exacerbate the radicalisation of the 
DRV, and fatally undermined the legitimacy of the PURA.     
 
The decision by the PURA leadership to align itself with Lerroux and the Radicals 
partly explains the reasons for the PURA’s campaign against the Madrid government 
during 1932 and 1933, but does not fully explain the campaign’s extraordinarily 
aggressive nature. National commentators highlighted the fact that the aggression 
and sophistication of the PURA campaign was exceptional. That is explained by its 
origins as a municipal party of Valencia city, which in order to gain and to hold 
decisive control during the years of the Restoration had to mobilise the masses and 





Violence and aggressive anti-clericalism was an essential part of the history of 
blasquismo at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although the Radicals in their 
early days were ready to use extreme language to mobilise the masses, the party 
had long eschewed such tactics and had become thoroughly reformist in its policies 
and political language. In contrast extreme language and domination of the streets 
remained alive, indeed central to blasquismo as it sought to maintain working-class 
support.  
 
These workers were typically members of the anarcho-syndicalist led union, the 
CNT. As the CNT’s membership grew and its leadership radicalised through the 
years, this put serious strains on the alliance, resolved broadly by the PURA’s 
decision to present itself as both a radically anti-clerical party, and an ill-defined but 
supposedly leftist force on social and economic issues. In reality, its programme, 
such as it was, on many of these issues was rather vacuous or even centrist, but the 
supposed radicalism manifested itself more in its attempt to define itself as the 
political champion of the CNT and  its representation of the PURA’s enemies as  
enemies of the working-class.  
  
In terms of national politics, given the divergence of the political trajectory prior to the 
Republic, one might have expected the PURA not to have declared loyalty to Lerroux, 
and to have found other political allies to the Radicals’ left, or at least to have acted 
as a firm ‘left wing’ within the Radicals.  In 1930 the national leadership of the Radical 
Socialists thought that the PURA might well join them, either formally or by becoming 
its unofficial provincial affiliate, but the attempts by Fernando Valera to achieve this 
outcome failed. Once the Republic had been declared the PURA showed little signs 
of any residual radicalism and the entire PURA leadership remained loyal to Lerroux 
until early in 1934, while the majority faction remained loyal until the Radical Party all 
but collapsed in late 1935.  
 
Having fully committed itself to Lerroux, the party, which in theory remained an 




acted during the first bienio as an identified block within the Radicals’ parliamentary 
grouping and does not seem to have made any contribution to the development of 
Radical policy, such as it was. Only after the November 1933 elections when the 
Radicals found themselves reliant on the political support of the CEDA did the PURA 
begin to show concern about the trajectory of republican politics and to act on 
occasions as an identifiable grouping.    
 
The left of the PURA then began to assert itself for the first time. Lerroux’s decision 
to bow to CEDA pressure and to pay the clergy an annual stipend produced the first 
opposition.  Although the legislation passed, two members of the PURA, Julio Just 
and Vicente Marco Miranda voted against while Gerardo Carreres abstained.1 
Government policy towards the Catalan sharecroppers known as the ‘Rabassaires’ 
also played an important part in the split within the PURA as the PURA left demanded 
that the proposals which would allow the sharecroppers to purchase their land be 
allowed to stand. On this point Just and Marco Miranda demanded that the PURA go 
into opposition, and when they failed to carry the support of the party (largely 
because of procedural manoeuvres by the majority of the leadership), they and three 
other PURA deputies left the party and went into opposition.2 
 
Throughout the rest of 1934 and throughout 1935 the majority of PURA deputies 
showed little signs of attempting to resist the rightward trajectory of the Radicals. 
Even the appointment of the blasquista Ricardo Samper as Prime Minister in May 
1934 did little other than temporarily slow the rightwards drift. In reality parliamentary 
arithmetic gave them a stark choice: leave the Radicals and go into opposition or 
continue to support Lerroux. Leaving the Radicals would mean the loss of control of 
local government, and probably the demise of the party. The party therefore stayed 
with Lerroux. Deputies kept their heads down and voted the Radical line. Only the 
occasional sniping emanating from the PURA press betrayed their unhappiness.  
                                            
1 El Mercantil Valenciano, 5 April 1934. 




Following the entry of the CEDA into government, and the repression of the October 
1934 rising, the Radicals nationally largely lost their ability to dictate the political 
agenda of the government, which was increasingly set by the CEDA, while at the 
local level throughout much of the country a grass-roots counter-revolution unfolded 
as the labour legislation of the first bienio was largely ignored.  The strength of local 
workers’ organisations in Valencia seems to have spared Valencia the worst of this 
counter-revolution, although local workers and poor peasants in some parts of the 
province undoubtedly suffered badly in terms of a reduction in income and of 
employment opportunities as its export-led agrarian economy faced the full weight of 
the economic depression of the thirties, the growth of protectionist measures in the 
affluent countries of northern Europe, and the devastating impact of severe frosts on 
the orange crop.  
 
Although local workers were largely able to resist a politically-driven counter-
revolution, the level of political polarisation throughout the country rendered 
specifically Valencian circumstances less important in terms of defining the dynamics 
of local politics. Workers here radicalised as they did throughout Spain, and to the 
extent that they gave political support to any organisation it was not to the PURA. 
Instead, workers transferred their political allegiances mainly to the Socialists while 
many poor peasants transferred theirs from the PURA to the newly formed provincial 
affiliate of Izquierda Republicana. 
 
As the President, Alcalá-Zamora, and the new Prime Minister, the Galician cacique 
and notable Manuel Portela Valladares, looked for allies in their attempt to partially 
‘make’ the elections of 1936 in Restoration style, they saw in the PURA a potential 
player in their project. Although the PURA never formally affiliated to Portela’s new 
‘Centre’ party, it was common knowledge that it was an integral part of Portela’s 
project and that Portela had high hopes for the PURA.3 But the project failed 
nationally and in Valencia. In the February 1936 general elections the PURA did 
                                            





extremely badly, polling approximately 10 per cent of the vote in the city and in the 
province and failing to gain a single seat.4  
 
The majority of the PURA’s former voters defected to the Popular Front, a 
demonstration of the more leftist orientation of its traditional voters than that of those 
who had voted for the Radicals elsewhere, and who now voted in their majority for 
the right.5 Spain was now so polarised that there was no longer any obvious purpose 
for a party of the ‘centre’ while mobilisation of supporters of truly mass parties of the 
left and right made it impossible to ‘make’ an election in Restoration style.  
 
The PURA now lost the control of the machinery of local government and with it was 
replaced as the dominant force in the province by Izquierda Republicana. Rather 
than disband, the party attempted to rebuild, showing surprising energy and 
committing significant financial resources to the process. It also tried to present itself 
as a party of the republican left, albeit one outside the Popular Front coalition. The 
evidence is limited as to how successful this attempt to rebuild was, but since it gave 
largely uncritical support to the Popular Front governments of the spring and early 
summer of 1936, it is difficult to see why voters should have supported it rather than 
Izquierda Republicana. It was a bystander to the events of February to July 1936. 
With the military rising, its fate was sealed. Too tainted by its support for the Radicals 
during 1934 and 1935, it was proscribed a month after the rising commenced, and a 
number of its leaders were assassinated.     
  
Whether or not, as Townson has suggested, the Radicals for all their failings 
represented a positive contribution to the attempts to consolidate the Republic, one 
cannot say the same about the PURA. Any attempt to organise politically, particularly 
                                            
4 Ignoring the somewhat anomalous vote for Martí de Veses. This was however a far better outcome 
than the Radicals who pooled just 0.9 per cent of the votes cast. Nigel Townson, The Crisis of 
Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 1931–1936. Sussex Academic 
Press, Portland, 2000, p. 344. 
5 Roberto Villa García, ‘El ocaso del republicanismo histórico: lerrouxistas y blasquistas ante las 





on the republican side, was seen as a potentially mortal threat to the PURA’s 
hegemony. It created a coarse and meretricious political culture in which the threat 
of violence was explicit, occasionally erupting into actual violence. None of this was 
inevitable. Its reputation and level of support in April 1931 was high and the PURA 
could have used this to make Valencia a relatively stable bastion of the Republic, 
creating a local polity in which opposing views could be contested in a civilised 
manner; instead its opponents were decried as enemies of the Republic.      
 
The Radicals nationally were notorious for personal cupidity and whether or not the 
PURA were worse, they were certainly no better. At the advent of the Republic, the 
PURA seem to have had an even worse reputation than the Radicals, but this may 
simply be because it had maintained control of its personal fiefdom in Valencia while 
Lerroux had no clear geographical power base (and no control over local government 
budgets) during the later Restoration years. All political parties in the Republic seem 
to some degree to have been corrupt in the sense of misdirecting state resources to 
build and support their patronage networks, but personal greed was the 
distinguishing feature of the Radicals and the PURA.  
 
For a party such as the PURA the use of patronage was essential to maintain its 
support from working class voters as the increasingly conservative nature of its 
political ideas was laid bare. Desperate to maintain working-class support, it not only 
misdirected funds but was profligate in its spending to fund an urban dole and to 
create municipal jobs.  This corruption became more extreme as the political 
polarisation within Spain put great strain on its traditional working-class support. Add 
to this the cupidity of the PURA leadership, and it is clear that its notorious reputation 
was deserved.6   
                                            
6 The impact of political corruption on political stability remains a contentious issue.  Traditionally, 
political scientists have tended to regard the cultivation of patronage networks as being a crucial 
element in the creation of stable political parties and political systems. Samuel Huntington, Political 
Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1968, p. 70. More recent work 
on developing economies and new democracies have tended to be much more negative about the 




In the context of the Republic, the net effect of continued corruption was undoubtedly 
negative in terms of the impact on political stability, albeit a relatively minor factor. 
For a brief period during 1934 and the first half of 1935 it probably had a minor 
positive impact in slowing down the demise of the Radicals nationally and of the 
PURA in Valencia but ultimately, by exposing their political and moral bankruptcy it 
hastened the collapse of the political centre. But for both parties it was the failure of 
vision as to what type of Republic they wanted, the lack of a clear political programme 
and the absence of a focussed and internally consistent ideology which were much 
more important in explaining their failure.    
 
In terms of national politics, the PURA had in 1931 sufficient ideological coherence 
and local support to have strengthened the republican centre-left had it wished to do 
so. It could have done this in a variety of ways. It could have remained independent, 
working on an ad hoc basis in parliament with other republicans. It could have 
merged with, or formally allied itself with the Radical Socialists, a party with which it 
seemed to have much in common, and could perhaps have helped stabilise that 
notoriously fissiparous party. It could have allied itself with the Radicals but then 
performed the function of the Radicals ‘left wing’, slowing the Radicals’ move to the 
right. It did none of these things, at least during the first bienio. Indeed in the level of 
its hostility to the central government as part of the Radicals’ campaign to break apart 
the republican-socialist coalition, it behaved in a particularly reckless and aggressive 
way which had the unforeseen result of boosting political support for the 
‘accidentalist’ DRV. 
 
Even when, after the 1933 general elections, the PURA began to show unease with 
the Radicals’ political direction of travel, the majority of the leadership demonstrated 
that their control over the machinery of local government in Valencia was more 
important to them than any political principles. Resisting the calls from its dissident 
parliamentary deputies and from the party’s grass-roots to leave the Radicals and go 
                                            
an impartial arbiter. Pranab Bardhan, ‘Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues’, Journal of 




into opposition, they were implicated in the overall political trajectory of the Radicals 
as it moved to the right both under the pressure of the Radicals’ own right-wing and 
as a result of the pressure from the CEDA and the realities of parliamentary 
arithmetic.  
 
Grumble they might, and grumble they did, but the PURA deputies continued to vote 
the Radicals’ parliamentary line and remained fully supportive of Lerroux until the 
Radicals began to collapse in late 1935, when the PURA jumped ship to the ‘Centre’ 
project of Portela.   From that point they became, largely, a political irrelevance. 
Unable to ‘fix’ the elections they lost control of local government, all influence. 
Attempts at reorganising showed limited success and the republican government’s 
response to the July 1936 coup ended the party’s existence.    
 
The history of the re-establishment, rise and fall of the PURA shows that the party, 
although loyal to Lerroux in parliamentary terms until virtually the bitter end, was a 
very different beast in Valencia. Here, it showed its quite distinct political culture and 
pursued its own trajectory in order to maintain its dominance in a manner which, 
although superficially consistent with the national strategy of Lerroux to detach left 
republicans from the Socialists and to come to power as leader of an all republican 
government, actually undermined the strategy by presenting Azaña, not the 
Socialists, as the ultimate enemy.  None of this is fully understandable unless one 
takes into account the long history of the PURA as in essence a populist municipal 
force of Valencia City. Constructed as a machine to take and hold power in a semi-
authoritarian hostile environment, once the Republic was proclaimed it did not 
change its ways and paid but lip service to liberal democratic ideals of free speech 
and tolerance and designed its Valencian political strategy around the silencing and 
elimination of local opponents.     
 
Usually, that meant demonising and using violence locally, but sometimes it suited 
the party to concentrate on national political parties and personalities, as it did during 




improve the quality of oranges sold for export. These actions were part of an overall 
strategy of the Radicals against the central government, but their intensity and 
aggressiveness only make sense in the context of the local context and specifically 
the PURA’s struggle to capture majority support from the small-holding peasantry, 
denying any further inroads into their support from its bitter local rivals the Radical 
Socialists but even more importantly from the rapidly growing DRV.  Valencia does 
in fact support the view that a ‘politics of exclusion’ as defined by the revisionist 
historians was indeed practised. But the sole practitioner of a ‘politics of exclusion’ 
there was the party of the supposed centre, the provincial affiliate of the Radical 







APPENDIX A: DRAMATIS PERSONAE 
Alberto Aguilera Arjona. Civil governor. Appointed September 1931. Member of 
Radicals.    
Juan Alcocer Penadés. Head of JDRV. Killed in 1935. 
Vicente Alfaro Moreno. PURA member and mayor of Valencia city from October 
1931 to January 1932. A founder member of EV. 
Hector Altabás Alío. PURA parliamentary deputy elected in 1931. Founding 
member of EV.  
Félix Azzati Descalci. Successor to Vicente Blasco Ibáñez as leader of the PURA. 
Owner of El Pueblo until shortly before his death.  Died in 1929. 
Sigfrido Blasco-Ibáñez Blasco. Youngest son of Vicente. Owner of El Pueblo.  
Elected leader of the PURA in 1930. Parliamentary deputy in 1931 and 1933.   
Vicente Blasco Ibáñez. Famous novelist and founder of blasquismo.  Retired from 
politics in 1907 except for return to writing anti-monarchical propaganda during 
1920s. Died in Menton France in 1928.  
Francisco Javier Bosch Marín.  Former Alphonsine monarchist and leading DRV 
member. Parliamentary deputy, elected in 1933 and 1936, and junior Minister in 
1935.  Assassinated behind republican lines in 1936. 
Juan Calot Sanz. PURA parliamentary deputy elected 1931. President of the  
Diputación Provincial from 1931 and PURA leader in Alzira. Assassinated behind 
republican lines in 1936. 
José Cano Coloma. PURA member in 1930 and one of founder members of PRRS 
in 1931. Subsequently one of local leaders of the PRRSI and later an important figure 
in Valencian IR. Municipal councillor for Valencia city. Parliamentary deputy in 1931. 




Gerardo Carreres Bayarri.  PURA member and elected parliamentary deputy in 
1931 and 1933. Appointed National Secretary for the Radicals in the summer of 
1934. Assassinated behind republican lines in 1936. 
José Centeno González.  Civil governor appointed April 1931. Member of DLR. 
José Costa Serrano. General Secretary of the DRV and defeated DRV 
parliamentary candidate in 1933 and 1936. One of leading DRV conspirators against 
the republican regime in the spring and summer of 1936. Subsequently an important 
ideologue of the Franco regime. 
Antonio De Gracia Pons. Provincial Delegate for Labour during the first bienio, 
member of the FSV and of the National Committee of the UGT. Councillor for 
Valencia city in 1931.  
Luis Doporto Marchori. Civil Governor appointed December 1931. Member of AR. 
José Duato Chapa. DRV member. Elected as parliamentary deputy for Valencia city 
in February 1936.   
Federico Fernández Castillejo. Civil governor, appointed June 1931. Member of 
DLR. 
Luis García Guijarro. Former Carlist and founder member DRV. Parliamentary 
deputy for DRV in 1933 and 1936. General Secretary of the UNEA.   
Joaquín García Ribes. PURA member. Councillor for Valencia city from 1931. 
Parliamentary deputy in 1931. 
Manuel Gisbert Rico. PURA member. Councillor for Valencia city from 1931. Mayor 
1934 to 1936. 
Julio Just Gimeno. Prominent PURA member. Parliamentary deputy in 1931 and 
1933. One of founding members of EV but defected to IR early in 1935 and elected 
as parliamentary deputy in 1936 as member of IR. Minister during Civil War and held 




Vicente Lambiés Grancha.  PURA member. Councillor for Valencia city from 1931. 
Mayor 1932-1934. Parliamentary deputy for Valencia province from November 1933.   
Luis Lucía Lucía. Former Carlist and editor of Diario de Valencia. Leader and 
ideologue of the DRV. Vice-President of the CEDA. Parliamentary deputy for the 
DRV in 1933 and 1936.  Condemned for sedition by both the Republic and the Franco 
regime and sentenced to death by the Franco regime but sentence subsequently 
commuted. Died in 1942.  
Joaquín Maldonado Almenar. Member of the JDRV. Active plotter in the spring and 
summer of 1936 against the Republic.  
Vicente Marco Miranda. PURA member and parliamentary deputy in 1931 and 
1933. Founder and leader of EV. Parliamentary deputy for EV in 1936.  
Pascual Martínez Sala. PURA member. Parliamentary deputy in 1933. Former 
agent of the industrialist Juan March. Assassinated behind republican lines in 1936.  
Luis Peña Novo. Civil governor, appointed August 1933; member of 
La Organización Republicana Gallega Autónoma (The Autonomous Galician 
Republican Organisation).   
Vicente Roig  Ibáñez. Lawyer, journalist and from 1934 editor of La 
Correspondencia de Valencia. Member of Radical Party. Parliamentary deputy from 
November 1933.   
Francisco Rubio Fernández. Civil governor, appointed July 1931. A Radical.  
Ricardo Samper Ibáñez.   PURA member. Parliamentary deputy in 1931 and 1933. 
Minister during 1933 and 1934 and  Prime Minister April to October 1934.     
Miguel San Andrés Castro. PURA militant in 1930. A founding member of the 
provincial branch of the PRRS. Subsequently member of the PRRSI. Elected as IR 
parliamentary deputy in 1936.  




Manuel Simó Marín. ‘Elder Statesman’ of Valencian Carlism. Leader of DRV 
minority on municipal council of Valencia city from April 1931. Assassinated behind 
republican lines in 1936. 
Braulio Solsona Ronda. Civil governor, appointed February 1936; member of IR.  
José Tercero Sánchez. Civil governor, appointed April 1934; Radical. 
Domingo Torres Maeso. Dockworker and secretary of the CNT affiliated port-
workers federation.  Leading member of the CNT, the Sindicatos de Oposición and 
of the Antifascist Workers’ Alliance. Editor of El Combate Sindicalista. President of 
the Municipal Council from February 1937, succeeding José Cano Coloma. 
José Torres Murciano. Leader of JDRV following death of Juan Alcocer Penadés. 
After February 1936 elections resigned from JDRV and joined the Falange. 
Augustín Trigo Mezquita. PURA member. Mayor Valencia city in 1931.  
Faustino Valentín Torrejón. PURA member. Parliamentary deputy in 1933. One of 
founding members EV. 
Fernando Valera Aparicio. Prominent PURA member in 1930. Subsequently 
member of national executive of PRRS and leader of provincial PRRS. Municipal 
councillor in Valencia city from 1931. Elected parliamentary deputy 1931. Member 
National Council URN from 1935. Parliamentary deputy for Badajoz in 1936. Last 
Prime Minister of the Republic in exile.  
Pedro Vargas Guerendeian. Veteran PURA member until 1931. One of founders of 
provincial PRRS. Subsequently one of provincial founders of PRRSI and later of IR. 
Elected as parliamentary deputy in 1931 and 1936. 
Ignacio Villalonga Villalba.  Prominent local industrialist and banker. Leader of UVR 
until 1933 when joined DRV. Elected parliamentary deputy for DRV in Castellón in 






APPENDIX B: A NOTE ON THE USE OF THE VALENCIANO FORM OF 
PLACE NAMES 
 
In this thesis I use the current version of the names of the towns and villages of 
Valencia province, with the exception of the use of the name ‘Valencia’ which is 
both the anglicised and the castellano version of the name for the city.1 For other 
settlements, the current version is not necessarily the version used in official 
documentation during the 1930s. I use the current version because most 
contemporary Spanish scholars of Valencian history, especially in works 
published after the transition to democracy, invariably use the current version. 
In the areas of the province which are firmly part of the valenciano speaking 
areas, these are the valenciano version of the names. In the areas of the 
province which are clearly castellano speaking areas, the names are 
unchanged from the form used during the Republic. In a few places where no 
one language predominates, settlements typically have two official versions of 
the name, a castellano and valenciano version.   
  
Thus in this thesis, I refer for example to ‘Alzira’ not ‘Alcira’, to ‘Carcaixent’ not 
‘Carcagente’, to ‘Ontinyent’ not ‘Onteniente’, to ‘Xàtiva’ not ‘Játiva’, and so on. 
The former are the valenciano version of the names, rarely used during the 
1930s in written documentation. In one case when the name was changed in 
1981 to its valenciano form the opportunity was taken to make a more radical 
alteration. This is ‘L'Alcúdia’ formerly ‘Alcudia de Carlet’ which, had it simply 
changed its name from the castellano version would have become ‘L'Alcúdia de 
Carlet’. I refer to this location by its current name, ‘L'Alcúdia’. In the few 
examples where both versions of the name currently have official status, for 
example ‘Bunyol’ and ‘Buñol’ I have used the latter version as this was the 
version used during the 1930s. Names in overwhelmingly castellano speaking 
areas have not changed and present no difficulties. Thus I refer to ‘Requena’, 
‘Utiel’ and so on. 
                                            
1 It was officially renamed ‘València’ (the valenciano version of the name) in 2016 by the new 
left-leaning Compromis dominated city council. The official name of the University of Valencia 





Although it might be objected that there is something anachronistic in using the 
current form of names when in the case of valenciano names they were not 
used during the republican period, by adopting the convention used by modern 
Spanish/valenciano scholars, I can minimise the need to use both the castellano 
and valenciano versions.  For many modern scholars, particularly those native 
to Valencia, the use of the valenciano name is charged with ideological 
significance. In my case the choice is entirely pragmatic and is simply to 
minimise the use of two versions of the same name.   
 
Where I refer in my citations to official documents of the period, there are two 
occasions where the use of the modern valenciano place names might create 
some confusion. This is where I refer to the official town hall minutes for ‘Xàtiva’ 
(‘Játiva’) and ‘Alzira’ (‘Alcira’). Because these are official documents I use the 
titles used during the 1930s. For example, where I cite the town hall minutes for 
the settlement of Xàtiva I refer to them as the ‘Actas del Ayuntamiento de Játiva’ 
(AAJ).   
 
The term I use throughout for the local language spoken in Valencia is 
valenciano which is the name given to the language in the Valencian Statute of 
Autonomy.2 The question as to what to call the local language became a heavily 
politicised issue during the democratic transition, with some even denying any 
similarity between Catalan and valenciano.3   
  
                                            
2 Article 6 of the current (2006) Statute. 
3 In spite of some of the wilder statements made by certain right-wing politicians during the 
democratic transition, there is no philological or morphological basis for the view that Catalan 




APPENDIX C:  A NOTE ON THE SPANISH ELECTORAL SYSTEM DURING 
THE REPUBLIC AND THE RESULTS IN VALENCIA 
 
 
The electoral system of the Second Republic introduced by the electoral law of 
8 May 1931 does not always lend itself to simple headline percentages. It was 
designed to encourage wide-ranging electoral blocks with the belief that this 
would encourage political stability. The new law replaced the previous single-
member constituencies with much larger multi-member ones. Although not 
strictly a system of proportionate representation it was supposed to encourage 
minority representation. Any electoral list gaining an outright majority of votes in 
a district would be guaranteed and simultaneously restricted to 80 per cent of 
the seats. A list winning a plurality of votes but which failed to win a majority 
would receive two thirds of the seats. The remainder would be passed to the 
second list if they received 20 per cent of the vote.  
 
The number of seats was calculated by reference to the size of the population 
of a constituency (not the number of electors) with a seat for each 50,000 of the 
populace.  The constituency under this system was a province, except that a 
municipality with a population of more than 150,000 inhabitants formed a 
separate constituency. As Valencia city had a population of over 350,000 
people, it became a separate constituency with seven seats. In the case of 
Valencia province, the population (excluding the city) in 1931 was over 650,000 
and there were therefore thirteen seats.  
 
Each elector was given a number of votes which was less than the total number 
of vacancies. Subject to this upper limit, each voter was entitled to vote for as 
many or as few candidates as they liked. In Valencia province, each elector 
could cast up to ten votes. For the city, an elector could cast up to five. The 
system favoured multi-party coalitions that could thus win a majority of votes, 
while the setting of an upper limit of votes for each voter which was less than 
the number of vacancies was designed to favour representation for minorities 




forward a list with more names than the maximum number of votes per voter, 
they risked the possibility that votes would be spread too thinly between their 
candidates.  
 
This complex system makes it difficult to present the relative performance of 
different electoral alliances by reference to simple percentages. The precise 
methodology used can produce very different results. There are two main 
alternatives. The first is to simple add up all of the votes received by each 
candidate, aggregate the total votes received by each political party and each 
political alliance and present these as percentages by reference to the total 
number of votes cast.  The second is to calculate the average vote per candidate 
received by a specific political party and electoral alliance and compare this to 
the sum of the averages. The usual convention followed   is to use the second.1  
 
Both methods deliver figures which can be misleading, but the second tends to 
be less so. The problems arise where a party or electoral alliance fields a 
number of candidates which is materially lower than the maximum vote 
allocated to each elector. Under the Spanish system an individual candidate 
could be elected with a high vote, possibly leading the list of candidates, and 
yet under the first system be shown as receiving a low percentage of the vote. 
Although the second system avoids this problem (by boosting significantly their 
percentage performance), it may show a party or alliance ‘winning’ when in fact 
they had succeeded in getting only a small number of deputies elected, a rather 
odd conception of ‘winning’.  
 
Moreover, the methodology rather flies in the face of common sense in that it 
ignores the fact that a party or alliance would only restrict their number of 
candidates in this way precisely because they did not expect to win had they 
fielded more candidates.  A minor additional objection is that the methodology 
                                            
1 For example by Luis Aguiló Lucía in his study of elections in the City in his Las elecciones en 





has to deal with ‘unspent’ votes (that is where a voter has used only some of 
the votes to which they are entitled) and the only way it can do this in the 
absence of clear evidence to the contrary is to allocate on a pro–rata basis 
across electoral lists.  Yet it seems probable that a disproportionate number of 
the ‘unspent’ votes would in fact originate with electors who chose minority 
candidates as their first preference.  
 
Fortunately in respect of the general elections of November 1933 and February 
1936 the two methodologies do not produce a radically differing analysis where 
all the major competing alliances produce ‘majority’ lists.  The problem however 
does arise in the June 1931 Constituent Cortes elections. This is because two 
relatively important political parties, the DLR and the DRV, both went to the 
elections in Valencia City fielding in both cases ‘minority’ list candidates that is 
each party fielded only two candidates. Officially, the DRV did not even stand 
but a semi-official ‘write in’ campaign was launched at the last minute. In both 
cases the ‘average’ (second) method gives each party some 10 per cent of the 
vote, while the first method reduces the percentages to half that.     
 
On balance I think that the ‘average’ method produces a more realistic outcome 
for June 1931 and I have used this approach. Aguiló Lucía however has a 
number of arithmetical mistakes in his workings. I have applied his 
methodology, correcting for errors, in reaching my figures for the Alliance of the 
Left and the Radical Socialists for the city. He gives the Alliance of the Left a 
slightly lower percentage in the City of just under 56% and quotes a clearly 
incorrect figure for the Radical Socialists of just under 24 per cent.2 For 
consistency I have applied his methodology to the province, too. A simple 
aggregation of votes without taking into account differing numbers of candidates 
gives the Alliance of the Left 70 per cent of the vote in the city and 55 per cent 
in the province.  
 
                                            










APPENDIX D: THE VALENCIAN PEASANTRY AND POLITICAL 
ALLEGIANCES 
 
Valencia was still largely an agricultural society in 1930; over 60 per cent of the 
population of the province (excluding the city) were engaged in work in the 
agricultural sector, either as day-labourers or as farmers.1 Many industrial 
workers were the children of agricultural workers and some worked in activities 
ancillary to agriculture, such as in the orange warehouses where oranges were 
cleaned, graded, sized and boxed. Thus even the 60% figure does not capture 
the extent to which agricultural work dominated the culture as well as the 
economy of the province.  
 
Capturing the loyalty of farmers and workers involved in the agricultural sector 
was key to any future electoral success. The vast majority of the farmers, both 
owners and tenants, were poor and either had to supplement their income by 
working for others, or could just about manage to maintain their family unit from 
their land.  Although the precise balance varied widely in different parts of the 
province, farmers represented between 30 to 40 per cent of the active 
population, while landless day-labourers represented between 30 per cent and 
50 per cent. I will argue below, in considering voting behaviour, that these 
percentages need to be redrawn and that peasant farmers, and the adult 
members of their immediate families, represent between 45 and 60 per cent of 
the population and landless agricultural labourers, excluding family members of 
peasant farmers, represent  15 to 30 per cent of the population.  
 
Comprehensive province-wide data on the precise size of holdings directly 
worked by small-scale owners and tenants for the republican period is not 
                                            
1 Rafael Valls Montés, La Derecha Regional Valenciana, 1930-1936. El catolicismo político 
valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1992 (Valls, Derecha Regional), p. 126. Fondo 
documental del Instituto Nacional de Estadística / Censo de Población /Censo de 1930 / 
Provincia de Valencia. Available at www.ine.es.inebaseweb/tree Navigation.do?tn=9253. 





available, but by combining data on the size of individual plots with more 
detailed but sporadic land-holding information and local census data, a broad 
picture emerges.2 Worked holdings in general were small; for example, in Alzira, 
an average holding was 1.7 hectares while in the horta of Valencia, it was closer 
to one hectare.3 A holding of one hectare in irrigated areas might just permit a 
family unit to survive without working for others. In arid areas, much lower 
productivity meant that a farmer with less than ten hectares might well have to 
work for others.4  Because there were some significant concentrations of large 
holdings owned for the most part by absentee landlords who leased to poor 
tenants, many farmers’ holdings were significantly smaller than the arithmetical 
average.  
 
During the later years of the nineteenth century and the first thirty of the 
twentieth, the number of small-holding owners was growing, while the size of 
holdings was dropping, but the major cause of this was not fragmentation of pre-
existing holdings, even though on death a farmer’s holding would be divided 
equally between his children, but the growing trend for smallholding tenants to 
purchase.  Burriel shows a doubling of owners between 1864 and 1930, 
accompanied by the halving of average plot size.5  Based on the relative size of 
                                            
2 Much useful information is to be found in the following: Eugenio Burriel de Orueta, La huerta 
de Valencia. Zona sur, Alfonso El Magnanimo/Caja de Ahorras, Valencia, 1971 (Burriel, La 
huerta); Salvador Calatayud Giner,  Capitalismo agrario y propiedad campesina: la Ribera del 
Xúquer, 1869-1930, Alfons el Magnánim, Institució Valenciana d’ Estudis i Investigació, 
València, 1989 (Calatayud,  Capitalismo agrario); Juan Piqueras, La vid y el vino en el Pais 
Valenciano, Valencia, Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 1981; Joan Romero González, Propiedad 
agraria y sociedad rural en la España mediterránea: los casos valenciano y castellano en los 
siglos XIX y XX,  Servicio de Publicaciones Agrarias, Madrid, 1983 (Romero, Propiedad 
agraria).   
3 For Alzira, see Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millán y García-Varela and María Cruz Romeo 
Mateo, ‘Leaseholders in Capitalist Arcadia: Bourgeois Hegemony and Peasant Opportunities in 
the Valencian Countryside during the Nineteenth Century’, Rural History, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2006, 
pp. 149-166 (Calatayud et al, ‘Capitalist Arcadia’), at p. 154. For the horta of Valencia in 1930, 
see Burriel, La Huerta, p. 286. The average size of an orange farm in 1920 was less than a 
hectare. Samuel Garrido Herrero and Salvador Calatayud, ‘The Price of Improvements. 
Agrarian Contracts and Agrarian Development in Nineteenth Century Eastern Spain’, Economic 
History Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, May 2011, pp. 598-620 (Garrido and Calatayud, ‘Improvements’) 
at p. 599.   
4 A hectare is slightly less than 2.5 acres.  
5 Burriel, La huerta, p. 286. Localised studies, where they exist, show similar fragmentation. See 
for example Calatayud, Capitalismo agrario, p. 153, and Carles Sirera Miralles, ‘Tierra, trabajo 
y riqueza en Quart de Poblet’ in Jorge Hermosilla Pla, (ed.), Quart de Poblet, Historia, Arte y 




holdings, I estimate that between 80 to 95 per cent of small-holders, owners and 
tenants, had to work at least some of the time for others.6  
 
In my Chapter 6, in discussing the campaign in Valencia against the centre-left 
governments of the first bienio, I argue that there were both national and local 
reasons for the campaign, but  its nature, and virulence, can only be properly 
understood in the context of the battle for the political support of the small-
holding Valencian peasantry. The evidence clearly supports the point that the 
political support of the vast majority of these peasants was still in play until at 
least the summer of 1933, while a significant minority remained open to 
persuasion beyond then. Yet many studies of the Second Republic take it as 
almost axiomatic that the small-holding peasantry, after an early period of 
political volatility when it appeared that a conservative republicanism centred 
around the DLR might be a viable vehicle to mobilise and contain the 
conservative rural masses, voted en masse for the parties of the right, and in 
particular for the CEDA.7   
 
Thus touching briefly on the politics of the peasantry in Valencia during the 
Second Republic, in an article on the peasantry in the Valencian horta, many of 
whom were tenants, Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millán and María Cruz Romeo 
comment that:  
….Tensions in the labour market, together with the stability that tenants 
had come to expect, gradually served to bolster that group’s support for 
right-wing politics. At the same time, their identification with a set of 
religious values emphasising both a strong work ethic and familial 
authority fit well with the conservative tenor of their daily lives. In short, 
the vast mass of lease holding families did not simply lay the foundation 
for agrarian capitalism during this critical period in Spanish agriculture. 
They also supported the values of a bourgeoisie that had abandoned its 
                                            
why fragmentation of holdings following death was not the main cause of this phenomenon is 
discussed below.  
6 My calculation from the table in Romero, Propiedad agraria, p. 296. 
7 It has been suggested that peasants moved rightwards politically because increased militancy 
from day labourers conflicted with peasant needs, but this cannot have been a decisive factor 
in Valencia as there were too few peasants who never worked for others and regularly engaged 
workers (no more than 5 per cent of the total). Francisco Cobo Romero, ‘La cuestión agraria y 




elite-driven political strategy in favour of a new alliance with the core of 
the Valencian peasantry…8 
 
This statement clearly has some validity, but it oversimplifies. There is no reason 
to believe that tenant farmers were more right-wing than small-scale owners 
and this statement presumably addresses poor tenant famers rather than 
owners simply because they were much more numerous in the horta. And it is 
clear that the DRV could not have become a mass party without poor peasant 
support. In much of the country, poor farmers formed the backbone of support 
for rightist politics and support for the right was reinforced by the growth in 
confessional agrarian syndicates, grouped under the national organisation the 
Confederación Nacional de Católico Agraria (the Catholic Agrarian Nation 
Confederation, or CNCA) of which the Federación Valenciana de 
Sindicatos Agrícolas (Valencian Federation of Agrarian Syndicates) was an 
important member.9  But there is also evidence to the contrary. 
 
In certain parts of the province such as in the important urban centre of Gandia, 
and in the administrative district of the Vall D’Albaida in the south of the 
province, peasant electoral support for the DRV was high. In Bocairent, a town 
in the Vall D’Albaida, where much of the population consisted of small-holding 
peasants, the DRV and its allies received in the February 1936 elections 75 per 
cent of the vote compared to the Popular Front’s 25 per cent.10 In Ontinyent, the 
administrative capital of the Vall D’Albaida, the DRV and its allied received over 
55 per cent of the vote in the February 1936 elections in a town where 
                                            
8 Calatayud et al, ‘Capitalist Arcadia’ at p. 165. My emphasis.     
9 For an excellent analysis of the importance of confessional agrarian co-operatives in Valencia, 
see Jesús Millán, ‘Campesinado y cambio social en la politización de la sociedad 
contemporánea. Una discusión sobre el conservadurismo agraria valenciano,’ in Lourenzo 
Fernández Prieto, Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, Aurora Artiaga Rego and Xesús Balboa (eds.), Poder 
local, elites e cambio social na Galicia non urbana (1874-1936), Universidade de Santiago de 
Compostela, 1977, pp. 161-188. The CNCA has been studied extensively, most notably by Juan 
José Castillo Alonso in his Propietarios muy pobres, Servicio de Publicaciones Agrarias, Madrid, 
1979.  For Valencia, see Samuel Garrido Herrero, El sindicalisme catòlico-agrari al País 
Valencià (1906-1923). Cooperativisme confessional, millora tècnica i mobilatció camperola  a 
Espanya després de la crisi agrària finisecular, Doctoral thesis, Universitat de  València, 1993, 
and his Treballar en comú. El cooperativisme agrari a Espanya (1900-1936), Alfons el 
Magnànim, Valencia, 1996.  





approximately 58 per cent of the population worked in agriculture and where 
almost 40 per cent of this section of the population were smallholders.11 In the 
same elections the voters of Alboraia, a settlement in the horta which formed 
part of the city of Valencia for electoral purposes, and in which Carlism had 
traditionally been strong, delivered to the right 65 per cent of the vote, the 
Popular Front gained 22 per cent and the PURA 13 per cent. Thus almost two 
in three voters voted for the right, in a settlement where the vast majority of the 
population were engaged in working small-holdings.12  
 
A comprehensive and completely definitive picture cannot be constructed given 
the limitations of the data available.  Nowhere do we possess the type of hard 
psephological information commonplace in modern democracies which enables 
clear answers as to how different socio-economic groups and members of 
particular occupations tended to vote. In a small number of large settlements, 
such as Valencia city, Alzira, Cullera, Gandia and Ontinyent, we have a more 
detailed breakdown of votes, sometimes by individual polling stations, combined 
in some cases with supporting information on the occupations and socio-
economic status of the inhabitants in these districts. This enables some 
conclusions to be drawn as to the relationship between social class and voting 
behaviour, which certainly by 1936 shows overwhelming support for the Popular 
Front from agricultural  labourers and other workers, and the (hardly surprising) 
correlation between relative affluence and support for the DRV. The description 
of all peasant farmers, whether poor, middling or rich, simply as ‘farmers’ makes 
                                            
11 José Lendoiro Salvador, Segunda República y Guerra Civil en Ontinyent (València), de la 
esperanza republicana al enfrentamiento social, (1930-1939), Doctoral thesis, Universidad de 
Educación a Distancia, 1999  pp. 219 and 345; Antonio Calzado Aldaria, II República, Guerra 
Civil y Primer Franquismo: La Vall d’Albaida (1931-1959), Doctoral thesis, Universitat de  
València, 2004, p. 111. 
12 BOPV, 20 February 1936. In 1933 the right received 59 per cent of the vote here, the PURA 
37 per cent and the left only 4 per cent. BOPV, 21 November 1933; Maria José Sigalat Vayá, 
La II República en Alboraia, 1931-1936,  Ajuntament d'Alboraia, Valencia, 1995, pp. 36, 65 and 
94; Garrido and Calatayud, ‘Improvements’, at p. 616; Census and electoral roll data at Archivo 
General y Fotográfico de la Diputación Provincial de Valencia/ Sección A/Central/ Secretaría 
General/Memorias de la Diputación/ Vol. 33 (AGFDPV/ General/ A/A3.12./Memoria/Vol. 33, p. 
178. Samuel Garrido Herrero, ‘Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del 
equilibrio en la Valencia del siglo XIX’ Working Paper, Sociedad Española de Historia Agraria, 
DT-SEHA No 10-09, September 2010, p. 9, available at:  http://core.ac.uk/download/ pdf/ 




even this information  of limited assistance in the context of the issue under 
discussion in this Appendix.13  
  
Other difficulties in analysing the electoral information relating to peasant 
farmers include in many cases a lack of localised information on the precise 
number of small-scale owners and size of landholdings, but much more 
frequently a complete dearth of information in respect of the number of tenant 
farmers. Often, one cannot ascertain accurately the number of agricultural 
labourers or, for some large settlements where there were a significant number 
of workers employed in manufacturing or service activities, their number.  
 
Official statistics were not compiled on a consistent basis from location to 
location. It seems to be the case, based on vastly different reported ratios 
between individuals described as ‘farmers’ and ’day-labourers’ in locations 
which appear otherwise similar  that in some places, peasants who needed to 
work for others for considerable portions of the year were registered as day-
labourers, while elsewhere they appear as small-holders. There is not even 
consistency as to how female workers are reported in the figures. Mostly, as 
can be ascertained in broad terms from the difference between the active 
population as reported in municipal records and in the electoral roll from 1933 
onwards, the figures do not include working women, but on a few occasions all 
or virtually all female workers seem to be included while on others the position 
                                            
13 For Alzira and the 1931 Constituent Cortes elections and the February 1936 elections, see 
Pilar Rovira Granero, Mobilització social, canvi polític i  revolució. Associanisme, Segona 
República i Guerra Civil. Alzira, 1900-1939, Germania, Alzira, 1996. (Rovira Granero, Alzira), 
pp. 153 and pp. 241-242, and also BOPV, 20 February 1936.  For Cullera, see Antonio Calzado 
Aldaria, ‘Tipología Electoral en Cullera durante la II República,’ in III Jornades d’ Estudis de 
Cullera, celebrades els dies 28, 29 i 30 de novembre de 1997, Ajuntament de Cullera/Setimig, 
Cullera, (Valencia) 2,000, pp. 267-284 (Calzado Aldaria, ‘Tipología Electoral’) at pp. 274-275, 
280 and 283. For Gandia and the February 1936 elections, see Antonio Calzado Aldaria and 
Luis Sevilla Parra,  La IIª República a Gandía, Centre d'Estudis Alfons el Vell, Gandía, 2000, 
pp. 210 and 211. For Ontinyent and the November 1933 elections see Antonio Calzado Aldaria, 
Segunda república y guerra civil: la Vall d'Albaida, 1931-1939, Associació de Veïns el Llombo, 
Ontinyent (Valencia), 2012, p. 279. Detailed polling data for Ontinyent in November 1933 is held 
at AGFDPV)/ Sección C/Censo y Estadística/Censo/Elecciones/C.1.2.2/ Diputados Cortes/1 




seems to be that some female workers (if they worked full-time) were included, 
but not all.    
 
Problems are compounded because for some relatively affluent farmers, not all 
of the adult male members of the immediate family (and female in locations 
which did include women in official statistics) may appear in the records at all. 
Where a farm was large enough to keep the entire family unit gainfully 
employed, other members may not appear in the municipal records as 
economically active even though, once they reached the eligible voting age of 
twenty three, they would appear on the electoral roll.     
 
These difficulties are formidable, but it is possible in some locations to gain 
much useful information by applying a number of reasonable assumptions to 
the electoral data and looking not simply at the named person on the register of 
land owners, but taking into account the members of the family who worked the 
farm in varying degrees, depending on its size, as a family unit. Based on 
census data on the demographic profile of individuals in the province, and 
considering the relatively stable size of families in the Valencian countryside, 
one can estimate the proportion of the voting population which one might term 
the ‘family farming unit’ composed of the farmer, his wife, and their children of 
twenty-three years (the official voting age) and older.  
 
From this one can calculate the upper limit of what one might term a ‘family farm 
voting multiplier’  to ascertain the probable voting behaviour of those who, in 
cultural, psychological and economic terms, considered themselves as peasant 
farmers. Note that the construction of this multiplier does not require any belief 
that family members necessarily voted for any particular ideological grouping or 
even together, although in most cases it is probable that they usually expressed 




in any given locality, but once one does so, there is no reason why the ‘family 
farm voting multiplier’ should not apply to these people too.14 
 
Once the ‘family farm voting multiplier’ has been ascertained, it has important 
implications for the data concerning agricultural labourers and in larger 
settlements workers in industry and service trades, because it was normal for 
the adult children in such family farms to work at least part of the time outside 
the family farm, either as agricultural labourers for others, or in other paid 
economic activities (or both). It is then necessary to ensure in looking at voting 
behaviour that such individuals are not double-counted and are excluded from 
the information concerning agricultural labourers and other workers. Note that 
the important point is simply to prevent double-counting; whether they are 
treated as agricultural labourers or other workers makes no difference to the 
analysis, although for simplicity I have assumed that all of these adult male 
children are recorded as day-labourers.   
 
I argue that that a much larger proportion of the rural electorate than is normally 
considered to be peasant farmers should be treated as such for the purposes 
of the analysis of electoral data, taking into account the nature of the peasant 
family unit, and that the ‘family farm voting multiplier’ provides a useful if crude, 
mechanism to estimate this. The four key component elements in arriving at the 
multiplier are: the relative stability of the rural population (or at least this element 
of the rural population); the average number of children per family; the ratio of 
men to women; and the age profile of the population. I will deal with these in 
turn. 
 
Average Stability of the Rural Population 
In the period 1857 to 1930 the population growth of the province was slightly 
ahead of the national trend, but these figures are largely accounted for by 
                                            
14 In this Appendix, I refer to ‘tenant farmer’ when I mean a tenant farmer who is not also a 




immigration into the province.  For the region as a whole, in the period 1900-
1930, three quarters of the growth was due to immigration. By 1936, immigration 
represented 80 per cent of the increase.  Indeed by the 1930’s ‘natural’ growth 
(the increase accounted for by additional births less deaths) had stabilised and 
had been broadly stable for much of the first third of the twentieth century.15 
Given that one would expect a ‘family farming unit’ to represent one of the most 
stable elements of the rural populace, the very low growth in the electoral roll in 
this period is probably a better measure as to what was happening among this 
group within the rural population. An analysis of the electoral data of most of the 
settlements of any significance in the province but excluding the city shows a 
relative increase between 1932 and 1934 of just under two per cent, less than 
one per cent a year.16 
 
Average number of children per family 
The main reason for this slow growth in population was that the average number 
of (surviving) children per family in Valencia was approximately two. Various 
studies have discussed the significant drop in fertility throughout Spain, with a 
marked drop in the period up to 1930, and have pointed out that there seems to 
have been little difference between rural and urban dwellers. Significant regional 
variations have been noted, with Valencia being one of the areas of particularly 
low fertility.17  
 
The reasons for this low fertility rate are not completely clear, but one possible 
factor in respect of peasant farmers is the desire to limit family size, in an area 
of Spain where the law required equitable partition of assets, in order to reduce 
                                            
15 Information from Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Estimaciones de población, censos y cifras 
oficiales de población, at its website: http://www.ine.es/. Accessed 2 April 2017; see also Ricard 
Pérez Casado, ‘Demografia’ in Ernest Lluch (ed.), L’estructura económica del País Valencià, 
Vol.1, L’Estel, Valencia, 1970, pp. 69-116 at p. 98.  
16 AGFDPV/General/A/A3.12/Memoria/Vol. 33, pp. 155-182. 
17 On this, see J. William Leasure, ‘Factors involved in the Decline of Fertility in Spain 1900-
1950’, Population Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, March 1963, pp. 271-285, especially pp. 273 280, and 
Ron Lesthaeghe and Antonio Lopez-Gay, ‘Structural and Cultural Synergisms in Successive 
Behavioral Innovations: A Comparative Analysis of Two Demographic Transitions in the 
Regions of Spain and Belgium, 1880-2010’, princeton.edu/papers/120669/ January 23, 2012 




the risk of the fragmentation of property holdings.18 Although there may have 
been some slight differential in respect of family sizes between practising 
Catholics and others, census data comparing settlements known to be strongly 
Catholic and others show no material difference in the rate of population 
growth.19  
 
Precise data on average family sizes is not available, but by looking at census 
data for 1930 and comparing the number of women in the province in the age 
band eighteen to thirty six with children up to the age of 15, we find that there 
are almost twice as many children as there are women.20 Although this 
calculation is far from perfect, given a broadly stable population it should provide 
a reasonable estimate of family size.  
 
The Ratio of Men to Women 
The same census data also shows a broad equality between the number of men 
and women.21  
 
Age Profile of the Population  




                                            
18 Iszaevich, Abraham, ‘Emigrants, Spinsters and Priests. The Dynamics of Demography in 
Spanish Peasant Societies’, Journal of Peasant Studies, April 1975, pp. 299-312. Marriages 
tended to occur between male and female children of smallholders as a strategy to counter 
fragmentation; Josepa Cucó i Giner and Rafael Juan i Fenollar, ‘La proletarización del 
campesinado y su relación con el desarrollo capitalista: el caso del País Valenciano,’ Agricultura 
y sociedad, No. 12, 1979, pp. 145-168 at pp. 152-153.    
19 AGFDPV/General/A/A3.12/Memoria/Vol. 33, pp. 155-182. 
20 My analysis of the data from Población (1930) por provincias, edad y sexo, at 
www.ine.es/jaxi/Tabla.ht?path=t120/e245/p06. Accessed 20 February 2018. 
21 My analysis of the data from Población (1930) por provincias, edad y sexo, at 




TABLE 1: AGE PROFILE OF VALENCIAN POPULATION IN 1930 
 
Up to 22 years old 44% 
23 to 42 years 28% 
43 to 55 years 14% 
Over 55 14% 
 
Source: My analysis of the data from: Población (1930) por provincias, edad y sexo, at 
www.ine.es/jaxi/Tabla.ht?path=t120/e245/p06. Accessed 24 February 2018. 
 
These figures include a significant number of recent immigrants, so one cannot 
apply these figures with any great exactitude, but in broad terms in Table 1 we 
have an almost equal number of adults whose offspring will have reached the 
age of voter qualification (twenty three for all adults from the 1933 general 
elections onwards) and those whose children are likely to be under that age. I 
have assumed, and there is little or no evidence to the contrary, that the general 
age population for the province holds good for the sub-category of farmers and 
their families.  
 
On the basis of the demographic profile, and the fact that most married couples 
had two children, one in two couples would have two children of voting age while 
the other couple would not. In broad terms therefore the ‘family voting multiplier’ 
should be three (and on the rare occasions when all female workers are 
included in the published statistics, 1.5). Note that in the analysis which follows 
the ‘family farm voting multiplier’ has only been applied in the context of poor 
farmers, because the adult children of better-off farmers are likely either not to 
appear in the municipal records at all as they were fully engaged in productive 
economic activity on the farm, or if they appeared are less likely to be included 
as ‘landless day-labourers’ or as industrial workers.     
 
Although some families might have three generations of voting age, which 
theoretically could increase the multiplier, I have not increased it because the 
calculation is complicated by the phenomenon of emigration from agricultural 




adult children, nearly always males, may have moved away for an extended 
period and may have disappeared from the electoral roll. More commonly, for 
the adult male of a family farmer, an adult son may have worked away from 
home for periods when not needed on the family farm. In the latter case, the son 
will appear on the electoral roll, but may not appear on the municipal register of 
agricultural or other type of worker. Both types of emigration will impact different 
locations in distinct ways, depending on a range of factors, the most important 
of which are probably the average size of holdings and the nature of the crops 
grown and therefore the intensity, and frequency, of labour requirements on the 
family farm. Unfortunately the information is not available to be able to quantify 
the impact of these factors on the multiplier.  
 
Once one looks at the electoral data in many rural locations in the light of the 
impact of family size and age, it becomes clear that the suggestion that the 
Valencian peasantry were overwhelmingly conservative in their political 
orientation, while true in some locations, is simply incorrect as a general 
statement. Particularly telling in this respect are the results of the November 
1933 general elections. Valencia was an unusual province in that it was one of 
the few locations where the republican-socialist coalition did not fracture, with 
the result that in these elections three strong coalitions fought for power.  
 
Although the PURA manipulated the outcome, there is little doubt that the PURA 
and the DRV were evenly matched in the province, both gaining slightly less 
than forty per cent of the vote each. The Left Front gained virtually all of the 
balance, with an overall vote of 22 per cent. The Left Front could not have 
managed such an outcome unless it had managed to obtain a significant 
majority of the votes of agricultural labourers and of workers in the towns 
throughout the province, and probably the votes of some poor farmers too. That 
being the case, the even matching of the PURA and the DRV meant that the 
PURA must have captured a very significant proportion of the peasant vote and 
possibly as much as the DRV. Since some poor peasants would have voted for 
the Left Front, it seems unlikely that in the November 1933 elections the DRV 




That there was sympathy within sections of the Valencian peasantry for 
republicanism should not be surprising. It is now clear that the view that Spanish 
republicanism was an almost totally urban phenomenon is wrong. The seminal 
article by Jordi Pomés led the way, but in the Valencian context both José 
Vicente Castillo García and Martínez Gallego have provided strong evidence of 
its rural significance.22  Martínez Gallego has shown that many lay, and often 
republican, co-operative organisations focussing on peasant needs existed and 
indeed prospered.23  In Alzira and Carlet for example there were important long-
established lay agrarian syndicates while in l'Alcúdia, there existed a long-
standing lay syndicate which was clearly republican in orientation.24 
 
In analysing electoral data to ascertain the level of support for republican and 
leftist organisations among the poor peasantry I have examined five 
settlements, chosen because they represent locations of importance (in terms 
of population size) but also because these are locations where sufficient 
information exists to carry out a serious analysis of the voting results.  These 
particular settlements have not therefore been randomly selected. They are a 
sub-set of a number of settlements which have been selected for serious study 
by competent historians, because of their relative importance and because local 
archives contain sufficient useful information. At least one large settlement 
where records exist and which was known to be strongly conservative, 
Ontinyent, has been excluded, because the aim of this Appendix is simply to 
show that the DRV did not achieve overwhelming support from the poor 
peasantry throughout the province, while it is known that the DRV was 
                                            
22 Jordi Pomés, ‘Sindicalismo rural republicano en la España de la Restauración’, Ayer, No. 39, 
2000, pp. 103-104; José Vicente Castillo García, ‘El Republicanismo como elemento 
modernizador der las sociedades rurales (1876-1923)’, Revista de Estudios Comarcales    Hoya 
de Buñol-Chiva, No. 1, 1996, and Francesc-Andreu Martínez Gallego, 
Cooperativisme i mutualisme laics al País Valencià, 1834-1936, Universitat de València, 
Valencia, 2010 (Martínez Gallego, Cooperativisme).   
23 Martínez Gallego has shown that such organisations were particularly prevalent in the vine-
growing areas of the interior. Martínez Gallego, Cooperativisme, pp. 239-241. 
24 For Alzira, see Bernat Sanchis i Botella, 100 años de asociacionismo agrario en Alzira. La 
agricola 1892-1992, Cooperativa La Agricola, Alzira, 1993. For Carlet, see Àngel Pascual 
Martínez Soto, ‘El cooperativismo de crédito en España, 1890-1934: modelos, sistemas de 
gestión y balance de su actuación.’ Historia agraria, No. 30, 2003, pp. 119-150 at p. 138. For 
l'Alcúdia, see Francesc Andreu Martinez Gallego, Agricultores solidarios: el cooperativismo en 
l'Alcúdia, 1908-1999, Caixa Rural de l'Alcúdia, l’Alcúdia (Valencia), 2000 (Martinez Gallego, 




successful in Ontinyent. Although not necessarily representative, the examples 
chosen are large enough to have had a significant impact on the overall 
provincial result, as they represent in population terms about 9 per cent of the 
total population of Valencia, excluding the city. The location of the five 
settlements chosen (L'Alcúdia, Alzira, Cullera, Carcaixent and Llíria) is shown 
at Illustration 8 at page 74. 
 
The results selected concern the February 1936 general elections, chosen 
primarily because official final figures for the province were published. Although 
final figures were also published for the June 1931 general election, and the 
partial re-run of October 1931, the DRV was still in the process of building its 
political machine, and these results are therefore a poor measure of its potential 
strength. No formal results were ever published for the province for the 
November 1933 general elections, and although the overall results, albeit 
undoubtedly fraudulent, do give an overall indication of genuine broad levels of 
support, this is less true when one considers individual results.  Certain facts 
which emerge from the February 1936 results do however allow a measure of 
informed speculation concerning changing loyalties during the earlier years of 
the Republic.     
 
Certain assumptions have been applied in order to analyse the information. 
These are: 
1. I have assumed that the vast majority of agricultural labourers and other 
workers voted for the Popular Front. Given that the Popular front could 
not have achieved the results it did without this level of support, this 
assumption is robust.  
2. I have assumed that agricultural labourers who voted for the DRV and its 
electoral allies represented 5 per cent of voters. The evidence for 
applying this figure is discussed below. 
3. There is no information on who voted for the PURA, and in allocating 
PURA voters between the three categories listed in the following tables, 
I pro-rated the figures. In most cases, the PURA vote is in any case too 




higher this sub-division still appears reasonable as it seems probable that 
in such locations the PURA must have managed to hold onto more 
peasant and agricultural labourer support than elsewhere. 
4. Except where mentioned to the contrary, I have assumed no material 
differential voter participation rate between social classes or sexes (the 
latter assumption is relevant to the ‘family farm voting multiplier’). This 
may or may not be correct. There is anecdotal evidence on the high 
turnout of women, but no hard information on any possible significant 
differential. On social class differential, there is little evidence either way.     
5. The allocation in the ‘Other’ Column in the following tables varies, 
depending on the location, and the methodology is stated for each 
location.    
With reference to assumption 2, there is little information available. The number 
of agricultural labourers in the confessional syndicate in l'Alcúdia was according 
to Martínez Gallego somewhere between 200-380, which expressed as a 
percentage of the active population of the town, was between 11 and 22 per 
cent of the total working population.25 Whilst not all of these individuals would 
have voted for the DRV, since one incentive to join Catholic syndicates was to 
get paid work as a labourer, access to a tenancy and credit for tools, seed, and 
to fund land improvements, irrespective of religious views, the existence of a 
large non-confessional syndicate gave leftist labourers an alternative so it is 
probably the case that there was a religious and political motivation at play in 
terms of the decision as to which of the two syndicates to join. The range of 11 
to 22 per cent is consistent with the membership figures for members of the 
DRV provided by Valls, which suggests that some 13 per cent of its membership 
consisted of agricultural labourers and other workers.  
 
Although Valls shows overall membership of the DRV as consisting of only 3 
per cent of agricultural labourers excluding other workers, his figures include 
members from Valencia city and larger conurbations whereas l'Alcúdia was an 
                                            
25 Martínez Gallego, Agricultores Solidarios, pp. 180-184; GFDPV/General /A /A3.12 /Memoria/  




overwhelmingly agricultural town.26 Membership of Catholic unions during the 
Republic in the province on the other hand do not suggest much support, 
although such open hostility was shown towards the Catholic unions by other 
working-class organisations that many potential Catholic voters may have 
preferred to keep a low profile.27 All in all, worker support for the DRV in the 
countryside is unlikely to have been higher than 5 per cent. 
 
L'Alcúdia 
We know that l'Alcúdia, in the Ribera Alta, a town almost entirely devoted to 
agriculture, was a town with a long republican tradition with a significant CNT 
and UGT presence and which during the Republic became a stronghold of the 
Radical Socialists.28 In 1930 it had a population of 5,062 and an estimated active 
population of some 1,700. In 1934 its electoral roll contained 3,182 names.29 
L'Alcúdia had a long established non-confessional agrarian syndicate, La 
Vedriola, led by prominent local republicans, which during the years of the 
Republic became strongly republican in orientation with close links to the 
Radical Socialists. In 1931 it had 810 members, a number in excess of 50 per 
cent of the active population of the town.  
 
There was also a confessional Syndicate, La Protectora, which in 1931 had 625 
members. Between the two, over 80 per cent of the adult male population was 
a member of one or other organisation.  Martinez Gallego has reviewed the 
membership rolls for La Protectora and discovered that 40 per cent of its 
                                            
26 Valls, Derecha Regional Valenciana, pp. 125 and 126. 
27 Excluding the city, the combined membership of the female and male Catholic union 
federations never exceeded 15,000 during the Republic. The figure for the women’s 
organisation was 6,000, and for the men’s approximately 8,000, less than 2 per cent of the adult 
working population. My calculations are based on information provided on female unions in  
Rosa María Capel Martínez, El trabajo y la educación de la mujer en España (1900-1930), 
Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid, 1982, pp. 544-547, and Candido Ruiz Rodrigo, ‘Sindicacion 
femenina católica.  Cuestion social y educación: Valencia 1912-1936’, in Various authors, Mujer 
y educación en España 1868-1975. VI Coloquio de Historia de la Educación, Universidad de 
Santiago de Compostela. Santiago de Compostela, 1990, pp. 676-690 at pp. 681-682. For the 
male unions, see Diario de Valencia, 17 September 1935.   
28 Martinez Gallego, Agricultores solidarios, pp. 73-75 and his El socialismo de los tres 
nacimientos: en los orígenes de las agrupaciones socialistas de L'Alcúdia, Agrupació del PSPV-
PSOE L'Alcúdia, L'Alcúdia (Valencia), 2002. 




members were landowners, a significant majority (over 70 per cent) of whom 
were poor to middling owners. The majority of the remaining members were 
either agricultural labourers or, probably, tenant farmers.30  Assuming 200 
agricultural labourers and 175 tenant farmers were members, this would 
produce a working population composed of 55 to 60 per cent poor farmers and 
32 per cent labourers. Table 2 sets out the electoral result in the February 1936 
general election, with an attempt to sub-divide voting behaviour based on the 
membership information of La Protectora. 
 
TABLE 2: L’ALCÚDIA. FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT. 
VERSION A 
 A: Labourers31 B: Poor Farmers C: Other Total 
Popular Front 751 592 34 1,377 
PURA 283 591 34   908 
DRV 54 789    238 1,115 
Total     1,088        1,972    340 3,400 
 
Source: Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia, 20 February 1936. 
Column A: the total is 3,400 x 32 per cent = 1,088 in accordance with the information from La 
Protectora.  The Popular Front figure is a balancing number (all balancing numbers in this and 
subsequent tables indicated by placing the figures in italics).  
Column B: the total is 3,400 x 58 per cent = 1,972 in accordance with the information from La 
Protectora. The ‘poor farmers’ column for the three electoral blocks are balancing figures.   
Column C: the total is a balancing figure. 80 per cent of this has been allocated to the DRV 
given that this includes wealthier famers and some industrial and commercial people, with 10 
per cent estimated to represent Popular Front voters and 10 per cent PURA voters.  
 
In this case I have not adjusted the figures by the ‘family farming multiplier’ since 
the register of names of La Protectora shows that in the vast majority of cases, 
                                            
30 Martinez Gallego, Agricultores solidarios, pp. 180-184. Martinez Gallego states that ‘a 
majority’ of the remaining members, that is at least 30 per cent of the total membership, were 
day-labourers, but does not say more than this. I have assumed that the majority of the balance 
are probably tenant farmers given the nature of the organisation.  Similar data is not held for La 
Vedriola. 





only one person per family (presumably the paterfamilias) was a member so 
that double-counting should be automatically eliminated. The one somewhat 
questionable assumption is the allocation of 80 per cent of the ‘other’ vote to the 
DRV, but even if all of this were to be allocated instead to the Popular Front the 
results would be as per Table 3.  
      
TABLE 3: L’ALCÚDIA. FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT. 
VERSION B 
 A: Labourers B: Poor Farmers C: Other Total 
Popular Front 751   286    340 1,377 
PURA 283   625    ----   908 
DRV  54 1,061    ---- 1,115 
Total     1,088 1,972    340 3,400 
 
The recast figure is clearly unrealistic, but the two tables establish a range of 
potential DRV votes from within the poor peasantry of between 40 per cent in 
the earlier example to 54 per cent in the latter. Given that the recast figure is 
improbable, it is therefore clear that on any likely scenario only a minority of 
poor peasants voted for the DRV. 
 
Alzira 
Alzira was the second largest settlement in the province with a population in 
1935 of 21,869 and a recorded active population of 7,906 (from the percentage, 
these reported figures are either entirely or largely male).32  In 1934 there were 
14,003 names on the electoral roll.33  Local records show 1,458 owners of land 
with less than half an hectare and a further 892 with land up to one hectare. 
These two groups (totalling 2,350 of poor farmers) worked over 64 per cent of 
the productive land.34  Municipal records show 4,877 individuals as agricultural 
                                            
32 Rovira Granero, Alzira, p. 25.  
33 AGFDPV/General/A/A3.12/Memoria/Vol. 33, p. 159. 




labourers.35 This data seems incorrect because the sum of the ‘family farm 
multiplier’ (3 x 2,350) and of agricultural labourers and their wives adjusted to 
prevent double-counting of farmers’ adult children ([4,887 x 2] – 2,350), gives a 
figure of 14,474, a figure which exceeds the total number of voters on the 
electoral roll.36  
 
Given that there was also some industrial activity, and an important commercial 
sector, the agricultural labourer data can only approximate to the correct 
position if we assume that a large but unknown number of female workers is 
included in the official figures for agricultural labourers.37 All that can be said 
with any confidence therefore is that family farmers and adult family members 
probably total at least 7,000 voters, that is at least 50 per cent of the electorate, 
while the number of agricultural labourers who are not adult children of family 
farmers must total at least 2,527 (4,877-2,350) and represent at least 18 per 
cent of the electorate.  
TABLE 4: ALZIRA. FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT. 
VERSION A 
 A: Labourers B: Poor Farmers C: Other Total 
Popular Front 2,016   982 3,452  6,450 
PURA -----   870 -----     870 
DRV ----- 3,542 -----  3,542 
Total 2,016 5,394 3,452 10,862 
 
Source: Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia, 20 February 1936.   
Column A: total derived from 14,003 x 18 per cent x 80 per cent = 2016. 100% allocated to 
Popular Front. 
Column B: the total assumes an allocation of the remaining voters (8,846) in the ratio 50/82. 
The three allocations between voting blocks are all balancing figures 
Column C: the total represents 8,846 x 32/82, all allocated to the Popular Front.   
                                            
35 Rovira Granero, Alzira, p. 63. 
36 It is more likely that the municipal data on workers’ occupations is faulty than the record of 
land-holdings, which was required for tax purposes.   




TABLE 5: ALZIRA. FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT. 
VERSION B 
 A: Labourers B: Poor Farmers C: Other Total 
Popular Front 1,755 2,658 2,037  6,450 
PURA   161   433   276    870 
DRV   100 2,303 1,139  3,542 
Total 2,016 5,394 3,452 10,862 
 
Column A: total as table 4, allocated 8% to the PURA, 5% to the DRV and 87% to the Popular 
Front. 
Column B: total as table 4. The allocations between three voting blocks are balancing figures.  
Column C: total as table 4, allocated between three voting blocks pro-rata in accordance with 
share of total vote.  
 
In the 1936 general election, 10,862 voters cast their votes with a 78 per cent 
participation rate. Alzira was a highly politically aware settlement, and here there 
were significantly different levels of voter participation, with an 85 per cent 
participation in leftist neighbourhoods, while elsewhere voter participation was 
in the range 60 to 65 per cent.38 Even given the differential voter participation 
and the problems with the information on agricultural labourers, on any 
reasonable set of assumptions, the majority of peasant voters in Alzira did not 
vote for the right as Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate.   
 
Table 4 is a most unlikely scenario, since it assumes that all middling to rich 
farmers as well as the industrial, commercial and professional middle classes 
voted for the Popular Front, as well as non-agricultural workers. Even table 5 
(which shows 43 per cent of poor peasants voting for the DRV) probably 
overestimates DRV support since a pro-rata allocation of column C delivers 59 
per cent of this figure to the Popular Front; a lower percentile in this line would, 
as a matter of simple arithmetic, increase the poor peasant figure in the Popular 
Front line. 
                                            





The important agricultural settlement of Cullera also demonstrates that having 
a significant number of peasant farmers within the electorate did not necessarily 
mean strong support for the right. In 1930, Cullera had a population of 
approximately 13,000 people and in 1934 there were 8,665 names on the 
electoral roll.39 Most of the local farmers who represented some 25 per cent of 
the working population owned small-holdings, with 93 per cent of owner-farmers 
cultivating land of 4 hectares or less.40 Local agricultural labourers accounted 
for some 2,800 of the work force that is over 60 per cent of the active population. 
No data is available as to the number of farmers who were tenants but otherwise 
landless. 
 
Although a number of assumptions have to be added into the calculations in this 
case to produce probable figures it is possible to demonstrate that support for 
the DRV from the poor peasantry was far from overwhelming. Note Table 6 
which suggests that almost 40 per of poor farmers supported the DRV, but even 
if only 40 per cent of the ‘Other’ vote were allocated to the DRV, as in Table 7, 
this would still only deliver some 48 per cent of the poor farmers’ vote to the 
DRV.   
 
In fact there is other evidence which suggest that these tables overstate the 
support for the DRV from poor farmers. This is the result of the ballot held in 
September 1933 to elect the committee of the local rice-growers syndicate a 
requirement under the Presidential decree of May 1933 which set up the 
Federación Sindical de Agricultores Arroceros (FSAA). Designed to promote the 
interests of rice-growing smallholders, the decree inter alia mandated the 
creation of local democratically-controlled co-operatives. Cullera was required 
                                            
39 AHN/Seccion de Fondos Contemporaneos / Politica y Orden Publica /Ministerio de 
Gobernacion/FC_M_Interior/SerieA/Caja2/Exped15;AGFDPV / General/A/A3.12./Memoria/Vol. 
33, p. 176. 
40 Antonio Calzado Aldaria ‘La Negociación de Salarios y Condiciones Laborales de los Obreros 
Agrícolas de Sueca y Cullera en la Plantada y Siega de Arroz durante La Segúnda Republica’ 
in Various authors, II Jornades d’Estudis de Cullera, 1, 2 and 3 de Desembre 1995, 7iMaig, 
Benicull del Xúquer (Valencia), 1998, pp. 213-232 at p.  214; On the number of poor farmers, 




to establish its own syndicate under the terms of the decree. The number of 
local farmers who voted were 345. Applying the ‘family farm voting multiplier’ to 
this figure, they represented over 1,000 potential voters in a general election, 
constituting some 40 to 50 per cent of all the poor farming families. Three 
competing slates for the committee were formed, one backed by the PURA, one 
by the Independent Radical Socialists and one by the DRV. The 
 
TABLE 6: CULLERA. FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT. 
VERSION A 
 A: Labourers B: Poor Farmers C: Other Total 
Popular Front 2,244   916 102 3,262 
PURA    891   686 276 1,853 
DRV   165 1,048 644 1,857 
Total 3,300 2,650  1,022 6,972 
 
Source: Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia, 20 February 1936. 
Column A: total is 6,972 x 60 per cent = 4,183, less adult children included in Column B (883). PURA and 
DRV votes calculated as in other tables. Popular Front allocation is a balancing figure. 
Column B: total is 25 per cent of votes cast adjusted for ‘family farm multiple’ which gives 38 per cent of 
the total.  PURA voters calculated on pro-rata basis. Popular Front and DRV entries are balancing figures.  
Column C: total is balancing figure.  PURA allocation on pro-rata basis, Popular Front assumed to be 10 
per cent and balance allocated to DRV. 
 
   
TABLE 7: CULLERA. FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT. 
VERSION B 
 A: Labourers B: Poor Farmers C: Other Total 
Popular Front 2,244 680 338 3,262 
PURA   891   686 276 1,853 
DRV   165 1,284 408 1,857 





result is at Table 8. This demonstrates that barely more than 25 per cent of 
these poor farmers voted for the DRV and that almost three quarters voted for 
republican parties.  
 
TABLE 8: CULLERA. FSAA ELECTION RESULT SEPTEMBER 1933 
Electoral Slate Votes Cast % of Total 
PURA 153  44% 
Independent Radical Socialists  99  29% 
DRV  93  27% 
Total 345 100% 
 
Source: José Codina Cerveró,  ‘La Agricultura en Cullera en los Años 1920/1930 y 
Posteriores’, in V Jornades d’ Estudis de Cullera, celebrades els dies 23, 24 i 25 de 
novembre de 2001, Ajuntament de Cullera/Setimig, Cullera, 2003, pp. 25-64 at p. 33. 
 
Carcaixent    
Carcaixent was an important settlement and an overwhelmingly agricultural 
town devoted to orange production, and ancillary activities, where small-scale 
famers almost equalled agricultural labourers in number. In 1931 the population 
was 15,393.41 In 1934 there were 10,413 names on the electoral roll.42 Official 
records show 2,500 agricultural labourers and 2,430 farmers (owners and 
tenants).  According to Sigalat Vayá, 86 per cent of farmers were poor.43  The 
participation rate in the February 1936 elections was 80 per cent.44 Carcaixent 
was known as a left-wing town, but as Table 9 shows, the DRV seems to have 
managed to obtain a fairly high percentage of poor peasant voters (55 per cent 
or higher if less of the ‘other’ column is allocated to the DRV).  
                                            
41 Maria Jesús Fuertes Llopis, ‘Algunas Aspectos Sobre El Cultivo del Naranjo y La 
Comercializacion de la Naranja en La Ribera. El Caso de Carcaixent de 1881 al Primer Tercio 
del Siglo XX’, Al-Gezira, No 7, 1992, pp. 265-326 at p. 271.  
42 AGFDPV/General/A/A3.12/Memoria/Vol. 33, p. 159. 
43 María José Sigalat Vayá, La Segunda República y la guerra civil en Carcaixent: 1931-1939; 
undergraduate dissertation, Universitat de Valencia, 1999, p. 36. 




TABLE 9: CARCAIXENT. FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT 
 A: Labourers B: Poor Farmers C: Other Total 
Popular Front    2,091    2,016    370 4,477 
PURA       116       250      52    418 
DRV       116       2,764    632 3,512 
Total    2,323    5,030 1,054 8,407 
 
Source: Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia, 20 February 1936. 
Column A: total is 2,500 x 2 x 80 per cent = 4,000), less 1,677 (see notes on Column B). The 
PURA allocation is pro-rata. The Popular Front number is a balancing figure.  
Column B: total is derived from the total number of farmers multiplied by the ‘family farm voting 
multiplier’ (2,430 x 3 = 7,290. Of this, 86% are poor farmers and the participation rate is 80% so 
7,290 x 86 percent x 80 per cent = 2,323. As one in three of these voters (1,677) represents an 
adult child, 1,677 is deducted from Column A.  The PURA allocation is pro-rata. Other 
allocations are balancing figures. 
Column C: the total is a balancing figure. Approximately 540 of the ‘other’ column consists of 
middling to better-off farmers (2,430 x 2 x 14 % x 80%). The PURA allocation is pro-rata. The 
DRV allocation is 60 per cent which seems reasonable given the proportion of middling to rich 
farmers. The Popular Front number is a balancing figure. 
 
Llíria 
Llíria is an important settlement with a population of approximately 8,226 people 
in 1930.45 In 1934 there were 5,328 names on the electoral roll.46 Good quality 
data is not available for the republican period, but according to the 1940 
municipal records, of the 2,050 people who worked in agriculture, 1,810 were 
farmers, only 208 were agricultural labourers and 21 were described as 
‘owners’.47 This unusual ratio of agricultural labourers to farmers suggests that 
the figures may not be particularly reliable, but can partly be explained by the 
fact that many of the children of poor farmers found work in the newly 
established large jute and esparto weaving factory which had moved from 
Valencia city to Lliria in 1929; it is known that the vast majority of employees 
were the children of local farmers.48  
                                            
45Josep Daniel Simeón Riera, Entre la rebel·lia i la tradició: Llíria durant la república i la guerra 
civil, 1931-1939, Diputació de València, Valencia, 1993 (Simeón Riera, Entre la rebel·lia), p. 54. 
46 AGFDPV/General/A/A3.12/Memoria/Vol. 33, p. 170. 
47 Simeón Riera, Entre la rebel·lia, p. 21. 
48 Ángeles Adrià Montagut, ‘Una industria vista por sus trabajadores: La Fábrica de Hilados de 






The vast majority of farmers in Lliria were extremely poor. Much of the land here 
was not irrigated, so very small holdings did little to alleviate extreme poverty. 
For un-irrigated land a holding of 5 hectares or less meant a struggle to survive 
and 85 per cent of the farmers on un-irrigated land were in this category. Where 
the land was irrigated, 96.7 per cent of owner held one hectare or less, which 
also meant a poverty-stricken existence.49  
 
Holding land in Lliria did not however mean that the majority of peasants 
supported the right. Applying the ‘family voting multiplier’ to the known number 
of tenant farmers results in a figure slightly higher than the electoral roll, a further 
reason to suggest that the record of farmers may not be correct, but somewhere 
between 80 and 90 per cent of the electorate were probably  ‘family farm voters’. 
During the first bienio, these voters had strongly supported the Radical 
Socialists. In the February 1936 elections the results (and my suggested 
allocation of votes) are shown at Table 10. 
 
TABLE 10: LLÍRIA. FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT 
 A: Labourers B: Poor Farmers C: Other Total 
Popular Front 301 1,513 585 2,399 
PURA  35   293 110   438 
DRV  18 1,271 408 1,697 
Total 354 3,077  1,103 4,534 
 
Source: Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Valencia, 20 February 1936. 
Column A:  total is 208 x 2 x 85% participation rate = 354. PURA and DRV allocations as 
previously, 85 per cent allocated to Popular Front. 
Column B: total is 1,810 x 2 = 3,620 x 85% = 3,077. Other three entries are balancing figures.   
Column C: total is balancing figure. Allocated across three voting blocks on pro-rata basis. 
 
                                            





Overall Support for the DRV  
 
Although there is insufficient information to build a province-wide model, it is 
possible to test the overall conclusions in this Appendix against two idealised 
models to examine what the likely average range of levels of support for the 
DRV might have been. To do this I have modelled the February 1936 election 
results on two scenarios, which I have called the ‘high agrarian density model’ 
and the ‘lower agrarian density/semi-industrialised model’.  Both of the models 
aggregate the combined Popular Front and PURA vote as the sole purpose is 
to look at the level of support for the DRV. 
 
The assumptions employed in the ‘high agrarian density model’ are: 
1. that farmers represent 60 per cent of the active population. 
2. that 90 per cent of farmers are poor. 
3. that day-labourers represent 30 per cent of the active population. 
4. that the DRV obtained 5 per cent of the vote of day-labourers. 
5. that the remaining 10 percent of voters would contain few workers but 
would instead consist of shopkeepers, small-scale industrialists, 
members of the liberal professions, clergy and employees of local 
government, and these would vote 70 per cent for the DRV. 
The majority of the actual settlements which might approximate to this ideal 
model would be the smaller towns, although a few important larger settlements 
will share some similarities.     
 
The assumptions employed in the ‘lower agrarian density/semi-industrialised 
model’ are: 
1. that farmers represent 45 per cent of the active population. 
2. that 90 per cent of farmers are poor. 
3. that day-labourers represent 15 per cent of the active population. 




5. that the remaining 40 percent would contain people employed in a variety 
of trades. Rather than speculate on the precise mix, I have used the 
electoral results for Valencia city as a proxy, whereby 40 per cent of this 
balance that is 16 per cent of voters have been assumed to have voted 
for the DRV and 24 per cent for the PURA and Popular Front combined. 
 
Few if any settlements in the province are likely to fully emulate the second 
model, but it provides a theoretical limit within which certain larger settlements, 
such as Gandia, are likely to show some of the same characteristics. In both 
cases the models assume that the populations voted exactly in line with the 
overall provincial result, which was: DRV 45 per cent, Popular Front and PURA 
combined 55 per cent.  Clearly this would not have been the case and there 
would have been very wide variations around the province-wide arithmetical 
average, but they show that on average the DRV must have achieved a modest 
majority from poor peasant farmers in February 1936.  Table 11 shows just 
under 56 per cent of poor farmers voting for the DRV ([30/54] X 100) while in 
table 12 it is 55 per cent ([22/40] X 100).   
 
Although the model assumed in Table 12 is an ‘outlier’, both deliver an almost 
identical result in respect of poor peasants, suggesting that a clear but modest 
majority of poor peasants voted for the DRV in February 1936. The relative 
insensitivity of the outcome even with significant changes in assumptions is not 
surprising. Once one applies the ‘family farm voting multiplier’, poor peasants 
represent such a high proportion of the electorate that all parties which aspired 
to electoral success required significant poor peasant support. As the Popular 
Front slightly beat the DRV led alliance in votes, the Popular Front must have 
gained a significant proportion of the poor peasant vote; therefore any DRV 






TABLE 11: FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT. HIGH 
AGRARIAN DENSITY MODEL 
 
Occupations Percentages DRV Non-DRV 
Poor Farmers  54 30 24 
Middling to affluent farmers   6  6 ---- 
Labourers  30  2 28 
Other  10  7  3 
Totals 100 45 55 
 
 
TABLE 12: FEBRUARY 1936 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT. LOW 
AGRARIAN DENSITY/ SEMI-INDUSTRIALISED MODEL 
 
Occupations Percentages DRV Non-DRV 
Poor Farmers 40 22 18 
Middling to affluent farmers  5  5 ---- 
Labourers 15  2 13 
Other 40 16 24 




The evidence is clear that many small-scale farmers, owners and tenants, voted 
for the right, but it is equally clear from the analysis of the February 1936 vote 
in l'Alcúdia, Alzira, Cullera, Carcaixent and  Lliria that a large proportion, indeed 
in parts of the province a majority, did not. The DRV had to fight hard to establish 
its overall (and modest) majority support from within the poor peasantry. It did 
not officially stand in the June 1931 elections, but in October 1931 its provincial 




vote and probably poor peasant support in the region of 22-24 per cent.50  In 
November 1933 the DRV probably received a slightly higher level of poor 
peasant support than the PURA, in the region of 45 per cent.  Overall, it appears 
that ultimately the DRV did obtain a clear but not commanding majority of poor 
peasant voters, but only by February 1936, with the collapse in support for the 
PURA. It fell short of obtaining a majority of poor peasant voters before then. 
 
The increase in support for the DRV from poor farmers does at first sight appear 
a little odd, since there were many tenant farmers in Valencia. Evidence from 
elsewhere suggests that there was a swing to the left from poor farmers who 
were tenants, as a result of large-scale evictions following the emasculation of 
the provisions in the agrarian reform legislation designed to protect them.51 It 
seems however that large-scale evictions did not occur in the horta. If they had 
occurred one would expect this to have been highlighted in the local republican, 
socialist and anarcho-syndicalist press, but there is virtually no mention of this 
phenomenon.  
 
The reason why the horta seems to have been relatively exempt appears to 
have been as a result of pressure from the DRV leadership. In December 1934 
it convened a meeting of DRV members who were peasant farmers and 
landlords to reaffirm the need to stand by the security of tenure which had 
developed under Valencian custom and practice. Over 1,000 DRV peasants 
and landlords attended the meeting, which resolved that landlords who refused 
to abide by local custom and practice would be expelled from the DRV.52 This 
initiative may have had some effect in relation to landlords in the horta because 
most of these were residents of the city where the DRV leadership resided and 
                                            
50 BOPV, 5, 6 and 7 October1931.  These estimates are based on applying the same ratio of 
poor peasant voters for the DRV to overall DRV support set out in Tables 11 and 12 ([56/45] X 
19%). 
51 In those parts of Spain where there were mass evictions, many peasants radicalised; Richard 
A.H. Robinson, The Origins of Franco’s Spain, The Right, the Republic, and Revolution, 1931–
1936, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1970, p. 252.  




any failure to comply with DRV rules would have been immediately noticed and 
the landlords subjected to pressure to comply.   
 
Elsewhere however there is evidence that the attempt by the DRV leadership 
was less effective. It is clear that in Alicante, where the tenancy arrangements 
for small-scale farmers were similar to those throughout much of Valencia 
province, peasants did radicalise as a result of the threat, and actuality, of mass 
evictions.53 DRV landowners were directly involved in evicting tenants in at least 
one case, that of Cocentaina, a town in the extreme north of Alicante province 
very close to the boundary with Valencia.54 Even in the Valencian horta some 
tenant farmers seem to have moved to the left. A report in Solidaridad Obrera 
on the peasants of Burjassot and Paterna refers to the tenant farmers of these 
settlements which it describes as former bastions of blasquismo but which had 
now radicalised.55  
 
Thus it is not true that the overwhelming majority of peasant farmers were of the 
right. Instead, there was a significant number of farmers with republican 
sympathies but without a long history of loyalty to any particular political party 
since historically blasquismo had been a force of Valencia city and sections of 
the nearby horta (such as in Burjassot and Paterna). Peasant farmers who did 
not hold long-standing republican sympathies probably initially voted for the 
conservative republican party the DLR. The fight to solidify republican farmers’ 
support behind the PURA, and to mobilise conservative farmers behind the 
DRV, led to the joint PURA-DRV campaign against the central government 
during 1932 and the first few months of 1933.  
 
The campaign, although responding to a genuine economic crisis, was 
designed both to weaken the central government and to ‘reframe’ the crisis into 
                                            
53 Joaquín Chapaprieta, La paz fue posible, memorias de un político. Ariel, Barcelona, 1971, 
pp. 401-402. 
54 El Combate Sindicalista, 11 October, 1935. 
55 Solidaridad Obrera (Barcelona), 25 January 1936. There is however no reference to evictions  




a particular political narrative designed to appeal to the peasantry and persuade 
them that the PURA and/or the DRV were best placed to defend them. This 
campaign was a game played for very high stakes. If the municipal and general 
elections of 1933 are any guide, both parties succeeded in mobilising a majority 
of poor farmers against the centre-left government, but neither party achieved 
a decisive hegemony over the other. As the PURA collapsed, the DRV did 
eventually achieve a majority of the votes of poor peasants, but many opted 
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Gandia, Alfons el Vell, Gandia (Valencia), 2002. 
Laclau, Ernest, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, New Left Books, London, 
1977. 





Lacomba, Juan Antonio, Ensayos sobre el siglo XX, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 
Madrid, 1972. 
Laguna Platero, Antonio, Historia del periodismo valenciano, 200 años en 
primera plana, Generalitat Valenciana, Valencia, 1990. 
Laguna Platero, Antonio, El Pueblo, historia de un periódico republicano, 1894-
1939, Institució Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1999. 
Laguna Platero, Antonio, and López Blasco, Andrés, (eds.), Dos cents anys de 
premsa valenciana, Generalitat Valenciana, Valencia, 1992. 
Lannon, Frances, Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy. The Catholic Church in 
Spain, 1875–1975, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987. 
Lannon, Frances and Preston, Paul, (eds.), Élites and power in twentieth-
century Spain: Essays in Honour of Sir Raymond Carr, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1990. 
Lázaro Lorente, Luis Miguel, Las escuelas racionalistas en el País Valenciano 
(1906-1931), Universitat de València, Valencia, 1992. 
Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred C. (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes, 4 Vols, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1978.  
Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, 
John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997.  
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Rokkan, Stein (eds.), Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: Cross-National Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1967. 
Lluch, Ernest, (ed.), L'estructura económica del Pais Valencia, L'Estel, 
Valencia, 1970. 
Lluch, Ernest and Soler i Marco, Vicent Enric, La via valenciana, Afers, 




López Villaverde, Angel Luis, El gorro frigio y la mitra frente a frente: 
construcción y diversidad territorial del conflicto político-religioso en la España 
republicana, Rubeo, Barcelona, 2008. 
 
López Iñíguez, Julio, La Unión Patriótica y el Somatén Valencianos (1923-
1930), Universitat de València, Valencia, 2017. 
Lowe, Sid, Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism, The Juventud 
de Acción Popular in Spain 1931-1939, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 
Portland and Toronto, 2010. 
Lull Martí, Enrique, Jesuitas y pedagogía, el Colegio San José en la Valencia 
de los años veinte, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1997.  
Macarro Vera, José Manuel, Socialismo, República y revolución en Andalucía 
(1931-1936), Universidad de Sevilla, Seville, 2000. 
Magenti Javaloyas, Silvia, L'anticlericalisme blasquista, València, 1898-1913, 
La Xara, Simat de la Valldigna, (Valencia), 2001. 
Magenti Javaloyas, Silvia, Política y políticos en la Valencia de la Restauración, 
1898-1914, Universitat de València, Valencia, 1997. 
Mainar Cabanes, Eladi, L'alçament militar de juliol de 1936 a València, La Xara, 
Benifairó de la Valldigna, (Valencia), 1996. 
Mainar Cabanes, Eladi, (ed.), Bajo las bombas, Vol. 14 of La Guerra Civil en La 
Comunidad Valenciana, Prensa Valenciana, Valencia, 2006.  
Mainar Cabanes, Eladi, El colp militar de juliol del 36 a València i la formació 
de les milícies populars (juliol 1936-març 1937), Universitat de València, 
Valencia, 1993.  
Mainar Cabanes, Eladi, (ed.), El fracaso del golpe de estado, Vol. 2 of La Guerra 
Civil en La Comunidad Valenciana, Prensa Valenciana, Valencia, 2006.  
Mainar Cabanes, Eladi, De milicians a soldats, les columnes valencianes en la 




Mainar Cabanes, Eladi, (ed), ¡Todos al frente! Vol. 5 of La Guerra Civil en La 
Comunidad Valenciana, Prensa Valenciana, Valencia, 2006.  
Malefakis, Edward, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1970. 
Malefakis, Edward (ed.), La Guerra Civil española, Taurus, Madrid, 2006. 
Mancebo, María Fernanda, La universidad de Valencia en guerra. La FUE 
(1936-39), Universitat de València, Valencia, 1988. 
Mancebo, María Fernanda, La Universidad de Valencia, de la monarquía a la 
república, 1919-1939, Universitat de València, Valencia, 1994. 
Mancebo, María Fernanda, La Universidad de Valencia en el tránsito de la 
Dictadura a la República: la F.U.E, Universitat de València, Valencia, 1982. 
Marqués, Josep Vicent, País perplex, notes sobre la ideologia valenciana, 3i4, 
Valencia, 1974. 
Martínez Roda, Federico, Valencia y las Valencias: su historia contemporánea 
(1800-1975), Fundación Universitaria San Pablo CEU, Valencia, 1998. 
Martínez Gallego, Francesc Andreu, Agricultores solidarios, el cooperativismo 
en l'Alcúdia, 1908-1999, Cooperativa Agrícola Ntra. Sra. de L'Oreto, L'Alcúdia 
(Valencia), 2000.  
Martinez Gallego, Francesc Andreu, Construint la ciutadania: una història 
contemporánia de l'Alcúdia 1801-2002. História de l´Alcudia, Vol. 2, Ajuntament 
de l´Alcúdia, L´Alcúdia (Valencia), 2002. 
Martínez Gallego, Francesc Andreu, Desarrollo y crecimiento, la 
industrialización valenciana, 1834-1914, Conselleria d'Indústria, Comerç i 
Turisme, Valencia 1995. 
Martínez Gallego, Francesc Andreu, Esperit d'associació: cooperativisme i 





Martínez Ortiz, José, Utiel. Gentes, hechos y moda de vida, Ayuntamiento de 
Utiel, Utiel, (Valencia), 1983.  
Martínez Serrano, José Antonio; Pedreño, Andrés and Reig, Ernest, (eds.), 
Estructura económica de la Comunidad Valenciana, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 
1992. 
Martínez Serrano, José Antonio and Reig, Ernest, Paro y fuerza de trabajo en 
el País Valenciano, La Conselleria, Valencia, 1979. 
Martínez Serrano, José Antonio; Soler i Marco, Vicent Enric  and Reig, Ernest, 
Evolución de la economía valenciana, 1878-1978,  Caja de Ahorros,  Valencia, 
1978. 
Martínez Canet, Robert,  Elits, subordinació i rebel·lia: la comarca de la costera 
entre la Restauració borbónica i la Segona República (1900-1930), Alfons el 
Magnànim, Valencia, 2006. 
Masmano Palmer, Chimo, Comunistas en Buñol. Historia del PCE, PCE, Buñol 
(Valencia), 2003. 
Mazover, Mark, Dark Continent: Europe's 20th Century, Knopf, New York, 1998. 
Millares Cantero, Agustín, Franchy Roca y los federales en el "Bienio Azañista", 
Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria, Gran Canary, 1997. 
Modesto Alapont, José R, A ús i costum de bon llaurador. L’arrendament de 
terres a l’horta de Valencià (1780-1860), Afers, Catarroja (Valencia), 1998. 
Montero García, Feliciano (ed.), La Acción Católica en la II República. 
Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, Alcalá de Henares, 2008. 
Montero Gibert, José Ramón, La CEDA. El catolicismo social y político en la II 
República, 2 Vols, Revista de Trabajo, Madrid, 1977.  
Moreno-Luzón, Javier, Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of 





Moreno Fernández, Luis Miguel,  Acción Popular Murciana. La derecha 
confesional en Murcia durante la II República, Universidad de Murcia, Murcia, 
1987. 
Moreno Seco, Mónica, Conflicto educativo y secularización en Alicante durante 
la Segunda República (1931-1936), Institut de Cultura ‘Juan Gil-Albert’, 
Alicante, 1995. 
Navarro Navarro, Francisco Javier, Ateneos y grupos ácratas, Generalitat 
Valenciana, Valencia, 2003.  
Navarro Navarro, Francisco Javier, El paraíso de la razón: la revista “Estudios” 
(1928-1937) y el mundo cultural anarquista, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 
1997. 
Navarro Navarro, Francisco Javier, A la revolución por la cultura. Prácticas 
culturales y sociabilidad libertarias en el País Valenciano, 1931-1939, 
Universitat de València, Valencia, 2004. 
Navarro Navarro, Francisco Javier, (ed.), Valencia, capital de la República, Vol. 
7 of La Guerra Civil en La Comunidad Valenciana, Prensa Valenciana, 
Valencia, 2006. 
Navarro Navarro, Javier and Valero, Sergio, (eds.), València capital de la 
República : 1936-1937. 1, El món mira a València, capital de l'antifeixisme, 
Ajuntament de Valencia, Valencia, 2016. 
Nicolás Marín, María Encarna, and González Martínez, Carmen (eds.), Ayeres 
en discusión: temas clave de Historia Contemporánea hoy, celebrado en la 
Universidad de Murcia, del 17 al 19 de septiembre de 2008, Universidad de 
Murcia, Murcia, 2008. 
Ors Montenegro, Miguel and Santacreu Soler, José Miguel, (eds.),  Violencia y 
represión en la retaguardia, Vol. 9 of La Guerra Civil en La Comunidad 
Valenciana, Prensa Valenciana, Valencia, 2006. 
Pagès i Blanch, Pelai (ed.), La Guerra Civil als Països Catalans (1936-1939), 




Palacio Lis, Irene, Mujer, trabajo y educación (Valencia 1874-1931), Valencia 
Universitat de València, Valencia, 1992.  
Palafox Gamir, Jordi, Atraso económico y democracia. La Segunda República 
y la economía española, 1892-1936, Crítica, Barcelona, 1991.  
Palafox Gamir, Jordi, Les propostes dels grups econòmics del PV davant la 
crisis dels anys 30 (pamphlet), Reial Societat Econòmica d’Amics del País 
València, Valencia, 1982. 
Palafox Gamir, Jordi, (ed.), Los años treinta: crisis económica y derecha 
valenciana, Almudín, Valencia, 1980. 
Paniagua, Javier (ed.), Entre las urnas y los fusiles, Vol. 8 of  La Segunda 
República y la Guerra Civil, Prensa Valenciana, Valencia, 2008. 
Paniagua Fuentes, Francisco Javier, and Piqueras Arenas, José Antonio, 
(eds.), Diccionario biográfico de políticos valencianos 1810-2005, Alfons el 
Magnànim,  Fundación Instituto Historia Social and Centro Francisco Tomás y 
Valiente UNED, Alzira (Valencia), 2006. 
Paniagua, Xavier and Piqueras Arenas, José Antonio (eds.), Trabajadores sin 
revolución: la clase obrera valenciana, 1868-1936, Alfons el Magnànim, 
Valencia, 1986. 
Payne, Stanley G, The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933–1936, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 2006. 
Payne, Stanley G, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1967. 
Payne, Stanley G, Spain’s First Democracy, The Second Republic, 1931–1936, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1993. 
Payne, Stanley G, The Spanish Revolution, Norton and Co, New York, 1970. 
Perales Birlanga, Germán, Católicos y liberales: el movimiento estudiantil en la 




Pérez Casado, Ricard, Estudis i reflexions, el ‘cas’ valencià, Eliseo Climent, 
Valencia, 1983. 
Pérez Domingo, Luis, Mártires carlistas del Reino de Valencia 1936-1939, Luis 
Hernando de Larramendi, Madrid, 2004.    
Pérez Ledesma, Manuel and Burdiel Bueno, Isabel, (eds.), Liberales 
eminentes, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2008. 
Pérez Ledesma, Manuel and Cruz Martínez, Rafael (eds.), Cultura y 
movilización en la España contemporánea, Alianza, Madrid, 1997. 
Peset Reig, Mariano,  Historia de la Universidad de Valencia, La universidad 
liberal (siglos XIX-XX),  Universitat de València, Valencia, 2000. 
Piattoni, Simona, (ed.), Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
Picó López, Josep, Empresario e industrialización. El caso valenciano, Madrid, 
Tecnos, 1976.  
Piqueras Arenas, José Antonio, Historia del Socialisme, Alfons el Magnànim, 
Valencia, 1981. 
Piqueras Arenas, José Antonio, Persiguiendo el porvenir.  La identidad histórica 
del socialismo valenciano 1870-1976, Algar, Alzira (Valencia), 2005. 
Piqueras Arenas, José Antonio, and Chust, Manuel (eds.), Republicanos y 
repúblicas en España, Siglo XXI de España, Madrid, 1996. 
Piqueras, Juan, La vid y el vino en el Pais Valenciano, Alfons el Magnànim, 
Valencia, 1981.  
Potter, Jack M; Diaz, May N, and Foster, George M. (eds.), Peasant Society: a 
Reader, Little and Brown, Boston (Massachusetts), 1967. 
Preston, Paul, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War, Reform, Reaction, and 





Preston, Paul, Las derechas españolas en el siglo XX, autoritarismo, fascismo 
y golpismo, Editorial Sistema, Madrid, 1986.  
Preston, Paul, La destrucción de la democracia en España, Alianza Editorial, 
Madrid, 1987.    
Preston, Paul, The politics of revenge, fascism and the military in 20th century 
Spain, Unwin Hyman, London, 1990.         
Preston, Paul, (ed.), Revolution and War in Spain 1931–1939, Methuen, New 
York, 1984. 
Preston, Paul, The Spanish Holocaust, Harper Press, London, 2012. 
Preston, Paul and Saz, Ismael, (eds.), De la revolución liberal a la democracia 
parlamentaria, Valencia (1808-1975), Biblioteca Nueva, Valencia, 2001. 
Purkiss, Richard, Democracy, Trade Unions and Political Violence in Spain: The 
Valencian Anarchist Movement 1918-1936, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 
Portland and Toronto, 2011. 
Radcliff, Pamela Beth, From mobilisation to civil war. The politics of polarisation 
in the Spanish city of Gijón, 1900-1937, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996. 
Ramírez Aledón Germà; Martínez Salas, Isabel; Garrido Rico, Sebastià and 
Cebrian Molina, Josep-Lluís, República i Guerra Civil a Xàtiva (1931-1939), 
Col·leccio Gramalla, 1991, Ajuntament de Xàtiva, Xàtiva, (Valencia) 1991.   
Reder, Marion and Torres Palomo, María Paz (eds.), Realidades y símbolos 
sobre las mujeres en el islam y occidente, Universidad de Málaga, 2002. 
Reig, Ramero, Blasquistas y clericales. La lucha por la ciudad en la Valencia 
de 1900,  Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1986. 
Reig, Ramero, Obrers i ciutadans. Blasquisme i moviment obrer, Vàlencia 
1898-1906, Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1982.  





Renau, Josep, La batalla per una nova cultura, Eliseu Climent, Valencia, 1978. 
Rey Reguillo, Fernando del, Paisanos en lucha. Exclusión política y violencia 
en la Segunda República española, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 2008.  
Rey Reguillo, Fernando del and Alvarez Tardío, Manuel, (eds.), The Spanish 
Second Republic Revisited, From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931–1936), 
Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, Portland and Toronto, 2011. 
Robinson, Richard A.H, The Origins of Franco’s Spain, The Right, the Republic, 
and Revolution, 1931–1936, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1970. 
Romero González, Joan, Propiedad agraria y sociedad rural en la España 
mediterránea, los casos valenciano y castellano en los siglos XIX y XX,  
Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y Alimentación, Madrid, 1983.  
Romero Salvadó, Francisco J, and Smith, Angel, (eds), The Agony of Spanish 
Liberalism: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913–1923. London, Palgrave-
Macmillan, London, 2010. 
Romero Maura, J, La rosa de fuego. El obrerismo barcelonés 1899-1909, 
Grijalbo, Barcelona, 1974. 
Rosas, Fernando (ed.), Portugal e a Transição para a Democracia, Colibri, 
Lisbon, 1999.  
Rosselló i Verger, Vicenç M. Josep, and Boira i Maiques, Vicent, Geografia del 
País Valencià, Alfons el Magnànim, València, 1995.  
Rovira Granero, Pilar, Mobilització social, canvi polític i revolució. 
Associanisme, Segona República i Guerra Civil. Alzira, 1900-1939, Germania, 
Alzira (Valencia), 1996. 
Royo Martínez, José, Torrent en la prensa de Valencia, Ajuntament de Torrent, 
Torrent (Valencia), 2017. 
Ruiz Rodrigo, Cándido, El debate por la Escuela en Valencia (1900-1936), 




Ruiz Rodrigo, Cándido,  Política y educación en la II República (Valencia, 1931-
1936),  Universitat de València, Valencia, 1993. 
Ruiz Manjón-Cabeza, Octavio, El partido republicano radical, 1908-1936, 
Tebas, Madrid, 1976. 
Ruiz Manjón-Cabeza, Octavio, El republicanismo, de Lerroux a Azaña, 
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, 2000. 
Ruiz Torres, Pedro, (ed.), Història del País Valencià. Època contemporània, 
Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1990. 
Saavedra, Pegerto, and Villares, Ramón, (eds.), Señores y campesinos en la 
Península Ibérica, siglos XVIII-XX, Crítica, Barcelona. 
Sánchez Verduch, María del Mar, Cheste y su Historia, Ayuntamiento de 
Cheste and Diputación, Cheste (Valencia), 2002. 
Sánchez-Albornoz, Nicolás, (ed.), La modernización económica de España 
1830-1930, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1985. 
Sanchis Botella, Bernat, 100 años de asociacionismo agrario en Alzira. La 
agrícola 1892-1992, Cooperativa La Agrícola, CIDEC, Alzira (Valencia), 1993. 
Sanfeliú, Luz, Republicanas, identidades de género en el blasquismo (1895-
1910), Universitat de València, Valencia 2005.  
Santacreu Soler, José Miguel, L'economia valenciana durant la guerra civil, 
(protagonisme industrial i estancament agrari), Alfons El Magnànim, Valencia, 
1992. 
Santesmases i Ollè, Josep, (ed.), Republicans i republicanisme a les terres de 
Parla Catalana: Actes del VI Congrés de la CCEPC, Barcelona, 2, 3, i 4 
de  novembre de 2006, Centres de Estudis dearla Catalana, Valls (Tarragona), 
2008. 
Sanz Hoya, Julián, De la resistencia a la reacción. Las derechas frente a la 





Scott, James C, Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change, Asia 
Society, New York, 1968. 
Scott, James, Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Resistance in 
South-East Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984. 
Scott, James, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985. 
Sebastiá Domingo, Enric, La revolución burguesa, la transición de la cuestión 
señorial a la cuestión social en el País Valenciano,  Fundación Instituto de 
Historia social, Alzira (Valencia), 2001.  
Seguí i Francés, Romà, (ed.), Prensa, propaganda y agitación, Vol. 12 of La 
Guerra Civil en La Comunidad Valenciana, Prensa Valenciana, Valencia, 2006.  
Seidman, Michael, Republic of Egos. A Social History of the Spanish Civil War, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 2002. 
Shanin, Teodor (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies: Selected Readings, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987. 
Shubert, Adrian and Álvarez Junco, José, (eds.), Spanish History since 1808, 
Hodder Arnold, London, 2000. 
Sigalat Vaya, Maria José, Canvi social i mobilització política a Carcaixent durant 
la República i la Guerra Civil (1931-1939), L’Entorn, Valencia, 2011.    
Sigalat Vaya, Maria José,  La II República en Alboraia, 1931-1936,   Ajuntament 
d'Alboraia,  Alboraia  (Valencia), 1995. 
Simeón Riera, José Daniel, Entre la rebel·lia i la tradició: Llíria durant la 
república i la guerra civil, 1931-1939, Diputació de València, Valencia, 1993. 
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Saitabi, 1999, No. 49, pp. 17-60.  
Banyuls i Garcia, Jeroni,  ‘Evolución demográfica de la Safor en el siglo XX’, 
Cuadernos de geografía, (Universitat de València), No. 37, 1985, pp. 175-188. 
Banyuls i Garcia, Jeroni, ‘Trajectòria de la població absoluta. La distribució 
espacial (1887-1987)’, in Various authors, 1 Congrés d’història de la ciutat de 
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